ORBIS

JUL 1971 6
JUL 1971 15 Mr Nutzger Mrs Motheral
JUL 1971 19 Mr. Ralph Wood

quarterly journal of world affairs

Volume XIV Winter 1971 Number 4

Is United States Foreign Policy Being Militarized? *Charles Wolf, Jr.*

The Tariff Preference: A Reconsideration *Sherman E. Katz*

Planning for Likely Wars *Reuben S. Nathan*

African Modernization and International Institutions *Kenneth J. Twitchett*

The *Trahison des Adultes* *J. H. Huizinga*

Space Age Geopolitics *Francis X. Kane*

Three Views of Latin America: President Nixon, Governor Rockefeller, and the Latin American Consensus of Vina Del Mar *John W. Sloan*

The CEP Claims, U.S. Tuna Fishing and Inter-American Relations *Bobbie B. Smetherman and Robert M. Smetherman*

Party Politics and Japan's Policy toward Communist China *George P. Jan*

The Role of Buddhism in the Overthrow of Diem *Edwin F. Black*

U.S. Intervention in Nicaragua, 1927-1933: Lessons for Today *John J. Tierney, Jr.*

Reviews *Hammond Rolph, Harland B. Moulton, Benson D. Adams, Edward P. Moxon-Browne*

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS, a quarterly journal of world affairs
published by the
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

EDITOR: William R. Kintner
MANAGING EDITOR: Robert C. Herber
ASSOCIATE EDITOR: Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
ASSISTANT EDITOR: Margaret M. Capotrio
CIRCULATION MANAGER: Marsha Palitz

EDITOR EMERITUS: Robert Strausz-Hupé

EDITORIAL BOARD: James E. Dougherty, Morton A. Kaplan, Lawrence B. Krause, Norman D. Palmer, Stefan T. Possony, Frank N. Trager, Arthur P. Whitaker.
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD: Loren C. Eiseley, Covey T. Oliver, Sidney I. Ploss, Froelich G. Rainey, J. K. Zawodny.
EDITORIAL RESEARCH STAFF: Nicholas D. Constan, Jr., Wayne H. Ferris, Diane K. Pfaltzgraff, Karl P. Sauvant, Harvey Sicherman, Gerald T. West.
SECRETARIAL STAFF: Betty Armstrong, Barbara Maser, Marcia Rose.

The Editors welcome articles that examine problems in international relations. Articles should be submitted in the original, accompanied by a self-addressed, stamped envelope if the author desires to have his manuscript returned. Articles should conform to ORBIS style and format; text and footnotes should be double-spaced, and the latter placed at the end of the article. Address editorial communications and manuscripts to the Managing Editor.

Books, monographs and pamphlets for review or listing should be sent to the Managing Editor. Address correspondence relating to advertising to the Assistant Editor and communications relating to subscriptions and bulk orders to the Circulation Manager.

ORBIS is indexed by *Public Affairs Information Service, Social Sciences and Humanities Index, Current Contents, Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences* and *ABC Pol Sci.* Abstracts of ORBIS articles appear regularly in *Historical Abstracts* and *America: History and Life,* both of which are publications of the American Bibliographical Center, as well as in *International Political Science Abstracts,* published in Paris by the International Political Science Association.

The opinions expressed in articles and reviews in this journal are those of the contributors and should not be construed as representing those of the Foreign Policy Research Institute or the Editors of ORBIS.

Copyright © 1971 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a Delaware nonprofit corporation.

Out-of-print issues of ORBIS, volumes I-V, are available in reprint editions from the Kraus Reprint Corporation, 16 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017, at $90.00 for the five volumes, clothbound; $80.00, paperbound; and $16.00 a volume, paperbound. Individual issues and complete volumes from Volume VI on are obtainable by writing to the Circulation Manager; please note, however, that Volume VI, No. 4, Volume VIII, No. 4, Volume X, No. 2 and Volume XI, No. 4 are now out of print. Prices for complete volumes are at the yearly subscription rate of $6.00; individual copies are $2.00. Reprints of articles published in ORBIS, as long as they are available, are 25 cents each.

ORBIS is published four times a year, February, May, August, and November, by the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Editorial and business address: 3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. Subscription rates: one year, $6.00; two years, $11.00; three years, $16.00. Single copy, $2.00. Second-class postage paid at Philadelphia, Pa. and at additional mailing offices.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS

A Quarterly Journal of World Affairs

VOLUME XIV WINTER 1971 NUMBER 4

Reflections on the Quarter 805

Is United States Foreign Policy Being Militarized? . . . . . *Charles Wolf, Jr.* 819

The Tariff Preference: A Reconsideration . . . *Sherman E. Katz* 829

Planning for Likely Wars . . . . . *Reuben S. Nathan* 850

African Modernization and International Institutions . . . . . *Kenneth J. Twitchett* 868

The *Trahison des Adultes* . . . . . *J. H. Huizinga* 891

Space Age Geopolitics . . . . . *Francis X. Kane* 911

Three Views of Latin America: President Nixon, Governor Rockefeller, and the Latin American Consensus of Vina Del Mar . . . . . *John W. Sloan* 934

The CEP Claims, U.S. Tuna Fishing and Inter-American Relations . . . . *Bobbie B. Smetherman and Robert M. Smetherman* 951

Party Politics and Japan's Policy toward Communist China . . . . . *George P. Jan* 973

The Role of Buddhism in the Overthrow of Diem . . *Edwin F. Black* 992

U.S. Intervention in Nicaragua, 1927-1933: Lessons for Today . . . . . *John J. Tierney, Jr.* 1012

Reviews:

The Ingredients of Chinese Foreign Policy . . *Hammond Rolph* 1029

Weapons and Security . . . . . *Harland B. Moulton* 1033

The Arms Race and Defense Spending . . . *Benson D. Adams* 1037

Canadian Crisis Diplomacy . . . . *Edward P. Moxon-Browne* 1044

Books Received 1049

Contributors to this Issue 1060

Index to Volume XIV 1068

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE UNITED STATES AND THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE, 1921-1922 by THOMAS H. BUCKLEY

Using newly opened American, British, and Japanese archives only recently made available, the author delineates the issues and events of the only successful disarmament conference in modern history and assesses its meaning for American and world diplomacy. / 234 pages, $8.50

THE POLISH QUESTION IN THE RUSSIAN STATE DUMA by EDWARD CHMIELEWSKI

This is the first monographic treatment in any language of Russia's failure, in 1905-14, to resolve its most critical problem involving national minorities. 174 pages. $7.50

Coming in Spring 1972

THE INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL OF MICHAL KALECKI (1899-1970) by GEORGE R. FEIWEL

THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE PRESS
Knoxville, Tennessee 37916

ORBIS is available to subscribers on space-saving microfilm.

As begun with Volume VII (the Spring 1963-Winter 1964 issues), each volume of ORBIS is recorded on a separate reel of film, obtainable at the end of the volume year.

A complete backfile, Volumes I-VI, is on one reel, priced at $24.00.

PLEASE ADDRESS INQUIRIES DIRECT TO:

University Microfilms, Inc.
P.O. Box 1307
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

How do you keep peace in a world of competing units armed with deadly weapons?

The question is more than academic. Students and professionals alike need the facts...

PREFACE TO DISARMAMENT
An Appraisal of Recent Proposals
By Marion H. McVitty
paperbound, $1.00 (please order from Public Affairs Press, 419 New Jersey Ave., S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003)

THE STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDER
Four Volumes
Edited by Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz

"Extraordinarily skillful compilation of essays by distinguished writers . . . deserves the highest praise..."–Stanley Hoffmann, Harvard University

Toward a Theory of War Prevention, Vol. I, $2.50
International Law, Vol. II, $2.50
The United Nations, Vol. III, $3.50
Disarmament and Economic Development, Vol. IV, $3.50
Each volume, paperbound; complete set, $10.00

WORLD LAW FUND
11 W. 42 Street, New York, N.Y. 10036

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Recent Penguins in POLITICAL SCIENCE

RUSSIA, CHINA, AND THE WEST 1953-1966. *Isaac Deutscher.* The Soviet Union and its role in the world from the death of Stalin to Khrushchev's fall. $1.65

PRINCIPLES OF DEVELOPMENT AID. *E.K. Hawkins.* A guide to the study of outside aid for economic development. $1.65

SOVIET COMMUNISM AND AGRARIAN REVOLUTION. *Roy D. and Betty A. Laird.* The authors contend that the communist system of collective farming is grossly inefficient and they relate this failure to the deepening crisis in world food production. $1.25

OIL AND WORLD POWER. *Peter R. Odell.* The political and economic influence of the world's largest industry. $1.25

NATIONALISM. *K.R. Minogue.* History and analysis of the modern world's foremost political ideology. $1.45

PROTEST AND DISCONTENT. *Edited by Bernard Crick and William A. Robson.* In five different countries, with emphasis on the youth rebellion. $1.45

DIVIDED ULSTER. *Liam de Paor.* The root causes of the conflict in Northern Ireland. $1.25

WESTERN CAPITALISM SINCE THE WAR. *Michael Kidron.* Postwar Western prosperity as a result of the arms budget. $1.45

CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION. *David A. Frier.* $2.25

TRADE AND SPECIALIZATION. *Ronald Findlay.* How and why nations specialize in goods and services for international trade. $1.65

For a complete list of Penguin books in political science, write:



Overseas readers, write: Penguin Education, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reflections on the Quarter

The Shifting Strategic Equation

OVER the past decade, the United States has moved from a strategic doctrine based on counterforce to one of "assured destruction" and to "realistic deterrence." This change in terminology reflects the great increase in strategic and conventional power the Soviet Union has registered in recent years. By 1971 the USSR had achieved numerical superiority over the United States in land-based ICBM's and the "throw-weight" of these missiles considerably exceeds ours. More impressive than sheer numbers, however, is the rate at which the Soviets have produced and deployed their ICBM forces in the last five years. From about 300 operational launchers in 1966, they now have an estimated 1,450 land-based launch vehicles. There is evidence that they have already begun to deploy some SS-9 missiles with MIRV's.

Projected improvements in the accuracy of the huge SS-9 missiles could, in Secretary of Defense Laird's words, "pose a serious threat to the future survivability of undefended Minuteman silos." Even if a nation retained the capacity to retaliate after absorbing a first strike, the nature of its retaliation would be crucial. The United States possesses essentially a countercity force. Any enemy first strike that eliminated our Minuteman missiles and our bomber force need not exhaust the attacker's own countercity forces, such as the Soviet Polaris-style submarine capability. As President Nixon asked in his February 1970 foreign policy report to the Congress: "Should a President, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans?" If the Soviet Union possesses a counterforce first-strike capability, possession of a second-strike capacity by both sides is *not* the equivalent of strategic parity. The threat of such a Soviet counterforce and countercity capability has given rise to concern about Soviet strategic programs, which emphasize both the large counterforce SS-9 missiles and the countercity submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).

According to President Nixon's foreign affairs report of February 1971: "The USSR has constructed a large ICBM, the SS-9, for which the U.S. has no counterpart. Deployed in sufficient numbers and armed with multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRV's) of sufficient accuracy, this missile could threaten our land-based ICBM forces. Our MIRV systems, by contrast, do not have the com-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bination of numbers, accuracy, and warhead yield to pose a threat to the Soviet land-based ICBM force." More recently, both Secretary Laird and Senator Jackson have expressed concern over a new —and apparently extensive— ICBM site construction program that may harbinger either an entirely new Soviet ICBM system or an extensive deployment of MIRV'd missiles.

In conventional weapons systems, the Soviets have made impressive advances in both radar and missile system air defenses, as evidenced by the SA-3 Goa system they have deployed in Egypt. Moreover, the pace of Soviet activity in the design and production of fighter aircraft far exceeds our own. New fighters have been flown about every eighteen months. By 1974 the Soviet Union can be expected to possess interceptors and avionics equal or superior to our own.

The Soviets' ICBM capability is augmented by a substantial nuclear-powered SLBM fleet that currently is the fastest growing element of their military establishment. Their Y-class submarines, like the American Polaris, each have sixteen tubes for launching missiles. There are now operational at least seventeen such submarines—capable of launching 272 missiles with a range of 1,300 nautical miles. With another fifteen or more of the Y-class boats in various stages of assembly and an estimated current production rate of six to ten SLBM's per year, the Soviet Union could develop by 1974 an operational force of Y-class submarines comparable in size to the current Polaris force. There is also some indication that a longer-range SLBM is under active development.

The Soviet navy, possessing modern and sophisticated capabilities, is second in size to the aging American fleet. With close to 400 nuclear and conventional submarines, the Soviet Union has the largest underwater fleet in the world. Many of its surface ships carry long-range surface-to-surface cruise missiles. Reinforced by two new helicopter carriers, a considerable number of landing ships, and a small but highly trained marine force, the navy now has the ability, for the first time, to project Soviet influence far from the heartland of Eurasia. A permanent Soviet naval force is now established in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean; squadrons flying the Soviet flag cruise in both the Caribbean and the Persian Gulf. Supported by a modern fishing fleet and by the world's fastest growing merchant fleet, the ships of the Soviet Union ply the seas of the world.

A gap has emerged in the relative Soviet and U.S. expenditures on research and development. Dr. John Foster, Defense Department Director of Research and Engineering, testified in March 1971 in the posture hearings before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees that since 1968 the Soviet Union has allocated her entire growth in research, development, test and engineering funding to the military. As a result, by the mid-1970's the USSR could gain technological superiority over the United States. The annual growth

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rate in Soviet military expenditures since 1968 has been about 15 per cent. On that basis, the Soviets will be devoting 40 to 50 per cent more —approximately a total of $11 billion—to military R&D during the fiscal 1972 period than will the United States. Although the Nixon Administration is asking for an increase of 12 per cent in spending ($7.89 billion for fiscal 1972, compared with $7.11 billion for fiscal 1971), this will neither make up for the years of relative neglect nor match Soviet expenditures.

Secretary Laird has acknowledged that "reductions in technological areas already have seriously affected our ability to sustain technological leadership." The loss of technical superiority over the Soviet Union could seriously jeopardize the national margin of security in the latter half of the coming decade. Meanwhile, the low R&D expenditures in the late 1960's will extract their toll in the first half of this decade. We can reasonably expect several major Soviet technological innovations in the next five years, of the magnitude of the 1957 Sputnik. Considering the lead-time required to transform scientific knowledge into practical applications, our defense R&D expenditures will largely determine our security position in the 1975-1980 era.

It is far easier to catalog the development of Soviet military capabilities than to assess Soviet intentions. There is no sure way of determining the specific nature of the intentions in advance. The progressive expansion of Soviet military force across both nuclear and conventional spectra indicates an effort to hedge against as many uncertainties as possible. The USSR, as well as the United States, must deal with a set of dynamic strategic interactions. Her security needs bear a close relationship to those threats, real or imagined, perceived by her leadership. The development of a threat from China would impose defense needs different from those she required in a bipolar world. But, whatever the threats that might have to be faced, the possession of an increasing array of advanced military capabilities is likely to increase the options available to the Soviet leadership in the decade ahead. The question that remains is whether the Soviet Union, secure in the strength of her capabilities, will seek to enter an "era of negotiation" or attempt to expand her political influence into areas from which historically she has been excluded. Conceivably, she will develop policies based on cooperation *and* confrontation.

The Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress

THE Twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union met in Moscow from March 30 through April 9. Five thousand Soviet delegates and 101 delegations from foreign countries attended. Leaders from around the world watched the events with keen interest, hoping to secure some indication of the Soviet government's intentions and objections for the im-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mediate years ahead, as well as evidence of recent developments in the political power struggle in the party's highest echelons.

Ostensibly the Congress had been convened to select a new Central Committee, Politburo and General Secretary. In fact the delegates were assembled to ratify decisions already made from above and to provide the Soviet leadership with a ceremonial forum for setting forth policies and programs for the future.

Among the principal revelations of the Congress: (1) Leonid Brezhnev has emerged as the preeminent political leader; (2) the leadership has, verbally at least, committed itself to substantial improvement of the living standards of the population; and (3) the Soviet Union as a superpower has acquired greater sophistication in the pursuit of its foreign policy goals.

In the months preceding the Congress there was evidence of Brezhnev's increasing stature. For the first time the CPSU General Secretary had undertaken talks with noncommunist foreign leaders, including Chancellor Willy Brandt of West Germany and President Pompidou of France. Such talks had previously been conducted by Premier Kosygin and President Podgorny. At the same time Brezhnev became more active in economic policymaking, normally the principal responsibility of Kosygin.

The Congress sessions gave substance to this major shift in power relationships. The theme of the Twenty-third Congress in 1966 had been collective leadership; the theme of the Twenty-fourth Congress, not explicitly stated but readily apparent, was the primacy of Brezhnev. It began with his six-hour-long keynote address to the opening session, which was televised "live." It was continued by subsequent speakers, nearly all of whom heaped lavish praise on him, in striking contrast to the 1966 procedures and reminiscent of the days of Khrushchev. Midway through the conference, and prior to Kosygin's report on the role of the economy, the 5,000 delegates unanimously approved the foreign and domestic policies of the Brezhnev leadership. Neither Kosygin's speech nor that of Foreign Minister Gromyko rivaled Brezhnev's in breadth and scope.

The Congress closed with Brezhnev's announcement that the newly "elected" Central Committee had "re-elected" all of the twenty-five men who prior to the Congress had held top Politburo or Secretariat posts. Of significance was the new listing of the leaders. Kosygin, who in 1966 had ranked second in the hierarchy, behind Brezhnev and ahead of Podgorny, now found himself relegated to third place, behind both Brezhnev and Podgorny. Moreover, all newspaper accounts of the event devoted separate and special attention to Brezhnev's re-election as General Secretary of the party.

Four men were promoted to full Politburo status, enlarging the body to fifteen members, the largest it has been since 1960. Of these, at least three were thought by knowledgeable observers to be Brezhnev

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

supporters. This development could be especially important in view of previous indications that Brezhnev had at times been outvoted in the Politburo: With the new additions, he will be able to press harder for attainment of his policy objectives. There is some speculation that in the not too distant future some members of the Politburo (presumably opponents of Brezhnev's views) will be dropped, and that Kosygin may "step down" from the post of Premier.

The new Central Committee seems to represent a clear Brezhnev gain. Although some of its previous membership was retained, its size was expanded by a third and many of the new members are thought to be in the Brezhnev camp.

Finally, although Brezhnev maintained the "centrist" policy on Stalin's role in Soviet history, he set the stage for a possible purge of the party membership by calling for an exchange of party cards. It has been seventeen years since the last such exchange. If the intention is to remove individuals opposed to him, his ability to implement a purge will reflect importantly on his future role in the political system.

Not surprisingly, these developments have parallels with the past. The post of First Secretary was an important vehicle utilized by Stalin and Khrushchev to reach the pinnacle of power. It took Khrushchev four years to establish personal supremacy in the leadership; it has taken Brezhnev some six years. It would be unwise, however, to conclude that Brezhnev's triumph is complete or guaranteed to be long-lasting. It remains to be seen whether he can muster the strength requisite for a "cleansing" of the party membership. Beyond that, his position will undoubtedly continue to be dependent on the success of his policies in grappling with the problems of Soviet society. Numerous challengers wait in the shadows eager to capitalize on his mistakes by appealing to the relevant interest groups in the Kremlin.

Given paramount attention at the Congress, as evinced in Brezhnev's keynote speech and Kosygin's economic policy report on past performance and the projected new five-year plan, was the verbal commitment of the leadership to improve the lot of the consumer. Brezhnev surprisingly emphasized the role of the consumer more than Kosygin did. The extent to which this commitment will receive practical implementation is far from certain. In view of all the publicity attending the Congress the leadership could hardly have ignored the need for substantial improvements in living conditions. To have done so would have risked fostering a serious morale problem, for what Soviet citizen could look forward with anticipation to a future that promised little more than a replay of the past economic record?

The postponement of the Congress, originally scheduled for 1970, may have been due to major disagreement in the Soviet leadership over the stance to be taken with respect to the consumer issue. Brezhnev may have outdone Kosygin for the express purpose of ob-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

structing a challenge to his position by pro-consumer forces. Previous Congresses have voiced their intention to improve living standards only to be followed by continued emphasis on industrial-military development. Yet the firmness of the position taken by the "Brezhnev Congress" makes it especially susceptible to popular dismay should the declared objectives fail to be pursued.

The commitment to heavy industry and the military sector remains substantial. Whereas overall investment in the Soviet economy in the new five-year plan is to increase by some 40 per cent, the leadership announced its intention to increase investments in the iron and steel industry by 70 per cent. Above-average growth is also scheduled for many defense-oriented industries, including computers, machinery and instruments, electric power and automated production lines. Only 30 per cent of government investment will be allocated to consumer goods and agriculture, although this represents a sizeable increase in comparison with allocations of recent years of about 24 per cent.

The Congress revealed an increasingly sophisticated Soviet foreign policy posture. Conciliation and cooperation were the watchwords, though traditional comments about the aggressive-minded and militaristic West found their way into the spoken record, and Brezhnev declared that "the total triumph of socialism the world over is inevitable."

Speakers did not extol the recent attainment by the Soviet Union of nuclear parity and even superiority vis-à-vis the United States in certain types of weapons systems. Rather they stressed the USSR's peaceful intentions and its commitment to military power for defensive purposes. Renewed proposals were made for troop reductions in Central Europe, the dismantling of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and the convening of a conference of the five nuclear powers to discuss nuclear disarmament. Simultaneously the Soviets introduced a draft agreement at the Geneva disarmament conference aimed at outlawing biological weapons. The draft, unexpected in the West, essentially paralleled the position of the Western states, i.e., that a ban on biological weapons should be separated from a ban on chemical weapons.

Proposals for resolving international security issues were similar to previous Soviet statements. Acceptance of them would be tantamount to the formalization of Soviet superiority, both conventional and strategic, especially in Europe. Yet ideas for cooperation with the West ranged beyond strategic problems. Premier Kosygin proposed that an all-European conference be convened to explore the possibilities of: (1) facilitating transcontinental freight by rail; (2) constructing large power transmission lines that would effect a single European power grid; (3) preserving the purity of the seas; (4) pooling efforts to combat cancer and heart disease; and (5) expanding East-West trade.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Soviet prospectus featuring socio-economic development at home and conciliation and cooperation abroad stopped short of indicating willingness to allow a free exchange of ideas with the Western world. To the contrary, the leadership reaffirmed that it would resolutely enforce its emphasis on ideological uniformity, a policy initiated following the Twenty-third Party Congress. At the same time, the regime justified its 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and declared its determination to undertake similar actions if they were deemed necessary to the preservation and extension of socialism in Europe. Thus, Brezhnev told the Congress: "In view of the appeals by party and state leaders, Communists and working people of Czechoslovakia, and considering the danger posed to the socialist gains in that country, we and the fraternal Socialist countries then jointly took the decision to render internationalist assistance to Czechoslovakia in defense of socialism. In the extraordinary conditions created by the forces of imperialism and counterrevolution, we were bound to do so *by our class duty, loyalty to socialist internationalism and the concern for the interests of our states and the future of socialism and peace in Europe.*" (Emphasis added.)

From beginning to end the Congress was a well-rehearsed, prearranged affair, whether as to the speakers who appeared, the speeches delivered, or the "votes" taken to "elect" the highest governing bodies of the Soviet Union. The policies outlined for the years ahead were not debated. The delegates and the Soviet people were informed of what to expect; they were not invited to participate in making the decisions or to vote on acceptance of them. In sum, the party formalities made strikingly apparent the great gulf still separating the Soviet and Western worlds.

Elections in India and Pakistan

IN developing countries, as in developed, elections may have varied and unpredictable consequences. This was amply demonstrated in the recent nationwide elections in India and Pakistan. In India the elections of March 1971 were a decisive victory for Mrs. Indira Gandhi and her New Congress Party. They gave India a government with the support of more than two-thirds of the Lok Sabha (Lower House), and thus at least the capacity to govern. In Pakistan, in contrast, the elections of December 1970 dramatized and consolidated the differences between the Eastern and Western wings, and led to developments which, by late March, seemed to mark the beginning of the end of the united Pakistan nation.

Why did free elections, on the basis of universal suffrage, lead to such different results in the two major countries of South Asia? The answer cannot be simply that India had had more experience with elections, although this was certainly a fact. Nor can it be that Pakistan had had little experience

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in, and had shown little aptitude for, representative institutions, whereas in India a parliamentary system has been functioning since independence, although this too was an historical fact.

Before the elections India's political prospects looked almost as grave as Pakistan's. Almost no one foresaw decisive victory for Mrs. Gandhi. Most predictions indicated that while her party would probably gain some seats in the Lok Sabha, it would be fortunate to obtain a bare majority. This would have left her still dependent on the support of regional parties and some independents, with the Communists as possible supporters, if needed. She would still therefore be primarily concerned with political survival, and would be so handicapped and harassed that she would hardly have the time, energy or capability to tackle India's mounting problems with the vigor they required.

The elections in Pakistan were designed as a first major step in the implementation of a plan, carefully formulated by President Mohammad Yahya Khan, to transfer "power to the elected representatives of the people." Conducted quite successfully, they left the future of Pakistan mainly in the hands of three men—Yahya Khan, still President of the country in a martial law regime, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami League, whose party won nearly all of East Pakistan's seats in the National Assembly, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, whose Pakistan People's Party won over half of the seats from West Pakistan. If these three could agree on the shape of Pakistan's new political order, the prospects for the new order seemed to be reasonably good.

India has had the most extensive electoral experience of any new state. The 1971 elections were the fifth nationwide general elections since independence. They were, however, the first to be held since the split of the Congress Party in November 1969; the first to be held before the expiration of a regular five-year parliamentary term; and the first not held simultaneously with state elections (this time state elections were held in only three states—West Bengal, Orissa and Tamil Nadu). Reflecting the breakdown of law and order in parts of the country, they were marked by a much greater incidence of violence than any previous election.

Before the elections Mrs. Gandhi headed a minority government, although her party had a wide margin of superiority over the leading opposition group, the other wing of the Congress—the so-called Congress(O). She requested the dissolution of the Lok Sabha, in late December, to appeal to the people for a clear mandate so that she could move forward with her socialist programs. As the only really all-India political leader, and as Nehru's daughter, she was the main asset of her party. In fact, she was the only issue of consequence in the campaign, for the "grand alliance" that formed the principal opposition, consisting of the Congress(O), the Swatantra Party, the Jana Sangh and the Samyukta Socialist Party, concen-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trated on a "remove Indira" program.

The elections gave Mrs. Gandhi her clear mandate, with 350 seats in the Lok Sabha of 521 members; the opposition parties, except for the Communist parties, which maintained their previous rather unimpressive position, were almost eliminated as a significant factor on the national political scene. The central question after the elections, therefore, was not whether political instability would continue to prevail at the center, but whether Mrs. Gandhi, having gained a relatively stable position, would be able to deal more effectively with India's mounting problems, preeminently poverty, unemployment, widespread disrespect for law and order, and increasing inequality in economic and social life.

The Pakistan story is quite different. Pakistan's experiment in parliamentary democracy was off base from the beginning, and after 1953 - 1954, when the Muslim League was breaking down (it was almost nonexistent in East Pakistan after the provincial elections of 1954) and when weak leaders and governments succeeded each other with bewildering rapidity, the system was subject to steady erosion. The country finally got a constitution in 1956, but it was never fully implemented. Instead, in 1958, military rule was imposed. For a decade, Pakistan had a remarkably stable government under Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, until 1962 under martial law, and after 1962 under an imposed constitution.

When a series of mounting pressures, including Bengali nationalism and West Pakistani radicalism, brought Ayub Khan down in March 1969, he was succeeded by another military leader, Yahya Khan, who reimposed martial law. Yahya announced, however, that his purpose was to restore democratic institutions in Pakistan, and, unlike other military leaders, he seemed to mean what he said. In November 1969 he reaffirmed his pledge and announced that a general election for a National Assembly would be held in October 1970.

On March 30, 1970, in a Legal Framework Order, Yahya decreed that Pakistan should be a federal republic to be known as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, that "Islamic ideology shall be preserved," that "direct and free periodical elections to the Federal and Provincial legislatures" would be held, that the provinces should have "maximum autonomy" but that "the Federal Government shall also have adequate powers," that fundamental rights for all citizens would be guaranteed, and that disparities between the provinces would be removed. He specified that the new National Assembly would consist of 313 members, with thirteen seats reserved for women, and with 162 directly elected seats from East Pakistan and 138 from West Pakistan. He also designated the number of members of the Assemblies in all five provinces—East Pakistan, the Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province. He stated that the newly-elected National Assembly would have 120 days to frame a constitution, which would have to be "authenticated"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by him. If it failed to agree on a constitution, it would be dissolved. Presumably, once the constitution was agreed upon, a government based on the election results would be installed, and Pakistan would launch its new democratic political system.

The elections to the National Assembly held on December 7 (the postponement from October was due to floods in East Pakistan) represented the first major step in the implementation of Yahya Khan's program. They were also the first held nationwide on the basis of universal franchise. In spite of the troubled situation in the country, especially in East Pakistan, where long-standing resentment against West Pakistan had been complicated by the cyclone tragedy of a few weeks before, they were conducted successfully.

The results were rather startling. They revealed that the Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, had won almost all of the seats from East Pakistan, and was therefore the unquestioned political voice of Pakistan's most populous province. In the West only one party won impressive support—the Pakistan People's Party, led by Z. A. Bhutto, dedicated to "Islamic socialism" and a tough foreign policy. The PPP won well over half of West Pakistan's Assembly seats; no other party won more than nine. The division between the Western and Eastern parts of the country was highlighted by the dramatic victory of two very different parties and leaders and by the failure of each party to win even a single seat in the other wing. The Awami League, however, had a majority in the National Assembly. Its six-point program called for a maximum degree of autonomy for the provinces, leaving only defense and foreign affairs and limited currency authority with the central government.

In the weeks following the elections negotiations among Yahya Khan, Bhutto, Sheikh Mujib and various intermediaries failed to produce agreement, even on the date for convening the newly-elected Assembly, whose opening was twice postponed. In mid-March Yahya Khan went to Dacca to confer with Sheikh Mujib, since the Awami League leader would not come to Islamabad, and Bhutto joined them a few days later. The impasse was so complete, and the defiance of the government in East Pakistan so flagrant, that Yahya ordered the armed forces, almost all from West Pakistan, which had been airlifted to the East in large numbers, to "do their duty and fully restore the authority of the Government." On the evening of March 25 the army launched massive attacks on the unarmed citizens of East Pakistan. Soon the major cities were under military control, and almost all of the leaders of the Awami League were either arrested or executed. In response the East Pakistanis openly proclaimed the existence of Bangla Desh—the Bengal nation—and launched a campaign of guerrilla warfare and counter-terrorism against the armed forces from the West. Under these tragic circumstances East Pakistan became no more than a conquered province;

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sooner or later the result may be complete separation, in hostility and bitterness, from the West.

Thus the developments in late 1970 and early 1971, centering around nationwide elections, clarified the political situation in both India and Pakistan, but in different ways. In India the prospects for greater stability and the continuance of the existing political system have been enhanced, at least temporarily. In Pakistan whatever hopes were raised for a return to some kind of representative government have been shattered; the lamentable events since the December elections seem to herald, not the birth pains of a new and more promising political order for a united country, but rather the end of a dream that was perhaps impossible after all.

The Incursion into Laos

THE invasion of Laos on February 8 marked a controversial new development in the Indochina conflict and in the American policy of withdrawal and Vietnamization. The presumed expansion of the war and the heavy fighting that ensued sharpened domestic debate over Indochina and increased pressure on the Administration to speed the end of the American involvement. The invasion also became a major political issue in South Viet Nam, where it may play a role in this fall's presidential elections. The North Vietnamese chose to make an all-out effort to protect their sole remaining supply lines to the South and discredit the South Vietnamese Army.

American policy toward Laos since the Geneva Conference of 1954 has been marked by a reluctance to assume major commitments in such a remote, primitive, and politically complex area. The 1954 agreements, calling for neutrality but leaving two northern provinces under temporary Pathet Lao control, were quickly broken by all parties. North Viet Nam and the communist bloc undertook the support of the Pathet Lao, and the United States moved to fill the vacuum left by French withdrawal on behalf of the Royal Government. Uneasy coalitions and agreements lasted until the end of the 1950's. During the 1959-1962 period these were followed by a bewildering series of coups, countercoups and coalition shuffles among assorted rightist military leaders, the neutralist Souvanna Phouma, and the communists under Souvanouvong. As a result of stepped-up communist pressure in 1961, the Kennedy Administration considered military intervention and went so far as to send a Marine contingent to neighboring Thailand. The primary focus, however, remained on finding a compromise solution and avoiding a major commitment. This was accomplished at Geneva in June 1962. A neutralist coalition of the three contending factions was set up and the neutrality of the country was reaffirmed.

The Geneva formula was unable to survive the heightening of the war in South Viet Nam during the 1963-1965 period, and both the communists and the United

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

States quickly resumed their supporting roles. Some semblance of political stability had been obtained with the merger of the rightist and neutralist factions, and the formerly suspect Souvanna Phouma emerged as the central figure of the Royal Government. While still professedly neutral, Laos found American support essential in maintaining control of the western half of the country.

With the introduction of North Vietnamese forces into South Viet Nam after 1964, the eastern Laos supply route assumed greater strategic importance to both sides, but the primary concentration of communist activity and American response shifted to South Viet Nam. The fighting in Laos developed into a seasonal pattern wherein communist offensives in the dry season and government counters during the monsoon fluctuated across the central portion of the country. The United States mounted air operations in support of Laotian forces and to interdict supplies moving to South Viet Nam. Military assistance programs were stepped up, and American personnel initiated extensive training and advisory programs with the Royal Laotian armed forces and with Meo irregular troops.

After the buildup of American forces in South Viet Nam in 1965, plans were occasionally broached for ground operations designed to sever the Ho Chi Minh Trail network in southeastern Laos. These were rejected at the time for a variety of reasons, including the magnitude of forces required for such an operation, the high level of fighting in South Viet Nam, the existence of the Cambodian supply route, the relative stability in Laos during 1965-1968, the difficulty of the terrain, and the desire to avoid expansion of the war to a nominally neutral country.

By the winter of 1971 many of these factors had changed. First, the ouster of Sihanouk and subsequent allied operations in Cambodia had sealed the Cambodian ports, the source of the bulk of supplies going to communist forces in the southern half of South Viet Nam. The success of the Cambodian operations had drastically altered the situation in the III Corps and IV Corps areas in favor of the allied effort. The communists were forced to place total reliance on the Laotian supply routes, greatly enhancing that country's strategic value. Second, the encouraging situation within South Viet Nam, as a result of the weakening of communist forces, the improvement of the ARVN, and the success of the pacification program, made it more feasible to attempt an operation against the supply lines in Laos even without the employment of American ground forces. Third, the situation in Laos had deteriorated during the preceding two years as the North Vietnamese focused more attention on this relatively weaker flank, especially during the monsoon season of 1970.

To these reasons must be added the desire to insure the safety of departing American forces and to prevent the North Vietnamese from launching major attacks co-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

inciding with the upcoming South Vietnamese elections; or, beyond that time, in the critical period during next year's dry season (November 1971-May 1972) when American combat troops will have departed.

The Laos operation resulted in perhaps the heaviest fighting of the war, with the possible exception of the communist TET offensive of 1968. The communists chose to make a maximum effort because the Laotian trails were absolutely essential to maintaining their military effort in South Viet Nam or Cambodia. Further, they viewed this as a prime opportunity to discredit the ARVN, weaken morale in South Viet Nam, and play on American public opinion by calling into question the success of the Nixon Administration's Vietnamization policy.

The military aspects of the operation were far different from most of the fighting within South Viet Nam or in Cambodia. Communist forces, armed with the best Soviet equipment, enjoyed approximate equality in artillery and armor, and their battle strength was estimated to be in the 35,000 to 40,000 range as compared with 15,000 to 20,000 ARVN. The North Vietnamese were well dug in on familiar ground, operating with short supply lines to North Viet Nam and in terrain that favored their style of warfare. Under these circumstances the invasion forces failed to accomplish their maximum objective of sealing the trail network for the remainder of the dry season. American airpower played a crucial role in what would otherwise have been an even more difficult withdrawal under intense enemy pressure. One can argue that the results of the operation would have been roughly the same had American troops instead of Vietnamese been committed to Laos.

In spite of the heavy allied losses, the operation may be judged a limited success. The North Vietnamese were placed on the strategic defensive and forced to commit themselves to maintain their supply system. Their losses both to the ARVN and to airpower were extremely high and make questionable their ability to launch major offensive operations in Cambodia or South Viet Nam for some months. That they have been trying to do just this, especially in April, indicates that the communist leadership perceives a need to demonstrate continued capabilities at any cost. Additionally, it was to the advantage of the allied effort to fight a battle of this scope in the Laotian jungle rather than in the populated areas of South Viet Nam. It is too early to judge the long-term results of the operation in protecting American troop withdrawals, the Vietnamese elections and the next dry season campaign.

The invasion seems to have had relatively little effect on the country in which it occurred. The Royal Laotian government made *pro forma* condemnations of the move as befitting a neutral, yet the invasion was limited to areas the government had not controlled for years. Meanwhile the war in Laos

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is subsiding back into its regular pattern after a series of communist attacks in the Luang Prabang and Plain of Jars areas.

In Viet Nam the invasion promises to become a political issue, with Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky delivering attacks on President Thieu over its handling and the high casualties incurred. Ky appears to be disassociating himself from his nominal superior to lay the groundwork for his own candidacy in this fall's presidential election.

In the United States the impact of the invasion moved along well established lines. Renewed attacks on Administration policy and the war in general were made in the Senate and the House. The sharpened domestic dissent, culminating in the May marches on Washington, may have increased American sentiment favoring a more rapid withdrawal. Meanwhile there have been new communist initiatives from Paris demanding a date for full American withdrawal and linking the release of American prisoners of war to such a date. It would be premature, however, to expect any major developments from Paris.

The latest round of troop withdrawals announced by President Nixon will lower American troop strength to approximately one-third of its 1968 level and virtually remove American forces from a ground combat role. As the American role in Indochina dwindles, the ability of South Viet Nam to stand alone, though still in question, appears better now than at any time in the past.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IS UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY BEING MILITARIZED?*

by Charles Wolf, Jr.

THE expression "militarizing U.S. foreign policy" has two different meanings. One is that foreign policy may be overweighted with military considerations, either as goals or as means. Military superiority over another country may be more highly valued than friendly relations and cultural contact (goals). Or, in considering alternative foreign policy means, we may be preoccupied with capabilities for exercising pressure on other countries, say, through overseas forces and bases, and insufficiently concerned with improved communications and negotiations with them.

A second meaning is that military men, or the military services, may have an excessive influence on foreign policy, and that the "military-industrial complex" may be too strong or inadequately controlled, with harmful results for U.S. policy and international well-being.

Although it is plausible to assume that these two situations will be closely correlated, the assumption is not always warranted. Sometimes nonmilitary individuals and groups stress military considerations (about which they may or may not be well-informed). And sometimes the military stress cultural and economic cooperation abroad (with credentials of similar caliber). We should be clear which meaning we have in mind when using the term. Since both meanings will be employed in this article, I will distinguish carefully between them.

I

One should be able to answer the question posed, whether U.S. foreign policy is being militarized, either negatively or positively, without necessarily applauding the one answer or deploring the

*This article has been adapted from a paper prepared for delivery to the Board of Trustees and guests of the Council on Religion and International Affairs, Chicago, June 23, 1970. The author is indebted to Charles Cooper, Fred Ikle, Andrew Marshall and Richard Moorsteen for comments on an earlier draft.

The views expressed are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other. However, closer inspection suggests that this is not really the case. Sometimes what we say or ask carries a meaning between the lines or the words as significant as what is in them. This question is a case in point, for it implies that "militarizing foreign policy" is bad; the more of it the worse, and the less the better. This article will dispute this implication.

In my view, the implication that militarizing foreign policy is bad is misleading, even though fashionable at the present time. By contrast, I would argue that foreign policy *should* be "militarized," to a degree. It is difficult to specify exactly what that degree is, but something can be said about its characteristics. The degree to which military considerations should enter into foreign policy is both substantial and complex. It varies for different types of policy. For example, military considerations should have a greater degree of influence on our policy toward overseas bases than on our foreign trade policy. Nevertheless, in general it is as important that military considerations be given sufficient weight in foreign policy formulation as that they not be given excessive weight.

Both military considerations and the military services can sometimes exert excessive influence on our policies, as they have in some instances in Viet Nam. But it is also true that their influence on policy can be largely ignored, as was the case in the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961. Unfavorable outcomes can result from too little as well as too much.

Moreover, there is the still more important question of the quality of military influence on foreign policy. The Geneva Accords of 1962, which led to the so-called neutralization of Laos and the *de facto* territorial partition of that unfortunate country, were substantially influenced by military considerations as well as by the military services. Yet it appears that these influences were based on fundamentally wrong assumptions about comparative U.S. and Chinese logistic capabilities in Laos, and about the ease with which the military situation in South Viet Nam could be insulated from traffic along the Ho Chi Minh trail. As subsequent developments have proved, military influences on foreign policy in that case were not so much insufficient in quantity as poor in quality.

Both defense policy and foreign policy are essential aspects of the basic international security policies of this country. President Eisenhower, in the same speech in which he warned that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"We must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence . . . by the military industrial complex," also had this to say: "A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be so mighty . . . that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction." In that same speech he further stated that

> We face a hostile ideology—global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose and insidious in method. . . . To meet it successfully, there is called for, not so much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crisis, but rather those which enable us to carry forward steadily, surely, and without complaint the burdens of the prolonged and complex struggle—with liberty at stake. Only then shall we remain, despite every provocation, on our charted course toward permanent peace and human betterment.[1]

Of course we need to control the military's influence on foreign policy—and on defense policy as well. It is, therefore, highly desirable that there be more visibility and information on military programs and policies, and better and more responsible debate, so that this control can be effectively exercised by the President, the Congress and the public. This is no different from saying that control should be exercised over the regular Foreign Service in its influence on foreign policy; or, for that matter, over the strongly organized educational and medical professional communities in their influence in their respective fields. There are "other industrial complexes" no less powerful and no less in need of scrutiny and control than the military-industrial complex.[2]

Determining, or even discussing intelligently, the appropriate relationships between the military and the formulation of foreign policy is difficult enough. But the problem is made more difficult by certain barriers to communication ("hangups") that accompany the strong convictions people have on various sides of this issue. It is often hard for us to understand what the other fellow's position is—to arrive at what has been called "second-order agreement," an agreed statement of where we disagree. Consider some of the divergent and usually concealed premises that people often carry with them in addressing the issue of "militarization."

One view is that those who do military planning and try to

[1]Address by President Eisenhower to the Nation, January 17, 1961, *Department of State Bulletin,* February 6, 1961, pp. 179-182.

[2]See Charles Wolf, Jr., "Military-Industrial Complexities" (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, P-4177, August 1969), published in abridged form in *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* February 1971.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

relate it to foreign policy are in favor of war. The opposing view is that, on the contrary, military planners are strongly desirous of peace.

Associated with the first view is a corollary that planning and preparing effective military capabilities is itself provocative. Opposed to this is the view that such planning deters potential aggressors.

The first view then moves toward the position that the probability of war is increased by the activity of military planners. The second view suggests that it is precisely their vigilance that protects the peace and lowers the probability of war.

One view, in other words, implies that thinking about the unthinkable, or at least the unpalatable, makes it more likely; the other, that failing to do so has the same effect. There are also those who believe that military preparedness is provocative in one area (say, with respect to U.S. military capabilities and Soviet or Chinese reactions) but a necessary deterrent in another area (e.g., with respect to Israel's preparations to forestall Arab attacks).

Frankly, not even systematic analysis can bring much evidence to bear to resolve such sharp dichotomies conclusively. Nor is history, recent or distant, an unambiguous witness. Each of us tends to be his own expert on these questions—based on our individual experiences, our reading of a rather plastic history, and our intuitions and insights into human nature and the behavior of nations. Without pretending to resolve these issues, perhaps we should be more candid about where we stand on them, what evidence and experience they seem to be based on, and what further research might contribute to understanding them better.

My own position is on the second side of each of the previous dichotomies. I believe that U.S. military preparations tend generally to deter and avoid war, and to protect the peace, to a much greater extent than they tend to increase the probability of war. To be seriously concerned about the risks and dangers of too little attention to national security matters does not, however, free one from worries about the size of the defense budget, or about arms races, or about the interactive effects of military preparation by potential adversaries on each other's conduct. These problems are no less important. There is nothing inconsistent in maintaining both concerns—about too much as well as

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

too little—simultaneously. Nor does any of the foregoing imply that the military should not be closely and continually scrutinized. It should be. There is a need both for strong and effective military programs and protagonists, and for strong, effective and continual monitoring and control of those programs and their advocates.

II

This two-sided formulation makes it clear that if there is a danger of overmilitarizing foreign policy, there is also the reverse danger. It would be nice, and certainly simpler, if we only had to worry about one danger at a time. But the world is too complicated for that.

In one sense, the problem is similar to the coexisting dangers of inflation and recession that face us in the national economy. Again, it would be nice if we only had to concern ourselves with one of these dangers at a time. Yet both inflation and recession, both continued price rises and rising unemployment, are real and serious risks. In the economic realm, we have some indicators that tell us which of these risks is more likely at a given time. If prices are rising by 6 or 7 per cent a year, and unemployment is perhaps 3.5 per cent, we can conclude (although even here some uncertainties remain) that inflation is a greater danger than recession. When these indicators shift, as they seem to be doing at present, so that the rate of price increase moves down to 3 or 4 per cent a year, while unemployment rises above 5 per cent, the risk of recession is relatively more serious. We even have some techniques for predicting these things several months in advance.

In the case of military influence on foreign policy, our understanding of the several types of risk—too much or too little, or of the wrong kind—and of the pertinent indicators, is much more limited. Therefore, the conclusions we tend to reach about the problem are much less reliable than in the economic example referred to. Nevertheless, we have a few relevant indicators and some relevant information to assist us to a more informed judgment about which risk is more worrisome in the military field.

In fiscal year 1961, the last year of tight Eisenhower budgets, our defense outlays were about $45 billion, which was approximately 8.8 per cent of the Gross National Product, and a little over 44 per cent of total federal government expenditures. In 1969, our defense expenditures were nearly $79 billion, about

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

8.7 per cent of GNP, and nearly 42 per cent of total federal government expenditures. For fiscal year 1971, defense outlays are down to $72 billion, about 7 per cent of GNP, and less than 36 per cent of total federal budget expenditures. In 1972 the downward trend in the percentages of GNP and budgetary expenditures is likely to continue. Moreover, in constant 1961 prices, defense expenditures in fiscal 1971 have been held to about $55 billion, or $10 billion more than they were in 1961.

Thus, while the level of defense expenditures in 1971 is still extremely large, it represents the smallest percentage of total government expenditures, and the smallest percentage of Gross National Product, that it has represented since the start of the Korean War in 1950. Even more important, the rates of change are negative and substantial. The military share of government and total resources has gone dramatically *downward* at the same time as the amount and the shares devoted to health and education, for example, have gone dramatically upward, from less than $2.5 billion, or 2.5 per cent of government expenditures in 1961, to $23 billion or 11.5 per cent of total government expenditures in 1971.

The fact is clear that, while we must maintain stringent control and constant vigilance to keep military claims on strained resources from becoming excessive, such claims are already under especially strict control. To say, as some do, that military expenditures are "out of control," or that they cannot be, or are not being, cut severely, is wrong. Indeed, the direction in which defense expenditures are moving may give some ground for concern lest they move downward too quickly, while the international environment remains perilous.

Apart from defense expenditures, there are many other indications that the military is coming under increasing pressure, control and criticism. Consider the accelerating pace of troop withdrawals from Viet Nam, in the face of initial military reluctance and objection, and the severe scrutiny and criticism of the military services in the continuing controversies over the FB-111, the C-5A, the ABM and the Navy's nuclear aircraft carriers. The notion that the military is exercising pervasive and growing influence on U.S. policy, outside the reach of public knowledge and control, seems to be sharply at variance with what prevails in the real world. In that world, rather than in the make-believe worlds of Professor Galbraith or General Shoup, one finds that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the military is retrenching, is defensive, and is exercising a diminished rather than an increasing influence.

At the same time the circumstances of the international environment caution us that we cannot reduce appreciably our military strength, or the part military considerations should play in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy, without damaging consequences to our national interests and to international peace. What we find in the international arena is an expanding Soviet presence in the Middle East and increasing evidence of such expansion (in bases and in influence) in the Asian area as well. In recent Congressional testimony, a group of leading British and American students of the Soviet Union envisioned the strong possibility of a more aggressive and expansionist Soviet policy throughout the world, as the USSR's strategic military capabilities reach equality or superiority compared with those of the United States.[3]

Sino-Soviet border conflicts have eased since the high tensions that prevailed in 1969, yet they remain a symptom of deep-seated antagonisms between China and the Soviet Union. While this circumstance is not a source of unalloyed comfort to us, it is possible that it may induce either or both countries to view with greater favor some improvement of relations with the United States. This is far from clear, however, and the path that leads in this direction is neither charted nor without risks.

To shift to another serious hazard, the prospect of nuclear proliferation among some countries, such as Japan, does not seem to be receding. Nor can we say that the possibilities of conventional conflicts (for example, between North and South Korea), let alone of insurgent wars in the Third World, are negligible. In the light of the Nixon Doctrine and for other reasons, the likelihood of our involvement in such conflicts is much less than it formerly was. We are committed, and wisely so, to placing greater reliance on the capacities of friendly and allied countries for their *self*-defense, and the threshold of provocation that would involve us in direct military support for their efforts is likely to be much higher in the future than it has been. Nevertheless, we should not adopt an ostrich policy if we want to contribute to progress in international peacekeeping and stability. For all

[3]Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, December 1969-May 1970 (Washington: GPO, 1970).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of these reasons, military considerations are, and should be, important influences on the formulation of our foreign policy.

None of this implies that we do not also need to pursue numerous foreign policy initiatives above and beyond our military preparedness. There is room, even compelling need, for foreign policy initiatives in a number of fields: strategic arms limitations, international development in the less-developed countries, facilitating "regional cooperation" or what this writer prefers to refer to as "multi-country associations," and promoting the freer movement of goods, services, capital and people throughout the world, including the communist sphere.

We should pursue these initiatives vigorously, while retaining a keen sense of the limits of our influence and the high domestic costs of unduly expanding it. In these undertakings, the military is definitely not an obstacle *if* our civilian leadership in the White House and in the State Department, as well as in the Defense Department, is convinced that national interests warrant moving in a particular direction.[4] The military plays a minuscule role in most of these matters, if it plays any role at all.

III

The difficulties and constraints bearing on our foreign policies are not difficulties that are governed, or in most cases decisively influenced, by the military. The problems are hard and complex, and the constraints often numerous and severe, quite apart from the military's role. To say that the military prevents or hinders the government's actions is to exaggerate its influence and to underestimate the fundamental complexities of the problems themselves. Slogans placing the blame for our foreign policy dilemmas on the military not only do the military a disservice, but hinder rather than help in finding solutions. Take, as an example, the issues involved in our overseas posture.

The United States has a large number of bases, forces and other installations abroad, excluding those in Southeast Asia. Why? They are there partly as a result of prior wars and commitments, but there are other, stronger reasons. Our overseas forces and bases provide reassurance to our allies (in Western Europe; Japan, Thailand, Korea, the Philippines and others in

[4]For a similar view, see the speech by Senator Eugene McCarthy at the National War College, May 25, 1970, news release, Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Asia) of our commitment to help them withstand aggression. They also provide deterrence against conceivable Soviet, Chinese or North Korean attacks in these areas. Maybe such attacks are unlikely. If so, it is partly because of the U.S. "presence" and commitment. Whether the threats would remain unlikely if these overseas capabilities were eliminated is open to question.

From this standpoint, our overseas posture is an important contributor to stability and peacekeeping in the international arena; not a guarantor, but a contributor. This is true notwithstanding the Viet Nam experience, as large numbers of West Europeans, Japanese, Koreans, Thai, Filipinos and Indonesians would agree.

Nevertheless, there is nothing sacrosanct about the present scale of our overseas forces and bases. Times have changed. While threats remain, they have perhaps abated in some areas. The economic and political capacity of allies, like the Japanese, the Germans and the Koreans, to bear more of the security burden themselves has increased encouragingly. For various reasons, therefore, including significant budgetary pressures at home as well as political repercussions abroad, it is worth considering how this posture might be scaled down. Put in budgetary terms, the problem is to realize a given (and appreciable) amount of reduction in our expenditures on overseas bases and forces, while minimizing the degradation in military capabilities and the chances of adverse political consequences.

In seeking to solve this problem, one can go about making adjustments in many ways: eliminating some bases; moving toward more austere basing and manning and training arrangements; arranging joint tenure with host countries; or "mothballing" some facilities, pre-positioning some equipment, and accepting a reduction in the speed with which a return by U.S. forces might be made. Important foreign policy and military considerations must be weighed in evaluating these alternatives. The evaluation itself is difficult. Many incommensurable effects are involved, and it is unlikely that any one of the alternatives dominates the others. The issues are important because the outcome can have a major effect on prospects for international peace and stability, on the confidence of our allies, and on the incentives they face to provide more effectively for their own security.

These issues entail major considerations of both foreign policy and military policy. The foreign policy choices require adequate

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

attention to military considerations, and participation by the Pentagon. The military alternatives cannot be properly evaluated without equally careful attention to political costs and benefits, U.S. international commitments, the reactions of allies and possible adversaries, and so on.

IV

Foreign policy should be militarized to a degree. By the same token, military choices require ample scrutiny from the standpoint of foreign policy, as well as firm control by informed and responsible civilian political leadership. Cool minds and a lot of homework are necessary to deal with these problems. Slogans that simply decry military influence on foreign policy distract attention from the serious effort needed; they contribute emotion and distraction rather than coolness and information.

President Kennedy expressed our situation well when he said: "We shall achieve peace only with patience and perseverance and courage. There is no way to maintain the frontiers of freedom without cost and commitment and risk. There is no swift and easy path to peace in our generation."[5]

[5]See *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, John F. Kennedy,* 1962 (Washington: GPO, 1964), p. 713.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE TARIFF PREFERENCE: A RECONSIDERATION

by Sherman E. Katz

IN an address to the Inter-American Press Association on October 31, 1969, President Nixon announced his decision to "press for a liberal system of generalized tariff preferences for all developing countries, including Latin America."

> We will seek adoption by all of the industrialized countries of a scheme with broad product coverage and with no ceilings on preferential imports.
>
> We will seek equal access to industrial markets for all developing countries so as to eliminate the discrimination against Latin America that now exists in many countries. We will also urge that such a system eliminates the inequitable "reverse preferences" that now discriminate against Western Hemisphere countries.[1]

Ten days later, when the President released the Rockefeller report on conditions in Latin America, he said:

> The Rockefeller report indicates that, if it is not possible to work out a satisfactory arrangement in the direction of implementing a recommendation for trade preferences for all the developing countries because of the ties that many of these countries will have with former colonial nations, then the goal that we have is to have special trade preferences for Latin America.[2]

If the type of international agreement for tariff preferences he proposed could not be negotiated "within a reasonable time," he declared, "then the U.S. will be prepared to consider other alternative actions it can take to assure that the American nations will have preferential access to the U.S. market."

A U.S. proposal for global preferences for the less developed countries (LDC's) was presented on November 3 to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, meeting in Paris. This "temporary scheme, i.e., not more than ten years," would "not constitute a binding commitment and would not impede further tariff reductions on a most-favored-nation basis." Under it, preferential duties would be set at zero; product coverage would encompass a wide range of manufactured and semi-manufactured products, excluding textiles, shoes, petroleum and

[1] *New York Times*, November 1, 1969.
[2] *Ibid.*, November 11, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

petroleum products. A selective list of agriculture and fishery products, subject to "further international discussion," would also receive preferential treatment. No ceilings would be placed on preferential imports; rather, standard escape clause and adjustment assistance would be relied on as safeguards for domestic industry. In regard to already existing preference arrangements, LDC's now receiving special preferences in industrial country markets for products covered by the U.S. proposal (British Commonwealth LDC's, for example, or the African states associated with the EEC by the Yaoundé Convention) would be excluded from the U.S. preference scheme. LDC's that grant reverse preferences to imports from industrial countries would also be excluded.

The President's trade bill, submitted to Congress on November 18, 1969, did not deal with preferences; the letter of transmittal noted only that "international discussions are now in progress on the matter." To keep his international negotiating hand free, the President added:

> At the appropriate time, I will submit legislation to the Congress to seek authorization for the United States to extend preferences and to take any other steps toward improving the market access of the less developed countries which might appear desirable and which would require legislation.[3]

In the past year significant progress has been made toward the establishment of a worldwide preference system, due in part to the United States' modification of its November 1969 proposal. At an OECD ministerial meeting in May 1970, Washington withdrew its insistence that the preference systems offered by the industrial countries be identical, on the American assumption that the other OECD members would make "comparable efforts." LDC's that promised a phase-out of reverse preferences within "a reasonable period of time" (i.e., by 1975 when the Yaoundé Convention expires) would be included in the U.S. preference scheme from the outset.

At the September 21-October 12, 1970 meeting of the UNCTAD Special Committee on Tariff Preferences, the U.S. delegation announced that LDC's now receiving special preferences would be included as beneficiaries under U.S. preferential arrangements as long as the special preference does not grow and "assume significant trade proportions." The United States reserved the right "to extend comparable special

[3] *Ibid.*, November 19, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

preferences ourselves" if such preferences are maintained by other countries. In its October 12 Report, the Special Committee on Tariff Preferences recognized that the revised offers of preferential arrangements submitted at the meeting by the developed countries were "mutually acceptable." The LDC's regard this phrase as a binding commitment by the industrialized nations to put into effect their preference offers for an initial period of ten years. The Committee "notes the determination of the prospective preference-giving countries to seek as rapidly as possible the necessary legislative or other sanction with the aim of implementing the preferential arrangements as early as possible in 1971."[4]

The Council of Foreign Ministers of the six governments of the European Economic Community agreed on March 30, 1971 to give generalized trade preferences to developing countries beginning July 1, 1971. The EEC members thus became the first to act on the October accord between the LDC's and the industrialized states. France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg will allow duty-free entry for all manufactured and semi-finished goods without exception. The EEC Executive Committee has figured that the trade will amount to $1 billion per year and that the Six will lose $100 million in tariffs that otherwise would have been paid. There are two limitations on the scope of the preferences, however. The first is a ceiling on the duty-free imports of each product, obtained by taking the 1968 c.i.f. (cost, insurance and freight) figures for the imports of the Six from the developing countries concerned, and adding 5 per cent of the value of their imports that year from other sources. This amounts to offering a 5 per cent share of the market held by developed country exporters. Certain "sensitive" goods, particularly from Hong Kong, are partially or wholly excluded from the 5 per cent-plus benefit. The second limitation is a "cut-off" formula whereby no one country can supply more than 50 per cent of the total EEC imports set by the ceiling. The proposed share-out rates among the EEC members are: West Germany 37.5 per cent, France 27.1 per cent, Italy 20.3 per cent, Benelux 15.1 per cent.

The EEC also offers a limited preference for processed agricultural products, covering 150 items of LDC imports worth $30

[4]UN Document TD/B/32c, October 12, 1970, Trade and Development Board, Fourth Special Session, Geneva, *Report of the Special Committee on Preferences*, "Agreed Conclusions," pp. 7-15. The Committee did not hold a formal vote on approval of the Report.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

million. Instead of duty-free treatment on these goods, tariff exemption is granted only for a few items while the rest benefit from varying tariff reductions.

The likelihood that the Nixon Administration will now seek Congressional authorization to implement U.S. tariff preference arrangements and the EEC agreement to institute a generalized preference system suggest that it may be useful to reconsider the preference idea as originally formulated by its chief proponent, Dr. Raul Prebisch. To examine its assumptions and to consider the pros and cons noted by other analysts are the purposes of this article.

The Trade Gap

The case for tariff preferences was boldly stated by Prebisch in "Towards a New Trade Policy for Development," a report prepared for the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964.[5] According to one analyst, this report "was in the nature of position papers for the developing countries — brilliantly conceived, yet highly controversial and consciously militant."[6] It became the platform of the Group of Seventy-seven developing nations in Geneva, and, in the absence of empirical data about worldwide preference systems, it has remained at the center of discussion regarding the effectiveness of such a system.

The central problem associated with the development process, according to Prebisch, is a "persistent tendency towards external imbalance," now commonly known as "the trade gap." This phenomenon arises from the fact that while exports of primary commodities — the bulk of LDC exports — grow at a relatively slow rate, the LDC demand for imports of manufactured goods grows quickly, at a rate that increases with the rate of development.

Balance of payments difficulties ensue when export earnings fail to keep pace with growing expenditures abroad for consumer durables and/or capital goods. Continued economic growth is clearly quite difficult when foreign exchange flows outward more quickly than it is earned.

[5]UN Document E/Conf. 46/3. See also Prebisch's earlier writings on the preference: "Commercial Policy on the Underdeveloped Countries," *American Economic Review*, Papers and Proceedings, May 1959, pp. 251-273, and "The Economic Development of Latin America," *The Economic Bulletin for Latin America*, February 1962.

[6]Henry Simon Bloch, *The Challenge of the World Trade Conference* (New York: Columbia University, School of International Affairs, one of a series of Occasional Papers, 1964-1965), p. 9.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Prebisch suggested expanding markets for the manufactures and semi-manufactures of the LDC's through trade preferences as a means of increasing export earnings and narrowing the trade gap. The UN Economic Commission for Europe thoroughly agreed. That body had estimated in 1960 that for the LDC's to achieve a 3 per cent annual increase in per capita income, they would have to expand their total exports to the developed countries by some two-and-a-half times by 1980, which could be done only if the LDC's were able to export a volume of manufactured goods at least seven times greater than that recorded in 1960.[7] Since more than half of the manufactured goods exported by the LDC's in 1960 came from only a few of them, such as Hong Kong, India and Mexico, the problem for most countries was even greater than the overall figures suggested.

Prebisch emphasized manufactured goods, i.e., industrialization, as the most effective way to foster economic growth, ruling out primary commodities as a means to end the net trade imbalance because of their inherent weaknesses.

Commodity-Export as a Development Strategy

These weaknesses are the result of economic structural factors, protective policies of the developed countries, and the tendency of the prices of primary commodities to deteriorate in relative terms.

Technological progress in the developed countries, according to Prebisch, is one structural factor retarding the growth of primary commodity exports from LDC's. The increasing substitution of synthetics for natural products and the progressive reduction of raw material content in finished goods diminish the demand for primary commodities. The mechanization, and now the industrialization, of agriculture reduce the need for agricultural imports from developing countries. Because of the low income elasticity of demand for primary products, the higher incomes generated by technological progress do not produce proportionate increases in the demand for foods or other staple consumer goods.

Although these structural factors are unavoidable, Prebisch points to protective policies that can be changed. The adverse effects of greater agricultural productivity on prices are countered in the industrial countries by price supports. These supports encourage expanded production which in turn necessitates restric-

[7]Gardner Patterson, "Would Tariff Preferences Help Economic Development?," *Lloyd's Bank Review,* April 1965, p. 21.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion of imports from other countries to guarantee a domestic consumer market. If, despite import restrictions, a domestic surplus results, the surplus may be exported by means of subsidies — an action that tends to depress world prices. In short, the protectionist policies of the developed countries in the primary commodities sector make it difficult for the developing countries to gain access to the industrialized country markets and, on occasion, adversely affect the world market price level.

In accounting for the weakness of the production and export of primary commodities as a development strategy, Prebisch probes beyond structural and politico-economic factors to what he calls the "downward trend of the terms of trade for primary commodities in relation to industrial products." This trend, in his judgment, is largely attributable to the fact that while increases in the production of manufactured goods in the industrialized countries, where labor is scarce and well-organized, lead to higher wages and therefore higher relative prices of manufactured goods, increases in agricultural productivity in the developing countries, where labor, particularly agricultural labor, is always in surplus and not organized, yield neither higher wages nor higher agricultural prices. The corrective process wherein labor shifts from agriculture to industry and primary production becomes more responsive to demand is too slow to be left to the free play of the market. The process could be hastened considerably, Prebisch argues, by rapid development of the industrial and other sectors of the developing country economies.

Some economists have raised theoretical objections to this formulation: for example, that it treats labor as the only factor of production and therefore its conclusions about changing cost relationships apply to only part of the costs; that increased real wages in the North mean the LDC's can compete with or replace the North in areas in which both produce or formerly only the North produced, if not in the Northern markets because of tariffs, then surely in the markets of the South.[8] In addition, critics question the evidence for the "trend" Prebisch described. Prebisch found that from 1950 to 1961 the terms of trade of primary commodities fell by 26 per cent in relation to those of manufactures, excluding petroleum, and the overall terms of trade of the LDC's declined by 17 per cent, again excluding petroleum. Application of the lat-

[8]See further, John Pincus, *Trade, Aid and Development: The Rich and Poor Nations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 131-134, "An Evaluation of Neo-Protectionist Arguments."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ter figure to the volume of exports indicated that this deterioration cost the LDC's $13.1 billion in purchasing power, an amount roughly equal to one-half of the net input of foreign financial aid during the same period — $26.5 billion, excluding remittances of interest and profits.

These dramatic figures may have exaggerated the point. The use of 1950 as a base year tends to distort the issue because Korean War pressures pushed commodity prices upward. Harry Johnson notes that in the terminal year, 1961, commodity prices declined as a result of depression in the U.S. economy and new supplies called forth by the price rise following the Suez crisis of 1956.[9] But John Pincus states: "As long as world demand for industrial imports is rising faster than world demand for primary imports, the terms of trade of primary exporters will tend to deteriorate, other things being equal."[10] This simple yet illuminating observation makes Prebisch's essential findings appear sensible and correct.

To alleviate the primary commodity problem Prebisch proposed international commodity agreements and compensatory financing, but he called these measures "palliatives" affording limited relief in view of the size of the trade gap. He was convinced of "the absolute necessity of building up trade in industrial exports."

Industrialization as a Development Strategy

Historical Circumstances: Insular Industrialization

Prebisch argued that historical circumstances and economic conditions have made the process of industrialization, particularly of industrial export, exceptionally difficult for the developing countries. The Depression forced industrialized countries to establish high tariffs and other restrictive measures which excluded manufactured goods from developing countries. The developing countries, just beginning to industrialize, geared industrial production to import substitution behind similarly high protective tariff walls. The LDC's hoped to narrow the already extant trade gap by producing the manufactured goods they had previously purchased abroad with scarce foreign exchange. With guaranteed and expanding internal markets of their own, there was no need or incentive for the industrializing states to direct their efforts

[9]Harry G. Johnson, *Economic Policies Toward the Developing Countries* (New York: Praeger, for the Brookings Institution, 1967), Appendix A, p. 250.
[10]Pincus, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

toward the external market. As a result, industrialization occurred in "water-tight compartments" leading to losses in productivity through uneconomic use of natural resources. World War II reinforced this pattern of "inward-looking industrialization," as Prebisch called it, and nothing has changed the pattern since.

This insular process of industrialization has produced a series of problems for the Latin American countries. Other developing countries will face the same problems, Prebisch maintained, if they are forced to industrialize under the same conditions, i.e., without access to external markets.

At first, import substitution is often directed at replacing nonessentials the country has decided it will either do without or produce itself. But the production of these nonessentials absorbs limited national resources that should be channeled toward the goods the country can produce most economically — raw materials and capital goods as well as consumer goods. A further consequence of substitution for nonessentials is increased reliance on the import of essential goods, often of the capital goods necessary to carry on whatever industries may be in operation. It then becomes more difficult to decrease imports without diminishing the growth of production.

As import substitution progresses to a wider range of goods, the products become more complex and substitution activities more difficult. The need for capital and large markets grows. Without the latter, unit costs become intolerably high and the uneconomic use of existing resources accelerates.[11]

A "vicious circle" of protectionism accompanies isolated industrialization. The small size of national markets prevents local industry from reducing costs through economies of scale. Protective tariff barriers must be raised by the LDC's to keep out lower priced imports. The high internal costs of producing these manufactured goods prohibits successful exportation. But costs cannot be reduced, at least in part because the expanded export markets needed to lower unit costs are not available. If it were possible to industrialize with a view toward large-scale export of the goods a country is best suited to produce, specialization would follow, costs would be reduced, and the vicious circle would be broken.

Finally, industrialization behind closed doors insulates the na-

[11]See John A. Power, "Import Substitution as an Industrialization Strategy," paper presented at the Conference of the Society for International Development, March 1966.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tional market from international competition and thereby reduces incentive to improve the product or to pare costs through increased efficiency. Local producers face no competition for the internal markets and have no access to external markets. Consequently, domestic productivity does not improve and potential gains from trade are never realized.

The Tariff Preference

The solution for these problems and for the "trade gap" problem in general is the increase of industrial exports. The tariff preference is designed to produce that increase.

The tariff preference in the Prebisch plan would allow free entry of manufactured goods from the developing countries to the markets of the industrial countries for a period of ten years, commencing with the time each industry in a given country began to export. Pre-existing tariffs would remain in force on nonpreferred imports from developed countries. All industrial products exported by the developing countries would enter duty free, with the exception of a "special share" reserved by the industrialized countries for the least developed among the LDC's.

According to Prebisch, each of the developed countries would have a global quota as an overall limit to the volume of goods to be imported under this system.[12] That quota could be set "at a very high level" relative to existing exports of the developing countries, yet it would still be small relative to the size of the developed country markets. It might be established on the basis of the volume of manufactured products imported by the industrial country.

Preferences might also be subject to quotas and/or exclusions for individual products in whose production the LDC's are already competitive on the world market. Products in these groups would then receive normal "most-favored-nation" (MFN) treatment. New exceptions to preferential treatment might be added, in accordance with clearly established criteria, after the system was in operation. An additional safeguard might be a provision that imports of a particular product would no longer qualify for preferential treatment once they exceeded a predetermined

[12]The preference offers submitted to the UNCTAD Special Committee on Tariff Preferences by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Nordic countries and Canada do not provide for any quantitative limitations on products included in the offer, but the EEC and Japanese offers provide for quotas on imports at preferential rates.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

percentage of domestic consumption in a particular importing country.[13]

What Gains Will the Preference Produce?

Prebisch contends that the growth of industrial exports under the preference system will narrow the trade gap and promote efficient industrialization in the less developed countries.

The Infant Industry Theory. The case for efficient industrialization through preferences is based on a "logical extension of the infant industry argument" from its unilateral origins to a multilateral level. The infant industry argument rested upon the companion concepts of the "economies of age" and the "economies of scale." A new industry needs time or "age" to develop the skill and techniques required for efficient production at competitive world price levels. Therefore, the argument originally ran, the country in which a new industry is born should impose temporary tariffs to keep out the lower priced goods produced by older, more experienced industries abroad. Tariff protection would give the domestic industry a learning period. The domestic consumer would pay for this "education" in the form of higher prices. After five or ten years the industry, if properly chosen in the first place, would be able to stand on its own feet and the tariff could be dropped. The return on the consumer's social investment would be an industry earning higher income than otherwise possible.

An industry can achieve "economies of scale" through expansion of output to the most efficient level, i.e., lowest cost per unit of production. By setting up tariffs and making the lower priced import more expensive, the argument goes, the domestic industry gets a chance to expand in the national market to higher levels of output at which it can enjoy lower "costs" per unit produced.

[13]A second proposal is not examined in this article. Prebisch suggests a "new substitution policy" within regional groupings of the LDC's. By granting tariff preferences within their own regions, the developing countries could begin to reap the benefits of the expanded scope of industrialization, i.e., specialization, economies of scale, and competition. Such "regional policies" are "interdependent" with Prebisch's proposal for tariff preferences in the industrial countries. If the regional export of manufactures is increased, the industries in the LDC's will be in a better position to compete in the world market. The expansion of industrial export to the world market will have beneficial effects on trade between countries of the regions. "In the last analysis," however, Prebisch said, the willingness of the industrial countries to import the manufactured goods of the regional group will be essential to economic growth.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

While the argument is widely accepted as sound in theory, serious difficulty can be encountered in practice. The major practical problem is selection of the proper infant. Harry Johnson calls the existence of infant industry conditions "an empirical issue concerning which the ratio of unsupported assertion to empirical evidence is probably unexcelled in any other field of economics." It must be decided what industry or industries can produce efficiently at world market prices prevailing five to ten years from the time the decision is made. If the infant has been chosen unwisely, it will not grow up, i.e., it will depend on continuation of tariff protection for economic survival. The national economy is then saddled with the higher costs and prices of an inefficient industry as well as the opportunity cost of having committed scarce national resources to an unsuccessful venture. The consumer has received none of the expected gains of this temporary interference with trade. Finally, the selection error is not easily undone, because resources have been allocated, a capital position has been staked out, and the industry has grown up behind a tariff wall. The political costs of removing that protective wall become prohibitive.

Multilateral Application. Transformation of the infant industry argument from its orthodoxy into a multilateral strategy complicates the matter of industry selection. This complication has led others to question whether a preference system would produce the efficient industrialization Prebisch predicts. According to one point of view, tariff reductions across the board on manufactured goods would abort the selection process inasmuch as all industries in the developing countries, rather than a carefully chosen infant, would receive a temporary advantage. The tendency, Johnson argues, may then be for LDC's, looking for the greatest short-run advantage, to establish those industries which were previously most heavily protected by developed countries. To be competitive after the preference is removed, however, these new industries will have to succeed in reducing costs below levels prevailing in the preference-giving countries. Johnson maintains that while the heavily protected industries in the developed countries are "likely to include" those in which the LDC's have a potential comparative advantage — labor-intensive manufactures with high raw material content — it is unlikely that they represent the best infant industry prospects for the LDC's. The tariff structures of the industrial countries are more generally directed at other industrial

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

countries and therefore at industries which are capital intensive or call for considerable technological skill.[14]

Pincus argues that no reasonable firm or government will make substantial investments in a strikingly inefficient industry whose survival depends on a temporary preference. The fact remains, however, that there is less control over selection of the infant in the case of multilateral protection of a wide range of industries than with unilateral protection of a single, selected industry. The end result, Gardner Patterson comments, might be to "encourage indiscriminate investment, with resulting waste of scarce resources and so reduce supply capability in the areas able to compete."[15]

Foreign aid issues arise from this new application of the infant industry argument. In the national context the infant was supported by consumer investment in domestic industrial growth. Now the argument calls for transnational investment in LDC industrialization by developed country private industry. The return on this investment will remain primarily in the developing country, in the form of an industry earning foreign exchange through effective competition in the world market. In short, Prebisch is proposing a new form of international transfer of resources. This raises a host of questions as to whether a preference system is a good form of foreign aid.

The tariff preference places capital in the form of increased earnings in the hands of producers who can successfully export to developed country markets. Direct aid places capital in government hands or in development banks for use in investment projects (possibly infant industries) chosen under a national development plan. A preference system may not channel resources to the industries the planner would have selected, but it clearly indicates to private enterprise the industries in which profitable investments can be made, and decisions motivated by profit have often proved sounder than those dictated by an economic plan. Furthermore, the LDC's add that in the face of declining direct aid it becomes necessary to adopt a "second best" strategy.

Patterson questions whether the margin that preferences might

[14]Johnson suggests two preference arrangements that would not obscure the choice of infant industries as much as the "across the board" system. If all infant industries were given the same absolute preference margin, rather than margins based on previous tariff levels, the infant industry potential of all would be equally ignored, allowing a process of "natural selection" to determine which industries should survive. Conversely, the preferences might be specifically adjusted as to margin and duration for each product in accordance with an advance study of its infant industry potential.

[15]Patterson, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

provide is sufficient to the task of infant industry protection. The protection afforded by unilateral tariffs was much greater, he argues, than the advantage conferred by preferences. The preference will not help the developing country exporter to expand his market unless his price meets two conditions: (1) his price must be lower than the domestic price in the preference-giving country in order to be preferred by the consumers of that country; (2) his price must not exceed that of nonpreferred developed country competitors by an amount greater than the preference margin, if his product is to be lower priced after duty-free entry. Assuming a nominal tariff rate of 10 per cent *ad valorem* and unwillingness by industrial countries to give LDC's more than 50 per cent preference margins, Patterson contends that the LDC advantage of 5 per cent would not enable the new industries to meet either of these conditions. Furthermore, within the Common Market and EFTA, "the domestic price" will be the lowest price within those six or seven countries. He concludes that "some but not many" LDC products might receive significant advantages.

Johnson and Bela Belassa[16] have argued that the significant barrier to the LDC's is not the "average nominal tariff," as Patterson suggests, but the "effective rate of protection."

Effective Protection. The most striking argument for preferences as a means of increasing LDC export earnings derives from the effects of the "differential tariff" now in force in many industrial countries and the resulting disparity between the "nominal" and "effective" rates of protection. The LDC's point out that tariff structures in the developed countries discourage simple processing of raw materials in the country of origin by placing higher tariffs on processed or semi-processed goods than on raw materials. Table I discloses this pattern with respect to copper, rubber, leather, cocoa, wool and wood. These differential tariffs give the domestic processor or manufacturer more protection than nominal tariffs would indicate.

To determine how much more protection is involved, it must be recalled that goods imported by the industrial country can be either substitutes for domestically produced goods or raw material inputs for domestic production. Tariffs on imported substitutes give protection to domestic producers, but tariffs on imported inputs act as a tax on domestic producers. The net protective effect

[16]"The Effects of the Kennedy Round on the Exports of Processed Goods from Developing Areas," UNCTAD Document TD/69, February 15, 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE I

NOMINAL AND EFFECTIVE TARIFF RATES
BEFORE AND AFTER THE KENNEDY ROUND

(Figures in percentages)

Product		*United States*		*United Kingdom*		*Common Market*		*Japan*	
		N	*E*	*N*	*E*	*N*	*E*	*N*	*E*
COCOA									
Cocoa beans	pre-K*	0		1.5		5.4		5.0	
	post-K	0		0		3.2		3.0	
Cocoa powder and cocoa butter	pre-K	4.6	36.7	1.1	-3.3	22.8	150.0	17.4	106.7
	post-K	1.6	11.6	0	-2.5	18.2	126.6	12.2	98.3
LEATHER									
Leather	pre-K	9.6	25.7	14.9	34.3	7.3	18.3	19.9	59.0
	post-K	4.7	12.0	11.4	30.3	4.8	12.3	11.6	34.7
Shoes	pre-K	16.6	25.3	24.0	36.2	19.9	33.0	29.5	45.1
	post-K	14.9	26.3	20.4	32.7	11.9	19.3	22.9	36.5
RUBBER									
Natural rubber	pre-K	0		0		0		0	
	post-K	0		0		0		0	
Rubber products	pre-K	9.3	16.1	20.2	43.9	15.1	33.6	12.9	23.6
	post-K	4.6	6.6	10.9	22.5	7.9	16.3	6.4	10.3
WOOD									
Wood simply worked	pre-K	0.7	1.1	7.9	21.5	3.2	4.5	5.9	13.3
	post-K	0.3	0	6.3	18.8	1.6	4.0	2.9	8.5
Wood manufactures	pre-K	12.8	26.4	14.8	25.5	15.1	28.6	19.5	33.9
	post-K	6.7	13.6	8.1	13.2	8.7	16.3	11.5	23.2
WOOL									
Wool, raw	pre-K	11.4		0		0		0	
	post-K	9.7		0		0		0	
Wool, yarn	pre-K	23.0	53.2	10.0	31.8	5.7	16.1	10.0	29.6
	post-K	20.7	49.5	7.7	25.0	5.7	17.5	5.0	4.7
Wool fabrics, woven	pre-K	50.1	119.1	17.5	36.3	16.0	36.9	20.0	43.1
	post-K	20.7	60.9	14.0	27.7	16.0	38.1	10.0	21.3
COPPER									
Copper ore and concentrates	pre-K	0.3		0		0		0	
	post-K	0.1		0		0		0	
Copper, unwrought	pre-K	4.9	24.4	6.7	33.7	0	-6.3	10.0	51.9
	post-K	2.3	11.2	3.3	15.6	0	-5.6	7.0	43.1
Copper, wrought	pre-K	8.5	14.9	16.8	32.9	10.0	20.2	23.1	43.9
	post-K	4.2	5.4	9.2	18.0	8.0	10.5	17.8	34.9

K*—Kennedy Round N—Nominal E—Effective

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the tariff structure will be the net subsidy (or tax) on the value added in a domestic production process.

Suppose a ton of raw chocolate has a world price of $100, of which $60 represents cocoa beans (raw material) and $40 the value added by processors. Suppose further that U.S. imports of raw chocolate face a 15 per cent tariff while imports of cocoa beans face a 5 per cent tariff. The U.S. processor can spend up to $115 (the duty-paid price of imported raw chocolate) to produce raw chocolate. This is more than the foreign processor can spend. How much more is the effective rate of protection?

	Foreign Product	*Domestic Product*
U.S. market price	$115	$115
Price received by producer	$100	$115
Cost of cocoa beans	$ 60	$ 63
Price chargeable for value added	$ 40	$ 52

The excess of domestic over foreign value added is $12, or 30 per cent of the foreign value added. This can also be expressed as the difference between (1) the gross subsidy on value added provided by the tariff on the final product (15/40 = 37½ per cent), and (2) the implicit tax on value added as a result of the tariff on raw materials (3/40 = 7½ per cent), i.e., 30 per cent. The effective rate of protection is therefore not 15 per cent as the nominal tariff suggests, but 30 per cent. The domestic producer can be 30 per cent less efficient than the foreign producer, or, if he is equally efficient, his return will be increased 30 per cent by the tariff system. Put another way, the foreign producer must be 30 per cent more efficient than the domestic producer to compete in the domestic producer's market.

At the request of the UNCTAD Secretariat, Professor Belassa made a study of nominal and effective tariff rates before and after the Kennedy Round.[17] His findings dramatically illustrate the high barriers remaining in force against manufactured products from the LDC's as well as the differential tariff structure under which duties are levied in direct proportion to the degree of processing in a product. Tariff reductions at the lower end of the processing scale without corresponding ones farther up the scale have in some cases increased the effective rate of protection.

Belassa also found that the Kennedy Round reductions sustained a pattern in industrial countries of average nominal and ef-

[17] *Ibid.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fective tariff rates on LDC manufactures at levels twice as high as the average tariffs on all imports of manufactures.[18]

Against the background of these tariff structures, the gains to be derived from preferences look considerably larger than Patterson suggested. If the tariffs on imported raw material inputs are left unchanged and preferential duties on the LDC products are set at zero, as the United States proposes, the domestic producer faces a net competitive disadvantage in the U.S. market because he pays a higher price for his raw materials. In the case of competition between two foreign producers, one from a developed country and the other receiving duty-free treatment as an LDC producer, the latter enjoys an effective preference rate equal to the subsidy ordinarily given to domestic producers by the tariff on the final product. The LDC producer stands in the same position as the domestic producer with the added advantage of not having to pay a "tax" (tariff) on raw materials. Even the 50 per cent preference postulated by Patterson would result not in a 7½ per cent advantage on the basis of nominal tariffs in the cocoa example, but an 18 per cent advantage in relation to other foreign producers.

Additional Gains from Preferences. Preference proponents list several positive side effects in support of their proposal. Preferences would stimulate increased attention to export markets and therefore, it is argued, away from high cost import-substitution industries. Industrial production would move in the direction of long-term comparative advantage through increased utilization of the resources the LDC's already possess.

Johnson carries this thought a few steps further. The concentration of preferences on products demanding only unskilled or semi-skilled labor, relatively little capital and relatively simple technology might lead to a "new international division of labor." Industries in which the LDC's have a visible comparative advantage would be transferred from the industrial countries to the LDC's. In this context the preference arrangement becomes less "protectionist" and more "trade-liberalizing" in spirit.

Johnson recognizes the political limitations on both sides: the developed countries would have to devise policies for the planned contraction or extermination of established, protected industries, and the LDC's would have to give up aspirations for industrial self-sufficiency. But this process, he reasons, would contribute both to increased efficiency in the utilization of the world's

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

human and material resources and to the economic development of the less developed world.[19]

Increased foreign investment may be another positive outcome of a preferential system. While preference opponents say the tariff advantage cannot compensate for the lack of capital, technological know-how, and managerial and marketing skills, proponents point to the growing mobility of multinational corporations and the inducement given by preferences to take advantage of the low-wage factor in LDC's. Investment decisions would be made with reference to profit possibilities and therefore would reduce LDC costs. Increased outside investment would entail technological and managerial training of nationals in the host countries.

In the long run, preferences may well be more of a two-way street than aid: the more LDC's can sell, the more foreign exchange they earn and, therefore, the more they can purchase abroad. While the LDC's sell about 25 per cent of their exports to the United States, 30 per cent of their purchases come from the United States, so increased LDC purchasing power should produce a net gain in the U.S. balance of payments.

Currently available alternatives to preferences appear inferior from the LDC point of view. The developing countries do not believe that further trade liberalization within the GATT framework will significantly increase their export of manufactures. Belassa's calculations on the effect of the Kennedy Round seem to prove their point. Direct aid to developing countries, at least from the United States, has been declining in recent years. Trade preferences might be less politically difficult to sell than aid as a way to stimulate LDC growth, in view of the recurrent practice of financing domestic income transfers in developed countries with tariffs, price supports and output restrictions.

Possible Costs of a Preference System

Patterson fears that the U.S. Congress might seize upon a request for departure from MFN treatment and traditional liberal trade doctrine as an opportunity to swap the policies embodied in the Trade Expansion Act for a new, wide-ranging protectionist policy. This policy could include "preferential" treatment in the form of nontariff "safeguards" for older, labor-intensive industries to which the LDC's present the greatest threat. Or it might lead to attempts to increase U.S. bargaining power through denials of

[19]Harry G. Johnson, "Trade Preferences and the Developing Countries," *Lloyd's Bank Review*, April 1966, p. 18.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MFN treatment to imports from other developed countries. Such steps would produce retaliation and a net decline in world trade. The current concern of Congress with the volume of U.S. imports, as evidenced in the proposed Trade Act of 1970, underlines Patterson's apprehension.

Opponents of the preference system claim that it will create "vested interests" in the LDC's against further reduction of trade barriers between industrial countries. Tariff reductions would narrow the margin of preference the LDC's would enjoy in relation to exports from their developed country competitors. The LDC's rejoin that they would influence Northern trade policy decisions far less than domestic producers who also have "vested interests" in national tariffs. The fact remains, however, that a new voice would oppose traditional MFN reductions within GATT, assuming, of course, that such reductions are favored by the developing countries themselves.

Preferences will produce increased "political friction," according to some observers. At UNCTAD I, African states already enjoying preferential treatment in the EEC and the United Kingdom were not sympathetic to the proposal of other LDC's that all industrialized countries uniformly extend preferences to all developing countries. Such a system would reduce the advantage they already enjoy. The least industrialized among the LDC's opposed those at a higher level of industrialization out of fear that the latter would pre-empt any preferential advantages. Among the industrialized states, those who opposed the idea entirely were at odds with those who believed the political advantages outweighed the economic costs. Some states preferred selective and individually negotiated preferences while others wanted to adopt a generalized system.

If and when a preference system is instituted, some of the feared inequities will at least temporarily become realities. Countries like Japan with many labor-intensive industries will be particularly affected by preferences. The costs to developed countries will be imposed not according to per capita income but according to previous tariff levels. In the short run, lower-priced imports from the LDC's will have an adverse effect on balance of payments accounts in the industrialized countries and may produce unemployment in small, marginal industries. If quotas or other restrictive "safeguards," not permitted in a nondiscriminatory trade system, are not enacted in anticipation of the preference system, the pressure to enact them will become irresistible when the impact of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the system has been felt. The growth rates of some LDC's may be accelerated considerably at the expense of others less prepared to compete in the expanded markets.

The United States contended at UNCTAD I that a successful preference system would make the developing countries economically dependent upon developed states, a result inconsistent with the LDC's intense desire for independence. Pincus notes that British relations with Commonwealth countries were not adversely affected because of the preference, but he acknowledges that countries sensitive to "neocolonial ties" might face considerable domestic opposition to preferential arrangements.

"Trade diversion" is often cited by critics as another economic cost of preferences. The result of shifting production from low- to high-cost centers, they say, will be a less efficient use of the world's resources. If the industrialized countries turn from lower cost non-preference-receiving sources of supply to higher cost sources that become lower priced only with preferences, the effect has been to "divert" trade, i.e., to subsidize high-cost production which would otherwise not take place. But "trade creation," it is said, would increase economic efficiency by shifting production from high-cost, protected producers to low-cost preference-receiving producers. This dichotomy ignores the cost-reducing effects preferences might have over time, focusing instead on efficiency in a static world market.[20]

An Audit of the Costs

All of these possible costs — legislative backlash, the hindrance to MFN reductions, international and national political friction, inequitable distribution of gains and losses, trade diversion — must be measured not only in relation to the benefits, here the potential acceleration of economic development in the South, but to the costs of taking other action or no action at all.

Several of the suggested costs are not results of a preference system so much as they are costs of political and economic innovation. The possibility that the intent of a proposed new trade policy might be subverted by Congress is a risk of any new program. Awe-inspiring as that possibility may be, it is not a con-

[20]Pincus (*op. cit.*, pp. 200-204) points out the conflict between static efficiency and development and discusses the possible positive outcomes of trade diversion even at the static level, depending on the viewpoint of the observer. Johnson suggests that the "trade diversion" analysis must be modified in light of effective protection theory (*Economic Policies . . .*, pp. 185-186).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vincing argument on the merits. Furthermore, Congress has recently shown itself fully capable of adopting a protectionist policy quite in the absence of an Administration request for departure from MFN treatment and traditional liberal trade doctrine. The dismantling of inefficient industries in the developed countries would be a long overdue step toward more rational use of economic resources. The "political friction" generated among developing and developed countries is a by-product of the problem of allocation of loss and gain inherent in any multilateral plan to redistribute resources. The North-South friction engendered by a preference system might be small indeed compared to the "friction" Northern countries can create if they continue to ignore the needs of developing countries.

The potential costs indicate that a preference system must be flexible, subject to adjustment, possibly accompanied by compensatory measures in some cases, not monolithic but carefully tailored to the different levels of national development.

Proponents of the preference cannot present hard evidence of the economic growth they claim the preference can produce. The empirical data do not yet exist on which to base estimates of the probable effects of preferences on LDC trade volume and gains from trade. The British Commonwealth preference, introduced in 1932, produced significant gains for less developed Commonwealth members over a long time span, but concurrent conditions — steady erosion of preference margins by MFN tariff reductions, high transportation costs to the United Kingdom from the Asian states ready to utilize the preference (India, Pakistan), and lack of familiarity with the British market also due in part to distances — minimize the predictive value of the British experience.

Conclusion

Preference proponents present a cogent theoretical case, but the novel character of their proposal prevents them from adducing empirical evidence to support it. Opponents of the preference argue that protection of infant industries is a national development strategy, significantly distorted when applied multilaterally and therefore unlikely to produce the economic gains claimed. The potentially detrimental economic and political effects of preferences outweigh their potential benefits, these opponents assert. Many of these economic and political "costs," however, would be incurred in any plan to move resources from North to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

South. Others involve short-run sacrifices by the industrial countries, such as a possible delay in MFN reductions. Increased foreign earnings produced by preferences should in the long run enable the LDC's to import more from the North.

The Kennedy Round failed to yield significant tariff reductions on the goods LDC's can produce most efficiently. The industrialized countries can and should do more than they are doing presently to improve the quality of life in the nonindustrialized world. The LDC's themselves have formulated the preference proposal to redress a long-standing imbalance in the gains from trade and to accelerate industrialization. The conclusion seems inescapable that the preference should be tested as a means to help the developing countries utilize the economic potential they possess.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PLANNING FOR LIKELY WARS

by Reuben S. Nathan

WHETHER the extent of our involvement in Viet Nam was foreseen and wisely planned, or whether we permitted ourselves to slide into a quagmire, will be debated for a long time to come. One fact is certain: once we were involved, we fought an unconventional war with conventional means, with concepts and methods that could not possibly achieve our objectives in any reasonable period of time. Relying on quantitative answers to a qualitative problem, we provoked an impasse with serious consequences to national unity. Whether the political decisions of four Presidents were right or wrong is a moot point, but the responsibility for the trouble Viet Nam has caused rests squarely with obsolescent military thinking.

Axiomatically, military establishments tend to fight present wars with means that did not quite lose the last one and, in Clemenceau's words, wars are much too serious a business to be left to generals. Most generals make the grade because they do not defy tradition. They like to think of war in terms of the infantry going over the top, preferably with bayonets fixed and flags flying. That may be an overstatement but it especially applies in countries which, like ours, object to the idea of a permanent General Staff. When creative staff work fails to merit the prestige stemming from membership in an intellectual elite, promotions tend to come from command functions. They come easier when command is exercised in the proper gung-ho spirit. That spirit led us down the primrose path in Southeast Asia. "Courageous generals are a menace," wrote Sun Wu in his *Art of War* 2,400 years ago. His most diligent students in our time are Mao and Giap; the fact that neither is a military professional (Giap is a history teacher) goes a long way in explaining their military successes.

It is curious that this country, which prides itself on civilian control of the military, tends to abdicate that control when it is most necessary — during wartime. President Roosevelt did not care to interfere with his military experts in World War II. Winston Churchill did; he may never have overruled his Chiefs of Staff but he left no doubt that his was the master's voice. Because the United States had by 1942-1943 turned into the senior

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

partner, he could not impress his views equally on Generals Marshall and Eisenhower, whose concepts were rooted in military rather than political considerations. From a purely military perspective there was no alternative to invading the Continent across the Channel, nor any reason to beat the Soviets to Prague and Berlin. The result, which Churchill wanted to forestall by invading Europe through its "soft underbelly," was something less than peace, namely, the Cold War.

Evidently von Clausewitz failed to communicate to his American students what he meant when he wrote that "war is merely a continuation of politics by an admixture of different means." His point was quite simple. Nations have national objectives. They try to achieve them by all manner of means: diplomacy, propaganda, economic commitments, pressures. When such "normal" means fail, they may resort to war. But the admixture of military operations does not change the objectives—these remain political or, to be more precise, psychological. The basic idea is to break the adversary's will to resist the objectives one seeks to accomplish, to make him submit to one's own views on the kind of peace to be lived with. To the extent that this requires military force, it is up to the military to apply it. But the military involvement may never be more than part of the mix from which the desired kind of peace is to issue. One does not destroy an enemy for the sake of destroying him unless, as Machiavelli put it, one is determined to eradicate him, man, woman and child.

We fought World War II to put an end to aggressively imperialist and thoroughly ruthless regimes in Germany and Japan, but we needed both Germany and Japan to construct a peace capable of limiting Russian expansionism and Soviet aspirations to rule the world. Political and geopolitical analysis should, therefore, have prevailed over conventional military thinking—obviously we should have tried to separate the Soviets from Germany by invading the European continent from the Eastern Mediterranean and by beating them to Berlin and Prague. We did better in the Far East because there, at least, we managed to isolate our postwar arrangements from Soviet influence. If a few years later General MacArthur meant *military* victory when he said that there is no substitute for victory, he either had never quite understood Clausewitz — which in his case is unlikely — or was more concerned with coining a slogan that might hurt President Truman. In any event he was wrong. North Viet Nam and the Viet Cong proved how right Clausewitz had been.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I

General Giap did not besiege Dien Bien Phu in 1954 for any special strategic reason, nor was he particularly interested in gathering military laurels. Neither Dien Bien Phu nor the few thousand French he caught there mattered much militarily. The French still had hundreds of thousands of men in Indochina to carry on. Giap fought the battle of Dien Bien Phu to win the war in Paris. He knew morale in metropolitan France was close to the breaking point and, taking advantage of the heroic image the defenders of Dien Bien Phu projected, moved to shatter it. Thus by winning a minor engagement he defeated France.

Except for a few months in the spring and early summer of 1965 when it appeared that he might be able to do so, Giap never attempted to win the present war by purely military means. As soon as U.S. combat units entered Viet Nam, he determined that there was only one way to overcome the superior physical strength of the United States: by protracting the war, if necessary for twenty years, and wearing down American morale. Note the seeming paradox and the brilliance of the concept — to win a war not by the traditional means of destroying opposing forces but merely by protracting the fighting. He realized at the same time that his short-lived attempt to defeat Saigon militarily in 1965 had been a conceptual error and a violation of the techniques of revolutionary warfare. He confessed frankly that chances of an easy victory had led him astray — that concentration on military objectives had made him neglect what really mattered: the allegiance of the people and their intimate cooperation.

Beginning in the fall of 1965, his military operations aimed at one primary goal: to inflict casualties on U.S. troops. It is a strategy no book on the art of war recommends. Military tradition conceives of taking ground and defeating armies, of destroying the enemy's physical capability to resist. Giap thought in terms of impressing Americans at home with the bloody price of fighting in a distant country. He coordinated the bloodletting with peace demonstrations in the United States as best he could. A specially dramatic incident, such as Norman R. Morrison's immolation in front of the Pentagon, was sure to be followed by an attack on U.S. forces, preferably on those not yet experienced in combat, without concern for either palpable military gains or North Vietnamese casualties.

The statement perhaps best illustrating the U.S. command's lack of understanding of this war came from high-ranking

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Americans who said after the TET offensive of 1968 that the enemy might have scored a psychological success but certainly sustained a military defeat. There is no question that the offensive was beaten militarily and that Hanoi and the Viet Cong never quite recovered from the losses they suffered; they had thrown their elite into the battle and lost most of them. There is no question either that the offensive failed to unleash a popular Vietnamese revolution, which some think had been its aim. Somehow I do not believe it was. Giap is not the type to count on spontaneous risings by unorganized masses.

The question is what the TET offensive was designed to accomplish and whether this was accomplished. For one thing, it compromised the American top echelon which had boasted over and over again that it was gaining control of the situation. However briefly, the enemy was now seen running over the country at will, and especially in places public opinion had been led to believe were secure. The impact on American opinion was traumatic. The decline of American military prestige, which has not yet run its course, may well date from TET.

Second, communist propaganda in Viet Nam had always been to the effect that the American people were peaceful but that their leaders were warmongers. One day the American people would recognize that only one man, fronting for Pentagon imperialism and Wall Street neocolonialism, stood between war and peace — Lyndon B. Johnson; then they would "overthrow" him. Only a few weeks after the TET campaign President Johnson announced that he would not seek a second term. This would enable him to strive for an acceptable settlement without being suspected of making a bid for re-election. True, Johnson was not "overthrown," but the effect was the same. The implication of his announcement was that he did not wish to take a chance on being defeated.

Third, the United States offered negotiations. Negotiations, to communists, mean a stage of accelerated war behind the deceptive shield of a conference which, to noncommunists, holds the promise of peace. Moreover, the world expects noncommunist negotiators to be reasonable and willing to compromise while, curiously, it accepts communist obstinacy. Hanoi, as a direct result of TET 1968, was in the highly desirable position of being able to parade its peaceful intentions without yielding a point.

Finally, the offensive, faithfully reflected on television, undoubtedly strengthened the "peace movement" in the United

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

States and to that extent weakened the power of the President to cope with a war in which much depended on the enemy's evaluation of American morale.

Is it too much to assume that these had been the objectives of the TET campaign — of an offensive unleashed by men who knew they could not hope to gain the advantage by military means but who felt certain of achieving it by manipulating American public opinion? If so, the campaign was an unqualified success. It is irrelevant that it was militarily defeated. Defeat was a price Hanoi was willing to pay for what it hoped would win the war.

Courting defeat emerges as one of the techniques with which modern wars are being waged and may be won. We might have learned this from the French-Algerian encounter; the French had, for all practical purposes, won militarily when they were forced to concede defeat. We might have learned from Mao's previous refusal to fight by the rules of traditional military science. Mao's contempt for the conventions is monumental; to him the main ingredients of successful warfare are evasion and retreat, inflexible determination never to fight on the enemy's terms. That is reflected in his famous formula: "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue." It is the old Sun Wu concept, based on the eminently practical notion that it is unintelligent to employ one's power if there is a chance of losing it. Power is an element, Sun Wu felt, that one must prudently hoard, keep in being, in order to make the other side wonder whether, when and where it may be used. Stratagems are what win wars, he said, not strategy; brains, not guns. Here is how the editor of Hanoi's party organ, *Nhan Dan,* speaking to the *New York Times'* Fox Butterfield (January 3, 1970), put it: "Mr. Nixon has forces made up of steel and iron. Our forces are made of water. Water is not so aggressive and violent as steel and iron, but water rusts iron and cools down steel."

II

Will we ever learn? There are few signs that we do — unless we accept our abandonment of search-and-destroy campaigns as a precedent of better things to come; and that was, it would seem, forced on our military strategists by considerations not necessarily connected with the situation in the theater of war. There is no indication of recognition on the part of the military that the search-and-destroy concept had been counterproductive. These cam-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

paigns could not help inflicting numerous noncombatant casualties and devastating villages — results that gave the enemy greater popular support in a war in which success depends on depriving the enemy of that support. The missions would impress the people in their path with the incredible superiority of American hardware, making them feel securely protected against Viet Cong terrorism and correspondingly inclined to gain our favor by, for instance, providing intelligence. Then our units would move on and leave the people in the lurch; the Viet Cong would return and revenge themselves on the "traitors"; and the people would never trust us again. Yet we were prepared to pay this price — if we realized that we paid it and how high it was — in the hope of keeping the enemy off balance and forcing him to fight. The enemy, deeply convinced that it is wiser to retreat than to fight except on one's own terms, melted away.

Search-and-destroy was typical of that conventional doctrine which continues to dominate American military thinking. Our military posture is oriented toward nuclear and conventional war, as confirmed by our major weapons systems, existing or in process, the organization and deployment of our military manpower, their training and the curricula of our military academies and colleges, the budget and organization of the Department of Defense. Obviously, we could not do without nuclear and conventional capabilities. They are needed to deter major confrontations, to put potential aggressors on notice that they will not get away with Hitlerian schemes. Without them we could not have persuaded Khrushchev to abandon Cuba as an offensive base. No matter what dreams of permanent peace may suggest to idealists who do not bother to study history or who claim (with Henry Ford senior) that the past is irrelevant to the present and the future, weakness remains an invitation to aggression. True, there are new technological dimensions which are supposed to make for fundamental change. But they can do this only as long as both parties to a possible conflict are equally equipped to destroy each other. In awe of the superior destructive power of the nuclear bomb, we tend to forget that man's ability and readiness to commit mass murder precede the splitting of the atom. The Thirty Years War (1618-1648) transformed Germany into wasteland. The battles for Verdun killed millions. The firestorms that Allied bombers unleashed over Hamburg, Dresden and Tokyo burned hundreds of thousands to a crisp.

If it stands to reason that no halfway rational power will resort

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to nuclear warfare because it is bound to result in reciprocal disaster, it follows that major conventional confrontations are equally unlikely. What normally happens in wars is that one side must face defeat. The question is how one faces defeat in these enlightened times. There is only one deducible answer. Unless one is willing to surrender to a presumably ruthless enemy, one escalates the level of the war. Is it really conceivable that a government or a theater commander whose field forces, possibly hundreds of thousands of men, are in danger of being massacred will stand by without resorting to the ultimate weapon, the nuclear warhead? It is not. War has its own emotional logic. It feeds on itself. People engaged in a major war tend to believe that the survival of their nation and their values depends on seeing it through. They will refuse to surrender while there still seems to be a way out.

The first use of a tactical nuclear weapon to avert disaster will be answered in kind, and the retaliation will inevitably turn into the strategic nuclear holocaust the world has dreaded. Who could wait to determine whether the first mushroom cloud was produced by a tactical or a strategic shot? Thus, even the most determined aggressors must consider the probability that conventional aggression will be as self-defeating as any attack relying on nuclear missiles from the start. Why should they take that chance when they have developed far better military techniques to achieve political objectives unachievable by nonmilitary or nuclear means?

III

The advantages of the techniques of revolutionary warfare, some of which we have seen in operation in Viet Nam, are enormous, and would be so even if we understood their nature and were better prepared to cope with them. In the first place, they allow for conducting wars by proxy — by people indigenous to the theater of operations. These people must be trained and organized carefully, and supplied with weapons, ammunition, food and whatever else they need to fight, since they will almost never be in a position to operate successfully on their own; nevertheless, they remain indigenes who, flying the false flag of national insurrection, appear to be other than the instruments of aggression from without. They do not necessarily compromise the aggressor and they save him employing and risking his own forces.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Second, numerical strength is unneeded. The prime weapons of revolutionary warfare are propaganda, subversion, terror, guerrilla and small unit warfare. The smaller the numbers involved, the better. It is easier to control them, harder to locate and catch them. Small groups can rarely afford independence; nor can they go off on tangents. The hard core of the Viet Cong has never been estimated at more than 40,000 men – the rest yielded to deceptive promises, were drafted, blackmailed, shanghaied, kidnapped. I saw examples of all of that; some of them Mayor La Guardia would have called "beauts."

Highly disciplined small units are not easily vulnerable to superior physical power. Three men can hide in a village almost indefinitely; if, as is likely, they are the only ones in the village who are armed and ready to use their arms against informers, few, no matter how opposed to them, will dare to give them away. Al Capone did not command divisions, yet none of the people who could have testified to the crimes he and his henchmen committed dared to bear witness against him. Who would like to watch his little daughter be maimed or killed? Furthermore, it takes only three men to remove a fairly heavy mortar from its hiding place under the floor of a hut, lug it in the dark of night through the jungle up a hill to a predetermined position, lob twenty rounds on a major air base or into a town, and vanish back into seemingly normal village life.

This is the kind of warfare that is most unlikely to escalate into nuclear exchange; it, therefore, offers a means of gaining political objectives without courting disaster – provided one conducts it intelligently and manages to achieve a measure of success. It lends itself to deceiving public opinion and creating the kind of confusion that allows for fishing in muddled waters.

The confusion results from mistaking revolutionary warfare for revolution. When Senator Fulbright, for example, held a series of hearings on the "nature of revolution" some years ago, he sought, according to the *New York Times,* to "establish that the United States could not influence social or nationalistic revolutions, *such as in Vietnam,* and therefore should not get involved in them." More recently, the press defined Vice President Agnew's mission in Asia as explaining to Asian leaders that the Nixon Doctrine, proclaimed on Guam in July 1969, means they will have to take care of their internal affairs without Americans to fight their battles, but that the U.S. power and presence will be in the Pacific if allies face *real* threats from outside their borders. When is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

something that looks like a revolution in fact a revolution, i.e., an internal affair, and when is it aggression in revolution's garb?

That is quite a question. It accounts, among other things, for the inability of the United Nations to agree on a definition of aggression. A number of UN members, especially the Soviet Union, object to any definition that would include aggression by means of revolutionary warfare, i.e., by means seeming to be internal. U.S. Army semantics added to the jumble by coining the term "counterinsurgency," which would appear to group efforts to cope with revolutionary warfare and to put down truly revolutionary insurgencies in the same category. There is a world of difference between them but that difference is not always obvious. One of the techniques of revolutionary warfare, and perhaps the most important and effective of them, is to confuse the issue further.

Revolution is a good word. It may sometimes be a good thing. The Declaration of Independence establishes it not only as a right but, given certain conditions, as the duty of mankind: "But when a long Train of Abuses and Usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object, evinces a Design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their Right, it is their Duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future Security." It is probably no exaggeration to say that more than half of mankind today lives under conditions which, according to this formula, justify resort to violent measures in order to secure a minimum of political, economic and social decency. Unfortunately, revolutions rarely achieve that end; they tend to devour their children and breed reaction, either in the name of counterrevolution or, more commonly, under the pretext of consolidating the revolution itself. Be that as it may, revolutions are often the only recourse of the oppressed. They thus deserve our sympathy and, if possible, our support. Denial of support can be more than morally wrong. It can be a political mistake. For the true revolutionary may have to look for support where he can get it. If he meets with apathy or hostility on our part, he has little alternative to turning to our enemies.

IV

But how does one determine whether a revolution is a revolution in the sense of the Declaration of Independence or whether it is aggression employing the techniques of revolutionary warfare? We may never be able to establish a conclusive set of criteria from which the answer can be derived. The one criterion for revolution

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on which the American Declaration and Soviet doctrine seem to agree is somewhat vague. Both point to the existence of a revolutionary situation involving great numbers of people who are unwilling to tolerate oppression any longer. The Declaration of Independence speaks of mankind, the Soviets prefer the term "masses." When the Communist Party of Bolivia, in accord with Soviet doctrine, sabotaged Che Guevara's attempt to stimulate a revolution by individual action, it was because of doubt that the Bolivian masses were ready to revolt — which marked Guevara an adventurer, not a revolutionary. It cannot be denied that many revolutions were inspired by small groups of men who succeeded in mobilizing the people and unleashing mass movements. Still, at one point "the people" must enter the picture. Until they are involved or until it becomes clear that they are reluctant to join the rebels, we have no way of knowing whether we are confronted with an incipient revolution or with a band of conspirators, practitioners of revolutionary warfare who may be tools of aggression.

Reliable criteria or not, it is essential to determine the nature of insurgencies if they occur in areas vital to the security of the United States. An insurgency in one of these areas that is not an authentic national development but the reflection of an international design, intended less to improve the lot of the people than to endanger legitimate American interests, is a matter of grave concern to this nation. We could hardly afford passively to watch a Cuban-controlled "rebellion" take over the Panama Canal or establish missile bases anywhere near the continental United States. Nor could we remain indifferent while a trumped-up "revolutionary" movement changed a delicate political balance in some critically important corner of the world to the advantage of imperialist powers hostile to this country.

Whether an insurgency is an act of revolutionary warfare that threatens American interests must be determined on the merits of each individual case. Whether or not the insurgency in South Viet Nam endangered vital U.S. interests by, for instance, jeopardizing the security of most of Southeast Asia and raising questions about the value of alliance with us is a controversial and emotionally loaded question. The point relevant to this discussion is that the Viet Cong insurgency neither was nor is a revolution. It was and is a clear case of aggression by means of revolutionary warfare. The people of South Viet Nam were never involved — except as victims. There was no popular movement engaging the masses, no

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

levée en masse, no march on Saigon; and apathy to the cause of "revolution" was not the result of ruthless oppression by dictatorial regimes, for no Saigon regime has been powerful or efficient enough to exercise that kind of control. Consider the TET campaign of 1968 when the Viet Cong seemed to dominate the scene. Certainly the people then had a chance to join them. They did not. A major part of the communist effort was directed against an unmoved populace wanting no part of insurrection. That is why close to 5,000 civilians were slaughtered in Hué alone.

If there was no revolution, was the insurgency part of the design of a militant revolutionary minority to improve the lot of the people? The answer may be found in its timing. When the Viet Cong renewed their operations against South Viet Nam in 1960, the economic and social situation in the country showed signs of unprecedented improvement. Hanoi and the Lao Dong, the Communist Party, could not tolerate a window on prosperity pointing up how little of what people really want communism has to offer. The Lao Dong, controlled by Hanoi, acted to prevent Saigon from improving the human condition. True, the improvement was less than perfect and only in its first stages, but the communists could not take a chance on its development. They rose, in other words, *against* the legitimate interests of the people — in the narrow-minded interests of a small minority ruthlessly concerned with taking control.

The personnel assigned to the sabotage were political agents systematically positioned since 1946, especially in 1954. The Lao Dong has always thought in long-range terms and no matter what nationalist slogans it may use, these embrace French Indochina rather than Viet Nam only: Laos and Cambodia as well as Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina, plus northwest Thailand. Hanoi's military dispositions suggest that it continues to think in these terms. The design is not to carry out a popular revolution but to impose Lao Dong despotism on scores of millions of people and over vast areas. As established by the Declaration of Independence *and* Soviet doctrine on "wars of liberation," the designation revolution fits the defense of South Viet Nam, the South Vietnamese quest for national identity and purpose, rather than the assault on them.

That South Viet Nam falls short of being an American-type democracy does not detract from this statement. As a recent letter to the editor of the *New York Times* pointed out, "of nearly 150 nominally independent countries in the world, only in about two

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dozen do the people regularly exercise the right to free elections." Yet in at least some of the countries which are governed less than democratically the regimes are the product of genuinely popular revolutions. It is not easy to introduce perfect democracy in countries at war, in countries still in the process of striving for nationhood. Even the United States did not emerge as a full-fledged democracy from its revolution. It is, moreover, questionable whether our concepts of democracy are applicable to Southeast Asia in the first place — though I found greater dedication to them in many quarters in Viet Nam than is evident in some parts of this country.

V

From the Vietnamese example we can define more clearly what the techniques of revolutionary warfare are. They add up, in the late Philippine President Magsaysay's words, to the most total form of total war conceivable. Revolutionary warfare means political warfare, psychological warfare, ideological, economic and social warfare; it employs military operations only to score political, psychological, ideological, economic and social points. Guerrillas do not, for example, cut roads to deny them to the enemy, as in conventional warfare. They know they cannot keep them cut for any length of time. If they cut the road from, say, Dalat to Saigon, they do so to interrupt the flow of fruit and vegetables to the capital. Stopping these vital supplies even for the briefest of periods means an immediate price rise in Saigon's markets. There is nothing the government can do to help the poor (which means the vast majority of the town's population) who find themselves hard-pressed to pay higher prices for desperately needed food. By holding up the trucks the guerrillas try to make that point: your government cannot protect you; the merest handful of our men can force its hand and reveal its helplessness; there is a vacuum where a government is supposed to function in your interest, and we are the only dynamic force capable of filling that vacuum.

To demonstrate to the people that real power lies in the hands of the insurgents, no matter how many men the government and its allies may put in uniform, is one of the two major objectives revolutionary warfare tries to accomplish. The other is to manipulate public opinion in the world-at-large by confusing it and persuading it that there will be no peace except on the in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

surgents' terms; that insistence on anything else is futile, wasteful of lives and immoral.

It is hard to see how these psychological objectives can be frustrated by conventional warfare operations, for there are not enough divisions in the world to prevent three faceless men from felling a tree somewhere along thousands of miles of road bordered by jungle, covering it with an automatic weapon and creating a traffic jam of Long Island Expressway proportions. Nullifying the techniques of revolutionary warfare requires a reversal of traditional military concepts. The most effective way to defeat aggression by insurgency is not to kill off the enemy, as in conventional fighting, but to plan and conduct one's strategy and tactics so as to save, secure and protect a maximum of lives, especially the lives of noncombatants, in order to demonstrate beyond the shadow of a doubt who the terrorists are. It is of decisive importance to win the allegiance of the people.

This is the key to victory. The forces of revolutionary warfare do not stand and fight except on their own terms and to score specific points; they are not normally vulnerable to attack by superior power. They are, however, vulnerable to any denial of popular support. Their techniques depend largely on the cooperation or sufferance of the populace, whether this is obtained by terror or by sophisticated propaganda. Usually without ready access to home bases, insurgents must live on the land and rely on the people for food, shelter, recruits, funds and, most important, information. It is equally important that the people do not inform on them. Denied that kind of support, they are paralyzed. They must wither on the vine and, sooner or later, fade away.

Here is their Achilles heel and the only truly promising target for their opponents. The question is with what arrows to hit it. One, obviously, is psychological operations. The people thirst for peace and security. Most of them being peasants and, therefore, smart, practical and pragmatic, they also prefer to side with the ultimate victor — for there are risks in having been allied with the losing party. If propaganda can persuade them of one's determination to achieve one's objectives, that is, to defeat aggression and leave the country free and able to stand alone, it will also persuade them that peace and security depend on the achievement of these objectives. But one's conduct makes the point with equal effectiveness. Psychological warfare is not only a matter of communicating with people by broadcasts, leaflets and other means of contact; it involves planning, designing and executing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strategy and tactics — military, political, economic and social — in such a manner as to focus their hopes on efforts in their behalf and gain their allegiance.

This does not mean going by the book of military traditions, for it makes psychological considerations the key to all military planning. From this aspect the worth of any action is in what it can contribute to the achievement of the primary objective: winning the hearts and the minds of the people. More often than not, this will mean disregarding conventional military wisdom. It may, for instance, suggest the temporary abandonment of vast areas in favor of securing numbers of geographic nuclei from which to expand, laboriously, until they meet. Such a strategy would serve to give the people inhabiting the nuclei the security they so desperately seek; it would, moreover, tempt those still outside the secured perimeters to make whatever contribution they can toward their gradual inclusion in the pacified zones. Their contribution may come in the form of invaluable information; it may be expressed in increasingly grudging cooperation with insurgents who are highly sensitive to changes in the political climate and often easily demoralized by them. A strategy of this sort has nothing in common with General Gavin's static concept of withdrawing into enclaves, for its rationale would be the dynamic enlargement of concentric circles until they merge.

Giving primacy to psychological considerations may at times suggest refusing engagements the conventional military mind tends to welcome. There are exceptional situations in which insurgents want to fight because they would, it seems to them, fight on their own terms. Rather than take them on, one might undermine their morale by letting them strike into empty space or vegetate in the jungle waiting for action, while continuing to pursue one's own objectives. Calculated refusals to engage forces would also keep down American casualties, which may be the would-be attackers' purpose.

Casualties, our own and those of noncombatants, favor the enemy's psychological and political objectives. Some of our more perceptive military leaders recognized this early in the campaign. At the time the first major U.S. combat units entered Viet Nam, in the summer of 1965, General Westmoreland ordered that new rules of engagement be drafted to minimize noncombatant casualties. As I submitted what may have been the first draft, I wondered whether its requirements had much of a chance of implementation. For here is the rub. When in conventional war a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

commander, whether of squad or brigade, meets with unforeseen circumstances in carrying out an assignment (take Hill 806!), he must make one of three possible decisions: to proceed as planned despite the change in circumstances; to look for an alternate way to carry out the assignment; or to break off the engagement. Unconventional war adds a new dimension, consideration of how a decision based on purely military reasoning will affect the chances of winning the total contest. What if that decision exposes noncombatants to dangers with the result of transforming potential friends into foes; what if it disappoints people who had been hoping for action that might secure their hamlets? It takes a considerable measure of political and psychological sophistication to come up with the correct answer, and military training, manuals and textbooks do not provide much help. Can one expect a squad leader, a young lieutenant commanding a platoon or even a regimental commander steeped in conventional military wisdom to make the statesmanlike decision the situation requires? One cannot — not until military training and doctrine are geared to an entirely new set of conditions.

It used to be, for instance, that a pilot encountering anti-aircraft fire on the way to his assigned objective would circle and hit the place that had fired on him. The Viet Cong counted on that: When they found a village less than hospitable, they would set up a machine gun close to it and, against all rules of guerrilla warfare (never to give oneself away to aircraft), fire on the first passing plane. The pilot, replying to the attack, would thus punish their enemies — which means potential friends of ours — and give them a chance to "prove" that Americans are barbarians. The new rules simply said that pilots should not permit themselves to be diverted from their assigned targets: if they were fired on along the way, they were to get away as fast as they could. Air Force officers with whom I discussed this matter told me that no man should be asked not to return fire, because fighting back is a fundamental human instinct. Perhaps it is. But in this case it could also sabotage the war effort.

The point I am trying to make is that little of conventional military wisdom is applicable to revolutionary warfare situations; therefore, we are quite unprepared to cope with the kind of war most likely to occur in the foreseeable future. While on many levels of the military there is a beginning recognition of this, it would seem not to have penetrated some of the top echelons which would have to support the urgently required changes. A number

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of generals, who must have been largely responsible for the planning of strategy in Viet Nam, have never bothered to conceal their contempt for psychological operations and unconventional warfare. Officers committed to new approaches have been kept from Viet Nam, the one theater of operations that cried out for their unorthodox talents. I have attended seminars in which none of the students (officers considered "comers" with the potential for high rank) touched on the subject of unconventional warfare, perhaps because they were not familiar with it but more probably because they assumed that an expressed interest in the unorthodox would prejudice their careers.

U.S. policy and strategy continue to slight the psychological considerations that should be the key to all planning in encounters with the techniques of revolutionary warfare, and that could have a considerable bearing even on confrontations with major aggressor units — such as North Vietnamese divisions — trying to bolster the insurgents. We are satisfied with "coordinating" what there is of psychological and unconventional activities instead of integrating them and providing them with that indispensable condition of success: unity of command. As a result the struggle in Viet Nam, which otherwise might have been concluded successfully years ago, goes on and on. Given our misdirected efforts in this conflict, if the communist powers were to succeed in unleashing the many "Viet Nams" of which they continue to speak, they might realize their hope of one day isolating and quarantining the United States; they might be able to cut off its markets and destroy it by causing depressions, unemployment and civil strife. *Unless* we take the steps necessary to prepare for the likely kind of wars and so to deter them.

VI

These steps will be neither difficult nor costly; they may in fact produce substantial savings because they will lessen our reliance on massive conventional power. They do not affront the web of bureaucratic agencies jealous of their prerogatives as would insistence on the ideal solution: that planning for confrontations with the techniques of revolutionary warfare be concentrated in a single agency with sufficient authority to produce an integrated strategy and secure its integrated execution. They apply only to the military establishment, which must bear the brunt of the battle.

(1) Military counterinsurgency operations (under whatever

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

name) call for total integration of the near-inseparable contributions required from all services. It follows that they must become a *joint* responsibility under the direction of a special Service Secretary or a special Assistant Secretary of Defense who can speak for them in the highest councils of government.

(2) We must establish unity of command over the joint forces concerned with counterinsurgency, to be exercised by a senior general officer. The existence of a staff section for Special Operations in the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot satisfy this need. Consideration might be given to converting the U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance, formerly the Special Warfare Center, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, into an Armed Forces Military Assistance Command with operational control of all units involved: Special Forces, Psychological Operations Groups, Air Force Special Operations Squadrons, naval support. (The true potential of naval support has never been fully recognized; it could, *inter alia,* provide self-sufficient and easily mobile psychological operations facilities.)

(3) All schools and institutes concerned with counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare, whether the Army's at Fort Bragg or the Air Force's at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, should be consolidated into an Armed Forces College. This would not only save a great deal of money but would provide the college with capabilities the present schools cannot muster. Highly qualified instructors have always been in scant supply. The college would instruct senior, staff and unit officers, commissioned and noncommissioned, but beyond that it would be charged with carrying out studies on doctrine on the broadest possible scale, covering conceptual subject matter as well as strategy, tactics, organization, terminology and training methods.

The last point could easily be the most important. It is imperative that every man (and woman) in uniform be thoroughly familiar with the true requirements of modern war. We cannot expect to cope with revolutionary warfare unless our soldiers know what it is all about. Face-to-face persuasion is probably the most effective way of communicating with the people on whose allegiance the outcome of confrontations with insurgency depends — and this is the mission of the individual soldier. He must understand why he is where he is and that the climate of local public opinion depends greatly on the manner in which he bears himself. He must be something of a diplomat and propagandist, aware of our objectives and familiar with the significance of psychological

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

operations in their achievement. He must have at least a smattering of knowledge in all the areas that count: history and culture, ideology, economics and the fundamentals of social life.

General William P. Yarborough, in a speech many years ago, predicted that the training of the soldier of the future would have to be primarily concerned with subject matter in which today's soldiers receive little instruction. There is now no question but that they must be equipped to do more than shoot guns. If we revert, as the President hopes, to a professional army, this training problem would ease. Professional soldiers serve longer than draftees; there would be more time to instruct them in non-traditional disciplines. But the process of thinking how to provide this instruction should start now. There is not much time to lose.

These are only the most elementary steps. They may be no more than a beginning, but what matters is to make a start. That will be difficult enough, for the timing is bad. The nation is tired of involving itself in what appear to some of its citizens to be other people's domestic troubles. Special warfare, special forces, propaganda, psychological operations, political warfare — all of these are today bad words. Only a few people bother to study the purpose and nature of revolutionary warfare as a technique of aggression, conquest and international politics; as a weapon that may one day be aimed squarely at the jugular of powers, such as the United States, which cannot be defeated by other means. U.S. security demands that we prepare ourselves not only for the unlikely but also for the likely wars.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AFRICAN MODERNIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

by Kenneth J. Twitchett

ALL the independent African states[1] are members of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, and twenty-one have association links with the European Economic Community.[2] The most meaningful African diplomatic activity is undertaken primarily within the institutional framework of these organizations. There is considerable inter-African activity at the local and regional levels, but little at the continental level outside the structures provided by the OAU and the principal UN arm in Africa — the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). The OAU and the United Nations system supply the only common diplomatic reference points between, say, Zambia and the Ivory Coast. Many African states can communicate more easily with their ex-colonial metropoles than with other African states. Existing communications systems (whether internal rail and road or external air and sea routes) favor the former and hamper the latter.

In land area and population, the African states range from international giants like Nigeria to micro-states like Lesotho. Some are relatively rich in natural resources, for example the Congo (Kinshasa), but for others, such as Botswana, the foreseeable future seems to be one of economic dependence and subsistence economies. Ties with the outside world are diffuse and divisive. Some states are genuinely neutral or nonaligned in their stance toward international ideological and power struggles, while others pursue policies oriented on the side of the Western or communist camps. Britain's former African colonies are linked with her through the Commonwealth, and most of the French territories

[1]Unless otherwise indicated, the term African states refers to the black African regimes south of the Sahara (including Mauritania, the Sudan and Malagasy), and excludes both the white regimes of southern Africa and the Arab members of the OAU.

[2]Eighteen former Belgian, French and Italian dependencies are associated with the EEC under the Yaoundé Convention — Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Togo and Upper Volta. Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have association agreements under Article 238 of the Rome Treaty. Nigeria signed a similar agreement that never became operative due to the Nigerian civil war.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

still have ties to France via Yaoundé-type association with the EEC and other institutional frameworks. The former metropoles also bequeathed varied administrative and political systems to Africa.

It is difficult to define the term African or find common characteristics differentiating Africans from Arabs, Asians, Latin Americans and Europeans. Just as the Indian, Chinese and Japanese cultures are as distinct from each other as they are from the somewhat mythical European one, so within Africa there are a multitude of similar cleavages. In some respects the cultural imprint left by the colonial metropoles is more potent than the indigenous African heritage. There is no African linguistic counterpart to the role played by Arabic among the Arab states. English and French have greater claims than, say, Swahili to be African lingua francas. Despite the contentions of African philosophers and publicists such as Leopold Senghor, it is hard to identify a common African personality or even a common negritude. Disunity through racial, ethnic and tribal differences is widespread. Blackness is a common denominator only insofar as it indicates a relative racial distinction from the whites of Europe. To paraphrase Metternich's remark regarding nineteenth-century Italy: Africa is perhaps no more than a geographical expression.

Possibly their quests to create viable state structures and to achieve international dignity may be taken as the common reference points among the African countries. But these are points shared in one form or another by almost all the Third World and to which the Africans themselves attach differing values. The African states tend to coalesce only in the importance they assign to the United Nations system, the OAU, and association with the EEC in furthering the economic and political aspects of their quests. They possess neither the financial means nor the trained personnel necessary for participation in international affairs on the same scale as the European states, and are inclined to conserve these scarce resources for activity relating to these three institutional frameworks. Their diplomatic missions to them are usually small. David Kay has calculated that in 1967 the average size of African missions to the United Nations in New York was only 5.5 persons. This figure was "somewhat overstated since it was a common practice . . . to appoint their Ambassadors to the United States as heads of their permanent missions."[3] The African

[3]David Kay, "The Impact of African States on the United Nations," paper delivered to the American Political Science Association, September 1968, p. 3. Professor Kay's figure was based on an average of all the African missions, Arab as well as black African.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

missions in Addis Ababa and Brussels follow similar patterns: small staffs with heads of mission doubling as ambassadors to Ethiopia and Belgium respectively. As of 1967 the representative of Niger to Belgium and the EEC, for example, was also accredited to Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and West Germany.[4]

The strain on the African missions is severe. African diplomats representing their countries before the world at United Nations headquarters find that "the time-consuming schedule of plenary and committee meetings during General Assembly sessions is followed by an almost equally heavy load of *ad hoc* committees when the Assembly is not in session."[5] Lack of expertise in their home states usually results in representatives at New York, Addis Ababa and Brussels receiving inadequate documentation and policy instructions from their governments. But this often means that they possess greater discretionary powers and have more important roles as plenipotentiaries than their European counterparts.

The burden on the African missions is somewhat reduced by the assistance they receive from international secretariats. The UN Secretariat in New York has especially close liaison with them, and they tend to rely on its documentation for much of their policy formation. The Secretariat of the OAU cannot provide comparable assistance, but the ECA also has its headquarters in Addis Ababa and intimate ties have developed between the two secretariats and the African missions. African associates of the EEC rely greatly on the Commission of the European Communities for documentation and advice. Possibly too much reliance is placed on these offices. Without membership in and/or representation at the organizations served by the secretariats, however, African interests would probably not receive as much attention as they actually do. The United Nations, the OAU, and association with the EEC all play important roles in promoting African economic and political advancement.

The Economic Role of International Institutions

All the African states must modernize their economies to succeed in creating more viable political structures and giving some satisfaction to their peoples' rising expectation of a better life.

[4]*Corps Diplomatique accrédité auprès de la Communauté économique européenne, Février* 1967, p. 57.

[5]Kay, *loc. cit.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This cannot be done without massive external assistance. Much of the aid they receive is bilateral in form, primarily from the former metropoles. Such aid largely depends on the interests and whims of the donors, and to some Africans it has distinct neocolonial overtones. Despite this aspect, however, they usually accept the aid willingly and desire an increase. African underdevelopment is so serious a problem that aid in any form and from almost any quarter is acceptable. While they profess a preference for multilateral aid channeled through international institutions, the volume of such aid is still small in comparison with bilateral aid.

They would like to receive the bulk of their economic and technical assistance from African sources, but they cannot contribute much to each other's development programs. Moreover, only a tiny minority of them accept assistance from the Republic of South Africa, the one state south of the Sahara with the capacity to make a meaningful contribution. Both to achieve greater international respectability and to increase security by fostering dependence on the Republic, the government in Pretoria has expressed a willingness to cooperate on an inter-African basis regarding development problems. Very few African states have accepted this offer, although more now favor a dialogue with Pretoria. The odium most of them have for the Republic has led to its exclusion from the ECA, the various United Nations technical agencies operating in Africa, and such global specialized agencies as the International Labor Organization and the World Health Organization.

On the inter-African level little has been achieved in formulating viable economic and technical assistance programs. Article 2 of the OAU Charter specifies that among the purposes of the organization are "economic cooperation, including transportation and communications, educational and cultural cooperation, health, sanitation, and nutritional cooperation, [and] scientific and technical cooperation." There has been hardly any progress toward this apart from the establishment of such bodies as the Economic and Social Commission and the Scientific, Technical and Research Commission. The habit of consultation that could be engendered by these and other organizations might eventually reap a rich reward.

The major arena for inter-African functional cooperation is the ECA — in practice if not in theory the economic arm of the OAU. The various United Nations technical missions and agencies operating in Africa all serve to promote such cooperation. Possibly

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the ECA's most useful contribution has been the part played by its Secretary-General, Robert Gardiner, in furthering the notion that African economic cooperation should take place on a regional rather than a continental basis. Regional cooperation would be more meaningful and realistic than attempts at large-scale continental cooperation. The regional economic units might eventually develop into integrated political institutions, with the possible long-term goal of a federal structure at the continental level. Cooperation within these smaller-scale units could also help to overcome the waste of resources through regional rivalries like that between Liberia and Nigeria for primacy in West African steel production.

Schemes for regional economic cooperation are influenced in part by the successes of the various West European experiments, especially the EEC. Unfortunately, there is much less political stability and economic compatibility among the African states than in Western Europe. Realization of the ECA's plan to form regional economic groups has been hampered by instability, differing economic capacities and needs, political and economic rivalries and jealously guarded sovereign prerogatives. Similar factors have militated against attempts at smaller-scale regional arrangements. For example, the Central African Republic, Chad and the Congo (Kinshasa) formed the Union of Central African States (UEAC) with the objective of pooling resources in tackling development problems. This essentially represented a breakaway movement from the Central African Economic and Customs Union (UDEAC), a loose association based primarily on what was formerly French Equatorial Africa. But the Central African Republic soon decided that its interests were better served by rejoining UDEAC and downgrading UEAC. Since Chad and the Congo (Kinshasa) are separated by the Central African Republic, UEAC was no longer a viable association. On January 1, 1969 the Central African Republic closed its borders to Chad, which only on the previous day had formally left UDEAC and begun to impose customs duties on its members' goods.[6]

Another example is furnished by former British Africa. Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda formed the East African Economic Community, as successor to the East African Common Services Organization. Although provision has been made for an East

[6]See "UEAC, UDEAC and OCAM, all at odds," *Financial Times*, February 14, 1969. The affair was eventually settled after the mediation of other African states, in particular by the Afro-Malagasy Joint Organization (OCAM).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

African Development Bank and other forms of mutual cooperation, little has been achieved due to inter-African rivalries and the markedly dominant economic position of Kenya.

Intra-African trade is low. Though many African governments subscribe to the view that economic development will get underway only if intracontinental commercial exchange is stimulated, they remain preoccupied with furthering their overseas export markets. They need foreign currency to purchase the goods necessary for modernization — goods that other African states cannot provide. There is some stimulation of intra-African trade by customs unions and free trade areas like the Afro-Malagasy Joint Organization (OCAM), UDEAC, and the West African Common Market. But some of the members of these organizations possess economies based largely on the same primary products: for example, in the West African Common Market, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Sierra Leone all rely to a greater or lesser extent on the export of groundnuts. While the French economy can withstand, say, West German competition in car production, primary products have not the same elasticity of demand; they are so important an aspect of most African economies that within a completely free trade area the less efficient producers of competing goods would quickly find themselves out of business.

Political instability and rivalry also obstruct intra-African trade. For instance, in the early part of 1969 Senegal was confronted with a difficult economic situation due in part to domestic unrest. She had high hopes of ameliorating it through cooperation with the other members of the Organization of Senegal River States (OERS), Guinea, Mali and Mauritania. Sekou Touré's refusal to allow Guinea to have any dealings with the military junta that overthrew his fellow radical, Modibo Keita, in Mali had the effect of paralyzing the OERS and any economic plans that would have helped Senegal. Overall, competing primary products and political instability augur ill for either economic cooperation or the stimulation of stronger trading relationships between the new states.

In the global context, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have not made major contributions to African economic development to date. Due to its constitution and inadequate resources, the Bank has had to assess the ability of all applicants to absorb development capital and to repay premiums plus interest. Although its interest rates have not been exorbitant

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

compared with world rates generally, most African states already carry massive debt burdens that prevent them from qualifying as applicants within the Bank's terms of reference. Nigeria and some other states have obtained loans, but on the whole Africa has received a much lower proportion of Bank capital than Western Europe or even Asia and Latin America. The IMF also operates on orthodox financial principles and is loath to adopt loan policies to embrace the needs of the developing states, most of which, on the surface at least, are not good investment risks. This orthodoxy has been much criticized by these states, which have used their numerical majority in such forums as the General Assembly and the two UNCTAD meetings to pass resolutions demanding grants, low-interest loans and other assistance more in keeping with their needs. In the procedures of the World Bank and the IMF, however, the voting capacities of the member states are determined by their financial contributions, not on the formula of one state one vote.

Nevertheless, the criticisms of the developing states and the resolutions passed in forums where they possess voting majorities have served to make the Western industrialized states more aware of African and other Third World development problems. In particular, there is now a general acceptance of the crucial link between aid and trade outlets for promoting development. Among other institutional innovations, the United Nations Development Program was established to provide financial assistance, supplementing the contributions made by the recipient governments, for pre-investment projects sponsored by the UN or its specialized agencies. At its seventh session in January 1969 the UNDP's Governing Council approved 104 new projects and supplementary financial assistance for nineteen already in existence. The African states received a high proportion of this aid: twenty-three of them were helped in their infrastructure development, and thirty-nine individual and two regional projects benefited. To take a random example, a World Health Organization project to assist in the preparatory work for establishing a training center for health personnel of all levels in the Cameroon received $210,500 — the Cameroon itself contributing $910,000.[7]

All types of infrastructure aid are important for states as underdeveloped as those in Africa. The EEC was the forerunner in

[7]For details of this and other projects backed by the UNDP, see *UN Monthly Chronicle,* February 1969, pp. 13-18.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the multilateral provision of such aid.[8] It was responsible as well for the first multilateral attempt to further development by recognizing the link between the provision of aid and trade outlets — the association tie between the EEC and the colonial dependencies of the Six established under Part Four of the Rome Treaty in 1958. The eighteen African states associated with the EEC under the Yaoundé Convention are the only ones receiving Community aid. Under the second Yaoundé Convention, signed in 1969, they will obtain $748 million in grants and $80 million in loans from the European Development Fund (EDF) over a five-year period. The European Investment Bank (EIB) can also make $90 million in low-interest loans available to them over the same period, and the Fund can give grants to ameliorate the interest charges on EIB loans. In effect, the EEC operates an interest rebate scheme to assist the Eighteen to shoulder their debt burden.[9]

EEC aid to the Eighteen is relatively flexible. Under the first Yaoundé Convention they benefited from large-scale development-potential surveys and detailed statistical advice, coupled with training schemes to enable the associates to produce their own development and trade statistics. The most serviceable aspect of EEC aid, however, takes the form of providing hospitals, bush dispensaries, village wells, irrigation projects and road building. For example, in recent years the European Community has invested $851,000 in asphalting roads in Mali. Such basic social and economic investment rarely comes from governments — they usually favor prestigious or profitable projects. Bush dispensaries are neither, but they help to improve the quality of life in the recipient state. Furthermore, no matter how well researched and generous aid-investment projects may be, they cannot make contributions to long-term economic and social development unless the people they are assisting are trained adequately to utilize the potential of the investments. The provision of such training is a major preoccupation of EEC aid. While a large number of scholarships to institutes of higher education in Europe

[8]The Commonwealth also provides important assistance to the infrastructure projects of its African members. Reference to this has been omitted because most of it is essentially British aid via the Commonwealth rather than institutional aid as such.

[9]The first Yaoundé Convention, signed on July 20, 1963, entered into force for a five-year period on June 1, 1964. The second Yaoundé Convention was signed on July 29, 1969 and became operative on January 1, 1971. For the provisions of both, see Carol Ann Cosgrove and Kenneth J. Twitchett, "The Second Yaoundé Convention in Perspective," *International Relations*, May 1970, pp. 679-689.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are financed, concentration is on the development of middle strata skills: the training of clerks, field inspectors and foremen rather than of highly skilled specialists.

The bulk of Community aid under the first Yaoundé regime was intended to develop the existing primary production structures of the Eighteen, most of which have either subsistence economies or rely on a single cash crop. Two important contributions were made to the agricultural sector of their economies. The first authorized the allocation of a proportion of EDF grants to finance structural reforms. The second sought to stabilize agricultural prices and to assist marketing boards to even out what are often crippling fluctuations in world agricultural prices. At the request of the Africans, although not to the degree they desired, the second Yaoundé Convention is intended to bring about greater economic diversification and to promote at least a measure of industrialization. These goals are to be pursued by permitting limited EIB contributions to profitable African projects, participation of risk capital in Fund-financed enterprises, channeling of Fund aid via local African development banks to promote small- and medium-scale industries, and certain preferences to local enterprises over their EEC competitors in a range of Fund-financed projects.

For the countries of Africa as a whole, however, it is the expanding EEC market which is most significant for their economic development. Between 1958 and 1967, imports of the Six from the Eighteen increased by 43 per cent, and from other African states by 108 per cent. In marked contrast to the surplus position of other industrialized nations, the Six have a large and expanding trade deficit with all of independent Africa, apart from the Republic of South Africa.[10] This advantageous trading relationship provides the Africans with much-needed convertible currency for financing their development projects. Still, it must be seen amid the spreading realization that aid alone is not enough to ensure development. Loss of markets or fluctuations in world prices may wipe out the benefits obtained from the most generous aid programs and exacerbate the vicious circle of loans, interest payments, and more loans to finance the repayments.

[10]See *External Trade of the EEC, 1958 to 1967*, Commission of the European Communities, January 1969. Only about 4 per cent of the EEC's external trade is with the Eighteen, and under Yaoundé I there was little evidence that their preferences resulted in much trade diversion or a significant increase in the trade of the associates with the European Community. But in the same period, EEC imports from nonassociated African and Latin American tropical producers increased dramatically.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Awareness of this danger has prompted four African states with no real traditional links with the Six[11] to negotiate preferential access to the EEC market through association under Article 238 of the Rome Treaty.[12] While the Lagos Accord of 1966 with Nigeria never became operative, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have negotiated the Arusha Accords of 1968 and 1969.[13] There is no provision for assistance from the EDF, and the trading concessions with the Six are not as favorable as those obtained by the Yaoundé associates. But association still offered advantageous concessions to the Nigerians and the East Africans. It also demonstrated their willingness to discriminate against Britain in favor of the EEC while enjoying Commonwealth preferences. EEC preferences for both categories of associates, however, are not high: the Community has a nil external tariff for most raw materials and a low one for unprocessed tropical agricultural products.

The association agreements are, essentially, disguised discriminatory trade agreements, and reciprocity is largely symbolic on the part of the Africans. Nevertheless, symbolic reciprocity is necessary for them to take advantage of the free-trade-area exemption to the GATT ban on preferences. Without the paraphernalia of association, the trading relationships of the Africans with the EEC would contravene the letter as well as the spirit of GATT. Nearly all the African states are members of GATT, but along with most of the Third World they reject its ideal of global nondiscriminatory trading relationships. To them it is first and foremost a rich man's club dominated by the needs of the highly sophisticated capitalist trading structures of the West. The outcome of the Kennedy Round negotiations would seem to confirm their suspicions.

Association has also been condemned by UNCTAD Secretary-General Raul Prebisch and others as prejudicial to the interests of the developing states as a whole. The general Third World approach as expressed in UNCTAD is that there should be preferential trading concessions for all the developing states rather than local or regional discriminatory arrangements. But, with the possible exceptions of France and the Commission of the European

[11]Unless we consider that Tanganyika was a German dependency until after the First World War.

[12]Article 238 permits the EEC to "conclude with a third country, a union of States or an international organization, agreements creating an association embodying reciprocal rights and obligations, joint actions and special procedures."

[13]The Arusha Accord of 1968, which had remained inoperative, was renegotiated in 1969. The 1969 Accord is for a five-year period and came into force on January 1, 1971 — it is due to run concurrently with Yaoundé II.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Communities, the Eighteen were the keenest advocates of renewing the Yaoundé regime. At the New Delhi UNCTAD in 1968, such notable anti-colonialists as Mali and Somalia were unwilling to forgo association benefits to further Third World solidarity or, more significantly, pan-African unity. Hamani Diori, President of Niger, while acting as the official spokesman of the Eighteen, pointed out that

> the New Delhi UNCTAD did not succeed in contributing to the needs of the underdeveloped African States. . . . while we await a global solution, our people continue to go hungry. We must seek a more realistic and realizable solution — it is precisely in the realm of association with the EEC that we can find this.[14]

The Dutch and West Germans especially would prefer more open global arrangements than the present association nexus favoring African states. Even the French appear to be coming to the view that regional, discriminatory trade preferences should be phased out and association evolve into a more flexible, globalized multilateral system. But it is doubtful if there will be a fulfillment in the immediate future of Diori's "wish that [the EEC's] exemplary effort could be transferred from the regional to the global plane."[15] The European Community does not appear to consider Asian states eligible for association. However, if Britain is successful in her latest attempt to join the European Communities, this could eventually lead to a rethinking of association due to the need to work out institutional relationships between the enlarged EEC and Britain's former and existing dependencies. Several of her former African colonies are already regarded as suitable candidates for association under either the Yaoundé regime or Article 238 of the Rome Treaty.[16] Certainly the present association arrangements have served some African states extremely well.

The Political Role of International Institutions

African economic development is intimately tied with political development because it is set back by political instability. This instability lies at the heart of African security problems, especially insofar as the major threats to most states emanate more from internal than from either external African or non-African sources. Political instability also thwarts the prevalent desire of African

[14]Author's translation from the original French. See *Pour une association rénovée*, Centre d'information du Niger (Paris, 1969), p. 7.
[15]*Ibid.*
[16]See Carol Ann Cosgrove, "Britain, the Developing Commonwealth, and the EEC," *The World Today*, June 1970, pp. 249-258.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

states for international dignity and acceptance as sovereign equals of the longer established white states. Tribalism, ethnic differences and political rivalries have threatened to tear some African states asunder. The fragility of their state structures and the agonizingly complex nature of their modernization problems deny them the luxury of loyal oppositions in the British sense. In a growing number of countries, even one-party rule has been replaced by various forms of military rule. African armies are essentially training grounds for new, more efficient elites whose principal practical role is the preservation of internal rather than external security.

Arbitrary distinctions of domain are part of the trouble. In most cases boundaries are only lines on a map originally drawn by the colonial powers for their administrative and political convenience. The Africans consequently inherited state boundaries dividing tribes and crossing traditional nomadic routes. Until the early 1960's the nationalists generally emphasized the need to abolish or adjust "the artificial frontiers drawn by imperialist powers to divide the peoples of Africa, particularly those which cut across ethnic groups and divide people of the same stock."[17] However, the immediate postindependence collapse of the Congo (Leopoldville) vividly demonstrated that self-determination in the African context was a Pandora's Box. The African nationalists ruled states with no real feeling of community and identification among their citizens. To open the door to indiscriminate tribal, ethnic or regional self-determination could easily result in Balkanization verging on anarchy. Their opposition to Katangese secession at the United Nations showed that the Africans as a whole were prepared to overlook the preindependence goal of the self-determination of peoples and to place emphasis instead on the self-determination of states, i.e., of the inherited colonial administrative units.

The sanctity of the existing boundaries is exemplified in the Charter of the OAU. Article 3 stresses that the organization is founded upon "respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each member-State and for its inalienable right to independent existence." "The sovereign equality of all member-States" and "non-interference in the internal affairs of States" are also ac-

[17]Quoted from a resolution of the first All-African People's Conference held at Accra in December 1958. The conference also called "for the abolition or adjustment of such frontiers at an early date" and urged "the independent states of Africa to support a permanent solution to this problem founded upon the wishes of the people."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

centuated. Thus Nigeria was legally correct in maintaining that the Biafran attempt at secession was outside the jurisdiction of the OAU unless Nigeria invited the organization's help in settling the problem. Only four African states recognized Biafra. The majority denied its right to self-determination, at least in public, for to do otherwise could have set a precedent threatening their own existence as sovereign states. Article 3 also unreservedly condemns "subversive activities on the part of neighboring States or any other States." But this pious principle has not prevented such interference. Ghana under the rule of President Nkrumah was often criticized for meddling in the internal affairs of other African states: at OCAM's establishment in June 1964, its first president, M. Ould Daddah of Mauritania, referred to "the action of certain states, notably Ghana, which offer a welcome to agents of subversion and organize training camps on their territory."

The African dislike of interference is reflected in a generally narrow legalist interpretation of Article 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter, at least with reference to their own affairs.[18] Somalia has been the most significant exception to this practice in her constant advocacy of the right of the Somali minorities in Ethiopia and Kenya to join the Somali Republic. During the General Assembly debate of 1960 on the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the Somali representative referred to self-determination as a right of all peoples against "the domination of overland colonial Powers" as well as overseas ones: "The disregard of such principles may well lead to disguised forms of colonialism, as wolves in the garb of sheep may sometimes creep into the fold."[19] The Kenyan and Ethiopian attitudes were succinctly stated by Jomo Kenyatta in his "classic alternative version of self-determination — if the Somalis want to leave, they are welcome to pack up their camels and depart for Somalia, not taking Kenya's land with them."[20]

Almost all the African states maintain that the principles of noninterference and respect for territorial integrity do not apply to either the remaining European colonies in Africa or the in-

[18]Article 2(7) reads: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter. . . ."

[19]Official Records of the UN General Assembly, December 13, 1960, p. 1249. Quoted in Rupert Emerson, *Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization*, Harvard University, Occasional Papers in International Affairs No. 9, December 1964, p. 50.

[20]Emerson, *loc. cit.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dependent white regimes of southern Africa. Article 2 of the OAU's Charter states that an objective of the organization is "to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa"; Article 3 speaks of "absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent." Most African states pay lip-service in support of the activities of the freedom fighters in white-dominated Africa south of the Zambesi. The illegitimacy of white rule in southern Africa is one of the few articles of faith upheld by all Africans — just as anti-colonialism in one form or another is possibly the only unifying force among them. To them, colonialism and racialism are synonymous in symbolizing white domination and exploitation of nonwhites. The diplomatic relations Malawi and the former British protectorates have with the Republic of South Africa result not so much from acceptance of the political status quo as from their economic dependence on the Republic. They too are anti-colonialist and anti-racialist in sentiment, but geographical proximity and economic dependence force them to be circumspect.[21]

The specter of colonialism is useful in assisting the Africans to cope with their domestic problems of political modernization. To condemn colonialism at the United Nations and the OAU has a cohesive function, engendering a sense of identity among the disparate groups at home. Evoking the specter can also serve to consolidate the position of the ruling elite vis-à-vis the rising generation. Most important, it provides an emotional outlet for frustration resulting from continued dependence on the former colonial powers for material needs and the prevalence of European values and cultures. The very principles of liberty and freedom on which the Africans justified their independence struggles, and the societies they often profess to create, are European rather than traditional-African in concept. Such a fervent anti-colonialist country as Tanzania, moreover, did not hesitate to call in British troops when her army mutinied. In an African context, even anti-colonialism has its limits.

This is particularly true regarding most of French Africa. The substance of *France d'outre mer* continues via unilateral links with France and Yaoundé-type association with the EEC. The French military role in Chad indicates the leading role the metropole still plays in guaranteeing the internal security of former territories. On their part the Africans have not attacked

[21]Malawi's close ties with South Africa under Dr. Banda have led some African militant groups to call for her exclusion from the OAU.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

France at the United Nations and other international forums to the extent that the erstwhile British dependencies have attacked Britain. This relative moderation stems both from the manner of the formal French exit from Africa and the fact that Britain has been more amenable to external criticism than was France under President de Gaulle.

African condemnation of colonialism at the UN does not usually embrace Soviet-type colonialism. To most Africans Soviet intervention in, say, Czechoslovakia is not a manifestation of colonialism or neocolonialism. The emphasis they place on their own sovereign status leads them to deny that the East European satellites are Soviet dependencies — they are all members of the United Nations and independent in terms of international law. The Africans are also realists in recognizing that the West as a whole is more tolerant of criticism than the USSR. Their disinclination to accuse the Soviet Union of colonialism is further strengthened because she herself condemns European-type colonialism and provides aid that partially reduces their dependence on the ex-metropoles. Most African states, however, have not been prepared to identify themselves with the more virulent brand of Soviet anti-colonialism or to countenance Soviet attempts to interfere in their internal affairs. Even Guinea has expelled the Soviet ambassador for alleged interference in Guinean matters.

There are no real inter-African antagonisms deriving from the Cold War, although ideological and political rivalries have existed since the onset of Africa's emancipation from colonial rule. The OAU was founded partly in an attempt to resolve such differences. The ideological orientation and actual policies of particular African states are greatly dependent on the attitudes and ambitions of the ruling elites. A change of leadership can be much more significant in an African country than in Britain or the United States. For example, Ghana is now much less militant and pro-Soviet than she was under President Nkrumah.

Within the OAU, ethnic and even racial antagonisms are evident. Some of the Africans are distinctly wary of the Arab members. During the UN Security Council's consideration of the American-Belgian Stanleyville rescue operation of November 1964, the representative of the Congo (Leopoldville) deliberately attempted to exploit racial and historical divisions among OAU members by referring to the Arabs as the "whites of North Africa":

Racism becomes obvious when the whites of Europe and America are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

condemned for providing arms to a black army, because black soldiers are going to use those arms against their black brothers. I wonder if the arms which the whites of North Africa are going to give to the black rebels of Stanleyville will not be used against their black brothers? . . . That is naked racism, and I am sorry to have to be so blunt. But logic forces me to expose it and say it aloud. For the history of the Congo seventy years ago does not allow us yet to forget the heavy trading in my black compatriots which was carried out by the whites of North Africa with the whites of Europe and America.[22]

The different interests and external antagonisms of African and Arab members of the OAU may be discerned in the reluctance of some Africans to forgo advantageous economic relationships with Israel as evidence of their solidarity with the Arabs. More significantly, while the Africans have some reason to be proud of their record of comparative racial moderation in view of past and present white inhumanity to Negroes, there is an ugly taint to African nationalism which has resulted in hostility to Arabs and also to Asians entrenched in the commercial life of Africa south of the Sahara. No residue of British responsibility can justify the odious African treatment of the Asians living in Kenya and Uganda.

African nationalism has been a divisive as well as a unifying force among the new states. Its macro manifestation resembles Arab nationalism in that almost all African leaders have felt it necessary to pay at least public lip-service to the ideals of pan-Africanism and African unity. In practice, however, the micro brand is the more potent as the Africans employ it in their endeavors to create more viable state structures. They are jealous of their sovereignty and unwilling to brook any diminution of this newfound status. During the discussions and negotiations leading to the creation of the OAU, all the African leaders expressed some sympathy with pan-African ideals. But President Nkrumah was almost alone in advocating the formation of a continental organization with far-reaching powers. The organization actually created was much more in line with the views of Haile Selassie — an intergovernmental consultative body without supranational content, whose Charter explicitly emphasized the sovereignty of the member states.

If the OAU survives it is likely to remain circumscribed in scope, at least for the foreseeable future. There is no real core area

[22]Quoted in K. J. Twitchett, "The Racial Issue at the United Nations: A Study of the African States' Reaction to the American-Belgian Congo Rescue Operation of November 1964," *International Relations,* October 1965, pp. 833-834.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

among the African states from which a supranational body could develop, even in the restricted sense of the European Communities. Moreover, if regional and subregional inter-African organizations continue to develop and become viable, their very viability could detract from the OAU, much as the EEC has taken attention away from the Council of Europe. Even the growth of organizations with a limited supranational content based on regional needs is unlikely. As the new regimes become more stable and obtain greater senses of identity, the ruling elites will not wish to lose their power and privileges in wider African political units.

Possibly international institutions have been most important in allowing the Africans to present themselves in the outside world as the equals both legally and in dignity of the longer established European states. The United Nations and the OAU have been most significant, but the Commonwealth and association arrangements with the EEC have also improved their status. Although relying on the European Community for assistance, the Yaoundé associates are accepted as the *de jure* sovereign equals of its six member states. The latter and the Commission of the European Communities might dominate all negotiations, but the associates at least have an institutional framework in which they appear to be bargaining on equal terms.[23] The Yaoundé procedure, moreover, forces the eighteen African associates to cooperate closely; within the association institutions they constitute one legal party in negotiations with the EEC. The habit of cooperation thus engendered is reflected in the purely African framework of OCAM, to which fourteen of the associates belong. Although the Congo (Kinshasa) has been periodically reported as feeling that its American and other interests are incompatible with those of the ex-French colonies, OCAM is perhaps the most successful of all the African organizations. Among its successes are mediatory efforts leading to the reopening of the border between Chad and the Central African Republic.

The OAU has had some similar successes, but overall its record has been unremarkable apart from actually surviving. That it lives on is no mean achievement in view of the lack of coherence among its members and the enormity and complexity of the problems with which it has had to grapple. Under Article 2 of the OAU Charter the African states agree to coordinate and harmonize their general policies "in the fields of defense and security," while Arti-

[23]The inoperative Lagos Accord and the Arusha Accords also provided for legal parity between the Six and the associates.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cle 21 pledges them to settle all disputes among themselves by peaceful means and to "establish a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration." Conciliation has eased tension in some potentially dangerous inter-African disputes. For example, although the dispute has by no means been settled, the organization has helped to dampen Somalia's frontier conflicts with Ethiopia and Kenya.

The OAU has had only a minimal role, however, in the major internal African conflicts. In the case of the Stanleyville rebellion in the Congo during the second half of 1964, the Tshombé regime eventually requested and obtained American-Belgian assistance in rescuing the rebels' white hostages — the efforts of the OAU's Congo Conciliation Commission having proved futile. Similarly, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda obtained British military assistance in suppressing the East African army mutinies at the beginning of 1964. While President Nyerere of Tanzania informed the OAU that he hoped British troops could be replaced by African ones, none were actually needed.[24] There seems to be insufficient mutual trust for many African states to go so far as to invite African military help in settling their internal conflicts. Nigeria relied primarily on her own efforts to subdue Biafra, while Chad has preferred French rather than African military assistance.

The OAU has had no real impact on the white regimes of southern Africa. The Africans' lack of effective power has forced them to rely on United Nations debates and sanctions rather than OAU action. Those who are members of the Commonwealth tend to confine their efforts to prodding Britain and other Western states to initiate measures to topple the Smith regime in Rhodesia. Moreover, despite frequent and virulent OAU condemnation, Portugal still retains her African colonies; the Republic of South Africa holds on to South West Africa and is unchecked in her policies of *apartheid*.

The only positive move made by the African organization against the white regimes has been the establishment of a Liberation Committee to aid the freedom fighters and coordinate their activities. The guerrilla-type activities of the freedom fighters have disconcerted the Smith regime to a greater extent than is generally recognized. But the Liberation Committee is beset with difficulties, especially as to finances, and there is widespread disagreement in the OAU regarding its objectives and the means to

[24]See Ali Mazrui, *Towards a Pax Africana* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 153.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

achieve them. It is extremely unlikely, in the foreseeable future, that the Africans themselves will be able to overthrow the Portuguese colonialists or the Rhodesian whites, still less eradicate all white rule in southern Africa. Nevertheless, African loss of face through inability to take much effective action must be set against the fact that the OAU has at least served as a consultative forum. The more positive results of consultation, however, are seen within the United Nations.

The African Voice in the United Nations

Ethiopia and Liberia were founding members of the United Nations. Prior to 1960 the only other African countries to become UN members were Ghana, Guinea and the Sudan. But Africa's rapid emancipation from colonial rule in the 1960's resulted in thirty or so new states joining the organization. In theory, their membership reflects their sovereign equality with former colonial masters and the superpowers. David Kay correctly maintains that the admission of the African states "substantially altered the organization's environment and the demands made upon it." The changes were "so substantial as to alter the nature of [its] political processes. . . ."[25] UN membership provides the Africans with an international platform from which to exercise a collective influence they would not otherwise possess. The influence is mainly vocal, but greater in impact than if they argued separately hundreds of miles apart within Africa.

When united, the African members can dominate General Assembly voting procedures. Their numerical voting strength is almost sufficient to block draft Assembly resolutions requiring a two-thirds majority. In combination with the votes of other Third World states it is sufficient for passing such resolutions. This strength has given the Africans an important role in constitutional developments at the United Nations. It played a considerable part in the revision of the Charter which increased the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen. Now the accepted norm is that the council will have two elected African members. The African view has been most significant on matters concerning European-type colonialism. It proved decisive in the formulation of the General Assembly Declaration of December 1960 on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which enshrined the precept that self-government is intrinsically

[25]Kay, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

superior to good government by an alien metropole. Perhaps the Africans' greatest achievement has been the Committee of Twenty-four, created to report on the implementation of the December 1960 resolution. An implicit objective of that committee is to bridge the constitutional gap in the Charter between the role of the United Nations in trust and in non-self-governing territories.[26]

Individual African states apparently attach more importance to the African caucus than to other UN groupings. The African members of the Commonwealth, for instance, in their public protestations and General Assembly voting records are more in line with other African states than with the Asian or white members of the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, although they convene as a group in an attempt to agree on common policy lines, the Africans are rarely sufficiently united to utilize their voting strength except on issues pertaining to colonialism and racialism. Even on these issues there are distinct differences of emphasis between the militant and the moderate African states.

The expanded African membership has also made difficulties for the United Nations. Its committee system has become grossly inflated with African representation, and providing the various missions with documentation has overtaxed administrative resources. The Africans contribute little to the organization's finances. They have to be fitted into the Secretariat, but the fact that some of them are less competent than their Western counterparts reduces its effectiveness. Those who are of comparable ability, moreover, might do a greater service at home, tackling the urgent problems of modernization.

In the wider context of United Nations affairs, neither the Africans nor the organization as a whole have had much authority in issues considered to be of vital national interest by either the Soviet Union or the United States. In other matters, like the dispute between Britain and Spain over Gibraltar, the verbal intervention of some African states complicated an already complex issue. They have no identifiable interest in this question apart from emotional anti-colonialism; their cynical disregard of the wishes of the Gibraltarians for the sake of anti-colonial dogma was disreputable, in British eyes at least. To many Western observers such actions negate the Africans' claims to have introduced a new

[26]For details of the attempt to reach an accommodation between Chapter XI of the Charter relating to Non-Self-Governing Territories and Chapters XII and XIII relating to Trust Territories, see K. J. Twitchett, "The Colonial Powers and the United Nations," *Journal of Contemporary History*, January 1969, pp. 167-185.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

moral tenor into international politics. The contention that European colonialism was a more serious threat to international peace than communist imperialism has also cast doubt on their judgment.

Expanded African membership has had a part in limiting UN peacekeeping activities. The crisis over the financing of peacekeeping forces was brought to a head by communist and French refusals to contribute to the costs of UNEF and ONUC. The latter was withdrawn from the Congo before completing its mission because of financial difficulties. Eventual acceptance of the principle that future forces should be financed on a voluntary basis was partly determined by the consideration that some African and other members who advocated them were unable to share the financial burdens. Indeed, recognition that numerical supremacy is not necessarily synonymous with political maturity and responsibility has been a cause of the swing back from the General Assembly to the Security Council as the dominant organ of the UN. African membership has made the organization even less of a Western club than previously, but such membership imposes duties and obligations as well as rights. U Thant possibly had some of the new African states in mind when suggesting that limits be placed on the right of all states to membership:

> . . . it appears desirable that a distinction be made between the right to independence and the question of full membership in the United Nations. Such membership may . . . impose obligations which are too onerous . . . and . . . may lead to a weakening of the United Nations itself.[27]

Whether the Africans, the West Europeans, or any other groups within the United Nations could agree on criteria for exclusion, however, is doubtful.

On the credit side, without large-scale African membership not only would the world be less familiar with African problems, but such positive international actions as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination might not have become possible. Without African pressure and the facilities afforded by the United Nations, the OAU and the Commonwealth, Rhodesia UDI (unilateral declaration of independence) might have been accepted, after a suitable period, by Western Europe at least. UN sanctions may be lacking in effectiveness, but states are forced to be circumspect when ignoring them.

[27]See U Thant's Report to the Twenty-third Session of the General Assembly on *The State of the World*. Quoted in Carol Ann Cosgrove and Kenneth J. Twitchett, editors, *The New International Actors: The UN and the EEC* (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Likewise, although most of the European metropoles were already disposed to favor decolonization, African criticisms undoubtedly accelerated the process. Only Portugal still retains a hold on her African dependencies, despite various UN condemnatory declarations, minimal international sympathy and the guerrilla-type activities of African freedom fighters. It could also be argued that anti-colonial pressure at the UN resulted in some colonies achieving independence too precipitately. The postindependence collapse of the former Belgian Congo is often cited as a case in point. But if Belgium had remained in control for a longer period of time, would she have laid surer foundations for the Congo's eventual independence? Her record during fifty years or so of colonial rule left much to be desired.

A major African accomplishment has been the exclusion of the Republic of South Africa from most of the UN's specialized agencies, which has so isolated her internationally. It is doubtful if this would have occurred, or *apartheid* have gained such widespread odium, without African criticisms in the United Nations and other international forums. It is sometimes maintained that UN condemnation has made the Republic more intransigent than might otherwise have been the case. Conversely, without external criticisms would she have done as much to improve the Bantu's material conditions as she actually has, inadequate though her efforts may be? The general white South African attitude to nonwhites tends to validate the second rather than the first proposition. Both the ruling National Party and the United Party have made it clear that they are not prepared to grant the Africans meaningful political rights.

Outside the framework of the United Nations, the Africans have been successful in precipitating the Republic's withdrawal from the Commonwealth, excluding her from the Olympic games, and, due to a combination of nonwhite blackmail and the pressure of domestic British liberal opinion, bringing about the cancellation of the 1970 South African cricket tour of Britain. But such successes are of only marginal importance. Britain and the other industrialized states still retain profitable trading relations with the Republic. South Africa, although somewhat cautiously, has introduced *apartheid* to South West Africa and ignored the various UN declarations terminating her administration over newstyled Namibia. On the latter issue the Africans have managed to prod the Security Council into establishing an *ad hoc* subcommittee to study ways and means to implement the UN resolu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions in accordance with the appropriate provisions of the Charter "in the light of the flagrant refusal of South Africa to withdraw from Namibia."[28] While it may be doubted that recommendations from this subcommittee, or any condemnatory resolutions, will force the Republic to alter her policies, their positive potential for the future should not be minimized. For instance, if in years to come the Africans should intervene militarily in southern Africa or back such an intervention, they could at least claim that their war was just in that UN resolutions had been passed condemning the white racialist regimes. Whether they would have the ability to undertake such action is another question. Significantly, some African statesmen, notably Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, now favor a constructive dialogue with South Africa.

Conclusion

Within the Western world generally there is now a certain ennui regarding ritual African anti-colonial incantations primarily directed at satisfying domestic elements of xenophobia. It is also significant that militancy is no longer such a prominent feature of African participation in international politics. There is somewhat less emphasis on the Churchillian drama of world affairs and greater concentration on internal problems of modernization. This is not a completely new development. Most of the former French African colonies and some of the British have followed this line since independence. Headlined militants like Modibo Keita, Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Touré have obscured the more mundane occupation of the majority of African leaders with day-to-day issues of development. Many of the prominent militant leaders have now been replaced by men of more moderate bent. In the future the Africans as a whole are likely to accord the United Nations lower priority in their external policies, especially should attempts at regional cooperation lead to the creation of viable communities in the style of the EEC. At present it seems improbable that any of the existing African regional experiments will develop core areas comparable to those underlying West European cooperation and integration. But twenty-five years ago few foresaw Africa's rapid march to independence. Africa is now on the world map.

[28]See *UN Monthly Chronicle*, March 1970, p. 3. The subcommittee was established by the Security Council on January 30, 1970, and is composed of all members of the council.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE *TRAHISON DES ADULTES*

by J. H. Huizinga

VOLUMES have been written about the revolt of the young but very little about its counterpart, the abdication of the adults. Yet this new phenomenon is surely the more interesting. The young have rebelled over and over again, often in much the same terms as today.

George Santayana wrote in 1922 of the "sophomores" who "style themselves liberals, radicals or (modestly) the Intelligentsia," and who

> proclaim their disgust at the present state of things in America; they denounce the Constitution, the government, the colleges, the press, the theatre and above all . . . the spirit of Business. . . . I have made a severe effort to discover . . . what these rebels want. I see what they are against—they are against everything. But what are they for? I have been unable to discover it. . . . This may be due . . . to their incapacity to express themselves clearly, for their style is something appalling . . . muddy, abstract, cumbrous, contorted. . . . Expression is what they yearn for and demand at all costs. They think they need more freedom . . . a chance to be more spontaneous.[1]

For the Spanish-American philosopher there was no question of taking the young radicals of his era seriously. He made light of them. Far from sympathizing with their demand for "freedom and spontaneity," he suspected that "they have had too much freedom . . . too much practice in being spontaneous when there was nothing in them to bubble out."[2]

But for one of the most renowned French philosophers of our day the discontents of the student community are sacred, and even elementary school children are to be credited with revolutionary impulses based on a profound insight into the intolerable nature of our society. According to Jean-Paul Sartre:

> There are kids of ten . . . who have already understood why they must reject this society. The remarkable violence of these young people and even of those kids is not the expression of willfulness but of a clear awareness of what is being prepared for them. On the one hand they realize that they have little chance to integrate themselves into our society because they are up against a whole series of educational obstacles erected so as to allow only a small elite to get to the top. On the other

[1] *Forum* (New York), May 1922.
[2] *Ibid.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hand the positions they would conquer if they succeeded in getting over these obstacles disgust them in advance because they will be nothing but objects, instruments of a system that has set out to specialize them for a specific task. The young understand this very soon and that is why we see today a generation of ten-year-old revolutionaries.[3]

These solemn imaginings of France's foremost thinker (and incorrigible bachelor) would be droll had they not proved so dangerous. For with the prestigious leader of the French intelligentsia adopting this attitude the great majority of the intellectuals was bound to follow him. And once the intellectuals had decided that in May 1968 they were witnessing what another of their stalwarts, André Malraux, has called "the beginning of the greatest crisis of civilization since the end of the Roman Empire,"[4] the French bourgeoisie, traditionally in awe of its spiritual betters, fell into line. Hardly a dissenting voice was heard amid the breathless chorus of adult praise for "notre jeunesse ardente et généreuse" who, more enterprising than the rebels in Santayana's day, "proclaimed their disgust at the present state of things" by chucking paving stones at the police, burning motorcars, erecting barricades and occupying public buildings.

So encouraging to the youthful lawbreakers was the climate of adult opinion that the government had no choice but to buy peace at the cost of abject capitulation—an abdication of authority so complete that it could but act as a green light for all discontented elements in the nation to try their chance at threatening violence to realize their demands. If students could get away with it, why should not the workers? Thus what had started as an attempt by a handful of "juvenihilists" to exploit legitimate student grievances in order to provoke disorder in the time-honored way of all subversives, was allowed to get out of hand until it came within an inch of bringing power down into the street. There it would have been picked up, not by the youngsters playing at revolution, but by whoever was first on the spot, colonels or communists knowing what they wanted power for.

II

One wonders what would have been the reaction of a French philosopher of Santayana's day, Julien Benda, had he lived to see his fellow intellectuals applauding the young "yearning for freedom" as they set about to clear the way for its most deter-

[3]J.-P. Sartre, *Les Communistes ont peur de la révolution* (Paris: Les éditions John Didier, 1968), pp. 25-26.
[4]*Le Monde,* April 15, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mined enemies. Perhaps it might have inspired him to follow up *La Trahison des Clercs,* his classic denunciation of the intellectuals who prostituted themselves to the cult of the nation, with an equally severe *La Trahison des Adultes,* chastising the grown-ups for their cult of rebellious youth, their failure to accept the mantle of responsibility for saving youth from the follies of its callow ignorance.

While this cult was carried to its most preposterous lengths in France, it had its origins in England. It was here, as early as 1956, that the *enragé,* locally known as the Angry Young Man, lived his first hour of glory. He made his debut in the guise of Jimmy Porter, the hero of John Osborne's *Look Back in Anger.* Jimmy was a horror-comic if ever there was one. Horrendous in his ranting, egomaniacal self-pity, his loutish abusiveness and sickly sentimentalism, he was comical because he was so wildly overdrawn, so inhumanly repulsive and yet so dearly loved by wife, mistress and friend as to be wholly absurd. But such was the acclaim he received from leaders of intellectual fashion like Kenneth Tynan that few in polite society dared question that the first of the Angry Young Men was bursting at the seams with deep social significance, that he represented "post war youth as it really is," in Tynan's words in the *Observer,* and "spoke out for the disgust which the young feel with their inheritance," as T. C. Worsley wrote in the *New Statesman.* Leading highbrow publications such as the *London Magazine* and *Encounter* fell over one another in their haste to procure contributions from his creator's pen, only to discover that, like the wife-bashing character of his invention, Osborne, too, had little but abuse to offer.

There is much in the nihilistic spirit of the early Angry Young Man as well as in the deferential reception of him by the adult community that makes his debut look like a first rehearsal for the tragicomedy performed all over the world in the middle 1960's. In Britain, however, he was venerated only as long as he limited his appearance to the stage and the pages of the more excitable left-wing journals. As soon as he emerged in the flesh and tried to catch up with his American or Continental contemporaries, who had long since wrested the palm from him, he got short shrift. The British carbon-copies of the *enragés,* who in Paris had been given every benefit of the doubt, were denounced by the British Minister of Education, Edward Short, as "wreckers . . . their weapons are lies, misrepresentation, defamation, character assassination, intimidation and, recently, phys-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ical violence." The Minister saw no "crisis of civilization" but only "squalid nonsense; the time has come for anybody who has any influence in this situation to stop it."[5] And few were those, even among the British intellectuals, who took him to task for this vigorous old-fashioned reaction.

They had mostly joined in the cult of the rebellious young when the latter went into action on the other side of the Channel. They had carried public opinion with them, as had been the case in Paris; even papers like the *Times* were nearly as full of admiring descriptions of the French youngsters on the barricades as *Le Monde*. But it was a different matter when the infection spread to England and one had to cope with its effects oneself. Then it became "squalid nonsense," all the more intolerable because some of the leading troublemakers were foreigners. "Repeated cheers," *Hansard* tells us, "greeted the announcement by the Minister of Education that at least four are from the United States. They are subsidised . . . by the British taxpayer. These gentlemen are clearly not here to study. They are here to disrupt and undermine British institutions. This small group are the thugs of the academic world."[6]

Though it was America that set the fashion of deferring to the rebellious young, only in France was it carried to dangerous lengths, without, moreover, the attenuating circumstances the American adult can plead for treating the anarchic demands of student radicals with solemnity. America is faced with a protest movement which, however naive in its simplification of highly complex issues such as Viet Nam or race relations, arose out of genuine concern with real and even agonizing problems. American students, unable to escape involvement in these real-life tragedies that had crowded in upon their once so happy nation, had some excuse for taking refuge in wild utopianism or, alternatively, pseudo-revolutionary nihilism.

Lacking the freedom from fear and freedom from responsibility vouchsafed their European counterparts sheltered under the American umbrella; living in what so cool a spirit as George Kennan has characterized as "a time in our national life more serious, more menacing, more critical than any I have ever experienced," many young Americans not unnaturally have tended to become "anxious, angry, humorless, suspicious of their own society, overexcited and unreflective, impatient . . . romantic

[5]The *Times* (London), January 30, 1969.
[6]Reported in *ibid.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and Quixotic."[7] Because they are overwhelmed by such severe strains, it is understandable that they have become thoroughly confused. At the same time their parents, exposed to the same strains and struggling with the same problems, have some excuse for condoning their excesses.

No one has shown himself less inclined to join the fashionable cult of the rebellious young than Kennan. He has written in much the same spirit as Santayana about their intellectual and moral self-complacency; he has passed the same strictures on their style, "that learned gobbledygook evolved by their betters on the faculties,"[8] and their lack of "all but the most childish ideas of how to improve the political system they scorn so profoundly." But at the same time he admits that "people of my generation cannot absolve themselves of a heavy responsibility for the state of mind in which these young people find themselves." While gently pointing out to them that it is a good deal easier to devote oneself selflessly to the improvement of society when one is still free and footloose than when one has come to be burdened with the more immediate responsibilities of a family, he does not deny that "the myopia and the crudities of their extremism reflect our own failings; our faintheartedness and in some instances our apathy in the face of great and obvious evil."[9]

III

It is a sad reflection on the quality of the French intelligentsia, so ready to see itself as the top of the class, that it was *its* leaders who beat all records in prostrating themselves before youngsters running "wild in the streets." In Sartre's Manichean view the juvenihilists are knights in shining armor up against an adult world that is rotten to the core, and that has left the young with only three courses open to them:

> to hang themselves out of sheer horror of this society we have made for them, to sell themselves to it and, as likely as not, hang themselves a few years later or . . . to wage a guerrilla war against the old men ruling them, mobilize the workers [as the] principal revolutionary force, and blow up the regime. . . . Fathers, remember that if your sons are revolutionaries it is because your cowardice has left them to their fate. They will not explain to you. They have exploded in words last May. . . . They have nothing more to say to those hardened, rotten, battered chil-

[7] George Kennan, *Democracy and the Student Left* (London: Hutchinson, 1968), p. 215.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 141.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dren known as adults. We will explain to you, we, a few adults less rotten or more aware of how rotten we are.[10]

No wonder Raymond Aron, one of the few French intellectuals who resisted what he called the "collective delirium,"[11] was unable to maintain his customary scholarly aplomb. During "those weeks when Paris opinion seemed unanimous in the cult of 'these admirable young,' " he knew an "indignation such as in all my life I have never felt before."[12] He felt "almost physically sick." Aron had nothing but contempt for that "singular Paris intelligentsia which grows ecstatic over writings [e.g., Mao's little Red Book] fit only for elementary schoolkids . . . and which is the first to stage in real life the comedy in which the absurd world conceived by the fashionable writers of the day takes concrete shape."[13]

It is perhaps partly because he realized he was virtually alone in taking this stand that he expressed himself with such unusual vehemence about the "capitulation of the adults rivaling . . . their children in infantilism."[14] If the fraction of the vast literature on the events of May 1968 which I have been able to examine is at all representative, Aron was a solitary figure in those days. For though, as he put it himself, "many in their hearts of hearts think as I do, too few dare to say so out loud."[15]

Jean Cau, the only one of those few I have come across, used even more forceful language to express the feelings aroused in him by

> those disgusting adults . . . who shower the most fulsome compliments on the young . . . abasing themselves in the most abject self-criticism . . . wagging their tails and flattening their ears; that rush of scribblers, artists and actors of all kinds who are falling over one another in their eagerness to ingratiate themselves; it is enough to make one vomit.[16]

Such violent denunciations might at first sight be discounted as typical reactionary noises in the spirit of David Low's immortal Colonel Blimp. But the author, driven to admittedly wild writing by the "disgusting adults," is by no means a man of the Right; Cau was formerly of *L'Express* when it was still very much a journal of left-wing opinion. As for Aron, far from being a

[10]J.-P. Sartre in an address reproduced in *Le Nouvel Observateur* (Paris), March 17, 1969, p. 9.
[11]Raymond Aron, *La Révolution Introuvable* (Paris: Fayard, 1968), p. 11.
[12]*Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.
[13]*Ibid.*, p. 147.
[14]In *Le Figaro*, June 10, 1968.
[15]*La Révolution Introuvable*, p. 135.
[16]Jean Cau, "Le Pape est Mort," *La Table Ronde du Combat*, 1968, p. 37.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

crotchety old square, unable to put himself in the place of the young, he has long shown active sympathy with their legitimate grievances. "For ten years I have never stopped criticizing the structure of our universities, I belonged to the party of reformers. I was considered a dangerous innovator by certain professors some of whom rushed to join the revolutionary colors in May '68."[17]

IV

The spirit of the abdicating adult finds most typical expression in the book, *Ces Idées qui ont ébranlé la France,* authored by a professor of sociology at Nanterre who writes under the pseudonym of Epistémon. Epistémon's readiness to lean over backward to sympathize with the students on the barricades, to give them every moral and intellectual benefit of the doubt, and to recognize his own need for "self-criticism," is all the more striking because he begins with a factual account of their behavior which would hardly seem to warrant such indulgence and humility. Correcting a widespread misconception, he points out that conditions at Nanterre—apart only from its dreary *material* environment—gave the student populace little cause for discontent, unlike the situation at the Sorbonne. Nanterre's dean, Grappin, was an indefatigable protagonist of university reform; the faculty had gone in for rather different ways from those of the huge and antique Sorbonne: dialogue with the students, pedagogic innovation, the most modern teaching of the social sciences. The professors took their meals with the students in the university restaurant, the leaders of the Students Union were entitled to the same type of offices as the members of the faculty. "The average professor was the prototype of the enlightened liberal reformist."[18]

Epistémon assures us that throughout the winter of 1967-1968, which Daniel (Danny the Red) Cohn-Bendit proudly claims "saw constant provocation of the authorities by a group determined to reveal the institution's repressive nature," there was "never any repression." Quite the contrary. The young troublemakers benefited from an appeasement policy worthy of Neville Chamberlain. When on March 22, 1968 Cohn-Bendit's troops occupied the faculty's council chamber in order to demonstrate their solidarity with a couple of their bomb-throwing friends who had been

[17] *Le Figaro,* June 12, 1968.
[18] Epistémon, *Cés Idées qui ont ébranlé la France* (Paris: Fayard, 1968), p. 21.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

arrested for attacks on the American Embassy and some American business offices, they were not disciplined in any way. Instead they were rewarded with acceptance of their demand to be allowed to use lecture halls for political meetings, i.e., proselytizing. They won this point in spite of the fact that what they were really after was not verbal political campaigning at all but far more forceful provocation.

"Their tracts revealed," Epistémon relates, "that they were out to break up lectures." For this purpose "they would write a letter to the Dean inviting him to make a certain amphitheater available at a certain hour on the following day and when he refused to do so they would invade it, grab the professor's microphone, shout hostile slogans, throw eggs, and in all these ways make it impossible for the lecture to continue."[19] Finally, by the end of April, the university authorities had had enough. When they closed the Nanterre faculty there reigned an "atmosphere of insurrectional terror. . .reminding my older colleagues of the technique of fabricated incidents widely practiced by the Nazis in their rise to power"—just as the Rector of the Sorbonne, where the *enragés* then went to work, was reminded "of the days of the OAS."[20]

One would have thought that, of all adults, an insider like Epistémon who had been present at the birth of the movement and thus was aware of its *vitium originis,* would hardly have joined in. But though he describes the ideas of the *enragés* for university reform (including an all-embracing veto right for the students) as "half-baked," intended only "to provoke," his strictures are addressed not to them but to "those [the reference is clearly to Aron] who carry on a campaign in the press to discredit the Movement." He confesses that at first he, too, was guilty of "refusal to try and understand it; I had fits of anger or fear. . .I spoke in cutting tones when I would have done better to listen." Until suddenly, like St. Paul on the road to Damascus, he saw the light and realized that it was his fault if his students showed themselves to be so "half-baked."

His conversion happened at the end of a long discussion with them "when I lost my patience and said 'if you talk like that we shall never get anywhere,' and one of them answered with quiet simplicity 'but you see, professor, that is what comes of the kind of teaching we have been getting from you.' From that moment dates the beginning of a long process of self-criticism within my

[19] *Ibid.,* p. 41.
[20] *Ibid.,* p. 69.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

innermost self."[21] He goes further still and accepts responsibility not only for the woolly-headedness of his charges but even for their violence. Lapsing into what Aron calls the "Byzantine intellectuals' language that cannot be understood by ordinary mortals," he describes the rebels' ideas about university reform as the form in which the students "express their longing for and their fear of change" and concludes that

> they have no alternative but violence if they are not understood. Their Utopia is the incoherent and provocative discourse in which they speak to us, as the American negro does in his spirituals, of their right to existence, their need to be treated as adults, their lack of guarantees for their future; and we have not listened to them in time.[22]

V

Nevertheless, as we have indicated, Epistémon was far from being the leader of the adult clique frenetically applauding the young playing at revolution. Their exploits inspired some of his colleagues to eulogies not equaled even by Sartre. For instance, sociologist Jean-Marc Coudray wrote in his contribution to the symposium, *La Brêche:*

> From one day to the next the enormous creative potential of society explodes, liberated from the bureaucratic-capitalistic straitjacket. The most audacious and the most realistic ideas—that is the same thing—are put forward, discussed, applied. The language, debased and emptied by decades of bureaucratic, cultural and commercial snoring, scintillates anew. Slogans of genius, efficient, poetic, emerge spontaneously from the anonymous mass. The educators are rapidly educated; university professors cannot get over their surprise caused by discovering how intelligent are their pupils and how absurd and useless everything they used to teach them. Within a few days young men of twenty attain a political understanding and wisdom not matched by honest revolutionaries after thirty years of militancy. . . . With a profound sense of tactics the Movement forces the State step by step to reveal its repressive, police-state nature. . . . It shows that the real substance of the bureaucratic capitalist organization is total anarchy. It compels university rectors and ministers to reveal their incoherence, their incompetence, the imbecility of their function.[23]

So catching was this spirit of exaltation that even hard-boiled foreign correspondents operating out of Paris were infected by it. The days when Aron felt "almost physically sick with disgust and indignation at the enthusiasm with which so many of my friends greeted

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 51.
[23] Edgar Morin, Claude Lefort, Jean-Marc Coudray, *May 1968: La Brêche* (Paris: Fayard, 1968), pp. 93-94.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the disintegration of French society" are remembered "with joy" by the London *Observer's* man in Paris; to him it was "exhilarating to see authority flouted and then routed." Like Sartre, he was deeply impressed by the participation of schoolkids in the revolutionary games of their student-brothers. "One of the most astonishing sights of the May Revolution was thousands of schoolchildren marching to the slogan 'Power is in the street, not in Parliament.' This is a phenomenon to make any Western Government tremble."[24] Incredibly, all this is in dead earnest, without a hint of irony.

Likewise, Professor Edgar Morin of Nanterre writes admiringly of the "heroic days" in which the "kid-guerrillas dare to answer tear gas grenades with paving stones."[25] For Professor Claude Lefort of Caen University their "direct action"—i.e., their violence—is their "first virtue working upon the collective imagination and stimulating others to go still further."[26] For yet another, Jacques Julliard of the Sorbonne, they are not really guilty of violence at all. Never mind whether on the night of May 11 Cohn-Bendit warned in the most explicit terms that "blood would flow if the police [did] not clear out of the Latin Quarter"; he and his friends were in no way responsible for the events of that night as "all objective observers are agreed that police repression was to blame for them."[27]

In this spirit of Orwellian Newspeak Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir and other luminaries of the Paris intelligentsia formed their Committee for Support of the Student-Victims of Repression while François Mauriac and four fellow Nobel prize-winners pleaded with de Gaulle for amnesty for the trouble-makers. The abdicating adults were in full cry. It was not only that they sympathized with the resort to violence to bring about a number of admittedly overdue reforms in the universities; that would have been an attitude which could perhaps be defended. But they went much further. They were prepared to take the juvenihilists at their own solemn valuation as the heralds of a new and better world. They welcomed their "revolution" as the dawn of the noble and pure society that, according to these youngsters, would somehow emerge from the chaos they were determined to create.

[24]Patrick Seale and Maureen McConville, *French Revolution 1968* (London: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 125.
[25]Morin, *et al., op. cit.*, p. 18.
[26]*Ibid.*, p. 50.
[27]*Esprit*, June-July 1968, p. 1039.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This blind confidence in the future, childlike optimism or, if one prefers, total irresponsibility, was the most characteristic feature of the movement. When one of its leaders, an adult fellow-traveler, twenty-nine-year-old assistant professor Alain Geismar, former Secretary General of the Teachers Union, was asked what kind of new society he envisaged, he had little more to say than that "I have a boundless confidence in the masses and I am sure that if they are capable of overthrowing one of the most powerful capitalistic states in the world they'll certainly prove equally able to build socialism."[28]

The juvenihilist, in his naiveté and ignorance, is convinced that all will be for the best in the best of worlds once he has smashed the existing order. His motto is not "après nous le déluge" but "après nous le beau temps." This gives him a certain charm, provided he does no more than talk his head off about it. But it becomes a different matter when he takes to action and the adult world starts encouraging and parroting him as happened on a vast scale in the Paris of May 1968.

Aron's colleague, Professor Morin, glorifies Cohn-Bendit as "the symbol of the anarchistic creativity of these youthful masses." Epistémon expounds their ideas about the "bureaucratic structures" which, once they have destroyed them, will make way for a "generalized spontaneity out of which new forms best adapted to those associated in a production—administration—or education —will emerge." Frivolous or meaningless graffiti or slogans like "The more I make revolution the more I want to make love," "I have nothing to say but I want to say it," "Imagination in power," are respectfully quoted as historical texts of deep significance. The "in-words" current among the young, who invariably characterize the university as well as the factory and the high school as "ghettos," find their way into every kind of adult writing.

A serious journal like *Esprit* writes of "children who isolated themselves from their parents in their ghettos and . . . who have suddenly risen against our consumer-society, the excesses of the technocracy and the inhumanity of social relationships."[29] The old technique of provocation setting in motion what Aron calls "the well tried mechanism of repression-riot, riot-repression" becomes not only respectable but highly original under the new name of "contestation." The French student movement, writes Joffre

[28]T. Sauvageot, A. Geismar, D. Cohn-Bendit, J. P. Duteuil, *La Revolte Etudiante* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1968), p. 55.

[29]André Rouède, *Esprit*, June-July 1968, pp. 1008-1009.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Dumazedier in *Esprit,* "has known how to invent means of action much more efficient than those ever used before to shatter the structures of social oppression."[30] Throwing eggs or tomatoes, shouting down bourgeois-minded lecturers—in short, raising hell —is lauded as "l'acte contestataire," which according to another *Esprit* writer is the "remedy for the crisis of civilization of the affluent peoples."[31] And the word "repression" has become so chic that Epistémon, who on page 21 of his book assured his readers that there had been none at Nanterre, discovers by page 99 that the students had every reason to complain of it. "The repression suffered by them is more insidious, more subtle, more penetrating than a physical constraint; the repression of the spoken word . . . before May '68 no one dared to open his mouth during a lecture."[32]

Even those who, like Jean-Marie Domenach, editor of *Esprit,* are willing to admit that the juvenihilists show themselves "totally lacking in any understanding of power or the institutions of the State" nonetheless feel obliged to believe that "from this outburst of creativities, this seemingly anarchic tumult, these limitless claims, there emerge the outlines of a new community."[33] While some extol the absence of constructive ideas, the revolutionaries' proudly proclaimed lack of any program, as proof of the originality of their political thinking, others credit them with profound insight into the needs of the time. Thus Jean Bloch Michel remarked that summer in another review, *Preuves:* "Nothing has struck me more than that they have not only rid themselves so quickly of stereotyped revolutionary thinking . . . but also prepared the birth of an original analysis of society which for the first time takes account of concrete realities."

Old-fashioned national pride accounts at least partly for this readiness to enthuse about the young Emperor's magnificent new clothes, the nonexistence of which is nowhere more clearly demonstrated than in the opening and closing passages of Cohn-Bendit's book, *Le Gauchisme.* Having for once consented to define his program, he does so by quoting from the 1871 trial of the "communards", accused of

> creating a society which recognizes neither government nor army nor religion, which decrees legislation by the people for the people, transfer of land into collective ownership, abolition of the right of inheritance

[30]August-September 1968, p. 67.
[31]Conrad Detrer, *ibid.,* p. 53.
[32]Epistémon, *op. cit.*
[33]*Esprit,* August-September 1968, p. 48.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of capital and the instruments of work, abolition of marriage as a political [*sic*], religious, juridical and civil institution, suppression of permanent armies and lowering of all frontiers until the very idea of a fatherland has been eliminated, and rallying of the workers of the world to a tight solidarity.[34]

There you have the measure of the juvenihilists' "originality" and awareness of "the concrete realities of our time." And here in the final passage of their leader's book (whose publisher "has paid us $12,500 advance on royalties knowing full well we shall use it to make Molotov cocktails") is how he wants his readers to help him realize his program:

Get dressed, because I hope you have read these pages in bed, go to the cinema, take in the dreary boredom of this spectacle which normally excludes you. . . . Look at the actors who simulate the reality which you unfortunately have to live every day. And then when the first advertisement appears on the screen, take your tomatoes and act, take your eggs and act. Refuse everything. Then go out into the street and tear down all the advertising posters you can find. After that simply remain in the street, look at your companions and say to yourself: the essential has not been said for it remains to be invented. Then act. Find new relationships with your girl friend, love differently, refuse the family. Not for others but with others, it is for yourself you make the revolution here and now.[35]

It is young men of this cast of mind whom Professor Morin hails as the leaders of "a student revolt more all-embracing than anywhere else in the West because . . . it is much better oriented by a political general staff of *extraordinary quality of action and thought.*"[36] In the same proud spirit even Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, of all people, writes of "the French having been once again called upon to take the lead in the march of history."[37] More predictably, the Gaullist organ *La Nation* enthused about "France once more having given the world an inspiring example thanks to its chief and its decisive lucid youth."[38]

VI

One feels for poor, nonconformist Aron, unable to join in the general jubilation, ashamed rather than proud of his country's showing, at a loss to understand why "cultivated and intelligent men cannot resist what seems to me a delirium." In Aron's sober view the juvenihilists who are supposed "to have gone beyond

[34]D. and G. Cohn-Bendit, *Le Gauchisme* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1968), p. 8.
[35]*Ibid.*, p. 270.
[36]Morin, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 70. (Emphasis added.)
[37]J.-J. Servan-Schreiber, *Le Réveil de la France* (Paris: Denoel, 1968), p. 13.
[38]Quoted in *Le Monde*, June 18, 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Marxism have in fact—in so far as they have any ideas at all—returned to pre-Marxism, utopian socialism; they have forgotten a century of history."[39] The "direct democracy" of the Sorbonne and the Odeon glorified in *Esprit* as a "striving for true freedom, a way of inventing life and to seize the possible," and which its young practitioners want to extend to all layers of society, is for Aron "a new delirium of the Paris intellectuals . . . the latest ideological fashion is practically meaningless; what can one say to people preaching direct democracy in an industrial society except suggest they should go and visit any Russian, American, English or French factory?"[40] He asks himself how his fellow professors could

> suddenly have forgotten the lesson taught by all the thinkers they have read and commented on with such erudition, from Aristotle to Lenin. . . . They have relapsed into the worst form of utopianism and revolutionary mythology. . . . Let them reread the handful of political philosophers who count in the history of Western thought: Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Spinoza, Hegel, Comte, Marx, and they will realize again that a state of nature which is not without charm during the few days of a revolutionary carnival, rapidly becomes more intolerable than any other conceivable order.[41]

It seems that some, like Jean-Marie Domenach, took this counsel to heart. The June-July issue of Domenach's review was still full of admiration for "the young who had already shaken the political and trade union bureaucracies and who would compel them to renovate themselves, thus creating favorable conditions for the replacement of capitalist power by the socialism of free men." Thanks to them "Europe had at last sketched out the first answer to the fascination of Americanism."[42] But in the next issue, two months later, he sounded a much less enthusiastic note.

> One had never yet seen revolutionaries so devoid of theory, which was all the more surprising as they were students and young professors. This intellectual elite [*sic*] does not seem to have read much, not even Marcuse; they admit it without shame. . . . When one compares the declarations of the students of the 'Twenty-second of March' with the manifests and programs drawn up by so many workers in 1848, one almost feels that this time one is confronted with illiterates in ideology and even sociology, for the recent works of Raymond Aron, Alain Touraine, Michel Crozier, Serge Mallet also seem unknown to them. No doubt it is partly a healthy reaction against the excessive theorizing that characterized Stalinism. But at the same time one cannot suppress a cer-

[39] *La Révolution Introuvable*, p. 14.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 147.
[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.
[42] P. 969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tain disquiet at the spectacle of so much ignorance allied to so much self-assurance.[43]

That the juvenihilist presents much the same traits wherever he crops up appears from an almost identical passage in Kennan's *Democracy and the Student Left:*

> One is struck to see such massive certainties already present in the minds of people who not only *have* not studied very much but presumably *are* not studying a great deal, because . . . the state of being an "enragé" is simply incompatible with fruitful study. It implies a degree of existing emotional and intellectual commitment which leaves little room for openminded curiosity.[44]

Also, quoting Jack Newfield's far from unsympathetic study, Kennan finds that in America "not only do they—the *enragés*—read few novels and almost no scientific or philosophical literature, they have read little within the radical tradition."[45]

The French intellectuals' admiration for the *moral* qualities of the youthful revolutionaries likewise began to wilt with the passage of time. In the August-September issue of *Esprit,* Domenach recognized that the movement was unleashed with the help of a provocation technique having "a certain amount in common with that used by the Nazis and the Stalinists . . . marked by violence and bad faith."[46] He further began to have his doubts about the blessings of that "direct democracy" that had at first seemed to him so full of promise: "these permanent assemblies with their confusion lend themselves to manipulation and could well in the end prove more harmful to individual liberty than 'bourgeois' representation."[47]

But though Domenach shows his disillusionment with the juvenihilists in all these different ways, in one important respect he remains wholly on their side. In their horror of the "consumer-society" he finds the justification for all their misdeeds: "To burn a few motorcars, tear up the paving of a few streets, what does such damage amount to compared with what is inflicted on men every day? How much do such acts matter if those who commit them attack things [*s'en prennent aux choses*] to assert their right to live. . .?"[48]

This is more of that "Byzantine intellectuals' language" which is as obscure in the original as in translation. What does "asser-

[43]August-September 1968, pp. 35-36.
[44]P. 6.
[45]P. 141.
[46]P. 37.
[47]P. 48.
[48]P. 43.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion of the right to live" mean? What exactly is the "damage" daily done to men by the "consumer-society?" According to another editor of *Esprit,* Paul Thibaud, who has invented as a new name the "société du découragement," the consumer society makes it impossible for men to "express themselves." Thibaud found May 1968 a pregnant historical experience because "the whole of France stopped work in order to talk, to liberate itself at last from an immense silence."[49] In the same vein, Professor Julliard marveled at the "new generation's conquest of a new right, the right to talk . . . without doubt the most modern and the most revolutionary aspect of this month of May, the most durable threat to a society based on social conformism and silent enjoyment."[50]

Aron, too, was struck by the "marathon of words; for five weeks on end the Paris students talked and talked and talked . . . obviously deriving enormous enjoyment from it." But to him "the sort of juvenile fraternity they found in their semi-delinquent community was only the overcompensation of the loneliness which is normally the French student's fate." He saw the whole episode as a "carnival that has nothing to do with the construction of a new society . . . one of those huge revolutionary festivals in which the French, who suffer from a too rigid and authoritarian hierarchy, periodically smash it so as to live their dreams of fraternity and equality until they construct a new hierarchic straitjacket."[51]

It was above all the fashionable talk about the horrors of the consumer society that made Jean Cau, a worker's son, "see red" to the point where he lapsed into four-letter words. But he has an excuse: "My family did not belong to this society and when my writing efforts enabled me to offer them its comforts and toys it was a joy to see how happy and delighted they were."[52] Aron also finds the criticism of this society "by cineasts riding around in Ferraris or children of managing directors who have given them a car, intolerable." Perhaps these two nonconformists reacted so vehemently because they knew themselves to be up against an intellectual fashion that had all but swept the board. Even "practical men," leading politicians, felt obliged to pay homage to it. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing declared that, in spite of

[49] *Esprit,* June-July 1968, p. 1033.
[50] *Ibid.,* p. 1043.
[51] *La Révolution Introuvable,* p. 32.
[52] Cau, *op. cit.,* p. 67.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the "clumsy and pretentious vocabulary," the critique of the consumer society nonetheless expressed "a judgment of intuitive value on our inability to let this society live."[53] De Gaulle's Minister of Education, Edgar Faure, not only adopted the vocabulary but even improved on it, saying that he, too, found the "consumer society far from ideal" and therefore wanted to make a "société de promotion" of it through "participation," "decolonization of the worker" and "social disalienation."[54]

VII

While it is difficult to condone the intellectual abdication of the adults who prostrated themselves before the juvenihilists' "extraordinary quality of action and thought," some excuse can be found for its moral counterpart, the equally widespread readiness to take the young rebels at their own valuation as selfless idealists of superior virtue and nobler aspirations. On the face of it their rejection of the consumer society seemed to express a timely and high-minded protest against a technocratic world bereft of any more uplifting ideal than economic growth, a world which in its achievement of freedom from hunger leaves a deeper hunger unsatisfied, and which in its search for ever greater affluence has been forced to organize itself in such a way as to make men feel like helpless cogs in a vastly complex machine. Seen in this light the rebellion of the young could seem worthy of respect.

Too many of the adults, however, led astray by parental pride as well as by the somewhat uneasy social conscience most of us derive from the inevitable flagging of our early barnstorming enthusiasms, failed to see two fair-sized flies in the holy oil with which the young anointed themselves. The smaller of the two was that their demand for a new type of society which would give more meaning and purpose to life, which would satisfy the need of men for something more inspiring to believe in and work for than the accumulation of gadgets, can only be met by the Hitlers, the Stalins or the Maos of this world. Free men have to find their own way to heaven. They know better than to ask society or the state to provide them with a faith or a cause. The whole history of expanding human freedom is one long *denial* of the right of the collectivity to supply the beliefs that give

[53] In Alain Griotteray's *Des Barricades ou des Reformes?* (Paris: Fayard, 1968), p. 12.
[54] *Le Monde*, July 26, 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

meaning to men's lives, one long assertion of the claim that a man's soul is his own. Many of the young men and women of today, so highly praised for their denunciation of a society which fails to still their spiritual hunger, are not "yearning for freedom" but for the comforts of its opposite; their craving is for the security to be found in the womb of the Mother-Church or in the drill-hall of the Father-State.

Even so loyal a friend as Professor Morin has to admit that theirs proved to be anything but a truly freedom-loving spirit:

> there is very little liberalism in their libertarianism. They too readily dismiss liberalism as bourgeois. . . . They do not know that love of freedom that is born of the experience of communist regimes . . . nor that truly radical criticism that dares to question Marx and that characterizes the intellectual awakening in Eastern Europe.[55]

But though he recognizes that the young Emperor wears none of the magnificent democratic clothes so widely attributed to him, Morin cannot bring himself to admit that he is naked. He hastens to dress him up again in the thick woollies of "the Byzantine intellectuals' language":

> the student commune has produced something new that evolution would not have brought. This something new has not taken form yet. . . . But the student commune will perhaps be the classical model for future mutations of the West. In transforming the Sorbonne into a carnival-forum-laboratory of ideas it has sketched out a society-University where education must be offered to all, where not dreary bureaucracy but the imagination must reign, where not only economic exploitation but the hierarchic roots of domination must be stamped out . . . where the problem of going beyond bourgeois humanity will have to be faced. The historic role of the student community will prove all the greater because it has remained intensely true to itself. Through this non-constructive experience it has constructed a future concerning the whole of society. In refusing immediate compromises it has already become exemplary.[56]

The other fly in the ointment too often overlooked by the admiring adults who equated anti-materialism with generosity is that the juvenihilists' idealism was exceptionally egocentric. That was clear from the beginning at Nanterre where, according to Epistémon, they demanded that every student should be guaranteed his diploma, that its possession should guarantee a job, and, if its holder did not find the job to his liking, the right to a new one. This selfishness, this indifference to the interests of the masses who, like Jean Cau's family, had not yet had the

[55]Morin, *et al., op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.
[56]*Ibid.*, p. 32.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

opportunity to discover the horrors of the consumer society, appeared even more blatantly at the Sorbonne. "The economy is hurt, let it perish," pronounced one of the graffiti. Said Cohn-Bendit: "We refuse a world in which the certainty that we shall not die of hunger is to be exchanged for the risk that we shall die of boredom."[57] "We must abolish in practice the Judeo-Christian temptations of abnegation and sacrifice. . . ."[58] No wonder there was little love lost between these bourgeois students obsessed with their own pseudo-intellectual dream world, built of big empty words, and the working class whose leaders they abused as "Stalinist filth" and which, as one of the juvenihilists' most fervent admirers, Professor Coudray, bitterly admitted, was "thoroughly conservative, caught up in the toils and snares of modern bureaucratic capitalism, fully taking part in the race to consume."[59]

VIII

How widespread was the *trahison des adultes*? According to Epistémon, one-third of the professors and two-thirds of the assistant professors and tutors joined the "student power" that occupied the Sorbonne. Articulate opinion outside the university was overwhelmingly on its side, and insofar as it was the intellectuals who formed this opinion it would perhaps be more equitable to speak of a new *trahison des clercs*.

If in France this phenomenon took on far greater dimensions than anywhere else; if, as a contributor to *Le Monde* put it in retrospect, "any number of leading lights made themselves properly ridiculous," there are two possible explanations. One, highly uncharitable, is that the French intelligentsia of the Left (to which almost all self-respecting intellectuals feel obliged to belong) deserves the judgment passed on it by one of its members, Professor Micha of Nanterre. He became so exasperated by the hell-raising activities of the juvenihilists and the approving attitude of the abdicating adults among his colleagues that he erupted in an article in *Le Monde* about "the stupidest Left in the world."[60]

The second, only slightly more polite, explanation is that the Paris intellectuals remain highly susceptible to the charms of revolution for the sake of revolution, in the spirit of *l'art pour*

[57] *Le Monde*, May 14, 1968.
[58] *Le Gauchisme*, *op. cit.*, p. 267.
[59] Morin, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 116.
[60] Epistémon, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

l'art. The juvenihilists offered them the chance at last to *live* the dream for whose fulfillment they no longer had much to expect from the professional revolutionaries of the French Communist Party, who were seemingly turning respectable. In their eagerness to experience, if not Wordsworth's "very heaven" vouchsafed only to the young, at any rate the "bliss to be alive" which their forefathers had often known since the "dawn" of 1789, they were blind to the fact that they were joining one of those revolutions that Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, like Aron, characterizes as "the last spasm of the past and thus not really revolutions but counter-revolutions . . . like the Luddites and the Chartists in England." Pointing out that "some of the recent upheavals have been led by people who increasingly will have no role to play in the new technetronic society," Brzezinski sees their reaction as "reflecting both a conscious and unconscious realization that they are themselves becoming historically obsolete. . . . Their violence and revolutionary slogans are merely —and sadly—the death rattle of the historical irrelevants."[61]

Aron is unable fully to share this confident conclusion that society has nothing to fear from the new Luddites—which is strangely reminiscent of Santayana's equally confident dismissal of the radicals of his day as incapable of more than a "dying song." Though Aron rejects Malraux's apocalyptic vision of the events of May 1968 as "the end of a world," a turning point in the history of civilization, he does not exclude the possibility that in retrospect they will appear to have shown up "the essential fragility of a liberal order in a scientific civilization; perhaps future historians will see in what seems to me a comedy the upsurge of subterranean and destructive forces."[62]

It is the fragility of this precious order that makes the *trahison des adultes* so different to condone. "The intelligentsia's systematic criticism of the liberal society," Aron concludes, "tends to burden those bearing the responsibilities of authority . . . with a bad conscience. . . . And it was probably this which at least partly accounts for the collapse of May."[63]

One can but hope that the lesson of this collapse will not have been lost on the intelligentsia, and, indeed, the adult community as a whole, in other countries where the fragile liberal order is threatened by the young "yearning for freedom" and inviting its destruction.

[61]*New Republic,* June 1, 1968.
[62]*La Révolution Introuvable,* p. 134.
[63]*Ibid.,* pp. 136-137.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SPACE AGE GEOPOLITICS

by Francis X. Kane

THE voices of many American leaders at both the national and urban levels have been raised in recent years to urge the United States to rest on the laurels of landing on the moon and turn its attention to domestic problems of greater priority. Other American statesmen and strategists are increasingly worried about our "technological demobilization," the pressures to reduce still further our expenditures on space projects, and the lack of a national strategy for coping with the continuing global acceleration of technology. The country is badly split on how far and how fast we should go in attempting to use space. This article will undertake to provide some background information for this national debate by examining many of the potential economic and social benefits to be derived from the exploitation of space, the relative capabilities of various nations to engage in space programs, and the possible use of space for military-strategic purposes.

There is no doubt in my mind that during the next twenty years we will see the maturing of the Space Age—an era characterized by an increasing number of space powers, each possessing a growing gross national product and capabilities for orbiting a variety of spacecraft. Motivations of prestige, commercial applications, and national security will propel these countries into the Space Age. As achievements grow more impressive and space devices assume a greater role in commercial and military affairs, more importance will be placed on specific locations on the earth's surface. If conflicts break out, the new orbital relationships will influence the type and timing of military operations conducted in aerospace.

America has been slow to grasp the coming impact of space, and its strategists have been among the most reluctant to face the changes that will result from space technology. This failure to foresee the obvious lies partly in the concentration on man's exploration of the moon, in the secrecy shrouding the Soviet effort, and in attempts to legislate a technological plateau.

Over the next two decades, applications of space technology

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

will be felt in all areas of human affairs—economic, sociological, and especially geopolitical. That is not to say that space devices will be given any more attention than was accorded the jet aircraft in the 1960's or the radio of prewar days. Nevertheless, the possibilities afforded by space technology will become increasingly obvious, the motivations of nation-states to participate directly in the Space Age will be strong, and the resulting impact on human affairs will be widely felt.

The First Decade

The achievements of the first decade of the Space Age, in reality from the first Sputnik to the end of November 1970, are remarkable. The number of objects put into orbit (satellites, apogee kick motors, propulsion stages, shrouds) was 3,700. The United States led in number of spacecraft launched through 1969 with a total of 664 and a launch success rate of 88 per cent. During this period U.S. launches reached a peak of 95 in 1966 and then declined to 49 in 1969. On the contrary, the number of Soviet launches continued to increase and reached 74 in 1969.[1] The capstone was the U.S. landing on the moon in July 1969.

While the Space Age was opened by launching an unmanned satellite, the achievements of the astronauts and cosmonauts held the public's attention. Nevertheless, both types of programs made significant contributions. The feasibility of communication satellites was demonstrated and the transmission of pictures onto the television screen "via satellite" has become so commonplace as to be accepted now without comment. Weather satellites, which gave meteorologists an important tool for weather forecasting, are estimated to have saved millions of dollars in bad-weather losses. By the beginning of the 1970's more than half of the nations of the world were using communication and weather satellites on a routine, daily basis. The users of communication satellites generated over 90 per cent of the total international telecommunications traffic in the world.[2]

Manned flights demonstrated that man can perform useful functions in space and that he can contribute to the success of

[1] *Aeronautics and Space Report of the President,* National Aeronautics and Space Council (Washington: GPO, January 1970), p. 92.

[2] Frank E. Loy, "Can the INTELSAT Experience Serve as a Precedent for International Co-operation in Other Fields?," in *Space Exploration and Applications,* papers presented at the United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Vienna, August 14-27, 1968. A/Conf. 34/2, New York, 1969, II, 992.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

space operations. Thus, what was the source of much debate early in the Space Age—man's value vs. man's cost—was settled by the many scientific experiments conducted on individual flights by spacemen. Man, of course, is not needed on all satellite missions; his role in each program must be analyzed on the basis of costs and gains.

The Second Decade

The debate at the beginning of what we may call the second decade of the Space Age is over such issues as: Should the planets be explored by man? Should permanent bases be established on the moon? Can industrial and commercial facilities be put into orbit? If so, what value will they have? As far as man's role is concerned, the question now is not whether men should be present, but how many—two, twelve or forty? How long can they stay in orbit? Must artificial gravity be provided?

Success in both manned and unmanned space programs has given a new dimension to considerations of security. Early assessments showed that satellites made it possible to operate military forces more effectively. Once again, technology took the lead, creating new strategies because of changes in the way forces could be operated. Some of the new characteristics of the operating forces are: responsiveness to decisions based on real-time data from sensors located in space; integrated operation of theater forces using a common grid; intimate awareness of changes in the physical environment; direct access to events occurring around the globe on a real-time basis; and improved effectiveness in weapons delivery resulting from our increased geodetic knowledge.

The President's Science Advisory Committee stated that there are ten important defense tasks to which satellites may lend themselves and cited four speculative examples, which included the use of communications, navigation, air traffic control, early warning, tactical weather, sensor monitoring, mapping and data relay.[3]

The program opportunities of the second decade of the Space Age spring from the physical characteristics of the natural environment and the rich state of space technology. Satellites possess several unique advantages. One is extremely long-distance, point-

[3]*The Next Decade in Space,* Report of the Space Science and Technology Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee (Washington: GPO, March 1970), pp. 17-18.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to-point coverage of the earth, an attribute that can be exploited in the design of communications, navigation, and geodetic satellites to "tie" such points together.

Another benefit resulting from the typically high altitudes of satellites is coverage of vast areas on earth. An airborne sensor at 30,000 feet can view an area of 110,000 square nautical miles. A spaceborne sensor at synchronous equatorial altitude (19,200 nautical miles) commands an area of over 63 million square nautical miles, nearly half of the earth's surface. Thus, satellites make it possible to observe events in remote, otherwise inaccessible areas. These properties enhance the value of surveillance, meteorological, sensor and environmental satellites.[4]

A third benefit is the ease of repositioning satellites. Establishing equivalent capabilities with earth-based alternatives can be costly and time-consuming. By contrast, a satellite, once in synchronous orbit, can be moved halfway around the world in two weeks or less by slight impulses from its on-board propulsion. It also requires minimal or no overseas basing and, consequently, has few or none of those costs and political uncertainties. With the advent of satellite-to-satellite relays, even the minimal need for overseas basing in some concepts vanishes altogether.

Because of the remoteness of satellites, attacks on them by nuclear warheads would not produce collateral damage to installations or population centers on earth, as would be the case with nuclear attack on earth-based systems. Moreover, a retaliatory action in kind would be far less likely to result in an all-out nuclear exchange. From a security viewpoint, the vastness of space makes it difficult to see satellites at high altitudes and hence to attack them. As a result, deep space offers an extensive hiding place for a deterrent force.

Space activities are constrained principally by environmental and economic factors. The natural environment includes the Van Allen belts and their radiation hazards, particularly to man. Under these conditions, manned spacecraft cannot operate for more than several hours at orbital altitudes in the neighborhood of 800 to 2,000 nautical miles, even with reasonable shielding. At other altitudes in near-earth space, the threat of a catastrophic puncture by a meteoroid tends to limit the duration of manned missions to a few months, unless adequate shielding is provided.

[4] *Useful Applications of Earth-Oriented Satellites*, Report of the Central Review Committee, National Research Council, Washington, National Academy of Sciences, 1969, p. 6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Another constraint has been the high cost of building and launching satellites. Unit spacecraft costs in the first decade of space tended to be between $2,000 and $12,000 a pound, exclusive of on-board fuel and depending on the sophistication of the equipment. Launch costs for the second decade have declined to between $700 and $1,000 a pound for launches into a low, easterly orbit, and there is a concerted program to cut them to $100 a pound. The high costs of satellites and space boosters resulted from the need to operate small numbers of systems, unattended and for long periods. The low rate of production, the initial impossibility of "in-space-maintenance," and the search for high reliability caused individual satellites to be expensive compared with other systems. However, the performance achieved by such satellites far surpassed that of other systems in terms of life, reliability and continuity.[5] Meteorology satellites, for example, used small payloads to view large parts of the earth's surface for years. The large coverage and long endurance could not be matched by airborne or surface systems.

During the second decade, all of the principal electronic systems needed for theater operations (communications, navigation, surveillance, weather) can be placed overhead, left unattended and operated independent of overseas installations. Rapid deployment to cope with contingencies around the globe can be greatly facilitated and "bare base" operations made more feasible.

Also, as space systems become an integral part of military operations, greater emphasis will be put on their survivability in space. Measures accepted as commonplace for other systems (hardening, decoys, redundancy) will be considered for space systems. Finally, space launch vehicles will be able to put greater weight into orbit.[6] A greater proportion of satellite weight will be available for use in in-space propulsion and maneuverability, a feature that will increase effectiveness by providing access to specific locations on the earth's surface on demand. Maneuverability can also be used to improve a space vehicle's chances to survive by eliminating the predictability of location characteristic of current systems in fixed orbits.

Thus, in sum, space can provide access to any part of the globe and a hiding place for space objects. Sensors operating in

[5]SYNCOM II exceeded its design lifetime by 500 per cent. The "Birds" of the initial Defense Communications Satellite Program were equipped with timers so that they could be turned off after six years in orbit.

[6]J. S. Butz, Jr., "The New Challenge: A Low-Cost Booster," *Air Force and Space Digest*, June 1969, pp. 79-81.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the vast region can report real-time information on the environment and on events occurring at any place around the globe. These characteristics provide the basis for new strategies and new modes of operating. The technology developed to operate in this environment is characterized by long life, reliability, high data rates and real-time information. Maneuverability and survivability have been improved to insure reliable support to strategic and tactical operations.

National Capabilities and the Economic Factor

In assessing the impact of space on geopolitics, we will concentrate on the two important factors of national capabilities and intent. Each is composed of a number of subfactors, such as competence in technology, available economic resources, desire for prestige, and requirements for security. We will examine capabilities and the economic factors first and then show how national intent determines how such capabilities are exploited.

Projections of the potential growth of gross national products of the principal nation-states today reflect assumptions as to political stability, rate of growth, impact of technology, and national intent in exploiting technology. For our purposes, it is sufficient to look at the forecasts of high and low rates of growth and try to bracket the extent to which such growth will affect space technology. Table I illustrates the possible ranges of growth. For example, growth rates for U.S. GNP have been projected to vary from 2 per cent to 5 per cent over the next twenty years. Starting from the 1966 figure of about $720 billion, we calculate that by 1985 the U.S. GNP could total between $1 trillion and $1 trillion, 800 billion. The nearest competitor, the USSR, with forecast rates of growth varying from 2 per cent to 7 per cent and taking off from a 1966 GNP of $300 billion, could have by 1985 a GNP in the range of $450 billion to $1 trillion. Other countries that have shown phenomenal growth in the postwar period, notably Japan, have been forecast to continue to grow at rates varying from 4 per cent to 10 per cent. The GNP for Japan in 1965 was $73 billion, and by 1985 it could fall between $150 billion and $450 billion.[7]

U.S. investments in space for the first fifteen-year period amounted to roughly $54 billion. The percentage of the GNP

[7]For an assessment of likely GNP's for 1975, see Bruce M. Russett, *et al.*, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964). Table 8.10 (p. 352) ranks Communist China fourth by 1975.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE I

POSSIBLE RANGES OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCTS
(approximate GNP's in billions of dollars)

Country	*Growth Rate %*	*1966 GNP*	*1972 GNP Range*	*1976 GNP Range*	*1985 GNP Range*
United States	2-5	720	800-950	880-1,100	1,000-1,800
USSR	2-7	300	340-450	370-600	450-1,000
West Germany	4-6	107	140-170	160-230	250-460
United Kingdom	2-6	93	105-130	110-170	150-280
France	2-6	84	92-120	100-150	125-250
Japan	4-10	73	90-130	110-190	150-450
Communist China	0-10	60	60-100	60-150	60-350
Italy	4-7	47	59-71	70-92	99-170
Canada	3-8	47	56-75	63-101	82-203
India	0-6	41	41-74	41-94	41-126
Brazil	3-8	25	29-39	33-53	43-106
Australia	3-8	20	24-32	27-43	35-86
Sweden	3-6	18	22-26	25-33	32-55
Netherlands	3-6	15	18-21	20-27	26-45
Belgium	3-6	14	17-20	19-26	25-43
Spain	2-6	11	13-16	14-20	16-34
Argentina	2-8	11	13-18	14-24	16-39
Pakistan	2-8	8	9-12	10-17	11-34
UAR	2-8	4	5-7	6-10	6-20
Greece	2-7	4	5-6	5-8	6-14
Israel	3-8	3	4-5	4-7	6-14

devoted to NASA reached its high point in 1966 at 0.8 per cent. If we assume that this percentage of the GNP grows to about 2 per cent by 1980 and 3 per cent by 1985, the cumulative total invested in the U.S. space effort over the next twenty years would be about $375 billion.[8]

These numbers are hard to comprehend and interpret because we lack perspectives on other U.S. national efforts over an extended period, e.g., in the fields of surface transportation and housing. One of the few estimates we have is that federal spending on education will increase from $20 billion in 1968 to $39 billion in 1980.[9] But since there are few projections of total U.S. expenditures for education, it is difficult to compare education and space as national priorities. However, we might note that the developing countries of the world have asked the affluent

[8]The NASA Science and Technology Advisory Committee concluded that "it is reasonable to utilize ½ to 1 percent of the Gross National Product to support the nation's civilian space flight program." See *Proceedings of the Winter Study on Uses of Manned Space Flight, 1975-1985,* NASA SP-196, I, 4.

[9]Howard R. Bowen, "Financial Needs of the Campus," *The Corporation and the Campus,* Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. XXX, No. 1 (1970), p. 92.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

countries to allocate one per cent of their GNP to development through the UN; by 1980 this would amount to $21 to $26 billion a year.[10]

In effect, the projection of investment in space suggests that by making a very small investment from a huge GNP, the United States will have almost unlimited possibilities for advancing space technology. If we choose a goal of making a manned landing on Mars and bringing the crew back to earth in the 1980's, we can spend $250 billion on this project at an investment not exceeding 3 per cent per annum of our GNP. If we pursue a program of this general magnitude, we can forecast space activities such as lunar colonies and exploitation of whatever industrial and commercial resources we develop in orbit or find on the moon. These would be part of a variety of activities in cislunar space that would have direct application to economic, social and political life on earth.

The high point of national achievement could be the construction of a permanent moon base or temporary landings on other planets such as Mars, and finally in the next twenty years, establishment of permanent manned stations on other planets. While not affirming that stations on other planets are a specific goal, the Joint Space Panels of the President's Science Advisory Committee concluded that "an attractive long-term objective for space exploration is a program directed ultimately at the exploration of the planets by man."[11] A preliminary estimate of the costs of all space projects, including manned stations on other planets, comes to $250-$300 billion over the next twenty years. If $375 billion could be made available, the projects would certainly seem feasible from a financial point of view. This funding for space projects need not come exclusively from the government, for the private sector has found applications in space projects just as it has in other advanced technology, e.g., nuclear energy, and the promise of the future is certain to attract additional private capital.

During the next two decades, the United States and the Soviet Union should, on the basis of GNP, continue to be the leading space powers. The greater economic power of the United States should guarantee that, through proper allocation of resources,

[10]United Nations, *A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System* (Geneva, 1969), p. 105.

[11]See their report, "The Space Program in the Post-Apollo Period," February 1967, p. 9.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

we can attain, and maintain, a lead of at least one level of accomplishment. As far as other participants in the Space Age are concerned, oversimplified assumptions as to GNP and resulting investment in space must be tempered by taking into account the considerable amount of time required to develop the necessary technological base. However, we should note that, because of our national policy, much of U.S. space technology will be available to other countries, thus reducing their R&D burden. We provide in open literature a wealth of technical detail on our space ventures.[12] We can assume, also, that individual technology projects, devices, components, and perhaps even systems will be available for purchase by other powers. The economic benefits to be derived from such commercial sales undoubtedly will spur other countries to develop their own space technology and sell its product.

Thus, many countries will be able to cut R&D costs and reduce total program expenditures. We can postulate that it will take every country entering the space race about as much time as it has taken the United States to achieve various levels of capability, but the cost to them will be much lower than it has been to the United States.

To enter the space race, a nation must have basic rocket technology: the demonstration of this capability is considered the entering level. If we accept this criterion, several nations qualify as participants in the Space Age: The United States, the USSR, Japan, Communist China, the ELDO[13] (Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Australia), as well as France acting separately. The second level is reached by building satellites. The countries at this level are the United States, the USSR, France, Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, Communist China, West Germany and Australia. The ESRO[14] combination (Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, with Australia and Norway as observers) and the INTELSAT consortium have also built satellites. Holland and India hope to launch their first satellites by 1974. In

[12]According to the President's message transmitting the *Fifteenth Semiannual Report for NASA, January 1-June 30, 1966,* over 800 technical briefs have been published. See House of Representatives Document No. 122, 90th Congress, 1st Session, p. 168. NASA exchanges data with forty-eight countries and estimates that its publications reach an audience of ten million persons.

[13]European Launch Development Organization.

[14]European Space Research Organization.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

addition, some countries have shown their intention to enter the space race by launching rockets developed by other countries: Argentina, Brazil, Greece, Norway, Italy, India, Pakistan, Egypt and Spain. The Soviet Union has launched satellites built by East European countries.

Although the West European countries were late in developing space technology, it is conceivable that a European space program—an amalgamation of the achievements and capabilities of France, West Germany, the Benelux countries, the United Kingdom and Italy—could mount a significant technological space effort. An integrated Europe could have a GNP in the range of $675 to $1,240 million in the 1980's.[15] However, as an English authority stated in 1967, it is "difficult to promote large-scale programs in Europe."[16] This point has been emphasized by the difficulties in 1970 of merging ELDO and ESRO into EUROSPACE and by the British government's decision to withdraw from ELDO by 1972.[17]

Yet, international cooperation seems to be the key policy for countries attempting to enter the Space Age. The French, for example, have cooperated actively with the United States in various experimental programs, including launchings from Wallops Island, Cape Kennedy and Vandenberg Air Force Base. In late 1970 a prototype of a French-German weather satellite was launched from the French site at Kourou, Guiana. Also, after de Gaulle's visit to the USSR in 1966, France and the USSR reported that they would conduct a Joint Communications Satellite Program, and a French satellite was scheduled to be delivered in 1971 to the USSR for launch with a MOLNIYA.[18] In April 1967, Moscow announced that it had concluded arrangements with its East European satellites (Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia) to engage in joint space projects; as part of this program, in December 1968 the USSR launched a scientific satellite to collect data on the Northern Lights.

Since the inception of the NASA effort, the United States has conducted projects with the United Kingdom, France, Canada, West Germany, Australia and Italy and a secondary rocket pro-

[15]For the three-year period 1969-1971, the ESRO budget was $172 million.
[16]A. V. Cleaver, "After Apollo, What Next?," *Astronautics and Aeronautics*, May 1967, p. 77.
[17]John Marriott, "Britain's Space Program—A Respectable Past and a Future Yet Uncharted," *Air Force and Space Digest*, August 1970, p. 63.
[18]*Air & Cosmos* (Paris), April 24, 1971, p. 14.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gram with Brazil, Greece, India, Norway and Pakistan. Other experiments have been planned with the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. Such international cooperation will make it less costly for other nations to become space powers and will increase their operational competence.

The most striking success in international space cooperation is the INTELSAT Consortium of some seventy countries which form a global communications network. By 1970 receiving stations had been erected in thirty-nine countries.[19] The United Nations has stated its needs for a comprehensive communications capability ranging from operation of peacekeeping forces[20] to exchange of library data through UNESCO. Direct broadcast satellites are a new avenue to mass education, and two of the largest developing states, India and Brazil, are active in efforts to utilize them.[21]

In 1967 France and West Germany reached agreement on Project Symphony, a communications satellite for radio and television distribution to Europe, Africa, South America, the United States and Canada. The project is designed to provide experience in space and to promote space industries and electronics.[22]

By 1970 the French had rocket launching programs with Pakistan, Argentina, Iceland, Norway and India.[23] The Soviet Union was offering to any nation, at no cost, a ground station to work with its MOLNIYA satellites. The future role of Communist China continues to be an unknown, but she orbited her first satellite in 1970 and has announced her intention of becoming a missile power.

Thus, as far as national capabilities are concerned, by 1970 there were ten active participants in the Space Age and three others with rudimentary capabilities. In the first category are the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Italy, Communist China, Australia, Canada and West Germany; in the

[19]See John A. Johnson, "Organization and Activities of the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium," UN Document, A/Conf. 34/2, II, 1062-1065.

[20]*Utilization of the INTELSAT System by the United Nations,* UN Document, Com. I/31, March 4, 1969.

[21]Ashok Parthasarathi stated that space endeavors provide a stimulus for socio-economic growth. He estimated that direct broadcast television would create over one million new jobs in India. See his remarks, "The Industrial and Technological Spin-Off Resulting from a Nationwide Television System Using Satellites," UN Document, A/Conf. 34/2, II, 807-811.

[22]J. Bouvet, "Le Projet Symphonie," UN Document, A/Conf. 3/42, I, 151-156.

[23]Michel Bignier, "La France et la Cooperation Bilaterale," UN Document, A/Conf. 3/42, II, 1018-1020.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

second, Holland, India and Brazil. Forecasts of economic growth and the availability of U.S. technical information make wider participation feasible. As applications to the commercial and industrial aspects of national life are better understood, there will be a more vigorous pursuit of space programs for economic benefit.

National Intent

Whether nations will take advantage of their capabilities and the new technologies will be determined by national intent, influenced by such powerful drives as prestige, commercial and industrial benefits, and national security.

Prestige

In the bipolar struggle with the communist system, many U.S. actions have been motivated by the objective of proving the superiority of the United States in political and social affairs and in economic achievement and technological application. Enhancing a nation's prestige can have a direct impact on its technological capability.[24]

To illustrate this point let us look at the late Charles de Gaulle's technological strategy. He faced two major deficiencies: insufficient technical know-how and a shortage of creative individuals. To overcome these difficulties, he invoked the strategy of investing large sums in the technology necessary to fashion a French independent nuclear deterrent. Building on to the technical base inherited from the French Atomic Energy Program and the aircraft industry created following World War II, he pushed the development of nuclear weapons and advanced manned aircraft so that there would be spin-offs throughout the French economy. To this he added the stimulus of a rocket program, which will culminate in the building of a dispersed, hardened missile force and submarine force, and he tried to promote the growth of a French computer technology. These efforts produced dual benefits: they gave France a technological capability and the scientific personnel needed for further technological advances. In short, he avoided repeating the errors of the prewar period during which the French failed to go beyond the prototype stage in nearly every facet of their arms industry. He also sought to lay the foundation of French technological independ-

[24]Dr. Raymond Hamelin, Scientific Attaché of the French Embassy in Washington, made this point in a speech to the Canaveral Council of Technical Societies, Cocoa Beach, Florida, April 5, 1965.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ence of the United States and the USSR. Other countries may be motivated in similar ways to construct strategies aimed at enhancing their prestige through technological strength.

Commercial Value

The exploitation of space technology, by such organizations as COMSAT and INTELSAT, can make a tremendous contribution in various fields of commercial activity. After President Nixon changed the national policy on communication satellites,[25] nine U.S. firms filed petitions with the Federal Communications Commission to provide services via satellites, such as cable television.[26] Improvements in agriculture, protection of forest resources, control of erosion, accurate weather forecasts, and greatly expedited communications lie in the future. Programs for the control of resources show great promise; the Sierra Leone government, among others, listed such programs as one of the principal benefits from space activities.[27]

Prior to the approval of NASA's Earth Resources Technology Satellite Program, a study forecast that the benefits to be derived from the program would amount to $60 billion per year. This would be achieved by cost avoidance, e.g., the prevention of nattural disasters and erosion, and, in a positive sense, through increased productivity and use of natural resources.[28] The problems in the Earth Resources Program lie not in the satellite or sensor technology but in the interpretation of the data output and its applications to commercial uses globally. Satellites can collect and transmit tremendous amounts of data (measured in billions of bits per second). The link between such data and a problem such as control of crop disease or urban development was only rudimentary at the start of the 1970's.

We can anticipate advances that will make it possible to operate commercial air fleets in a more efficient and less costly man-

[25]COMSAT was formed originally as a new type of entity financed by the government, communications corporations and the public. Nixon changed the national policy that had given COMSAT a monopoly on commercial communications satellite operations and encouraged entrepreneurial exploitation of such technology.

[26]*Los Angeles Times,* July 12, 1970, pp. H-2 and 3.

[27]"Needs of the Developing Countries in the Field of Practical Benefits to be Derived from Space Research and Exploration," UN Document, A/Conf. 3/42, II, 1028-1032.

[28]Planning Research Corporation Report PRC R-2128, Los Angeles, January 1968, Vol. I (Summary), p. 34. Congressman Joseph E. Karth estimated the economic benefits could amount to more than $36 billion a year. L. B. Taylor, Jr., "Prospecting from Space," *Skyline,* North American Rockwell, 1969, Vol. 27, No. 1, p. 23.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ner through the use of navigation, communications and weather satellites. Navigation satellites were technically feasible in 1970 and designs were in hand for both civil and military use. ESRO took the lead in defining a satellite system for navigation over the crowded North Atlantic air routes, providing for more efficient use of the air space and increased safety. The major questions to be resolved at the start of the decade are the choice of specific design and timing of acquisition.

Security

Space systems have given new dimensions to strategy—geographic, temporal, operational and conceptual. Exploitation of the characteristics inherent in satellite surveillance systems permits decision-making and control to be exercised in "real time." The rational interaction of offensive and defensive forces can be exercised. New options for decision and action become real.

During the early years of the Space Age the United States engaged in extensive debate and discussion about the peaceful uses of outer space and played a leading role in bringing into reality specific treaty prohibitions: for example, weapons of mass destruction are not to be stationed in orbit and military operations are not to be conducted on other celestial bodies. In Dr. Charles Sheldon's opinion, the United States has not violated the terms or the spirit of existing international agreements even though it uses space systems on a regular basis for military support roles, including communications, navigation and similar activities. Nor are the Soviets guilty of violations, despite their open claims of orbital rocket capability.[29] In the late 1960's the USSR tested a new weapons system, FOBS (Fractional Orbital Bombardment System),[30] and from this "it is an easy jump to MOBS" (Multiple Orbital Bombardment System).[31] Dr. John S. Foster assessed the potential impact of the Soviet FOBS and MOBS as reducing the warning time of attack on our bomber bases "to a few minutes."[32]

Another type of space system on which the USSR has placed great importance is the reconnaissance satellite. From 1966 to 1969 the Soviets put 104 of them into orbit and recovered their payloads. The pace of the program has grown from 21 in 1966 to

[29]Charles S. Sheldon, II, *Review of the Soviet Space Program* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 81.
[30]See Charles S. Sheldon, II, "The Soviet Space Program," *TRW Space Log*, Winter 1968-1969 (Redondo Beach, Calif., TRW Systems Group), pp. 17-18.
[31]John S. Foster, Jr., "Options for Strategic Systems," *Astronautics and Aeronautics*, August 1970, p. 31.
[32]*Ibid.*, p. 33.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

32 in 1969;[33] during this period nearly one-third of the 330 satellites orbited by the USSR were of the reconnaissance variety.

There has been much speculation about other satellite operations that the Soviets have conducted but whose purpose they have never explained. U.S. commentators believe they are designed to inspect and destroy satellites. Dr. Foster listed an "Orbital Anti-Satellite System" as one of the weapons systems developed by the USSR since 1963.[34]

The United States has concentrated on an entirely different kind of space program—one that will provide early warning of missile launches. In March 1971 Dr. Foster assured Congress that "we now have experimental evidence that such a satellite can provide the U.S. with an excellent warning system in the future. . . ."[35]

The United Kingdom was the third country to develop a military space system when she launched SKYNET I in late 1970. This defense communications satellite system permits secure communications from the United Kingdom to her Far East military bases. In 1970 NATO was planning its satellite communication system.

As pointed out earlier, all the electronics for theater and contingency operations can be positioned "overhead." They will give the commander the ability to observe the weather in his area of responsibility, scrutinize enemy operations, know the location of his own forces with pinpoint accuracy, communicate with them, and control them in real time. Future commanders will find themselves in a situation which disappeared about the time of Napoleon. They will be able to see and control their forces, but in new dimensions of time and space. Once this capability exists, protection of space systems from counter-space operations will be essential.

In contrast to other nations whose space applications have been geared to support surface and atmospheric operations, the USSR has begun development of the second stage of space age capabilities for conducting military operations in space.

Thus, we can anticipate that during the next two decades the utility of satellites for more effective surface and atmospheric military operations will increase in such areas as communications,

[33]Philip J. Klass, "USSR Accelerates Recon Satellite Pace," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, April 6, 1970, pp. 72, 74 ff.

[34]Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Statement on the FY 72 Defense RDT&E Program Before the Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate, 92nd Congress, March 18, 1971.

[35]*Ibid.*, p. 63.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

weather, navigation, position location, data relay, air traffic control, surveillance, and sensor monitoring. But once the Soviets begin military operations in space, they will force other nations to develop similar capabilities.

Internationalism versus Nationalism

A basic question is whether space will be "internationalized," i.e., whether future space activities will be international in purpose, direction and execution. Supporters of internationalized space say it would be a step toward reducing international conflicts and promoting the cause of peace.

In the 1970's, however, nationalism will still be the driving force behind space efforts. The Soviets practice what may be termed "space autarky." They have not depended on any other nation for assistance in tracking their satellites, including their manned missions. Their tracking networks are entirely under their control and depend on both land-based stations and supporting ships. In 1968 they appealed to other nations, notably India, to recover their spacecraft re-entering from new missions, but this was a notable exception.

Other nations might be eager to engage in international projects because they lack national capabilities. Their intent could be to build the necessary base so that they can initiate a national effort at a later date. Given the present strong drive for national capabilities in other fields, it would seem that during the next two decades, as national capabilities grow, space programs will become more and more national in character and purpose. As in all national endeavors, the magnitude and progress of space efforts will be constrained more by capabilities than by intent. Thus, the decisions of individual governments as to their choice of strategies and acquisition of devices must be left for future assessments.[36]

Orbital Considerations

The location of launch sites exercises considerable influence on the feasibility of conducting space operations. Currently, the U.S. program utilizing Cape Kennedy exploits what are known as "low

[36]The United States continues to press for more international cooperation in space, citing INTELSAT as a model. Also, in 1969 Washington proposed that development of a "space shuttle" or "space transportation system" be an international program. By late 1970 the European contribution to such a program was planned at about 10 per cent of the funding required. *Air & Cosmos,* September 26, 1970, p. 15.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

inclination orbits," that is to say, those orbit planes inclined about 30° to the equator. Vandenberg Air Force Base is the launch site for polar orbits. The Soviet Union, in contrast, uses "high inclination orbits": many of their space devices are placed into orbital planes inclined 45° to 80° to the equator.

The initial assessments of the value of what is called synchronous equatorial orbits were made in the 1940's, and it was shown that a satellite at 19,200 nautical miles over the equator appeared to be stationary over the same point at the earth's surface. Since then, this orbit has assumed greater and greater importance in determining the character of space operations. U.S. satellites SYNCOM I and SYNCOM II were the first devices to explore the use of this orbit[37] and pioneer the way for many postulated future uses of it. However, in order to obtain synchronous equatorial orbit, it is necessary for the United States to launch from a site not located on the equator and, therefore, some penalty is incurred in maneuvering the spacecraft to the desired location in space. This penalty is a reduction in size of the spacecraft so that it may carry the propulsion devices necessary for maneuvering in space. A launch site on the equator has the attraction of permitting direct access to this highly important orbit without incurring the penalties of payload reduction.

Another factor that helps to determine the orbiting inclination of a spacecraft is the nature of the constraints placed on launching. They are primarily safety constraints involving considerations such as abort of the launch, the places at which the booster stages and other devices will enter the earth's atmosphere and impact on the earth's surface, and the need to overfly territory of another country. An ideal launch site would be one in which no constraints were imposed by considerations of safety and national sovereignty. Four criteria for an ideal launch site are: (1) Boost-phase overfly must be limited to ocean areas and/or land masses with population density less than twenty-five inhabitants per square mile over a downrange distance of approximately 2,000 to 3,000 nautical miles. (2) Easterly launches are required in order to minimize performance requirements by capitalizing on earth rotation effects, except in high inclination (near polar) cases. (3) The higher orbit inclinations can be attained with northerly or southerly launches. (4) Direct ascent to the desired orbit inclination is required: a plus or minus 5° variance is tolerable.

[37]Eugene M. Emme, *A History of Space Flight* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 199, 212.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Launch Site Locations

With these considerations in mind, let us look at the existing and forecast launch site locations of the countries engaged in space operations. (See Table II.) In the United States, there are only two: Cape Kennedy and Vandenberg Air Force Base.[38] Cape Kennedy gives ideal access to low inclination orbits and Vandenberg to polar orbits, but some penalties are incurred in going to equatorial orbit from either of these locations. Past assessments of plans to build a U.S. launch site on the equator have invariably shown that we can accept the penalties through judicious spacecraft design.

The launch site locations in the USSR are at Tyuratam, Kapustin Yar and Plesetsk.[39] The existence of the Plesetsk launch site was revealed by a group of high school students in Britain who plotted the location after tracking some of the Soviet satellites launched from this point. These three sites give the Soviets easy access to orbits between 45° and near polar inclinations. To the present, they have not attempted equatorial or polar orbits, but they have shown ingenuity in placing spacecraft, such as MOLNIYA, in eccentric orbits which have given them coverage of the areas on the earth's surface at the times desired for specific projects. Their INTERSPUTNIK satellites, the first of which is STATIONAR-I, will be in geostationary orbits.

The European cooperative programs will be able to use the launch sites in Australia, available through ELDO. The most attractive location, with regard to easy access to equatorial orbit and lack of constraints on operational launches, is the French site at Kourou, only 5° from the equator, near what was formerly the Penal Colony at Devil's Island, French Guiana. Although there are many problems involved in the logistic support of this remote site, we can anticipate that over the next twenty years many of these operating problems will be overcome and that Kourou will be exploited for a variety of space operations. The United Kingdom and the major Continental nations do not have locations on their territory that can give them access to desired orbits, and they have a great number of constraints on the directions for launch. Italy has tried to overcome this handicap in its San Marco Project by constructing a launch platform on rafts

[38]Wallops Island, Virginia, is the site for some Scout launches.

[39]Sheldon, "The Soviet Space Program," *op. cit.*, pp. 3-23.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE II
PRESENT LAUNCH SITE LOCATIONS

State	*Ideal and Penalty Launch Sites*	*Equatorial*	*Low Inclination*	*High Inclination*	*Polar*
United States	Ideal	None	Kennedy	Kennedy	Vandenberg
	Penalty	Kennedy Vandenberg	Vandenberg	None	Kennedy
USSR	Ideal	None	None	Tyuratam/ Plesetsk	Tyuratam
	Penalty	Tyuratam	Tyuratam	None	None
West Germany	Ideal	None	None	None	None
	Penalty	None	None	None	None
United Kingdom	Ideal	None	None	None	None
	Penalty	None	None	None	None
France	Ideal	French Guiana	French Guiana	French Guiana	French Guiana (Northerly Launch)
	Penalty	None	None	None	None
Japan	Ideal	None	Kagoshima	Kagoshima	Kagoshima (Southerly Launch)
	Penalty	Kagoshima	None	None	None
Communist China	Ideal	None	None	None	None
	Penalty	Shuang-Cheng-Tzu	Shuang-Cheng-Tzu	Shuang-Cheng-Tzu	Shuang-Cheng-Tzu
ELDO	Ideal	Kourou	Kourou	Kourou	Kourou
	Penalty	Woomera	Woomera	None	None

off the east coast of Africa, but the operational problems have been formidable.

Because of their geographical limitation, these countries must follow one of two courses of action in order to develop their space capabilities. Either the European powers must combine to use a location such as Kourou or Woomera (Australia), or they must exploit a new kind of technology which would give them recoverable boosters and thus make it possible to be independent of the usual launch site criteria. Such a technological break-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

through is feasible and would reduce costs of launching, primarily through reuse. Space transportation systems which take off vertically and operate routinely as recoverable carriers could give European nations and other landlocked powers a way of having national launch capabilities.

Japan's attractive launch location on the southern tip of Kyushu at Kagoshima gives her easy access to almost any desired orbital inclination. The site at Thumba in India, sponsored by the UN General Assembly for international rocket soundings, shows promise as a launch location.

Communist China, in terms of Space Age operations, is almost a landlocked power. The inland range is long enough for the testing and development of medium-range ballistic missiles. However, for the testing of ICBM's and space launchers, China must find access to the ocean areas and this requires her to overfly her neighbors: to the north, the USSR; to the east, Korea or Japan; to the south, Taiwan and Viet Nam; and to the west, Burma and India. If China wants to make easterly launches—they are the most attractive because of the greater payload possible—she will have to operate in a narrow corridor or face political problems.

In launching her first satellite, China did not seem to be concerned with safety considerations. Her objective apparently was political: the orbital inclination (68.5°) and altitude (237 nautical mile perigee and 1,287 nautical mile apogee) were chosen to make the satellite visible to people in the United States and Europe. The fact that on ascent the satellite had to overfly Indochina, the Philippines and Australia did not deter Peking.

Infrastructure

Over the years many networks have been built on the earth's surface for tracking, controlling and collecting data from satellites. The United States has six such networks; one of them, TRANSIT, has nineteen sites. The USSR has several; France has one linking South America, Africa and Europe; ELDO has one; the United Kingdom has SKYNET, and China has a limited capability.

From one point of view, the satellite is merely the sensor end of a large radio-controlled machine. One of the attractions of the data relay satellite concept is the potential of eliminating ground-based facilities. Most of the electronic links would then be inter-satellite, providing greater flexibility and lower costs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Strategic Defiles in Space

Space strategy will be concerned with control not of space itself but rather of specific locations in space, and of access to and routes between these points. While space is limitless and offers vast areas for maneuver and for concealing satellites, key areas will be known and thus vulnerable. Strategic importance will come from influence over decisions on earth and control of key locations, both of which will strongly affect the economic exploitation of space and the security of nations.

Strategic defiles have played a significant role in the history of military operations, because they permitted control of passage between various locations or permitted or denied access from one region to another. Do counterpart strategic defiles exist in cislunar space? The answer at the present state of knowledge is a tentative yes. However, it must be remembered that, because of the dynamics of space, the relative locations of orbiting bodies and of man-made objects are in a constant state of change. Location at synchronous equatorial orbit between the earth and moon may be important during the course of one operation and less important for a different operation. The significance of the libration points[40] (the regions of gravitational stability in the earth-moon dynamics) remains to be defined rigorously. NASA has considered putting communication satellites at a libration point in order to remain in continuous contact with astronauts behind the moon. In addition, since libration points are stationary and there is an infinite launch window to and from the lunar surface, they could be ideal for lunar logistics staging. Initial analysis shows that they have potential also for access to transit paths in earth-moon relationships. However, at certain times, relative locations of various orbiting bodies are such that specific locations in space do assume strategic significance. One or more stations in periodic circumlunar orbits could control cislunar space with some degree of regularity.

The Space Treaty outlaws interference with space travel to the moon.[41] Nevertheless, it may be technically possible some day to hinder the transit of spacecraft to and from the moon. It may also be possible to interfere with the operation of supporting satellites, such as communications and navigation devices. Interdiction of

[40]R. W. Farquhar, "Future Missions for Libration-Point Satellites," *Astronautics and Aeronautics*, May 1969, pp. 52-56.

[41]According to Article I, "There shall be free access to all areas of 'celestial bodies.' "

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this kind could be vital, depending on events taking place on the earth's surface or in the earth's atmosphere. Future assessments of specific military operations will have to include analyses of the importance of specific locations because of their impact on strategy and tactics.

Strategic locations may also be essential to the successful exploitation of space for commercial and industrial purposes. Rescue stations may be established at locations such as the libration points or in circumlunar orbit. Refueling stops may be placed in low earth orbits for spacecraft traveling to the planets. Shuttles using nuclear fuels could reduce costs of space operations; and by operating only in space and never re-entering the earth's atmosphere, they would alleviate some of the current concern about nuclear contamination.

Conclusion

As the 1960's unfolded, the United States developed the most advanced technology and used it to accomplish the most dramatic voyage of exploration in the history of mankind: U.S. astronauts were sent to the moon, landed there, and returned to earth safely bringing parts of that celestial body with them. Driven by the challenge of the USSR, the United States has opened an entirely new realm of human endeavor with significant impact on geopolitics. Yet the American people and large numbers of their elected representatives are now turning their backs on space endeavors. At the height of the American achievement, our space programs, including manned missions, scientific exploration and security applications, have been relegated to low priority status.

While the U.S. space program is being demobilized, other nations look to the use of space technology to attain their national goals. The Soviets continue to increase their national investment in all areas of technology. Their plans call for launching more unmanned satellites, exploring the moon, and building manned space stations in low earth orbit. They have made it clear that, in the long run, they want to and can control space.

Japan and France have joined the UN-sponsored Global Atmospheric Research Program (GARP) and have begun building weather satellites to orbit over the Pacific (Japan) and Eurasia (France). Japan has drafted a national program to increase technological achievements for the first half of the 1970's.

Projections of space communications programs show that by 1985 there will be twenty telecommunications networks with sixty

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

active geostationary satellites.[42] Parallel with this assessment is a prolonged negotiation within the INTELSAT consortium to reduce the dominant U.S. role and pave the way for European satellites.

In the UN, the work of the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and of the Working Group on Outer Space is being augmented by studies of the Economic and Social Council and by programs to exploit space activities, such as earth resources projects. The developing countries look to space programs as a spur to national economic, educational, social and technological advancement.

As Fred L. Polak has observed, *"The rise and fall of images of the future precedes or accompanies the rise and fall of cultures."*[43] Thanks to American achievements, the image of the future includes many uses of space. But the frustrations inherent in the U.S. role as a superpower have made the American people uncertain as to their goals and endeavors. The "American image of the future" is blurred. The current technological demobilization and the drive to dismantle the U.S. space program are symptoms of this impairment of vision. For a short time the United States will have the technology, the infrastructure, the skilled people to capitalize on the potential it has created. It could still be the nation which contributes most to and benefits most from space.

[42] *Air & Cosmos*, March 13, 1971, p. 13.
[43] Fred L. Polak, *The Image of the Future* (Leyden, Netherlands: A. W. Sythoff, 1961), I, 49.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THREE VIEWS OF LATIN AMERICA: PRESIDENT NIXON, GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER, AND THE LATIN AMERICAN CONSENSUS OF VINA DEL MAR

by John W. Sloan

FOR the second time in as many decades, the United States is reviewing its policy toward Latin America and acknowledging that the policies pursued during the past ten years have failed. The Nixon Administration is now laying the foundations for a new inter-American policy for the years ahead. This policy will quite likely be influenced by the interaction of three views of Latin America: President Nixon's, as reflected in his Action for Progress speech; Governor Rockefeller's, as spelled out in his "Quality of Life in the Americas" report; and Latin America's, as stated in the Consensus of Vina del Mar. A study of these three documents may provide us with some indication of the kinds of inter-American conflict and cooperation we will witness during the 1970's.

The Latin American Consensus of Vina del Mar

The Special Latin American Coordinating Committee (CECLA), originally created in 1964 to arrive at a common Latin American position for the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), was revived in 1969 following a suggestion by President Nixon that Latin America adopt a common viewpoint in its negotiations with the United States. The twenty-one CECLA nations hammered out their Consensus between March and May 1969 in the Chilean resort town of Vina del Mar, and Chilean Foreign Secretary Gabriel Valdes submitted the eighteen-page report to President Nixon on June 4. At that time Valdes commented, "We believe that our action has far-reaching importance for the United States, because never before has your country encountered a Latin America united on its own definition."[1] The Consensus report he handed to the President stated that its purpose was "to propose new approaches that will take due account of current conditions in the hemisphere" and to try to lay the foundation "for establishing jointly with the United

[1] *New York Times*, July 6, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

States . . . new bases for inter-American economic and social cooperation."

A review of Latin America's present economic condition is set forth in Section I, paragraph 5, of the Consensus:

> As the present decade nears its end, the economic and scientific-technological gap between the developing world and the developed nations has widened and is continuing to widen, and the external obstacles that act as a brake on the rapid economic growth of the Latin American countries have not only not been removed, they are on the increase. The persistence of these obstacles manifests itself with particular intensity, for example, in the tariff and non-tariff restrictions that impede access to the great world markets under equitable or favorable conditions for the raw, semi-processed, and manufactured products of the aforesaid countries; in the progressive deterioration of the volume, terms and conditions of international financing assistance, which is practically offset by the burden of service on existing debts, with the resultant serious impairment of Latin American countries' "capacity to import"; in the disturbance stemming from the functioning of the international monetary system; in the conditions of ocean transport that shackle and raise the cost of Latin America's foreign trade; and in the difficulties of transferring modern technology to the countries of the region. . . .

The gloomy picture painted by CECLA is accurate. In the last two decades, Latin America has attempted to achieve self-sustaining economic growth through strategies of national import-substitution, the Alliance for Progress and regional integration. With the possible exception of the integration efforts of the Central American Common Market, none of these policies has been successful in making the drastic changes necessary for the region's future economic growth.

The end of the 1960's found most of the achievements of record overwhelmed by the population explosion. With a growth averaging about 3 per cent annually for the region, the present Latin American population of 250 million is expected to soar to 643 million in just thirty years. Food production per capita has remained about the same over the past two decades in most nations but has actually declined in several, which is startling considering that almost half of the Latin American population lives on the land. In education, the number of children enrolled in primary school has increased by 50 per cent since 1960, and the number of students enrolled in, or graduating from, secondary school has more than doubled. However, instead of providing six years of free compulsory education for all children of school age — the Alliance objective — the average Latin American country has

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

enrolled less than one-half of its children in school. More than half of the total population aged five years and over is still illiterate, and the number is increasing.

Economist David Felix points out another depressing fact. "The post-war trade performance of Latin America has been . . . the poorest of all the major Third World regions."[2] Sluggish trade performance is significantly responsible for the low rate of per capita economic growth. While the Alliance for Progress had aimed for a per capita growth rate of 2.5 per cent during the 1960's, the actual growth rate for the decade was only about 1.5 per cent. Unless this is substantially increased, it will take Latin America nearly a century to reach the standard of living the United States has enjoyed in recent years.

Poor trading performance, combined with a decline since the Viet Nam war in those resources contributed by the United States, has meant that the nations of the region have had to allocate a greater proportion of their capital to paying foreign debts. In 1968 Latin America had to devote $2 billion to payment of foreign creditors instead of to internal development. That amount represents 16 per cent of export earnings in 1968; in 1958 a debt service of $1 billion represented 10.5 per cent of export earnings.[3]

To change these conditions, the CECLA report proposes new policies for inter-American economic and social cooperation. Of the multitude of proposals made in the Consensus of Vina del Mar, the six most important are:[4]

(1) Effective compliance with commitments to halt any new measures restricting exports of basic products and manufactures from Latin America.

(2) Negotiation of schedules for the elimination of customs and non-tariff restrictions on Latin American products "of special interest," such as Brazilian and Colombian cotton textile, or Argentine and Central American beef exports.

(3) Modification of United States policies that encourage uneconomic domestic production of basic products such as beef and sugar, thus disadvantaging Latin American commodities, or that compete with Latin American exports, such as cotton, in world markets.

(4) Systematic consultation to prevent "the disruption of Latin America's flow of trade" caused by requirements that U.S. aid loans be used to buy United States goods which are not competitive in price, or by "dumping of surpluses."

[2]David Felix, "Economic Development: Take-Offs into Unsustained Growth," *Social Research*, Summer 1969, p. 290.
[3]*New York Times*, October 31, 1969.
[4]*Ibid.*, June 5, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(5) Adoption by the industrial countries of a system of preferences in favor of manufactures and semi-manufactures from developing countries.

(6) Elimination of "special conditions" attached to aid-financing, which require purchase of United States goods, use of U.S. ships to transport aid-financed goods, and other restrictions on the use of aid funds designed to ease U.S. balance of payments problems.

The assumption underlying these proposals is that the obstacles erected and maintained by the developed world, and especially by the United States, are the basic cause of Latin America's disappointing development. The CECLA report is saying that external economic relations must be rearranged in order to promote the prospects for internal economic progress. Whether this judgment is a true one—that is, whether the impediment to development is external, or is embedded in the national social systems, or is a result of both internal and external factors — is a matter of great importance and of controversy. Whatever the truth, the CECLA report has placed the blame for the disappointing results of the past decade squarely on the United States.

Governor Rockefeller's Report: Quality of Life in the Americas

The Nixon Administration took over in January 1969 with no preconceived Latin American program. On his first day in the White House, President Nixon was advised by Galo Plaza, Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, to appoint Governor Nelson Rockefeller to head a Latin American fact-finding mission. There followed a month of bargaining between the former Republican rivals as Rockefeller sought assurances that the mission and his subsequent recommendations would be treated seriously. On February 7 he finally agreed to the undertaking.

The purpose of the Rockefeller mission was to consult with Latin American leaders "concerning the development of common goals and joint programs of action which would strengthen Western Hemisphere unity and accelerate the pace of economic development."[5] He attempted to achieve this purpose by making four trips to Latin America beginning May 11, 1969 and ending early in July. The journeys were scheduled so that the Governor would not be away from his duties in New York longer than ten days on any one trip.

[5] *Ibid.*, February 18, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Rockefeller was aided by thirty-six advisers, twenty to twenty-five of whom accompanied him on each of the four trips. Among the notables who wrote special reports for him George Woods, former President of the World Bank, reviewed foreign aid; Detlev W. Bronk, past President of the National Academy of Science, covered scientific and technological aspects; General Robert W. Porter, former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command, Panama, studied military problems; William F. Butler, Vice President and Chief Economist of the Chase Manhattan Bank, evaluated Latin American economic policies; and Arthur K. Watson, Chairman of the Board, IBM World Trade Corporation, appraised the role of private investment. Each of these men talked with his national counterparts in each of the twenty nations visited, thus allowing the mission to consult with 3,000 Latin American leaders.

It was originally planned for the Rockefeller group to visit twenty-three countries, but Peru, Chile and Venezuela refused to receive the mission. The Peruvian refusal resulted from disputes over the expropriation of a Standard Oil subsidiary and a conflict over fishing rights. The Chilean and Venezuelan cancellations were caused by fears of rioting: the two Christian Democratic presidents, Eduardo Frei and Rafael Caldera, had no wish to find themselves in the politically untenable position of using their police to protect a United States capitalist from demonstrators — including the youth wings of their own parties. Moreover, the Chileans claimed that what Rockefeller was trying to find out had already been spelled out in the Consensus of Vina del Mar and submitted to President Nixon.

The major difficulty the mission encountered was rioting. The Rockefeller report tried to view the violent demonstrations that accompanied the group as having a positive function: "One important by-product of the demonstrations and violence was that they put the mutuality of the problems of our hemisphere on the front pages of our newspapers, on the nation's television screens, and therefore in the minds of most Americans." Undoubtedly, Rockefeller remembered that the rioting Vice President Nixon was subjected to on his trip to Latin America in 1958 had resulted in favorable Congressional action the next year in agreeing to the establishment of the Inter-American Development Bank.

On August 30, 1969 Governor Rockefeller submitted to President Nixon his 137-page report entitled "Quality of Life in the Americas." The President promised that it would play a "vital

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

part" in the formation of the Administration's new Latin American policy. The report was made a National Security Council document and was studied by Henry Kissinger and his staff.

The picture of Latin America delineated in the Rockefeller report is, in some ways, even more pessimistic than that portrayed in the Consensus of Vina del Mar. Charts, graphs and diagrams are used to describe the problems of population growth, urbanization, balance of payments and poor trade performance. The conclusion drawn from these graphic details of the Latin American condition is that "In every country, there is a restless striving for a better life. . . . In such a setting, all of the American nations are a tempting target for Communist subversion. In fact, it is plainly evident that such subversion is a reality today with alarming potential. . . . The seeds of nihilism and anarchy are spreading throughout the hemisphere."

For the near future, the Governor predicts rising frustration with the pace of development, intensified by industrialization, urbanization and population growth; political and social instability; an increased tendency to turn to authoritarian or radical solutions; continuation of the trend of the military to take power for the purpose of guiding social and economic progress; and growing emphasis on nationalism across the spectrum of political groupings, which will often find expression in terms of independence from U.S. domination and influence.

To meet the problems of the present and the near future, the report makes eighty-three recommendations for action. These have as their goal "the creation of a community of self-reliant, independent nations linked in a mutually beneficial regional system, and seeking to improve the efficiency of their societies and the quality of life of their peoples." Rockefeller makes the point that if the United States "cannot maintain a constructive relationship in the Western Hemisphere, we will hardly be able to achieve a successful order elsewhere in the world."

To achieve this "constructive relationship," the report calls for reorganization of the U.S. policymaking apparatus that deals with Latin America. The State Department, it contends, now controls less than half of the policy decisions affecting Latin America; other agencies, such as the Treasury, and the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture and Defense, control the rest. With different bureaucracies sometimes working at cross purposes, the effect has been a deterioration in hemispheric relations. Rockefeller therefore proposes the following innovations: (1) a Secretary of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Western Hemisphere Affairs; (2) a Western Hemisphere Policy Staff Director for the National Security Council; and (3) an Institute of Western Hemisphere Affairs operating under the Executive Office of the White House to administer the U.S. foreign aid program. His hope is that these institutional reforms will ensure that policy recommendations will be effective.

The new policy recommendations are designed, first, to remove the "paternalistic attitude" of the United States toward Latin America, which has severely strained hemispheric relations in the last decade, and, second, to lay the foundations for a new inter-American partnership. It is felt that this new relationship can be forged if the United States accepts the following guidelines: (1) It should determine its attitude toward Latin America's internal political developments in a more pragmatic way; (2) it should decide how it can shift increasing responsibility to the other American nations (through multilateral channels) for the development process; (3) it should decide how its interests are affected by insurgency and subversion elsewhere in the hemisphere and the extent to which its programs can and should insist on meeting the security requirements of its neighbors.

Translated into policy, the first and third guidelines mean increased U.S. support for military governments in Latin America. Rockefeller believes that, because the Latin American military officer is no longer recruited from the landowning class but from the lower middle class in the cities, the military is no longer allied with the forces of the status quo, and so accepts the need for social change. Amid the failure of political parties to lead their nations to orderly and sustained economic growth, the military often emerges as the one institution capable of effective leadership. Therefore, the United States should support most of the military governments in Latin America.

Rockefeller recognizes that there are dangers in such support. Not only may the authoritarian style of the military result in repression, but the military may "have an intrinsic ideological unreliability and a vulnerability to extreme nationalism. They can go in almost any doctrinal direction." He is particularly worried that military leaders might accept Marxist solutions to their national problems by viewing themselves as the "elitist-vanguard" of the people.

Yet the Governor feels that support of the military is worth these risks because the subversive capabilities of communist forces are increasing throughout the hemisphere. He therefore recom-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mends that "The United States should reverse the recent downward trend in grants for assisting the training of security forces for the other hemisphere countries. (The total amount proposed for fiscal year 1970 is $21.4 million as against $80.7 million in fiscal year 1966.)" Furthermore, we should no longer oppose the "legitimate" desires of Latin American military establishments to buy modern equipment, and we should increase our aid and training of local police in Latin America.

Some obvious contradictions emerge here. If one of the goals of both the Rockefeller report and the Nixon Administration is to lower the profile of the United States in the hemisphere by making the Latins more responsible for their own development, this purpose will not be served by increasing our support of the military and the police. Such support will profoundly implicate the United States in any repression employed by these forces. And if, as Rockefeller admits, the guerrillas are shifting from a rural to an urban strategy, of what use is most of the modern equipment sought by the military? How does one fight urban terrorism with supersonic jets?

The assumption that the new Latin American military leaders will accept and promote social change because they are recruited from the lower middle class is dubious. Probably no other institution is more capable of breaking class allegiance and substituting an institutional loyalty than the military. The institutional needs of the military, such as acquiring modern equipment, officer clubs, adequate military housing and pension plans, could be given precedence over the developmental needs of the nation — building schools, roads, dams and irrigation projects. We know from our own experience how insatiable the demands of the military can be.

Moreover, if one disregards the recent military rhetoric promising reform, examples of fundamental reform initiated by the military are sparse. The most concrete example is the agrarian reform law decreed by General Juan Velasco Alvarado, President of Peru. The military governments of Argentina and Brazil appear to be more repressive than progressive. Although the rate of economic growth in Brazil for the past two years has been excellent, its performance in such fields as agrarian reform, education and improving the lot of the poverty-stricken has been poor.

The second guideline mentioned above is concerned with inter-American economic relations. Here the Governor made a number of policy recommendations, several of which are similar to those in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the CECLA report. First, Rockefeller recommends that the Nixon Administration refinance the debts due to the United States in a "generous" manner. Second, he urges the strengthening of the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) to further efforts toward multilateral decision-making. Third, he proposes the untying of aid restrictions: "The Executive Branch should seek the suspension or modifications of the Pelley, Conte, Hickenlooper, Symington and Reuss amendments which affect the extension of assistance including cut-offs where countries purchase sophisticated weapons, or seize United States fishing boats operating without a license, or expropriate without due compensation." Similarly, he advises repeal of the provision that half of the goods financed by the United States must be transported in U.S. ships — an obvious special interest subsidy.

The most important economic proposals concern trade. Rockefeller's assumption here is identical to an idea espoused by the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) since 1950 — namely, that "An increasing flow of two-way trade in industrial products must supplement the present interchange of manufactured goods and primary products." The Johnson Administration, under the influence of Walt Rostow, had hoped Latin America could increase its trade in manufactured goods by following policies of regional integration in the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Central American Common Market (CACM). The Rockefeller report supports LAFTA and CACM, but believes integration efforts will not be effective until Latin American industry can compete with the economic power of U.S. enterprises and their subsidiaries. Given the present inadequacies of Latin American enterprises (poor management techniques, poor quality control and high costs of production), tariff cuts engineered by LAFTA would most likely benefit U.S. subsidiaries more than Latin American companies.

Therefore, Rockefeller recommends that "The United States should press for the maximum feasible development of mutually beneficial trade with other nations of the hemisphere. A doubling of such trade by 1976 is a realistic goal. This can only be accomplished by U.S. action to revise its tariffs and quotas to promote such mutually beneficial increased trade." Since the United States now exports goods to Latin America worth $4.7 billion and imports goods from Latin America worth $4.3 billion, a doubling of the trade would mean a total inter-American commerce of $18 billion. Rockefeller hopes this national policy objective can be ac-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

complished by securing the agreement of other industrial nations to extend tariff preferences for industrial goods produced in the underdeveloped world. Until such agreement is reached, however, the United States would grant tariff preferences only to nations not receiving special treatment from other industrial countries. Since much of Africa is receiving special treatment from the European Economic Community (EEC), and since the EEC is not likely to extend tariff preferences to other parts of the Third World, the Rockefeller proposal, if accepted, would bring about a special trading relationship only between the United States and Latin America. This would make Latin America more dependent on the United States than ever before.

It can easily be seen that the Rockefeller report reiterates the Vina del Mar assumption that the basic impediment to Latin American development is external. The failures of the past decade are attributed to the problems of international trade, bureaucratic bungling in the United States and international communism. No mention is made of such internal Latin American problems as the lack of agrarian reform, corrupt bureaucracies, poor national planning and the unequal distribution of income.

Despite the fact that Rockefeller employs the contemporary term "quality of life" in his title, the document reads as if it were written during the Cold War days of the 1950's. Just as in 1960 Latin America was pictured as being "one minute to midnight" away from Castro-like revolutions, Rockefeller now describes the continent as being at a "crossroads," with the choice of pursuing either the road of freedom or the road of communism. In his words, "Rising frustrations throughout the Western Hemisphere over poverty and political instability have led increasing numbers of people to pick the United States as a scapegoat and to seek out Marxist solutions to their socio-economic problems. At the moment, there is only one Castro among the 26 nations of the hemisphere; there can be more in the future." In brief, Rockefeller appears less concerned with the "quality of life" in the Americas than with the possibility that Latin Americans may repudiate their inept governments and attempt Marxist solutions to their national problems.

President Nixon's Action for Progress Speech

The major problems confronting Richard Nixon when he assumed the Presidency were Viet Nam, the Middle East and inflation; Latin America was a low priority item. Given the region's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rising nationalism and its frustrations over the failures of the Alliance for Progress, the new Administration set out to lower the profile of the United States in the hemisphere. Whereas President Kennedy gave his Alliance for Progress speech in March 1961, the Nixon Administration chose to delay its major Latin American policy announcement, ostensibly because of the months needed to prepare and study the Rockefeller report. The Rockefeller report bought time for Nixon at the expense of increasing Latin anxieties about how committed the new Republican government would be to Latin American development. The Latins consider themselves already overstudied and chronically underfunded by the United States. In submitting the Consensus of Vina del Mar to Nixon, Gabriel Valdes expressed the attitude of most Latin American leaders when he stated, "All that can be said has been said; the time has come for action."[6]

Responding to this demand, President Nixon, in his address before the Inter-American Press Association on October 31, 1969, announced that "our goal for the 70's should be a decade of Action for Progress for the Americas." In obvious reference to the Alliance for Progress, which failed to fulfill its promises, the President offered "no grandiose promises and no panaceas," although he affirmed that the commitments of the Alliance would continue to guide United States policy.

The sources of his proposal to reshape and reinvigorate the inter-American partnership, he acknowledged, came from personal conviction, Governor Rockefeller's report, the Consensus of Vina del Mar and the counsel of many advisers. Nixon agrees with Rockefeller that there has been a worsening of inter-American relations because of United States paternalism. And, like Rockefeller, he accepts the need for administrative changes in Washington to ensure that Latin America receives special attention. In accordance with one of Rockefeller's three administrative recommendations, he promised to submit to Congress a request to raise the rank of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to Under Secretary, thus giving the hemisphere a special representation not available to other regions. The new Under Secretary would be given authority to coordinate all U.S. government activities in the hemisphere.

According to the President, however, the most important problems in inter-American relations "center on economic development — and especially on the policies by which aid is administered

[6] *Ibid.*, June 12, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and by which trade is regulated." On the issue of aid administration, Nixon proposed that

> a multilateral inter-American agency be given an increasing share of responsibility for development assistance decisions. CIAP . . . could be given this function. Or an entirely new agency could be created. Whatever the form, the objective would be to evolve an effective multilateral framework for bilateral assistance, to provide the agency with an expert international staff and, over time, to give it major operational decision-making responsibilities.

Giving CIAP greater power would be a significant step toward the kind of multilateralization within the Alliance for Progress long advocated by former Presidents Alberto Lleras Camargo of Colombia and Juscelino Kubitschek of Brazil. In the Consensus of Vina del Mar the Latins indicated that they preferred CECLA to assume the role of a multinational aid agency instead of CIAP. But it is hardly likely that President Nixon would accept CECLA as the distributor of U.S. aid because the United States is not a member of CECLA. Washington might be willing to see some of its political control over aid funds diluted in a multinational organ, but it would not be willing to see its control eliminated.

Nixon did follow the advice of Rockefeller and CECLA concerning the debt service and "tied" loans. The President concluded that Latin America's debt ought to be refinanced. One obvious appeal of this proposal is that it does not require the permission of Congress. Since Nixon lacks the aid funds available to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, this is probably the most effective offer in the way of "aid" that he can make to Latin America.

As for "tied" loans, the President said,

> For several years now, virtually all loans made under U.S. aid programs have been encumbered with restrictions designed to maintain U.S. exports, including a requirement that the money be spent on purchases in the United States. . . . In June, I ordered the most cumbersome restrictions removed. In addition, I am now ordering that, effective November 1, loan dollars sent to Latin America under AID be freed to allow purchases not only here, but anywhere in Latin America. As a third step, I am also ordering that all other onerous conditions and restrictions on U.S. assistance loans be reviewed, with the objective of modifying or eliminating them.

Although these changes will be welcomed by Latin Americans, their effect will probably be minimal. Since the United States is primarily concerned about internal needs, and Congress appears to be disillusioned with foreign aid, not much aid is going to be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

available for Latin America. Moreover, most Latin American countries do not produce the complex machinery needed for development; this means that the bulk of U.S. aid money will still be spent in the United States.

With few aid funds available, the most important substantive proposal made dealt with trade. During his campaign for the Presidency, Nixon had stressed that Latin America could best be helped through trade instead of aid. In the CECLA and Rockefeller reports, he had been advised of the importance of export growth as the engine to propel development. Now, conceding that the region was too dependent on the export of primary goods, he said Latin America "will have to turn toward manufactured and semi-manufactured products for balanced development and major export growth. Thus they need to be assured of access to the expanding markets of the industrialized world."

To achieve this goal, Nixon proposed four steps: (1) to initiate a sustained effort to reduce the nontariff barrier to trade maintained by the developed nations against products of particular interest to Latin America; (2) to provide increased technical assistance to promote Latin American trade expansion; (3) to support the creation, within the inter-American system, of regular procedures for consultations on all trade matters; and, most importantly, (4) "in world trade forums to press for a liberal system of generalized tariff preferences for all developing countries, including Latin America. We will seek adoption by all of the industrialized countries of a scheme with broad product coverage and with no ceilings on preferential imports." Keeping his promise, the President announced on November 10 that his proposal of tariff preferences for the underdeveloped world had been introduced in Paris by the U.S. delegate to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. He also announced on November 10 that if the other industrialized nations failed to accept his proposal the United States would negotiate a preferential tariff schedule with Latin America alone.

The preference idea was first suggested at the UN Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva in 1964 by the Argentine economist Raul Prebisch, former Executive Secretary of ECLA and the first Secretary-General of UNCTAD. The United States opposed the idea in 1964, but accepted it "in principle" at the second UNCTAD meeting in New Delhi in 1968. Great Britain already has a system of preferences with the Commonwealth nations, and the EEC has a special relationship with eighteen mostly

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

French-zone countries of Africa. Both of these systems include reverse preferences which benefit the manufactured goods of Great Britain and the EEC. The Latin American nations are not part of any tariff preference area, and they argue in the CECLA report that if a worldwide preference system cannot be worked out, an inter-American preference system should be established to compensate them in the enormous U.S. market for benefits lost in Western Europe to African states.

In announcing that the United States would push for a generous system of tariff preferences for the Third World, President Nixon was also implicitly saying that, at least for a year, Washington would not grant Latin America preferential tariffs. Since it is unlikely that Western Europe will agree to Nixon's proposals, the Administration appears committed to negotiating preferential tariffs with Latin America in the near future.

These negotiations will be extremely difficult. The United States still has a balance of payments problem and is threatened with a potential trade deficit. From trade surpluses of $6 to $7 billion five years ago, the surplus shrank to only $835 million in 1968. The rise in imports is giving vent to rising protectionist pressures. In 1969 there were 270 bills awaiting Congressional action that would impose limits on imports.[7] The real problem for the Nixon Administration may not be how to liberalize trade, but how to head off new import restrictions. The AFL-CIO has already mounted a protectionist campaign against the President's proposal. It believes that the growth of international companies has "exported jobs" to foreign countries and that granting preferential tariffs for goods manufactured in the Third World would add to that trend.

Serious consideration should be given to the wisdom of a policy of preferential tariffs for Latin America. At a time when Washington is talking of lowering the profile of the United States by making the Latin Americans more responsible for their own development, it is questionable whether we should increase the dependence of our southern neighbors on U.S. markets. In addition, a significant expansion of Latin American exports to the United States would increase the already powerful U.S. protectionist interests to a point where they would almost surely obtain their objectives in Congress. Furthermore, even if the United States were to reduce its tariffs, this might not result in a dramatic increase of inter-American trade. The LAFTA experience suggests

[7] *Ibid.*, November 16, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that one of the basic obstacles to increased trade is not so much tariffs as the high cost production of Latin American enterprise, both public and private. Should any one of these outcomes occur, Latin American hostility toward the United States would grow sharper.

The two most important issues confronting the Nixon Administration as far as its political relationship with Latin America is concerned are the growth of economic nationalism, exemplified by recent events in Bolivia, Chile and Peru, and rising militarism, as indicated by sixteen military coups since 1961. In his Action for Progress speech, the President did not state clearly what his policy will be toward these interrelated issues. Yet he did say, in an obvious reference to Peru and Bolivia:

> . . . just as a capital-exporting nation cannot expect another country to accept investors against its will, so must a capital-importing country expect a serious impairment of its ability to attract investment funds when it acts against existing investments in a way which runs counter to commonly accepted norms of international law and behavior. And unfortunately, and perhaps unfairly, such acts by one nation affect investor confidence in the entire region.

The President acknowledged that each nation must decide for itself "whether it wishes to accept or forgo the benefits private investment can bring," but he made clear his own ideological conviction that there are economic and social advantages to a developing nation in pursuing industrialization through private investment. He also announced that he was ordering U.S. aid programs to emphasize assistance to locally-owned private enterprise. But, given the growing nationalist sentiment in Latin America, it is questionable whether U.S. aid to locally-owned private enterprise will be politically beneficial to either the United States or local capitalists. Such assistance may serve to confirm the thesis of radical nationalists that there is an unholy and unpatriotic alliance between U.S. and Latin American capitalism.

In apparent reference to Latin America's military governments, the President said,

> we recognize that enormous, sometimes explosive, forces for change are operating in Latin America. These create instabilities, and bring changes in governments. On the diplomatic level, we must deal realistically with governments in the inter-American system as they are. We have, of course, a preference for democratic procedures, and we hope that each government will help its people to move forward toward a better, a fuller and freer life.

This is less of an endorsement of the military than was offered by

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Governor Rockefeller; there is no suggestion of increasing U.S. aid to Latin American military regimes.

Nixon's speech contains less Cold War rhetoric than Rockefeller's report. For example, his reference to Cuba is less hostile than any statement made by a United States President during the 1960's. In Nixon's words, "We cannot have a peaceful community of nations if one nation sponsors armed subversion in another's territory. . . . The 'export' of revolution is an intervention which our system cannot condone, and a nation which seeks to practice it can hardly expect to share in the benefits of the community." This might be interpreted as meaning that Cuba could be accepted again in the inter-American system if she stops trying to export revolution. Was it a signal to Havana?

Conclusion

Each of the views of Latin America discussed here assumes that the basic impediment to the self-sustaining growth of the continent is external — that is, that Latin America's economic failures are due to the paternalistic attitude of the United States and the nature of the international economy. There are significant external obstacles to Latin American development which should be changed, but there are also many internal problems whose solutions are far more urgent. Even if U.S. aid is "untied," the aid-giving machinery streamlined, and preferential tariffs granted, we may still find that at the end of the 1970's Latin America has not overcome its economic problems. None of these reforms will affect some of the internal bottlenecks to development. Changes in tariff schedules will not cure the ills of population growth, lack of agrarian and educational reform, burgeoning urbanization, corrupt bureaucracies or political instability. Social afflictions — rich Latins evading taxes and sending their savings to Switzerland, a middle class whose consumptive appetites inhibit the accumulation of capital, repressive military authority — will remain. Unless these internal problems are given priority, any increase in capital from either trade or aid will, as in the past, not be used with the efficiency so desperately required for self-sustaining growth.

To quote a perceptive criticism of the Alliance for Progress written by Simon G. Hanson, editor of *Inter-American Economic Affairs*: "The Alliance had been launched with the thesis that it is the United States which must prove itself genuinely interested in structural reform, social advancement and democratic government. The implication was that Latin America itself was already fully committed to these goals. This of course was a completely

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

false basis of policy."[8] Yet this is still the basis of our policy toward Latin America. The underlying assumption of the three views we have discussed is that the existing political systems can bring about progress. For example, President Nixon views the nations of the hemisphere as being "determined to break the grip of outmoded structures, yet equally determined to avoid social disintegration."

The record of the past decade does not support Nixon's assertion. Despite the efforts of the Alliance, half the school-age children of Latin America are not attending school. As for agrarian reform, considered the best indicator of whether a political system is "determined to break the grip of outmoded structures," the Congressional Committee on Government Operations recently reported that,

> In almost every country it visited, the subcommittee inquired into U.S. aid operations affecting agrarian reform. The picture it found was virtually the same everywhere. Agrarian reform is moving only glacially. Generally speaking, the wealthy landowners still control the soil. The *campesinos* still live the never-ending cycle of borrowing on the future to exist today. Now the cities of Latin America are overflowing with millions of squatters who see greater hope in the squalor of city slums than they did in the furrows of land owned by some other man.[9]

The crux of the problem remains internal. These internal problems may require radical solutions, preferred by an increasing number of Latin Americans, rather than pragmatic solutions, preferred by most Latin American governments and the United States. If, as predicted by Rockefeller, radical nationalists assume power in several countries, the coming decade will witness intense hemispheric discord because of the fundamental conflict between the security needs of the United States, as defined by Nixon and Rockefeller, and the developmental needs of Latin America, as defined by the growing number of radicals.

We may have to agree with George C. Lodge that the fundamental issue for inter-American relations is "revolution — radical, structural change in the political, economic and social systems of Latin America and the relationship to it of the United States."[10] Unfortunately, this issue is ignored by Nixon, by Rockefeller, and by the Latin Americans themselves in the Consensus of Vina del Mar.

[8]Simon G. Hanson, "The Alliance for Progress: The Sixth Year," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, Winter 1968, p. 6.

[9]"U.S. AID Operations in Latin America under the Alliance for Progress," Thirty-sixth Report by the Committee on Government Operations, 90th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: GPO, 1968).

[10]George C. Lodge, "United States Aid to Latin America: Funding Radical Change," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1969, p. 735.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CEP CLAIMS, U.S. TUNA FISHING AND INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS

by Bobbie B. Smetherman and Robert M. Smetherman

POSTWAR inter-American relations have been plagued by the persistent problem of acceptable limits to territorial waters. The United States and other maritime nations refuse to recognize exclusive fishing rights more than twelve miles from shore; until 1966 they usually maintained the traditional three-mile "cannon shot" limit. Chile, Ecuador and Peru are among nine Latin American states which now claim 200 miles as the limit of their territorial waters. These three are referred to as the CEP countries because in 1954 they signed a pact promising mutual defense of the 200-mile claim and agreeing not to reduce it unilaterally. In the last ten years of the nearly twenty-year dispute, the bitterness attending the seizure of foreign fishing vessels for "illegal" fishing has become acute. The disputed waters, particularly off the coast of Peru, are exceptionally rich fishing grounds. The Humboldt or Peru Current is teeming with fish, especially the *anchoveta* on which tuna and other large fish, as well as guano birds, feed. Experts have explained this abundance by pointing out that southerly winds force the surface waters out to sea, thus allowing an "upwelling" of deeper waters which carry the nutrients necessary to feed the rich marine life.[1]

Nationalism has exacerbated the claims dispute. The coastal states claim they are merely exercising their rights of national self-determination in defying the major maritime powers and the traditional premise of international law of the sea — the three-mile limit. The dispute and the seizures have also vented Yankeephobia, a powerful feature of Latin American politics. More than aggravated nationalism has prevented prompt, rational settlement of the dispute, however. Complex questions of conservation, ecology, undersea technology and the future course of economic development, as well as Peru's explosive entry into fishmeal production, have impeded solution.

[1]Robert C. Cowen, *Frontiers of the Sea: The Story of Oceanographic Exploration* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960), p. 164. Periodically the cold waters move out to sea and are replaced by warmer currents, causing millions of anchovy and guano birds to die. The warmer currents are known as *El Niño*, the child, because, according to folklore, they arrive with the Christmas season every seven or eight years.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Seizures

Since 1961 the Latin American nations, primarily Ecuador and Peru, but also Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Panama and El Salvador, have "seized" over 190 foreign fishing vessels in the disputed zone for fishing without licenses. Ecuador seized seventy-four and Peru thirty-eight of the 126 U.S. tuna boats figuring in this total. The remainder were mainly from Japan, Canada and Mexico.[2] Peru has also seized vessels from Chile and at least one from Ecuador in her earnest defense of the anchovy resource off her coast. Prior to 1961 there were at least forty-two "incidents" between U.S. fishing boats and Ecuador and Peru. The records of those incidents are not reliable enough, however, to be included in this tally. The American Tunaboat Association distinguishes between "seizures" and "harassment" or "incidents." A "seizure" occurs when a fishing vessel is forced into port, usually after being forcibly boarded, and is detained and ordinarily fined.

Through April 1971 the total amount of fines levied against U.S. fishing boats was $2,197,780.[3] According to the terms of the 1954 Fishermen's Protective Act, the U.S. government reimburses the boat owners the amount fined by countries whose claim is regarded as "illegal." Other costs associated with the seizures, primarily the value of the time lost in fishing, are not reimbursable. The largest single fine was the $157,740 levied by Ecuador against the largest tuna clipper, *Apollo,* at the time of its second seizure in 1971. During the first four months of the 1971 fishing season, Ecuador seized twenty-five U.S. fishing boats and fined them over $1,250,000, an amount greater than all of the fines in previous years. Ecuador's navy even halted a U.S. Navy freighter, mistaking it for a "mother" ship for tuna vessels. The quantum increase in Ecuador's seizures and fines can be attributed in part to an unusually heavy 1971 tuna run of the skipjack tuna, a species which, because of its smaller size, has tested free of dangerous mercury levels. Ecuador also seems to be increasingly

[2]*Congressional Record*, March 28, 1968, S3494-S3495, and American Tunaboat Association, *Statement Before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation, H.R. 10607*, 91st Congress, 1st Session, June 4-5, 1969, pp. 1-20. (This hearing was postponed and has never been rescheduled.) The figures have been updated through September 1969 with press reports of later seizures. Chile, the first CEP nation to extend her territorial waters claim, has seized only one U.S. vessel. The reason for this is that at the time of her 1947 claim, Chile was more concerned about whaling off the South Pacific coast. Since then the tuna fishery has developed north of her coasts.

[3]*Idem.* These figures also have been updated with press reports of later fines.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

intractable about the 200-mile claim. She warned that the *Apollo* would be confiscated outright if it is caught in "Ecuadoran" waters again.[4]

The sum of the seizures does not illustrate the full magnitude of the problems caused by the claims dispute. Numerous other vessels, primarily of U.S. ownership, have been harassed in various ways — chased, boarded and searched, or even fired upon. Seventeen incidents have involved gunfire causing considerable property damage and one serious injury. Happenings of this kind frequently go unreported and thus are impossible to tabulate with accuracy. Enough of them occur, however, to cause some U.S. fishermen to buy licenses in self-defense, or to refrain from fishing in the disputed area for fear of harassment or seizure. The American Tunaboat Association discourages its members from buying licenses unless forced to do so, because it suspects that widespread purchase would be tantamount to *de facto* recognition of the 200-mile claim.[5]

Since fishing boats are traditionally unprotected militarily, U.S. tuna clippers have little more than their bravado and skill to protect them against seizure. Some have been able to outrun or outmaneuver the patrol vessels, or to disappear into fog or darkness. In 1963 when two boats were seized thirteen miles off the Ecuadoran coast, they were joined in port by nineteen other U.S. vessels protesting the seizures. Fines of $26,272 were paid and the other vessels were not held or charged. In a more recent Peruvian episode on February 14, 1969, after one U.S. tuna boat had been forced into port, another, the *San Juan,* defied surrender orders. She was subsequently chased for two hours and raked with more than sixty rounds of machine-gun fire. When the *San Juan's* sister vessels realized that she might be sunk, six of them formed a line and bore down on the Peruvian gunboat in an attempt to ram it. At that point, the patrol boat broke off its attack. No one was injured aboard the *San Juan,* but she suffered an estimated $50,000 worth of damage.[6]

The rate of seizures by Ecuador and Peru reflects both fishing and political developments. Peru seized six U.S. vessels in 1955 and seven in 1967 but made only three seizures in the intervening years. The increase since the mid-1960's reflects both her prominence as a fishing nation and the powerful influence of na-

[4]*New York Times,* March 22, 1971, p. 5.
[5]Interview with August Fellando, General Manager of the American Tunaboat Association, May 2, 1969.
[6]*The American Fishery and Cannery Worker,* February 1969, pp. 1-4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tionalism in Peruvian politics. Ecuador's pattern over the earlier years was more consistent; between 1951 and 1956 she seized thirteen U.S. vessels. In 1963 she seized only two vessels but that incident caused nineteen other vessels to protest. During that year, after chaotic changes in Ecuador's government, a military junta assumed power. The United States negotiated a secret agreement with the junta contracting to recognize a twelve-mile limit (instead of the three-mile limit still officially adhered to) if Ecuador would relinquish the other 188 miles. This treaty, kept secret because of the CEP pact, worked satisfactorily until it was abrogated by the Arosemena Government which came to power in 1966.[7] Since then, the junta has been excoriated because of the secret treaty, the 200-mile claim has been asserted with a vengeance, and the rate of Ecuadoran seizures has risen sharply.

Furthermore, the Arosemena Government tripled the licensing fee from $12 to $35 per net registered ton per vessel.[8] This boosted the cost for an average U.S. tuna vessel from $3,000 to $10,000, with the result that no U.S. vessels now pay the Ecuadoran fees unless forced to do so by gunboats. One other fact illuminating the Ecuadoran seizures is that the Ecuadoran navy has a direct financial stake in them — it receives 70 per cent of the fines.[9] Peru charges a yearly registration fee of $500 plus $12 per net registered ton per trip and apparently sells some licenses to skippers who believe they stand to make a profitable catch.

U.S. fishermen are extremely frustrated by the dispute. They are bitter about their lack of military protection and have been especially galled that some of the patrol boats used by the Ecuadoran and Peruvian navies are surplus U.S. vessels given or sold under military assistance programs. The use of such vessels is declining now, however, because the two navies have modernized their fleets by purchasing new high-speed patrol boats from Europe.

U.S. Tuna Fishing

Fisheries economists point out that the resource is a "common property" that has no single owner with interests to protect, i.e., to prevent "overfishing." No one collects an economic rent with which to provide this protection. In fisheries competition, the economic rent is divided among all fishermen exploiting the

[7] *New York Times,* April 14, 1968, IV, p. 10.
[8] Instituto Nacional de Pesca, "Estadisticas de la actividad pesquera en el Ecuador," *Boletin Informativo,* September 1968, pp. 39-41.
[9] *Registro Oficial,* Numero 132, March 10, 1969, No. 110-CL, Ley de Pesca y Fomento Pesquero, Titulo IX, Article 71.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

resource. This obliges increasingly heavy capital investment in more sophisticated boats and gear. Not only do costs skyrocket, but excess capacity is created and there is a strong tendency to deplete the resource.[10]

The U.S. tuna industry fits this economic model. Originally the U.S. vessels that started fishing in the disputed area in the early 1950's were former sardine boats idled by the disappearance of sardines off the California coast.[11] California fishermen turned increasingly to fishing for tropical tuna, which brought them into conflict with the CEP claims. Their vessels were small and inefficient for long sea voyages; many fished with pole and line after attracting schools of fish with cut bait.

Now the original sardine boats have been replaced by large, expensive vessels called tuna clippers or purse seiners. The average vessel displaces 400 tons, costs some $800,000, and is equipped with sonar and power blocks; some even use spotter planes to locate the fish. There are currently some 140 vessels in the tuna fleet, employing about 2,000 fishermen. The largest clipper, the 1,800-ton *Apollo,* is a $3 million vessel. At 1971 tuna prices, it is capable of carrying a catch worth at least $700,000.[12] The success of U.S. tuna fishing techniques has persuaded some of the world's major maritime nations, such as Japan, Canada and the Soviet Union, to abandon long-line fishing and attempt to copy them.

The fishing waters off the west coast of Latin America have become vitally important to the U.S. tuna industry. For example, of the 200,000-ton catch in the Eastern Pacific in 1967, U.S. flag vessels caught 75 to 85 per cent, worth $50 million. In contrast, Ecuador, the only CEP nation currently fishing seriously for tuna, accounted for only 6 per cent of the total catch.[13]

[10]Considerable literature exists on the economics of fisheries. See Expert Meeting on the Economic Effects of Fishery Regulation, Ottawa, 1961, *Economic Effects of Fishery Regulation* (working papers edited by R. Hamlisch) (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization, 1962); James Crutchfield and Arnold Zellner, *Economic Aspects of the Pacific Halibut Fishery,* Fishery Industrial Research, April 1962, Department of the Interior, 1963, pp. 15-20; James Crutchfield, "The Marine Fisheries: A Problem in International Cooperation," *American Economic Review,* May 1964, pp. 207-218; and Francis T. Christy, Jr. and Anthony Scott, *The Common Wealth in Ocean Fisheries: Some Problems of Growth and Economic Allocation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), pp. 221-230.

[11]Wilbert McLeod Chapman, "Industry and the Economy of the Sea," *Governor's Conference on California and the World Ocean* (Los Angeles: California Museum of Science and Industry, 1964), pp. 69-70. California sardines disappeared because of a drop in water temperature for several years and were replaced by their natural competitors, anchovies. This ecological shift had another impact on Latin American fisheries; it freed equipment and capital from the idled California sardine canneries for the infant Peruvian fishmeal industry.

[12]*New York Times,* March 22, 1971, p. 2.

[13]*Ibid.,* March 28, 1968, p. 21.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Most of the U.S. fleet is based in San Diego, where the major canneries have exercised considerable control over the industry through pricing, off-loading and selection policies. Recently the boat owners began organizing competitive marketing devices and studying other ways to attain a better bargaining position so they can receive a greater return on investment.

Economic consultants Forbes, Stevenson and Baldridge, in a study prepared for the Department of Commerce, gathered figures on the financial performance of the average $800,000 400-ton tuna seiner at 1969 prices. These show that a successful boat can gross $516,875 per year by making five or six trips. Annual expenses are $387,946 including the crew's compensation. Traditionally crew members receive a share of the net profits of the vessel. On a successful vessel the eleven to thirteen crew members may make between $15,000 and $20,000 annually, with additional bonuses for the captain, engineer, mastman and deck boss. The boat owner would net $128,929 before depreciation and taxes, or a rate of return on investment of 16.1 per cent.[14] This financial performance is adequately rewarding, but given the nature of competitive fishing, the costs will continue to rise while profits fall.

There are several alternatives being studied to improve this pattern. Some U.S. tuna vessels are beginning to fish in the Atlantic off the African coast, delivering their catches to canneries in Puerto Rico or to the new Italian market. Another proposal is to locate a shore-based off-loading facility nearer the fishing grounds so that more time can be spent in fishing and less in transporting fish. Of the average boat's 250 days at sea, an estimated 100 are spent in travel to and from the fishing grounds. The chief question is the location of such a facility. Ecuador and Peru each would relish having it located on their coasts. They would acquire not only significant economic input, but also would be able to collect licenses (economic rent), regulate entry into the fishery and protect the resource from depletion. There is no serious likelihood, however, that the off-loading facility will be located in Ecuador or Peru. Fear of potential nationalization plus the boat owners' bitterness about seizures precludes this. The Forbes, Stevenson and Baldridge report suggests establishing the facility in or near the Panama Canal Zone to serve the Eastern Pacific fishery

[14]Office of Technical Assistance, Economic Development Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, *Feasibility Study: A Tuna Transshipment Plant in San Diego and Other Ocean-Oriented Facilities,* prepared by Forbes, Stevenson and Baldridge (Washington: GPO, 1969), pp. 65-72.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

— which also raises problems in terms of hemispheric relations — and locating another somewhere near the new West African fishing ground, and advises that the boat owners build a transshipment plant in San Diego.[15]

The U.S. industry has been powerful enough to get several favorable legislative acts passed. Not only did the 1954 Fishermen's Protective Act reimburse boat owners for fines, it also committed the U.S. government to bring suit for such money against the offending country and allowed private fishermen to bring suit for personal damages. This provision was ineffectual. In more recent years Congress has enacted four laws that promise reduction or curtailment of military and foreign aid to the offending countries. Because Peru and Ecuador have been able to bring counterpressures to bear, however, none of these has been applied more than temporarily.

For example, the Kuchel Amendment to the 1965 Foreign Assistance Act gave the U.S. President discretionary authority to suspend all aid to countries "illegally" seizing U.S. fishing vessels. When Ecuador and Peru were warned, following a series of seizures, that this authority might be used, they threatened to boycott the Punta del Este meeting on the Latin American common market. The United States hastened to placate them and the Kuchel Amendment was never applied.[16] Similarly, in 1968 Congress passed the Foreign Military Sales Act which curtails *all* military assistance to a nation that seizes U.S. fishing boats. This measure was applied temporarily to Ecuador and Peru in 1969, but the State Department hurriedly lifted the ban as the price for getting under way another diplomatic effort to solve the dispute. Retaliatory U.S. legislation has thus proved to be diplomatically ineffective. Apparently the same pattern was repeated in early 1971.

Settling the problem of territorial waters will be an extremely difficult process. For U.S. fishing interests, competitive fishing has fostered major capital investment and an emotional attachment to "open seas" not easily abdicated. Officially, moreover, the United States is aware that if the 200-mile claim is recognized, there will be chaos in many of the world's traditional fishing grounds and potential chaos in the future development of undersea mineral resources. For Ecuador and Peru, maintenance of the claim has

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 8-20.

[16] *New York Times*, August 21, 1968, p. 9. The Peruvian press responded that Peru could and should make up the aid lost by increased fines.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

become a nonnegotiable matter of national pride. One of the most serious charges against the Ecuadoran junta of 1963-1966 was that it, in effect, relinquished the 200-mile claim. No future government in Ecuador, or Peru, is likely to make that mistake again.

Diplomacy and the Claims

The diplomatic history of the dispute displays a surprising paradox: one ground on which the CEP countries justify their claims is that a similar claim was made by the U.S. President. In 1945 President Truman issued unilateral proclamations on the continental shelf and offshore fisheries which were promptly misinterpreted by the Latin American nations. The former proclamation declared the continental shelf and its minerals contiguous to the U.S. coasts subject to U.S. control, but plainly stipulated that the waters above the shelf were *not* affected by the declaration. The proclamation on fisheries merely stated the need for fisheries conservation in waters contiguous to the U.S. coasts. In such areas fished solely by U.S. nationals, the U.S. government would establish and regulate conservation zones. In such areas fished by nationals of other countries, the United States proposed the establishment of jointly regulated conservation zones.

> The right of any state to establish conservation zones off its shores in accordance with the above principles is conceded, provided that corresponding recognition is given to any fishing interests of the nationals of the United States which may exist in such areas.[17]

It has been an important psychological justification for the Latin American nations to insist that their unilateral extensions are modeled after similar extensions made by the United States.

There are a number of other rationalizations to defend the extension of territorial waters. Conservation probably has been the most important of these. One expert thinks the 200-mile claim was advanced because this distance is believed to be the farthest the Humboldt Current ever moves out to sea.[18] Another asserts that the conservation purpose was twofold: to conserve fisheries and guano for Latin American agriculture.[19] Officially the CEP nations have claimed that the interrelations between all forms of

[17]Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, September 28, 1945. Also known as the "Truman Proclamation."

[18]Andres A. Aramburu y Menchaca, "Character and Scope of the Rights Declared and Practiced over the Continental Sea and Shelf," *American Journal of International Law*, January 1953, pp. 120-123.

[19]Barry B. L. Auguste, *The Continental Shelf: Practice and Policy of the Latin American States with Special Reference to Chile, Ecuador and Peru* (Geneva: Librarie E. Droz, 1960), pp. 165-184.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

coastal life and all forms of sea life demanded conservation for reasons of national self-preservation. Some observers conclude that the main motive was one of nationalism or anti-imperialism, cloaked in conservation and legalism in order to gain exclusive control over sea resources.[20] Others think the coastal states extended their claims primarily to produce revenue from the sale of licenses and permits.[21] Still other explanations involve the coastal states' dependence on employment opportunities in developing their own national fishing fleets and the boon to them in creating a valuable protein supply for their undernourished and rapidly expanding populations. The latter development would allow for reduction of food imports, particularly if the problems of transportation and refrigeration in inland areas were attacked simultaneously.[22]

The first action taken by a Latin American nation following the 1945 Truman Proclamation came just one month later, when President Avila Camacho claimed Mexico's continental shelf as Mexican property and expressly claimed fishing interests.[23] In 1946 Argentina declared her "epicontinental sea," or all the waters over the continental shelf, to be Argentine territory. Geographic bounty has provided Argentina with a continental shelf that extends as far as 500 miles off shore at some points. When Chile issued her declaration in 1946, she was unable to follow the Mexican and Argentine examples because the west coast of South America, unlike the east coast, has almost no continental shelf. Chile extended her territorial waters in terms of distance — 200 miles. Peru followed with an identical declaration in 1947. Later Ecuador and others made similar claims.

At Chile's invitation, Ecuador and Peru met in Santiago in 1952 and signed with her a joint treaty declaring the 200-mile maritime zone. Two years later they strengthened their resolve by signing the Declaration of Santiago, which specified that none of the three would diminish the 200-mile claim without prior consultation and agreement with the two other signatories. This loyalty pact in-

[20]Shigeru Oda, *International Control of Sea Resources* (Leyden, Netherlands: A. W. Sythoff, 1963), p. 18; Christy and Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 183; and Crutchfield, "The Marine Fisheries: A Problem in International Cooperation," *op. cit.*, p. 214.

[21]Henry Reiff, *The United States and the Treaty Law of the Sea* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1959), p. 309; S. A. Bayitch, *Interamerican Law of Fisheries* (New York: Oceana Publications, 1957), p. 11; and Myres S. McDougal, "International Law and the Law of the Sea," in Lewis M. Alexander, editor, *The Law of the Sea* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967), p. 8.

[22]Christy and Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

[23]Teodoro Alvarado Garaicoa, "The Continental Shelf and the Extension of Territorial Waters," *Miami Law Quarterly*, Summer 1956, p. 493.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dicates that the claimants were under considerable pressure from the maritime powers, especially the United States, to revoke the claims.[24]

After the CEP powers rejected a U.S. suggestion that the dispute be turned over to the International Court of Justice for arbitration, the United States then proposed a four-power conference on fishery conservation, stipulating that the territorial limits would not be discussed. This conference, held in Santiago in 1955, accomplished little; the positions had already congealed, auguring the now standard conflict between the underdeveloped coastal nations and the developed maritime nations. The CEP nations viewed the issue as one of foreign plunder of their valuable natural resources without compensation; they saw oceanic fishing as merely the latest example of exploitative foreign capitalism.

The U.S. delegation proposed establishing an international conservation commission to regulate fishing vessels, each member to have one vote and each nation to enforce compliance by its own vessels. The Santiago conference turned down this proposal because the CEP nations wanted a twelve-mile limit plus "areas traditionally exploited."[25] This was unacceptable to the United States because it would have allowed each coastal state to claim 200 miles as "traditional."

The most extraordinary feature of the Santiago negotiations was the unique CEP ecological theory propounded to give "scientific" justification to the claims extension. According to this theory, "eco-systems" or "biomas" are interdependencies linking all varieties of coastal life with all varieties of sea life. The U.S. delegation countered by pointing out that the meteorological and oceanographic conditions which contribute to the richness of the Humboldt Current originate much farther away than 200 miles, and cannot be related to national boundaries in any case. Stymied by this impasse, the conference adjourned. One by-product of the negotiations was that Ecuador decided to join the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission.[26]

[24]Reiff, *op. cit.*, pp. 306-307, and Josef L. Kunz, "Continental Shelf and International Law: Confusion and Abuse," *American Journal of International Law*, October 1960, p. 764.

[25]U.S. Department of State, *Santiago Negotiations on Fishery Conservation Problems* (Washington: GPO, 1955), p. 1-11.

[26]The United States and Costa Rica established the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (CIAT) in 1949 for the purpose of gathering scientific information on conservation of tuna and its bait fish. Panama and Colombia, as well as Ecuador, later joined. Peru has never joined and Ecuador dropped its membership in 1968. CIAT sets overall species limits on tuna catches; it is not empowered to set national quotas. Food and Agriculture Organization, *The State of the World's Fisheries* (Rome: FAO, 1968), p. 34.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Attempts to settle the dispute also were made through official Organization of American States channels. These multilateral, inter-American efforts worked to the diplomatic disadvantage of the United States. Rather than achieving an inter-American agreement limiting the unilateral expansion of territorial waters, they resulted in the CEP powers reaping significant hemispheric support for the principles of expansion. No doubt this increased support was partially an exercise in Yankee baiting. But it also hailed a new chapter in the increasingly problematic, worldwide quarrel between the developed maritime nations and the underdeveloped coastal nations.

There were OAS-sponsored conferences dealing with the issue in 1953, 1954 and 1956. The 1956 OAS Conference on the Continental Shelf and Conservation accepted a U.S. proposal that no final decisions be made except by unanimous vote, which meant that it could not rule on the width of territorial seas. Early in 1971 Ecuador appealed to the OAS for a ministerial meeting, charging that U.S. suspension of military aid to Ecuador for one year was "economic coercion" and thus violated Article 19 of the OAS Charter. The OAS voted 22-0, with the United States abstaining, to take up Ecuador's charge, although the United States was able to get the severity of the language reduced. Trying to forestall a meeting which would pit the Latin nations against her, the United States announced that she was ready to join with Ecuador in submitting the matter to the International Court of Justice for a binding decision. The emergency meeting of the OAS ministerial council later voted approval of a mild resolution encouraging the United States and Ecuador to settle their differences through negotiations. Unconfirmed rumors hinted that the United States had lifted her military sanctions against Ecuador in order to end the confrontation between Washington and the twenty-two Latin members of the OAS. Nonetheless, Ecuador indicated her continued displeasure by ordering U.S. military missions out of the country.[27]

The United Nations attempted to settle the question of the width of territorial seas in two conferences on the law of the sea held in 1958 and 1960. These conferences also failed to produce an agreement, although they did make important changes in maritime law. The conflicts were refined somewhat, but the issues, expanded internationally and technologically, were the same. The

[27]*Los Angeles Times,* January 28, 1971, p. 1 and January 31, 1971, p. 5; *New York Times,* January 28, 1971, p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

large number of newly independent, developing states are acutely sensitive to "exploitation" of offshore resources by foreign maritime powers. In addition, the technological explosion has launched a resolute national scramble for undersea resources.[28]

In both UN conferences the United States tried to obtain an acceptable compromise between the maritime and coastal positions. This involved getting concessions from Iceland, Britain and Japan, all of which opposed any extension beyond the three-mile limit, as well as securing reductions of the continental shelf and the 200-mile claims of Latin America and other nations. In 1960 the United States and Canada jointly proposed a six-mile territorial sea with an additional six miles for a national fishing zone. They also agreed to a proposed amendment, designed to conciliate the Latin American nations, stipulating that a coastal nation could extend its fishing zone farther if there were scientific justifications, to be determined only after a hearing by coastal and maritime nations.[29] The amended proposal failed by one vote; had even one opposing nation abstained, the UN could have successfully enunciated a compromise agreement delimiting territorial waters. Ecuador had tentatively agreed to abstain when the United States agreed to immediate recognition of a twelve-mile zone off the Ecuadoran coast. Later she insisted that the United States also relinquish its claims and those of U.S. nationals for reimbursement of fines and damages.[30] Since the U.S. delegation had no authority to relinquish the private claims, it was unable to persuade Ecuador to abstain. Chile apparently had intended an affirmative vote, but Peru constrained Chile not to abrogate the Declaration of Santiago. Thus the three CEP countries, as well as Venezuela, Mexico and Panama, were among the twenty-eight nations that opposed the twelve-mile limit.[31] Even though the compromise proposal was not adopted by the UN Conference of the

[28]Teodoro Alvarado Garaicoa, *El dominio del mar* (Guayaquil: Departmento de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Guayaquil, 1968), pp. 149-195, and Daniel S. Cheever, "The Role of International Organization in Ocean Development," *International Organization*, Summer 1968, pp. 629-648.

[29]Arthur H. Dean, "The Second Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Fight for Freedom of the Seas," *American Journal of International Law,* October 1960, p. 777 and Oda, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-103.

[30]By 1958, in accordance with provisions in the 1954 U.S. Fishermen's Protective Act, there were twenty U.S. claims for a total of $88,000 as well as three private claims filed by U.S. citizens against Ecuador and Peru totaling $100,000 for personal losses sustained because of seizure incidents. See Dean, *op. cit.*, p. 764.

[31]*Ibid.*, pp. 780-782. Note that the primary efforts of the U.S. delegation were to break the unanimity of the CEP nations rather than to pressure one of the other opposition votes to abstain or to vote affirmatively.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sea, many nations have tacitly accepted twelve miles as the internationally recognized limit.

Recently, the UN has been restudying the question of the continental shelf, because the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf was open to revision in 1969. As the 1958 Convention defined it, the continental shelf extends either to the 200-meter depth or to the depth which is "exploitable." The latter definition means that the only real limit to claims of continental shelves is technology. Unfortunately the 1970 UN conference in Geneva on "peaceful uses of the seabeds and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction" failed to resolve any of the issues. The delegates agreed only that they should report to the General Assembly that they had met, discussed, and been unable to agree.[32] The United States presented the only complete set of proposals, paradoxically contributing to the conference's failure. The U.S. proposal was that all nations renounce claims to jurisdiction of ocean floors beyond a depth of 200 meters and that beyond this depth an "international seabed resources authority" would license and control all drilling and mining activities on behalf of all nations, sharing the profits from successful enterprises among the developing countries. Most nations were simply unprepared to make an agreement of any sort.

Unilaterally the United States has tried repeatedly to reach an agreement with the CEP powers, either as a group or individually. But since the Declaration of Santiago made the 200-mile claim a point of national honor, the State Department has decided that it is unlikely ever to be revoked. The aim, therefore, is to work out a practical arrangement on conservation and seizures that would leave the 200-mile claim and its political significance intact.[33] The secret treaty between the United States and Ecuador achieved such an arrangement only temporarily, from 1963 to 1966.

Informal talks between the United States and the CEP states began in April 1968 to draft an agenda for another four-power conference on the dispute. The United States suggested that a special international institute be established to solve problems of conservation, exploitation, development and seizures. The CEP countries replied that they would discuss only the scientific and technical aspects of fishery conservation, not the "nonnegotiable"

[32]*Los Angeles Times,* August 31, 1970, p. 6. The next UN conference is scheduled for 1973.

[33]U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, Subcommittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, *Twelve-Mile Fishing Zone,* Hearings, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, 1966, p. 28.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

200-mile claim.[34] Seizures continued during these fragile preliminary talks, nearly upsetting them. U.S. relations with Ecuador and Peru were at a low ebb. Even though the fishing issue was not the primary cause of the strains, both appear to have used seizure incidents to indicate their extreme displeasure with other features of U.S. foreign policy. Four times during the spring of 1969 Peru seized U.S. fishing boats; one of those actions included the gunfire attack on the *San Juan*.

On the other hand, there are occasions when conscientious patrol boats capture U.S. tuna boats at seemingly inopportune times. In June 1969, during a crucial phase of the informal negotiations, the Ecuadoran navy found eight U.S. tuna boats navigating near the mouth of the Guayas River. The boats were not fishing: Ecuador charged that they were in this deliberately provocative position in hope of sabotaging the conference. At any rate, before they reached the nearby port, Salinas, another patrol boat intercepted and freed the U.S. vessels. Ecuador maintained that their liberation demonstrated its desire to hold official talks.[35] Parenthetically, it must be added that the U.S. Congress prodded the negotiations by threatening legislation (H.R. 10607) which would prohibit importation of all fishery products from any nation that seized U.S. vessels in "international" waters — although hearings on the proposed legislation were postponed because of the upcoming Buenos Aires conference on the dispute. To both Ecuador and Peru, passage of such a law would have severe consequences.

Finally, after months of negotiations, the CEP nations met formally with the United States in Buenos Aires in August 1969. The conference attempted to find a practical solution to the seizures and related issues without addressing the legality of the 200-mile claim. The U.S. delegation proposed several varieties of international licensing agencies to license all boats fishing in the disputed area. The CEP countries rejected these proposals and made two basic demands: that the United States eliminate both the 35 per cent tariff on canned fish products and the labeling restriction which prevents bonito from being marketed in the United States as tuna. The talks were recessed for a study of these

[34] *El Comercio* (Quito), December 23, 1968, p. 1.

[35] *Ibid.*, June 21, 1969, p. 1. It seems unlikely that U.S. fishing boats would attempt deliberate sabotage of talks on the claims-seizure dispute; they apparently have more to gain by settlement than continuation of the dispute. In a letter dated August 28, 1969, American Tunaboat Association General Manager Fellando repudiated the charge, saying that it has long been the policy of the ATA to persuade the U.S. government to seek such a conference.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proposals and demands, reconvened and recessed again in 1970, and are scheduled to be reconvened in 1971.

The interchange of proposals indicates some progress; this is the first occasion on which the United States was asked for something other than accession to the claims extension. U.S. fishing interests now have to decide whether tariff protection is worth continued risk of seizure. Another encouraging aspect of the talks was the impression they gave that the CEP nations were almost as earnest in their desire for a solution as the United States; such an attitude was never apparent in previous discussions.[36]

Meanwhile the number of Latin American nations claiming the 200-mile limit continues to grow and now includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Uruguay. The most recent addition was Brazil, whose President decreed the claims extension on March 26, 1970. This decree is viewed as evidence of Brazil's interest in offshore oil and in a growing fishing industry.[37] On May 4-9, 1970 the nine nations, meeting in Montevideo, adopted the Declaration of Sea Rights upholding the right of all maritime states to "establish the limits of their sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction in accordance with their geographical and geological characteristics." The declaration also affirmed their right as maritime nations to dispose of the natural resources of the sea adjacent to their coast in order to promote "the maximum development of their economies and raise the living standard of their peoples."[38]

Colombia probably will join the "200-milers." Senator Diego Uribe Vargas has been trying since 1962 to get such a claim adopted on three grounds: the Colombian claim of "continental shelf" lacks precision; Colombia must be on equal footing with her neighbors; and she must protect both her fish resources and the rich soil being eroded to sea.[39] The Colombian Foreign Ministry has discussed a possible claims extension with the Peruvian government.

It is also conceivable that Argentina may revert from a 200-mile claim to her original "epicontinental sea" claim. In 1967, as the result of a dispute with Soviet fishing boats, Argentina refined the "epicontinental sea" claim to one of precise mileage, namely, 200 miles. Since then, however, she has learned that there may be some

[36] *Los Angeles Times,* August 18, 1969, p. 4. Comprehensive coverage of the talks can be found under David F. Belnap's by-line in *ibid.*, August 17, 18 and 20, 1969.
[37] *New York Times,* March 26, 1970, p. 5.
[38] *Ibid.*, May 10, 1970, p. 14.
[39] *Los Angeles Times,* May 13, 1969, p. 8.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

richly productive fishing grounds off the South Atlantic coast. The Argentine government is drawing plans for a $9.7 million project to finance a major fishing industry, and wants to make amicable agreements with Brazil and Uruguay on development of the new grounds. Paradoxically, it appears that the greatest supply of fish is farther out than 200 miles, which may tempt Argentina to return to her original "epicontinental seas" claim.[40]

Furthermore, now that most of Latin America's coastal waters have been placed under the 200-mile claim or some variant of the continental shelf claim, African nations may soon follow suit. Senegal threatened in 1970 to become merely the first of the African states to make a 200-mile claim. The problem of satisfactorily internationalizing future seabed exploitation and establishing acceptable oceanic fishery rules may thus become even more entangled. It seems patently clear that the trend is spreading.

Fishing in the CEP Economies

Peru became the world's leading producer of fish in 1962 and has held that position for every year since, catching around ten million metric tons annually.[41] This catch is almost totally in the form of anchovies seined from the Humboldt Current, which are then reduced to fishmeal for export. After an inauspicious start in the early 1950's the industry boomed — at one time there were over 200 separate companies producing fishmeal along the Peruvian coast. By 1968 the entire industry, then some 135 companies because of consolidation, was earning an estimated $204 million annually.[42] The abundance of the anchovies, the relative simplicity of the fishmeal reduction industry, and the growing demand for protein dietary supplements for poultry and livestock in nations with advanced agriculture all have stimulated this boom. Foreign capital and equipment were available in the beginning because of the disappearance of the sardine off the California coast. The presence of foreign-owned companies is a continuing pattern, though they are not dominant — their part in fishmeal production is expected to remain at something less than 50 per cent.[43]

Fishmeal has become Peru's leading export, the source of some 27 per cent of her foreign exchange.[44] The government, naturally,

[40] *New York Times*, February 25, 1968, p. 78.
[41] FAO, *Yearbook of Fishery Statistics, 1968*.
[42] *Peruvian Times, Fisheries Supplement, 1969*, p. 29.
[43] Alejandro Bermejo, "Ten Million Tons of Fish," *Peruvian Times, Fisheries Supplement, 1969*, pp. 8-9, 26.
[44] *Peruvian Times, Fisheries Supplement, 1969*, p. 46.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

views the industry with a protective eye. Most tuna boat seizures have occurred since 1965, as official insistence on the 200-mile claim has grown more inflexible. The Peruvian government has been concerned also with the ecological interaction of the guano birds and the anchovy and has made continuing studies of bird and fish populations. Between 1956 and 1959 construction of more fishmeal plants was halted until the government decided there was room for both guano and fishmeal industries.[45] The Instituto del Mar del Peru (IMARPE) has campaigned rather ineffectively for greater efficiency in the use of raw materials rather than continued multiplication of plants and vessels. Because 1965 was a disastrous year due to a temporary change in the currents, IMARPE was able to institute a closed season (*veda*) which limits anchovy fishing to 170 days per year. This regulation, however, does not limit the number of fishermen or the sophistication and size of their equipment. Peru still manages to exceed her previous production and fishery records by continual modernization. The fishmeal industry believes that it is fishing at the maximum sus-

TABLE I

FISHING CATCHES IN CHILE, ECUADOR AND PERU
(metric tons)

	Chile	*Ecuador*	*Peru*
1950	87,700	10,000	113,800
1955	214,300	15,000	235,500
1956	188,300	21,800	332,300
1957	213,100	26,400	511,000
1958	225,800	31,100	961,200
1959	272,600	35,900	2,186,600
1960	339,600	44,300	3,569,100
1961	429,800	38,600	5,291,000
1962	638,600	42,600	6,957,500
1963	761,900	50,300	6,899,000
1964	1,160,900	46,300	9,116,500
1965	708,500	53,500	7,461,900
1966	1,383,500	48,200	8,789,000
1967	1,052,900	57,400	10,133,700
1968	1,376,100	46,900	10,520,300

Source: UN Food and Agriculture Organization, *Yearbooks of Fishery Statistics.*

[45]U.S. Department of the Army, *U.S. Army Handbook for Peru* (Washington: GPO, 1965), p. 585.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tainable level, and practicing conservation at the same time. Others believe that the anchovy resource is being depleted, and that the fishery is economically inefficient because of the increasing costs of competition.[46]

The Peruvian government has also attempted to stabilize the world market for fishmeal. On May 25, 1970 the junta government nationalized the marketing of all fishmeal and fish oil, having created a new agency to handle it. Steps such as this illustrate the official concern with the heavy dependence on fishmeal for export earnings. There is also resentment of the political and economic influence the industry has had. Common rumor blames the fishmeal producers for the August 31, 1967 devaluation of the *sole*. Furthermore, the heavy production of fishmeal has meant a severe drain on available water and power supplies.[47]

In contrast to the anchovy fishery, Peru's tuna fleet is small. There are five foreign-owned companies (four of them American) which dominate the industry; since they are Peruvian-based companies, the licensing requirements do not apply to them. The entire Peruvian tuna catch is semi-processed in Peru and canned in U.S. canneries in Puerto Rico to avoid the U.S. tariff on canned fish. The major fishmeal producers are making plans for expansion into a "table" fishery; they recognize that they cannot continue expansion indefinitely in the anchovy area.

TABLE II

PERU'S FISHERIES EXPORTS
(metric tons)

Products	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*	*1967*
Fishmeal	1,159,731	1,416,541	1,259,997	1,302,014	1,560,900
Fish oil	110,035	133,623	111,238	87,389	195,968
Frozen	19,118	14,281	11,703	14,103	16,321
Canned	13,102	11,172	11,293	13,431	3,445
Total	1,301,986	1,575,617	1,394,231	1,416,937	1,776,634

Source: Peruvian Times, Fisheries Supplement, 1969, p. 46.

[46]George Bergstrom, quoted by Robert Cahn, "Making Economic Aid Effective," *Current,* February 1969, p. 42; Garth I. Murphy, "Menos de 7,500,000 T.M. rendimiento sostenible de la anchoveta," *Anuario de Pesca 1967-1968,* pp. 56-69; and Milner B. Schaefer, "Para analisis de dinamica pesquera es basica la marcacion de anchoveta," *ibid.,* pp. 72-77. *Pesca* is a commercial fisheries review published monthly by Ediciones Sudamerica, S.A. in Lima. An annual yearbook of its most important articles is also published.

[47]Joseph Grunwald and Philip Musgrove, *Natural Resources in Latin American Development* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 476.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Apparently these interests are behind the demand that the United States remove its tariff on canned fish and the labeling restriction on bonito. In order to have a profitable, large-scale tuna fishery, Peru currently would have to depend on an export fishery.

Chile, despite her 2,000-mile coastline, has only recently begun to develop a national fishery. She has a fishmeal industry even though tuna are not normally found in abundance that far south. CORFO, the government corporation financing and guiding this development, has avoided the excess capacity of Peru's industry. Aided by loans from the Inter-American Development Bank, it is promoting fishery development for several reasons: to improve nutrition; to provide guano for domestic use, thus freeing more nitrates for export; and to establish a profitable fishmeal enterprise, affording employment and diversification. Table III illustrates the importance of fishmeal production in the increase of Chilean fishery exports. Peru has been concerned about this new Chilean industry, and with some reason. In 1965 the currents changed, causing the disappearance of anchovies from Chile's claim. This occasioned an economic crisis in the new Chilean industry as well as some Chilean encroachment on Peru's claim. Peru, therefore, has zealously patrolled this particular area.[48]

TABLE III

CHILEAN EXPORTS OF FISH PRODUCTS
(thousands of U.S. dollars)

Products	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*
Frozen	1,762.3	2,517.1	2,902.7	6,494.5
Canned	221.9	327.6	344.8	239.9
Fishmeal	9,412.2	15,994.3	8,327.8	25,811.7
Fish oil	1,636.2	2,610.9	2,336.5	2,991.4
Other	339.1	623.4	1,069.3	1,588.7
Total	13,371.7	22,073.3	14,981.1	37,126.2

Source: Statistical Profile of Chile (Washington: Chilean Embassy, 1968), p. 31.

Ecuador's fishmeal production also has jumped — from 1963 through 1967 it increased by 187 per cent — but in contrast to Peru and Chile, national law obligates the fishmeal producers to sell their products internally; only the surplus is allowed for the

[48]"Fluctuaciones de la pesqueria Chilena," *Anuario de Pesca, 1967-1968,* pp. 130-137.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE IV

ECUADOR'S EXPORTS OF FISH PRODUCTS
(metric tons)

Products	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*	*1967*
Tuna	4,966	5,024	7,096	6,523	11,581
Shrimp	2,454	2,442	2,580	2,405	2,734
Lobster	97	95	85	77	80
Other	15	225	5	10	73
Fishmeal	....	7	498	....	49
Total	7,532	7,793	10,264	9,015	14,517

Source: Instituto Nacional de Pesco, *Boletin Informativo,* September 1968, p. 95.

export market. Consequently, 97 per cent of Ecuadoran fishmeal production was used domestically in 1967.[49] It must be pointed out that Ecuadoran waters are too warm to provide the abundant anchovies found off the Peruvian coast.

Currently Ecuador is more interested in developing her tuna industry than in promoting fishmeal production. The Instituto Nacional de Pesca is intent on promoting tuna production for the lucrative U.S. market. Its studies compare Ecuadoran tuna prices with U.S. tuna prices and are much concerned with the relative inefficiency of the Ecuadoran tuna fleet. Foreign vessels registered legally in Ecuador have an average capacity fifteen times that of the average Ecuadoran tuna boat. Also, 92.5 per cent of the foreign boats use nets while 81 per cent of the Ecuadoran vessels fish for tuna less efficiently with lines.[50] The following figures point out the contrast. Two foreign companies (U.S.) operate legally in the country. In 1967 they maintained eighty vessels while the Ecuadoran government, which owns and operates a national tuna fleet, had sixty-three. In that year, Ecuador's fleet caught 17,170 metric tons to 28,459 metric tons caught by the licensed foreign vessels. Both the national fleet and the foreign-owned fleet aim their production for the U.S. market.

Ecuador's Instituto Nacional de Pesca urges the government to expand the size and efficiency of the national tuna fleet in order to increase exports to the United States.[51] Ecuador recently

[49]Instituto Nacional de Pesca, "Estadisticas . . . ," *op. cit.,* p. 66.
[50]*Ibid.,* p. 39.
[51]*Ibid.,* p. 41.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

negotiated a $5.3 million loan from the World Bank for the purchase of twelve large refrigerated boats expected to double her tuna catch. In accord with this thinking, she decreed a comprehensive new fishing law on March 10, 1969, codifying a number of earlier laws in terms of the role fishing should have in national economic development.[52]

Conclusion

The chances of reaching a working agreement that would curtail seizures seem to have faded once more in early 1971. During 1969 and 1970 they appeared to be improved because each side was able to bring real leverage to bear on the other. The CEP nations demanded removal of the U.S. tariff and labeling restrictions as the price for ending the seizures. Such a potential bargain really left it up to the U.S. fishing interests: Would they be willing to forgo the tariff protection designed against Japanese canneries in return for respite from seizures? Considering the number of seizures in relation to the total number of boats operating and the days fished, they might well prefer the risk of seizures. Perhaps they would agree to a hemispheric tariff reduction. Or, since considerable frozen Japanese tuna is already imported, they might concede that the tariff is unnecessary, especially in light of the new U.S. tuna exports to the Italian market. On the other hand, the tariff is designed primarily to protect U.S. canneries rather than boat owners and fishermen. Since cannery domination of the industry is under attack on several levels, conceivably the boat owners and fishermen could press for the deal proposed by the CEP powers. They stand to gain more from a diminution of the risk of seizure than do the canneries.

Given the renewed intractability Ecuador has displayed in 1971, it is evident that leverage is more difficult to apply against Ecuador than against Peru. The threatened embargo on fish imports from nations which seize U.S. fishing vessels would be considerably more injurious to Peru than to Ecuador. For this reason, it is apparent that Ecuador feels she has more to gain by stepping up the seizures and fines. During 1968 she exported 11,451 metric tons of fish products, at a value of $4,907,300, almost entirely to the United States.[53] With twenty-five seizures in the first few

[52] *Registro Oficial,* Numero 132, March 10, 1969.

[53] Instituto Nacional de Pesca, "Estadisticas . . . ," *Boletin Informativo,* December 1969, pp. 101-108.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

months of 1971, she has collected about one-quarter of that amount. Moreover, Ecuador could confiscate the catches of the ships she fines. The two 1971 seizures of the *Apollo* harvested fines of $249,740, but Ecuador could have confiscated the catches worth an estimated $1,400,000. Or, as she warned the captain of the *Apollo,* she could make an outright confiscation of the $3 million vessel. If she took either action, she would probably lose her export market in the United States. Therefore, it seems likely that Ecuador will prefer to continue her present pattern of seizures and fines, and that the issue will not be settled in the foreseeable future.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PARTY POLITICS AND JAPAN'S POLICY TOWARD COMMUNIST CHINA*

by George P. Jan

UNDER modern conditions the traditional division between international and domestic politics and the corollary distinction between external and internal dimensions of foreign policy have become less useful for analytical perspectives. With respect to foreign policy various attempts have been made to establish a meaningful linkage between its two aspects. The decision-making approach, the scheme of compatibility and consensus, the concept of adaptive politics, are but a few examples.[1] This article examining the role of party politics in the formulation of Japan's policy toward Communist China is intended as a case study of one of the internal dimensions of Japan's foreign policy, i.e., a single factor analysis.

External Dimensions of Japan's Foreign Policy After World War II

In order to understand the domestic sources of Japan's policy toward Communist China, it is necessary to consider briefly the external factors bearing on this issue, for the international environment imposes certain constraints on Tokyo's foreign policy. Between the end of World War II and 1952, when the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan became effective, that country was under allied occupation, American occupation in reality. During this period, the Japanese government had little or no influence

*The author is grateful to the Social Science Foundation and the Graduate School of International Studies of the University of Denver for a research grant which made possible his research in Japan.

[1]See Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, editors, *Foreign Policy Decision-Making* (New York: The Free Press, 1962); Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "Compatibility and Consensus: A Proposal for the Conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review,* December 1967, pp. 971-982; James N. Rosenau, "Compatibility, Consensus, and an Emerging Political Science of Adaptation," *ibid.,* pp. 983-988; James N. Rosenau, editor, *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1967); James N. Rosenau, "Foreign Policy as Adaptive Behavior: Some Preliminary Notes for a Theoretical Model," *Comparative Politics,* April 1970, pp. 365-387; Robert A. Dahl, *Congress and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950); and Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

over its foreign affairs. External relations, such as the establishment of overseas agencies to deal with consular affairs, were largely determined by the United States. Even after the country regained independence in 1952, its foreign policy was not truly independent of American domination.

Japan's goals in the 1950's were essentially twofold: national security against possible foreign invasion, and economic recovery. For their attainment she relied heavily on the United States. This resulted in following Washington's lead in international matters. Thus, one of the overriding factors influencing Japan's China policy is the U.S. China policy, which since the outbreak of the Korean War has been the containment of Communist China. Eisenhower-Dulles' rigid anti-communist stance in the 1950's severely limited Japan's flexibility in dealing with the new regime in Peking.

Another external constraint has been the attitude of the Soviet Union and Communist China toward Japan. In 1950, shortly after the Chinese communist revolution, Moscow and Peking concluded a mutual defense treaty aimed specifically at Japan. Their intensely hostile attitude discouraged Japan from seeking a rapprochement with these two communist giants. In the context of the Cold War's polarization in the 1950's, Japan had no choice but to lean toward the United States for national security and economic assistance.

Japan's postwar position in Asia also influenced her China policy. After their defeat, the Japanese were weak not only economically and politically, but also psychologically. Knowing that they were unpopular in many parts of the world, especially in the Asian countries they had occupied during the war, they adopted a policy of self-imposed isolation. They concentrated on internal reconstruction and avoided active participation in world politics. While the China issue became a matter of increasing importance to them, it did not occupy the center of the Japanese political stage.

This situation gradually changed, however, with Japan's rapid economic recovery. Beginning in the 1960's she re-emerged as a major Asian power. Foreign trade, a vital sector of her economy, spurred her interest once again in foreign affairs, Asian affairs in particular. It is no exaggeration to state that trade is one of the controlling factors in determining Japan's foreign policy. This has been particularly true since her expanded economy has enabled her to compete with the United States and other advanced coun-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tries for the limited world market in Asia and elsewhere. In the last two decades about one-third of her foreign trade has been with the United States, one-third with Asian countries and one-third with other countries, which helps to explain the importance of the United States and Asia in her relationships. Moreover, in order to promote foreign trade, Japan needs international peace and order. Largely for this reason, her basic foreign policy in recent years has been "peace diplomacy." Under this guideline she seeks to establish friendly relations with all countries. She supports the United Nations and regional cooperation, but shuns military alliance with the exception of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

It is in the light of these major external factors that the internal dimensions of Japanese policy toward Communist China must be examined.

The Position of Major Political Parties on the China Issue

Liberal Democratic Party

Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its predecessor the Liberal Party have been in power since the Peking regime was established in China in October 1949. An understanding of the China policy of these two parties is thus essential in evaluating the Japanese position. When the communist regime was inaugurated in Peking, Japan was still under allied occupation. Her government, then headed by Shigeru Yoshida of the Liberal Party, had little voice in matters concerning Sino-Japanese relations. Yoshida himself was anti-communist, but the China problem was too complex to be decided on the single issue of communism.

In 1951 the allied powers, chiefly the United States and Britain, made it known that neither Peking nor Taipei would be invited to the proposed San Francisco Peace Conference with Japan. On July 12, 1951, when the revised draft treaty prepared by the United States was released, China was not included among the principal signatories. Japan was authorized to use her own discretion to negotiate a separate peace treaty with either of the two Chinese regimes. However, it was an open secret that both Washington and Taipei were pressing her to sign a peace treaty with Nationalist China.

The Japanese government began to play a more active role in formulating its China policy after the conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty in September. An overseas agency was set up in Taipei on November 17 for the purpose of promoting trade and handling affairs concerning Japanese nationals and property on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Taiwan. In the same month Tokyo proposed that the agency be permitted to administer all affairs of mutual concern and to communicate directly with the Nationalist government by means of diplomatic codes and diplomatic pouches. The diplomatic status of the Japanese agency was elevated when this request was approved on January 25, 1952.

At about the same time Tokyo made evident its decision to seek a peace treaty with Taipei. The first official Japanese announcement came with the release of a Yoshida letter to John Foster Dulles, then an adviser to the U.S. Department of State and the chief architect of the San Francisco Peace Conference. This letter, dated December 24, 1951, was made public in Tokyo on January 16, 1952. In it Yoshida stated that Japan would recognize the Nationalist government on Taiwan, not the communist regime in Peking. But he indicated that the terms of the proposed bilateral treaty with the Nationalist government would "be applied to all territories which are now or which may hereafter be, under the control of the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China. . . ."[2] This point was confirmed by the Notes between the Chinese and Japanese plenipotentiaries at the conclusion of the Japan-Nationalist China Peace Treaty on April 28, 1952.[3]

Article X of the treaty explicitly provides that

> For the purpose of the present Treaty, nationals of the Republic of China shall be deemed to include all the inhabitants and former inhabitants of Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) and their descendants who are of the Chinese nationality in accordance with the laws and regulations which have been or may hereafter be enforced by the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores); and juridical persons of the Republic of China shall be deemed to include all those registered under the laws and regulations which have been or may hereafter be enforced by the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores).[4]

During the negotiations it was reported that the Japanese delegation formally rejected the Nationalist government's claim to mainland China.[5]

The Yoshida letter and the treaty provisions clearly reflected the Yoshida formula for dealing with the China issue: Japan recognizes the Nationalist government as the legal government of the territories under its control; mainland China is not so con-

[2] *U.S. Department of State Bulletin,* January 28, 1952, p. 120.
[3] *China Handbook, 1952-53* (Taiwan: China Publishing Company, 1953), pp. 157-158.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 155.
[5] *Nippon Times* (Tokyo), January 27, 1952.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trolled and thus the treaty terms do not apply to it. As to the mainland, the Yoshida letter indicated that Japan would not recognize Communist China under the existing circumstances, but it did not guarantee that Japan would not recognize China in the future. In promoting trade with Communist China in the early 1950's, the Yoshida government paved the way for present Japanese adherence to the "separation of politics from economics" in dealing with the two Chinas. Consciously or unconsciously, the Yoshida regime laid down the basic China policy for Japan which has been followed by all successive administrations controlled by the LDP.

The China policy of the current Sato regime is still one of "separation of politics from economics." This was stated clearly in the December 1967 edition of the Japanese government's Diplomatic White Paper:

> Japan's China policy has as its basic premise two facts: on one hand is the reality of Japan's conclusion of a peace treaty with Nationalist China and Japan's maintenance of diplomatic relations with that country and, on the other hand, is the reality of the need to maintain various *de facto* relations with the Chinese continent and its population of 700 million people. Further, as long as the governments of both Nationalist China and the Chinese People's Republic continue to claim sovereignty over the whole of China, the best policy for Japan to follow in pursuit of her own interests is to continue diplomatic relations with Nationalist China and to continue contacts, including trade on the private level, with Communist China on the basis of the principle of the separation of politics and economics. The Japanese Government, for the time being, intends to continue this policy, while maintaining a watch over Communist China's internal and external actions, as well as developments in the international situation. However, the China question is an important problem not only for Asia, but for the future of the world. Thus, we should see to it that the problem is discussed fully in the United Nations and solved on a just basis in the light of world opinion.[6]

This policy imposes serious limitations on the relations between Peking and Tokyo. Peking's strategy in dealing with Japan has been the "cumulative approach" to the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations, using trade as the inducement. But Japan has definite limits on political contacts with Peking beyond which she refuses to go. This frustrates Peking's political goals and is a source of frictions. Furthermore, Taiwan is sensitive to Japan's contacts with Peking and protests strongly against any Japanese act that could be construed as presaging official recognition of the

[6]Hirokazu Hatano, "Sino-Japanese Relations Today," *Japan Quarterly* (Tokyo), July-September 1968, p. 310.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Communist Chinese regime – which makes for difficulties with Nationalist China as well.

Although there is a general LDP consensus that trade relations with Peking should be improved, the LDP leadership is by no means united on the China issue. Two active groups within the party represent divergent policy views: the pro-Peking *Ajia-Afurika Mondai Kenkyukai* (Asian-African Problems Research Association), organized on January 28, 1965, and the pro-Taiwan *Ajia Mondai Kenkyukai* (Asian Problems Research Association), organized on December 16, 1964. The pro-Taiwan group, led by Okinori Kaya, a senior LDP member of the House of Representatives, comprises the LDP mainstream including the majority of the Kishi, Sato and Ishii factions. In general its leaders are older than the pro-Peking leaders. The pro-Peking group has as its adviser Kenzo Matsumura, a senior leader in the LDP and a former Minister of International Trade and Industry, and includes among its House of Representatives members the majority of the Miki and Kono factions. The following table shows the strength of the two rival groups as of 1965:

TABLE I

STRENGTH OF PRO-PEKING AND PRO-TAIWAN GROUPS IN JAPAN'S LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Faction	*Ajia-Afurika Mondai Kenkyukai*	*Ajia Mondai Kenkyukai*
Sato	9 (3)	27
Kono	17	2
Ikeda	8	12 (1)
Miki	18 (3)	9 (2)
Fujiyama	10 (1)	9 (2)
Oono	13 (1)	9 (2)
Kawashima	1	4
Ishii	0	10
Kishi-Fukuda	0	13
Others	1	3

( ) Indicates members of the House of Councillors; others are members of the House of Representatives.

Source: "Chugoku Seisaku o towareru hoshu, Kakushin" ("Conservatives and Progressives Are Questioned on Their China Policy"), *Ekonomisuto*, February 23, 1965, pp. 14-23; cited in Sadako Ogata, "Japanese Attitude Toward China," *Asian Survey*, August 1965, p. 395.

The pro-Peking group demands a change of the Sato policy and advocates further improvement of economic and political relations

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with China. LDP leaders who are strongly opposed to the Sato policy include the famous "Six Men," Kenzo Matsumura, Yoshimi Furui, Aiichiro Fujiyama, Tokuma Utsumomiya, Seiichi Tagawa and Hideji Kawasaki, all influential senior members of the party. Since his last visit to Communist China in 1970, Matsumura, due to old age, has not been as active as before in the pro-Peking group. Fujiyama and Furui have emerged as major leaders. However, this faction is in the minority in the party and it does not go so far as to advocate the withdrawal of recognition from Nationalist China. The debate between the two groups in 1968 exemplified the LDP's division on the Chinese issue.

The LDP is a federation of many factions operating more or less like political parties within a party. To stay in power, Prime Minister Sato must maintain a coalition of factions to insure his majority. Thus, he must consider the demands of the pro-Peking minority as they may affect party support of his leadership. He was well aware of the close relationship between domestic policy and foreign policy when he stated that "Most foreign relations before us cannot be solved without taking proper action in domestic policy."[7]

Japan Socialist Party

The Japan Socialist Party (JSP) is in favor of recognizing Communist China and severing relations with Taiwan. It regards Taiwan as a part of China which should be returned to Chinese control. It wants to admit the Peking regime to the United Nations and to expel Taiwan from the world organization. The JSP agrees with Peking that politics and economics are inseparable. In February 1971 it organized a "National Congress for the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations Between Japan and Communist China," consisting of the JSP, Sohyo (the General Council of Japanese Trade Unions), the Japan-China Friendship Society Orthodox Headquarters, various peace groups, Sino-Japanese associations, scholars, intellectuals and youths. The Japan Communist Party, the Liberal Democratic Party, the Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party were not invited to take part in the congress because they had denounced the joint communiqué issued by Peking and the JSP in 1970. The objective of the congress is to implement the principles of this communiqué.

The JSP has sent a number of missions to Peking. The first, in April 1957, and the second, in March 1959, were headed by Ine-

[7]*New York Times*, April 11, 1970.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

jiro Asamuma, the party's chairman. The second Socialist mission produced the controversial "Asamuma Declaration" calling for the annulment of the Japan-Taiwan treaty as the essential preliminary to the restoration of diplomatic relations and the conclusion of a new treaty with Peking. It contended that the Taiwan issue was China's domestic question. This declaration also called for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Taiwan Straits and condemned American imperialism as the common enemy of Japan and China.[8] In 1960 Asamuma was assassinated during a speech at a public meeting. In December 1961 a third Socialist mission, headed by Chairman Mosaburo Suzuki, produced a joint communiqué attacking the two-China policy of Japan's Ikeda government.[9] As of 1971, five JSP missions had visited Peking and each had joined with the Chinese People's Association for Relations with Foreign Countries in issuing statements supporting Peking's terms for the promotion of Sino-Japanese relations.

Like the LDP leaders, the JSP leaders are not united on all issues concerning Communist China. This is especially true in regard to the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and the ways and means of normalizing relations with Peking. Elements on the extreme left in the party are more pro-Peking than those on the extreme right. The most pronounced pro-Peking group, the *Heiwa Doshikai* (Peace Comrades Association) led by Hisao Kuroda, chairman of the party's special committee on Sino-Japanese relations, criticizes the evasive policy of the JSP and endorses the Cultural Revolution in China. The majority of the Sasaki faction led by former chairman Kozo Sasaki generally favors the Kuroda position. The three right-wing factions, identified with Saburo Eda, Seiichi Katsumata and Mitsu Kono, hold diametrically opposite views. The right wing is opposed to the Cultural Revolution and regards it as a power struggle in China. Saburo Eda, party secretary general, is among the rightists' outspoken leaders. At the end of 1968 Katsumata, a former party chairman and now chairman of the JSP theory committee, found it hard to draw up a report on the party's evaluation of the Chinese Cultural Revolution.[10]

The JSP is opposed to Communist China's nuclear tests. On May 10, 1966 the JSP International Bureau Director issued a statement expressing "regret for and opposition to" China's third

[8] *Japan Quarterly,* October-December 1963, p. 412.
[9] *Ibid.,* p. 413.
[10] *The Japan Times* (Tokyo), December 23, 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nuclear explosion, although it mentioned understanding that China's containment by the United States made nuclear testing and development necessary.[11] The party issued a similar statement after China's test in September 1969.[12] It wants the prohibition of nuclear tests by all countries and fears that Chinese tests will give the Sato government a pretext to introduce nuclear weapons in Japan.[13]

JSP controversies concerning China center around the choice of methods in promoting Sino-Japanese amity and the evaluation of the Cultural Revolution. The leftists are impatient with the lack of progress in improving Sino-Japanese relations. The rightists are inclined to adopt a gradual approach. The leftists rate the Cultural Revolution highly and argue that the same movement should be launched in Japan; Hisao Kuroda and Shichiro Hozumi are among some of the Socialist leaders favoring this view. The rightist factions regard the Cultural Revolution as a power struggle unique to Communist China, and thus as not applicable to the Japanese situation.[14]

Despite these internal disputes, however, the JSP is united in its views on the following issues: (1) it wants to recognize the Peking regime as the sole legal government of China, (2) it condemns the "two-China" policy, (3) it regards Taiwan as a part of China and the issue of Taiwan as an internal Chinese problem, (4) it will try to restore Sino-Japanese relations as soon as possible, (5) it advocates the admission of Communist China to the United Nations, and (6) it is strongly opposed to the LDP policy of "separation of politics and economics" in dealing with China.

Komeito

The Komeito was founded in 1964 as the political arm of the neo-Buddhist organization Soka Gakkai. Although it has been officially separated from its religious parent body since 1970, it is still dominated by the Soka Gakkai. Its China policy is consistent with its overall foreign policy goals. The Komeito wants Japan to become an "eternally peaceful state," never aspiring to be a world power possessing military might. In its view the only way Japan can win trust and respect as a member of the family of nations is by becoming a country of highly developed culture, absorbing and

[11] *Ibid.*, June 23, 1969.
[12] *The Japan Socialist Review* (Tokyo), October 15, 1969, p. 23. This journal is the English-language organ of the Japan Socialist Party, published twice a month.
[13] *Ibid.*, May 15, 1966, pp. 1-3.
[14] *The Japan Times*, September 18, 1967.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

assimilating the cultures of Asia, Europe and other areas. It regards war and expansionist interference as the greatest obstacles to this goal and would make their elimination the basic objective of Japan's foreign policy. Its long-range doctrine is "One-Worldness."[15]

The party's foreign policy principles are conceived to achieve (1) absolute peace, (2) an end to confrontation and distrust among nations, (3) elimination of all forms of expansionism, (4) acceptance of the precepts of racial self-determination and noninterference, (5) worldwide economic, social and cultural cooperation based on standards of equality and reciprocity.[16]

The Komeito considers Japan best qualified, because of tradition, geographical location and racial background, to open China's closed door. It believes Japan has a solemn duty to normalize relations with Peking and build a bridge between the United States and China for the peace and prosperity of Asia.[17] For the improvement of relations it makes the following proposals: (1) Recognize the Peking government and thereby restore diplomatic relations. (2) Refrain from interfering in the problem of relations between Peking and Taiwan, regarding this as China's internal affair. (3) Promote the Peking government's admission to the United Nations. (4) Discard the "Yoshida Letter." (5) Vigorously increase intergovernmental trade. (6) Enliven cultural interchange.[18]

The Komeito does not agree that "China is a socialist state and therefore is a peaceful nation." It argues that socialist nations are not necessarily pacifist nations, citing the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as an example. But while it feels that China's military might poses a potential threat to Japan, it does not believe this problem can be solved by a military confrontation. To the Komeito, the best way to achieve peace is to phase out the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, extend Japan's recognition to the Peking government, promote China's admission to the United Nations, establish an Asian headquarters of the UN in Tokyo, and

[15] "Toward the Realization of World Peace Through the Middle-of-the-Road Principle," adopted by the Seventh National Convention of the Komeito. See Komeito Press Release, January 22, 1969, p. 6.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

[18] "Measure for Normalizing Diplomatic Relations Between Japan and China," *ibid.*, p. 1. The "Yoshida Letter," from Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida of Japan to President Chiang Kai-shek of Nationalist China, pledged that Japan would not finance her trade with Communist China by funds from the Export-Import Bank of Japan. Although this was a private letter, it has been honored by the Japanese government.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

implement a series of measures aimed at Japan's "complete neutrality," meanwhile building up an international environment congenial to the prevention of war and striving for the realization of disarmament on the part of powers such as the United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China.[19]

In proposing the signing of a "fundamental treaty" with Peking, the party suggests that Japan's recognition of the government of the People's Republic as the government of China should be divorced from the question of Taiwan, but it wants to give the government on Taiwan a *de facto* status to safeguard Japanese interest in the island. Thus, the Komeito seems to favor a "one China, one Taiwan" policy. Far from wanting to scrap the Japan-Nationalist China Peace Treaty, it advocates that a war-ending declaration not be included in any treaty with Peking, so as to avoid complications arising out of the previous pact with the Nationalist regime.

The "fundamental treaty" with the People's Republic should confirm the basic good neighbor policy of amity by emphasizing the historical, geographical and cultural affinities between the two countries and calling for adherence to the principles of the UN Charter: denial of recourse to force, peaceful settlement of disputes, mutual respect for the independence and sovereignty of the other party, nonintervention in internal affairs, and cooperation for the promotion of common interests. Diplomatic and consular relations should be established.

In the treaty proposed by Komeito Japan would renounce her right, title and claims to Taiwan and the Pescadores. The party does not object to the reversion of these islands to China, which seems to be inconsistent with many of its other statements on Taiwan. At the same time it feels that China should support Japan's claim to Okinawa and the Kuriles. Moreover, China should renounce all claims to war reparations against Japan, and Japan should renounce all special rights and interests acquired in China. There should be mutual renunciation of the assets both nations and their nationals possessed within the territory of the other, as well as of claims owed to the other nation or its nationals, prior to September 2, 1945.[20]

In December 1970 the Komeito established a "National Council for Normalization of Relations Between Japan and Communist China," consisting of politicians, intellectuals, commentators,

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.
[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 6-8.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stage and movie celebrities and novelists. Its objective is to launch a nationwide campaign to improve Sino-Japanese relations.

Democratic Socialist Party

The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) favors a "two-China" policy. It wants to give Peking the Chinese seat in the United Nations and strive for the normalization of relations with Communist China, but not to withdraw recognition from Nationalist China. It advocates a plebiscite by the people of Taiwan to decide the island's political future,[21] and calls for the promotion of trade with Communist China.[22] Although some of its leaders would prefer a more positive policy toward Peking, the majority seems to support the current party line. The DSP has no significant direct contacts with Peking.

Japan Communist Party

The Japan Communist Party (JCP) was more pro-Peking than pro-Moscow before 1966, the year in which China's Cultural Revolution began. But when a mission headed by JCP Secretary-General Kenji Miyamoto visited China, North Korea and North Viet Nam in 1966, troubles developed between the Japanese party and the Communist Party of China (CPC). The JCP delegation failed to issue a joint communiqué with the CPC. After the return of the mission the JCP's cooling sentiments became increasingly manifest, culminating in the withdrawal of its two official representatives from Peking in August 1967. The JCP is opposed to Maoist militancy, although a minority group within the party vocally favors Maoist policies.

Despite its split with Peking, the party has not changed its basic China policy. In the JCP platform of 1968, it still urged the normalization of relations.[23] It advocates Japan's recognition of Peking, the admission of the Peking regime to the United Nations, the return of Taiwan to mainland control, and the improvement of trade and cultural relations with China. Chairman Sanzo Nosaka has attacked the government's China policy, contending that Sato's stance is the main obstacle to the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations. However, the JCP seems to be less inclined than the JSP to comply with Peking's terms for normalization. For

[21] *The Japan Times*, March 14, 1970.
[22] Eki Sone, "Japan and the China Problem—A Democratic Socialist View," *The Japan Quarterly*, July-September 1961, pp. 279-286. Sone is one of the founders of the Democratic Socialist Party.
[23] *The Japan Times*, June 15, 1968.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

instance, Nosaka denounced the Japanese Socialists' plan to send a top-level mission to Peking as an "ingratiatory attitude" toward China and predicted that the JSP's lack of self-reliance would not contribute to expediting the restoration of diplomatic relations.[24]

As further evidence that the JCP's support of the Peking regime is not as enthusiastic as before, it failed to place special emphasis on the China issue in the December 1969 general election, unlike the Socialist Party and the Komeito.

Areas of Consensus and Dispute

The LDP has made some efforts to unite all forces in Japan to present a national front for national interests. For instance, a book written by an LDP member of the House of Councillors proposed that several measures be adopted in order to enlist the support of the JSP for a nonpartisan diplomacy. These include a round table conference forum for Diet interpellations, separation of the mass movement outside the Diet from the JSP Diet activities, and the inclusion of JSP Dietmen in international conferences.[25] Sato has consulted some opposition leaders on foreign policy issues from time to time. Kenichi Hirosawa, who is in charge of the JSP's Planning Board, argued, however, that nonpartisan diplomacy could not be applied to the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China. He contended that the China issue was different from the normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations, and the restoration of relations with China could be achieved only by the struggle of the masses.[26]

Despite the different policy views of the major parties, there are areas of consensus among them. All parties favor the improvement of trade and cultural relations and the promotion of people-to-people diplomacy with Peking. On these issues their differences are concerned with the degree of commitment and the choice of methods. Another area of consensus is that all parties are opposed to Communist China's nuclear tests.

With respect to political relations with China, the LDP stand is undoubtedly the most determined: the governing party refuses to take any action that may be construed as an official recognition of the Peking regime. It wants to maintain a *de facto* two-China policy but not to declare such a policy officially for fear of retaliation by Nationalist China, whose substantial trade with Japan

[24] *Ibid.*, July 6, 1968.
[25] Kenichi Hirosawa, "Today's Task of Movement for Restoration of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations," *The Japan Socialist Review*, May 1, 1966, p. 42.
[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 42-44.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

amounted to $815 million in 1970.[27] In addition to this economic factor, the anti-Peking factions constitute a majority within the LDP, and Sato must take this into consideration before he makes any major changes in his China policy. The Komeito and the DSP seem to be willing to adopt a two-China policy officially; they are not enthusiastic about the return of Taiwan to mainland control. The Socialists and the Communists are in favor of recognizing Peking and returning Taiwan to China.

On the trade issue, although the LDP favors the promotion of trade with China, it refuses to sign any trade agreement with Peking on a governmental basis. Largely due to the pressure from Nationalist China, Sato continues to honor the "Yoshida Letter" forbidding the use of Export-Import Bank of Japan funds to underwrite Japanese exports to Communist China on a long-term credit basis. This has been one of the sources of Peking's irritation. The LDP is also more rigid concerning the exchange of visitors with China.

The JSP attacks the LDP's "separation of politics from economics," or *seikei bunri*, arguing that these two vital interests cannot be separated in international politics. The Komeito and the DSP favor a gradual approach in normalizing relations with Peking, but they are impatient with the LDP's rigid stand and lack of progress in this area. On the whole they are closer to the LDP than to the JSP and the JCP on the China issue. Both the Komeito and the DSP want to promote trade with Communist China more positively than the present Sato posture permits, but they are reluctant to sever relations with Taiwan.

In summary, the main China policy difference among Japanese political parties concerns the recognition of the Peking regime. The LDP is opposed to recognition but favors a *de facto* two-China policy; the JSP and the JCP are for recognition, while the Komeito and the DSP advocate an official two-China or "one China, one Taiwan" policy.

Partisan Activities

The formal decision-making organs in Japan are the Cabinet, headed by the Prime Minister, and the Diet (Parliament). The LDP has been controlling these two branches of government since its establishment in 1955. After the December 1969 election, the House of Representatives of the Diet was composed as follows:[28]

[27] *Free China Weekly* (Taipei), March 21, 1971.
[28] *The Japan Times*, December 29, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Party	*Seats Secured*	*Predissolution Strength*
LDP	288	272
JSP	90	134
Komeito	47	25
DSP	31	31
JCP	14	4
Minor Parties	0	0
Independents	16	3
Total	486	469 (17 seats left vacant)

Since then, with the admission of twelve conservative-oriented independents, the actual strength of the LDP in the lower house has reached 300. This is the first time the LDP has won so many lower house seats and gained such a substantial majority.

The composition of the House of Councillors, the upper house, after the July 1968 election was:[29]

Party	*Number of Seats*
LDP	139
JSP	64
Komeito	24
DSP	10
JCP	7
Independents	1
Vacancies	1
Ni-in Club	4
	250

Thus, the LDP has a safe majority in both houses. Generally speaking, LDP Diet members support the Prime Minister, who is their party president, and the China issue has never reached the point of a floor fight among them despite their serious differences. This means that as long as Sato can hold the LDP Diet members in line, his China policy cannot be challenged successfully by opposition parties. Mainly for this reason, there have been no showdown votes on the China issue, although there were many heated debates. The issue is usually raised by opposition parties in the Diet during interpellations. The interpellators often include members of the LDP. In these sessions responsible government officials, such as the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, are obligated to answer the questions put to them. For example, on February 17, 1970 Prime Minister Sato answered questions concerning China put to him by four interpellators: Tomomi Narita, chairman of the JSP; Yoshikatsu Takeiri, chairman of Komeito; Eiichi Nishimura, chairman of the DSP; and Mikio Mizuta, chairman of the policy board of the LDP.[30]

[29] *Ibid.*, January 27, 1969.
[30] *Ibid.*, February 18, 1970.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Because of the resounding defeat of the Socialist Party in the 1969 election, the LDP will remain dominant in the Diet at least for the next few years. This means that in reality Japan will have a one-party government. Even if the opposition parties were to cooperate with one another and take united action in the Diet against the LDP China policy, they would still be in the minority.

In December 1970 a "Dietmen's League for the Normalization of Japan-China Relations" was organized with Aiichiro Fujiyama, a senior LDP Dietman and a former Foreign Minister, as its chairman. It has a membership of 379 out of the present 738 members of the Diet. The party affiliations of the 379 are: LDP, 95; JSP, 154; Komeito, 71; DSP, 36; JCP, 21; and Independents, 2. This suprapartisan alliance of pro-Peking Dietmen will undoubtedly exert considerable influence on the Prime Minister in formulating Japan's future China policy. The basic weakness of the League is the reluctance of the LDP members to vote against their own party.

Since challenge to the Sato policy in the Diet has not been effective, the best hope for the opposition parties to influence Japan's posture toward China is to rely on extraparliamentary activities, which they call "carrying the struggle to the masses." From time to time they organize mass meetings to agitate for the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations. For example, after China suspended trade with Japan in 1958 a National Convention for the Discussion of Countermeasures Concerning the Relations Between Japan and China was held in Tokyo, sponsored by a number of pro-Peking groups, many connected with the JSP or the JCP.[31] For such purposes opposition parties and the pro-Peking elements in the LDP often cooperate with other pro-Peking groups and organizations. The latter include the Japan International Trade Promotion Association, Japanese Dietmen's League for the Promotion of China-Japan Trade, Japan-China Friendship Association (Orthodox), Japan-China Importers and Exporters Association, Japanese National Peace Committee, Japanese Red Cross Society, Japan Science Conference, General Council of Japanese Trade Unions (Sohyo) and especially the Japan Teachers' Union which is a constituent member of Sohyo, Japan-China Exchange Association, Japan-China Citizens Conference on the Restoration of Sino-Japanese Relations, China Research Institute, Chinese Cultural News Agency, Asian Culture Library, China Association, Association of China Researchers and

[31]George P. Jan, "The Japanese People and Japan's Policy Toward Communist China," *Western Political Quarterly,* September 1969, p. 614.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Research Organizations, Association of Japanese Repatriates from China, Japan-China Buddhist Exchange Association, Asian News Service, some elements of the All Japan Federation of Student Self-Governing Organizations (Zengakuren), the Tokyo General Association of Overseas Chinese, and numerous *ad hoc* committees and conferences. The pro-Peking activities are often supported by heterogeneous groups ranging from the ultra-left to the ultra-right. Some of these organizations are fairly active, others function only occasionally, but all play a part at one time or another in promoting better relations with Communist China.

In addition to the mass movement, the opposition parties make use of public statements and criticisms designed to influence the government's policy — news releases, position papers, direct demands, press conferences, speeches, articles, pamphlets and books. On October 24, 1968, JSP Policy Board Chairman Tagaya and Board Secretary Hosoya called on Chief Cabinet Secretary Kimura and Agriculture and Forestry Minister Nishimura, respectively, to present JSP's proposal to remove restrictions on the import of Chinese meat into Japan. The two government officials were obliged to discuss the matter with them and answer their questions.[32]

Public Opinion on China

If the best hope for the opposition parties to influence the government's China policy is extraparliamentary, through a mass movement, it is relevant to examine Japanese opinion on Communist China. The news media give prominent coverage to China and most publications are sympathetic to the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, yet it is difficult to gauge public opinion with accuracy, let alone to determine the operative linkage between public opinion and public policy. In recent years Japanese public opinion survey methods have improved appreciably, but a study of polls concerning the China issue in 1969 disclosed that almost 50 per cent of the Japanese people were uninformed or unconcerned about Communist China. Of those who expressed definite views, the majority favored a two-China policy of some form. While many felt the need to restore diplomatic relations with China, few wanted to sever relations with Taiwan or to see Taiwan returned to China. Most respondents approved of trade with both Chinas. Most were opposed to Communist China's nuclear tests.[33]

[32] *The Japan Socialist Review*, November 15, 1968, pp. 29-30.

[33] For a detailed analysis of Japanese public opinion on Communist China, see George P. Jan, "Public Opinion's Growing Influence on Japan's China Policy," *Journalism Quarterly*, Spring 1971, pp. 111-119.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The two-China attitude and the large percentage of people who are uninformed or unconcerned about China give the LDP the opportunity to use considerable discretionary power in formulating Japan's China policy. In the 1969 general election for the House of Representatives, the 47.63 per cent (22,381,566) popular vote received by the LDP far outnumbered the 21.44 per cent (10,074,099) received by the JSP.[34] This seems to indicate that the LDP's "separation of politics from economics" in dealing with Communist China had not caused serious disaffection among twenty-two million and more voters. If some of these supporters were dissatisfied with the party's China policy, they must have rationalized their continued support on satisfaction in other areas, such as economic prosperity.

Conclusion

Due to the dominance of the LDP in both houses of the Diet, opposition parties are unable to force the Sato regime to change its China policy through parliamentary channels. In view of the 1969 election's drastic decrease of JSP membership in the House of Representatives the LDP will face no effective opposition for some time to come. The inability of the opposition parties to organize an effective united front on the China problem makes it more difficult for them to influence Japan's policy through Diet action.

The main pressure on the government to change its policy will come from three sources: (1) the factions within the LDP favoring further improvement of Sino-Japanese relations, (2) the extraparliamentary activities of the opposition parties and groups, and (3) the opinion of the Japanese people. For Sato, or his successor, the LDP's numerical majority does not necessarily guarantee his political viability. Prime Minister Kishi of the LDP was forced to resign in 1960 in the controversy over the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. At the time the LDP had a majority in both houses of the Diet, but the anti-Kishi factions in the party acted as interested bystanders instead of supporting him. Although Ikeda, his successor, was still a Liberal Democratic leader, Kishi's political fortunes fell.

To protect his political career and the interest of his own faction in the LDP, Sato must make sure that his China policy does not seriously antagonize the militant elements in Japanese society favoring the improvement of relations. The extraparliamentary

[34] *The Japan Times*, December 29, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mass movement of the opposition parties could be effective in forcing him to modify his rigid stand. Extraparliamentary activities have proved to be politically significant in modern Japanese history. It was not uncommon for extremist elements to take politics from the Diet to the streets before and during World War II.

The slight thaw in Sino-American relations since the ping-pong diplomacy of April 1971 has stimulated movements in Japan to normalize relations with China. Sato is under unprecedented pressure from both within and outside his party to re-examine his China policy. He has made several statements indicating his intention to improve relations with Peking, including a possible change of Japan's policy toward the designation of the Chinese representation question in the United Nations as an "important question." However, Sato will not support any UN resolution to remove Nationalist China from the world organization, and he intends to continue to honor the Japan-Nationalist China peace treaty of 1952.[35]

These policies will certainly be considered as hostile by the Chinese communists. While they may not expect immediate diplomatic recognition, they perhaps hope that Tokyo will make some major concessions to show its sincerity in normalizing relations between the two countries. The liberalization of Japan's trade policy toward China and her support or tacit approval of Peking's admission to the United Nations are probably areas in which they would like to see important policy modifications made. Unless Sato makes some concessions on these issues, it is unlikely that Peking will agree to improve relations. The mere announcement of Tokyo's wish to establish official contacts, such as holding ambassadorial talks, cannot soften Peking's militant attitude toward Japan. The violent attacks on the Sato regime by the Peking press in recent months bear this out.[36]

All signs indicate that any change in Sato's China policy will be of marginal nature. Opposition parties will have to rely primarily on extraparliamentary activities to gain popular support for their position. Barring unforeseen internal turmoils in Communist China and Japan, and drastic developments in the international environment, Sino-Japanese relations will, in all probability, remain troublesome in the near future.

[35]*Ibid.*, April 15, 1971.

[36]See, for instance, an article entitled "True Colours of Japanese Militarism Exposed," *Peking Review*, May 21, 1971, pp. 21-22.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE ROLE OF BUDDHISM IN THE OVERTHROW OF DIEM

by Edwin F. Black

BUDDHISM is both a religious and a political force in Viet Nam, a fact which first became evident in the last days of the Diem regime. Only a few of the politically active Buddhist leaders sought this dual role, yet it is one that now seems impossible to avoid. Their responsibilities will inevitably mount as the conflict shifts more and more from the battlefield to the political arena.

The Chairman of the Unified Buddhist Church, the Venerable Thich Tinh Khiet, wrestling with this problem in 1964 after the tumultuous involvement of his religion in the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem, observed: "The difficulties encountered in the task of defending the Buddhist doctrine and building up a common religious doctrine for the people have not ended." The ordeal the nation has just undergone "enables the Vietnamese Buddhists to appreciate good policies and oppose bad ones, thereby helping to preserve Buddhism as a religion and bring prosperity and happiness in peace to the whole people."

What were the political overtones of this message? Did it mean, for example, that the Buddhists, acting collectively under the leadership of their new unified church, intended in the future to take a position for or against the various policies of the government? Does "happiness in peace" imply a willingness to believe that communism and Buddhism can coexist in a free society? Does the phrase "to the whole people" indicate a readiness to unite the North and South under a coalition government pledged to neutrality?

I

To understand the nature of the Buddhist dilemma, it is necessary to review the tragic and violent events of 1963 which began shortly after 9:00 p.m. on May 8, some 400 miles north of Saigon in the Imperial City of Hué, the ancient capital of all Viet Nam. The concatenation of turbulent developments then set in motion, called *l'affaire bouddhiste*, culminated six months later in the violent death of President Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and the overthrow of the nine-year-old republic.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On that May evening, the 2507th anniversary of Buddha's birth, the normally happy atmosphere of the annual religious celebration was charged with tension. A flower dance had been scheduled at the Tu Dam pagoda, but some 3,000 Buddhists assembled there received other instructions. They were told to cross the main bridge over the placid, winding River of Perfumes and to gather at the intersection in front of the government radio station. There a Buddhist monk, Superior Bonze Thich Tri Quang, began inciting the crowd to violence. Despite his shaven head and saffron robes, Tri Quang possessed all the skills of a trained political agitator. He urged the crowd to break into the studio and force its director to broadcast a recording of a Buddhist protest demonstration that had taken place earlier in the day. As tensions mounted, the Chief of Thua Thien Province (Hué is its capital city) arrived on the scene. He called in an auxiliary guard of local troops under the command of Major Dang Sy, a Catholic, and ordered them to protect the radio station and disperse the gathering. The security forces began their task by turning fire hoses on the people. Suddenly two explosions occurred in the midst of the crowd, followed by gunfire. Eight people were killed, including five Buddhist children and a Catholic girl. Fifteen soldiers and civilians were wounded. It was midnight before the demonstrators were dispersed and order was finally restored in the city.

Word of the clash reached President Diem early the next morning. He immediately ordered Bui Van Luong, his Minister of Interior, to fly to Hué and conduct a thorough investigation. After talking to many eyewitnesses, the Minister was able to piece together the following story. On the morning of May 8, the program for the day's religious ceremonies (previously agreed upon between the local authorities and the Buddhist monks) was arbitrarily changed by Thich Tri Quang without consulting the government officials or his own Buddhist superiors. In addition, he injected into the procession of the faithful a number of large banners bearing slogans extremely critical of the government, thus skillfully transforming the annual Buddhist Wesak religious festival into a political demonstration.

The ceremonies began at the Dien De pagoda, and from there the marchers proceeded through the streets of Hué to the Tu Dam pagoda where a reviewing stand had been set up for the local officials and distinguished guests. In front of the stand was the usual microphone. As the marchers began to pass, Tri Quang seized the microphone and read off the anti-government slogans as they were

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

carried by. He then made a violent speech against the Diem regime which earned him a round of applause from the crowd. As was the custom, the entire ceremony was recorded on tape so that it could be broadcast later in the evening for the benefit of those unable to attend.

That night at eight o'clock the ceremonies were scheduled to resume with a sermon by a widely respected monk who occupied a senior position in the Buddhist hierarchy. At the last moment, according to Minister Luong's report, Tri Quang canceled the sermon and ordered his younger monks to pass the word among the congregation that they should all gather at the radio station. After the crowd had assembled, Tri Quang summoned the director of Radio Hué and demanded that he broadcast the tapes of the morning ceremony. This the director refused to do because the recording contained the text of the seditious slogans and the critical speech Tri Quang had made. The director said that if these parts were deleted, he was prepared to broadcast the rest of the ceremony. Tri Quang would not permit the recording to be altered in any way. Instead he urged his followers to break into the radio station and put the tapes on the air. The director, fearful of the crowd, retreated inside the building, locked the door and telephoned the province chief for help. When the province chief, supported by his local security detachment, arrived, the inevitable confrontation occurred and ended in tragedy.

II

The emotional causes underlying the incident at Hué stem from fundamental differences between the Buddhist and Catholic religions—the former essentially detached and passive, the latter active. Buddhism as practiced in Viet Nam has been more a philosophy of life than a formal religion. It places little stress on specific dogma, internal secular organization, traditional rites, or regularly scheduled times of worship. It is an extremely individualistic religion; no attempt is made to exert social or any other pressure on the worshiper to attend church at any specified time or place. Catholicism, on the other hand, is a militant, proselytizing faith, and over the years its missionaries were able to make gradual progress in their efforts to convert the Vietnamese.

Buddhism in Viet Nam has its historical origins in China and India. After the death of the Chinese Emperor Han Linh De in 189 A.D., there followed a period of strife and civil war which

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

caused a number of Chinese bonzes to take refuge in northern Viet Nam. Later, during the third century, other monks en route from India to China settled in Viet Nam and spread the teachings of Buddha. In the early days, Buddhism reached only the noble classes. Not until the tenth century did religious leaders begin to teach it to the common people. From the time of the Dinh Dynasty (968 A.D.) until the end of the Tran Dynasty (1400 A.D.), Buddhism went through a period of great development. Grades and ranks were decreed for the monks, canonical books were written, ceremonial days were prescribed, and the sermons of famous bonzes were recorded. After the Tran Dynasty, it fell into decline and, except for a brief resurgence during the seventeenth century, continued to decay throughout the early colonial period under the French.

In 1925 there was a general international revival of Buddhism. Institutes, associations and schools were set up in north, central and south Viet Nam for serious religious study. During the 1930's a number of Buddhist magazines were published and sects were established. After World War II, Buddhism resumed its formal organizational growth. At a Buddhist Congress held in Hué on May 6, 1951, the General Buddhist Association of Viet Nam was formed and promptly joined the World Buddhist Fellowship that had been established the previous year at Colombo. In 1952 the Second International Congress on Buddhism in Tokyo provided a further stimulus to the teaching of the religion in Viet Nam. Like everything else in the country at that time, this Buddhist regeneration, paralleled by a somewhat similar Catholic revival, was intimately associated with the national struggle for independence from French colonial rule. A part of the post-World War II wave of anti-colonialism, it reflected Viet Nam's desire to assert its personality as an emerging nation and to express itself in both the religious and political fields.

III

In South Viet Nam, particularly since 1960, the Buddhists had become more and more disturbed by Catholic successes in winning new adherents. Since the population is approximately 80 per cent Buddhist, most of the converts to Catholicism are former Buddhists. As a countermeasure, the Buddhist elders felt compelled to adopt similar activist techniques to invigorate the appeal of their faith. They adopted a multicolored flag, said to represent the tattered, oft-patched robe Buddha wore during periods of medita-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion; they placed greater stress on celebrating various Buddhist holidays and feast days; and they began to move toward tighter discipline and organization among the monks.

This defensive reaction was reinforced by the widespread belief that President Diem and his immediate family, who were all devout Catholics and constituted the focal point of political influence in the country, were partial to the Catholic faith. In what is called central Viet Nam — i.e., the four provinces just below the Seventeenth Parallel — governmental authority was largely delegated to the senior officials in Hué. Living there were two of President Diem's brothers who wielded considerable power, both officially and unofficially.

On spiritual matters, the one brother, Archbishop Ngo Dinh Thuc, was extremely active in promoting the growth of Catholicism. He had built a magnificent modern cathedral in the center of the city and saw to it that Catholic congregations observed their many religious holidays with due public pomp and ceremony. On temporal matters, the shadowy figure of Ngo Dinh Can, the second brother, who was said to be the founder of the Can Lao Party, a pro-Diem political organization, controlled vast commercial interests and had final say in most of the patronage dispensed throughout these four provinces. The public had grown to hate him long before 1963, and after the November 1 coup he was one of the first to be arrested. When General Khanh unexpectedly seized power on January 30, 1964, Can was promptly brought to trial. Just a year and a day after the incident in Hué he was executed by a firing squad.

The responsibility of lodging a formal protest against the government for the tragedy at Hué was immediately assumed by the General Buddhist Association. This took the form of the now famous "Five Demands," calling on the President to: (1) Rescind all restrictions on the flying of religious flags. (2) Give the Buddhists equal rights with the Catholics. (3) Stop the arbitrary arrests of Buddhists in Hué which had begun after the May 8 affair and halt further governmental actions against Buddhist organizations there. (4) Assure Buddhists throughout the country the right to worship and teach their creed. (5) Pay compensation to the families of those killed on May 8.

Within a week, a delegation of Buddhist leaders, headed by the Venerable Bonze Thich Thien Hoa, Chairman of the Sangha (clerical) Association of Viet Nam, were ready to present their complaints formally to President Diem. At an audience on May 15

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the five demands were discussed at length with the President and he approved all of them "in principle."

Unfortunately, emotions and suspicions on the Buddhist side and a desire by various responsible government officials to save face combined to create administrative delays and inaction in dealing with the problem. The focus of the conflict shifted to Saigon, where the General Buddhist Association, using the Xa Loi pagoda as its headquarters, began an active campaign to arouse public support for the Buddhist position. Other key pagodas joined in and began turning out mimeographed tracts accusing the government of stalling. Memorial services and religious processions in honor of those killed at Hué were held in the capital.

Meanwhile, the feeling among Buddhists in Hué still ran high. During the first week in June, students as well as bonzes and nuns participated in demonstrations organized principally by Thich Tri Quang. On June 3, some 1,200 young Buddhists who had assembled in front of the Government Delegate's office clashed with the local security forces, reinforced by regular troops. As a result, more than fifty students required treatment at the hospital and the city was placed under martial law. During the melee some of the tear gas used to break up the disturbance fell in liquid form on a number of persons, causing skin burns and giving rise to ugly rumors that mustard gas had been used. This incident seemed to confirm Buddhist claims of government repression and served to deepen the split between the government and a large segment of the people.

When he heard of the new riots, President Diem again stepped in. He appointed a three-man committee, headed by Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho, a prominent lay Buddhist, and including the Ministers of Defense and Interior, to investigate the complaints jointly with the Buddhist representatives. At the first meeting, held on June 5 and lasting six hours, Superior Bonze Thich Tam Chau acted as the chief spokesman for the Buddhist Association of Viet Nam. The next day, the President himself broadcast a special message to the people of Hué reminding them of their duty as citizens to maintain public security and national discipline. At the same time he acknowledged "with sadness" that many government officials had "not yet reached a substantial degree of understanding and sensitivity regarding their duty toward the people."

By now neither side trusted the other. From the Buddhist point of view, nearly a month had gone by since they had presented

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

their grievances directly to their President. Although he had personally approved them "in principle," there had been no effective action by the government. Instead, the authorities had tightened their security measures around the main pagodas: they placed barbed wire barricades across the entrances; cut off water and electricity to the Tu Dam pagoda in Hué; restricted the free movement of monks; used brutal tactics to break up a peaceful demonstration in Hué; and, according to the Buddhists, were trying to turn the people against their holy men by implying that the monks were heavily infiltrated by communists.

The government, for its part, was suspicious about the sudden appearance of well-organized political activity within the main pagodas — a development entirely out of character for the Buddhists. Moreover, it was becoming sensitive about the exaggerated and largely unfair charges levied against it by the communist propaganda apparatus around the world and by the U.S. press. The latter, in the eyes of many responsible Vietnamese, tended toward sensational, unsympathetic reporting which damaged the government's image in the eyes of the American people. Many U.S. reports seemed to overlook the fact that the country was fighting for its survival against a ruthless, externally-directed communist insurgency, and that large-scale disturbances, whatever their causes, were a menace to national security and had to be rigidly controlled to prevent their being exploited by the Viet Cong.

IV

On June 11, in the midst of these negotiations, a monk committed suicide by fire. The details of this tragic, public self-immolation need not be repeated here. They were more than adequately covered in close-up sequential press photos of the monk's silent, immobile agony. Millions all over the world, shocked that there should exist in this day and age conditions so intolerable as to motivate such an extreme act, concluded that the Diem regime was cruel, repressive and completely indifferent to the wishes of its people. The U.S. government, already beset at home with problems of discrimination and civil rights, found it extremely embarrassing to be in the position of supporting an Asian government which appeared to be interfering with religious freedom, the most basic of all civil rights.

Few realized that this suicide was not a personal or spontaneous gesture on the part of a devout and deeply troubled bonze. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

act had been under consideration for some time. The final plans were reliably reported to have been discussed and approved at a meeting of senior Buddhist monks at the Xa Loi pagoda on May 28. On May 30, nearly two weeks before the event, Radio Hanoi's regular broadcast to Europe and Asia contained a significant clue to the sinister importance of this meeting:

> . . .Reuters further reported that Buddhist believers are considering the possibility of staging a "new dramatic public demonstration to draw attention to their demands." One Buddhist would sacrifice his life by soaking himself in petrol and burning himself to death as a protest against the Ngo Dinh Diem repression of South Vietnamese Buddhists.

The subsequent tragedy adhered closely to the script. The first official report received at the Vietnamese Joint General Staff Headquarters read:

> 110930 June: Buddhists initiated a mass at the Phat Buu pagoda. Then an estimated 300-400 Buddhists formed two columns and moved from Cholon to Saigon. They turned on Phan Dinh Phung street and stopped at the intersection of Le Van Duyet. One vehicle carrying four Buddhist monks stopped. One monk jumped out of the vehicle and sat in front of the Cambodian Embassy. Another monk took a gasoline can, poured gasoline on the seated monk and set fire to him. Afterwards they put the body on a table and carried it to the Xa Loi pagoda, with a sign in front and a Buddhist flag in back.

That afternoon a solemn President Diem went on the radio again to try to calm his people. He informed them that as a result of the June 5 meeting between Vice President Tho's Inter-Ministerial Committee and the Buddhists' representatives, a delegation from the General Association of Buddhists would arrive in Saigon the next day to begin formal discussions on how to meet the Buddhist complaints. Expressing his profound grief at the morning's tragic suicide, he concluded by reminding his people that "Buddhism in Vietnam finds its fundamental safeguard in the Constitution of which I personally am the guardian."

The new Buddhist delegation, to which the President referred, called itself the Inter-Sect Committee for the Defense of Buddhism. It was headed by the ninety-year-old Supreme Leader of Buddhism in Viet Nam, the Venerable Thich Tinh Khiet, who ended a five-day protest fast to fly down from Hué. After three days of lengthy meetings, an "agreed joint communiqué" was drafted on June 16 and signed early that morning by both parties. The President personally countersigned it and noted on the document, in his own hand, that "the articles written in this joint communiqué have been approved in principle by me from the begin-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ning." It provided that any infringements or violations which came to the attention of the Buddhist authorities were to be immediately referred to the Vice President who, as chairman of the government committee, would see that investigative and corrective action was taken at once.

Even before news of this agreement could reach the people, rioting broke out in the capital that Sunday morning. Some 4,000 Buddhists had gathered to attend the funeral of the Venerable Thich Quang Duc, the first monk to burn himself to death. When a bonze informed them that the Supreme Buddhist Leader, Khiet, had ordered the rites postponed, the crowd, instead of dispersing, marched toward the Xa Loi pagoda, the central Buddhist headquarters. En route they encountered a police cordon that attempted to divert them from their destination. A group of well-organized toughs in the crowd attacked the police with clubs, rocks and bicycle chains, injuring forty-two of them. Tear gas finally restored order and about 250 demonstrators were arrested.

Although both sides forswore further violence, the situation continued to deteriorate. What was once a complaint against the infringement of Buddhist rights, became now a full-fledged political issue involving a general loss of confidence in the Diem regime. This growing mistrust was not directed at the President himself, but at his immediate family: his sister-in-law, Madame Nhu, and three brothers — Ngo Dinh Nhu, the Political Counselor at the Palace and husband of Madame Nhu; Archbishop Thuc, and Mr. Can. Many Vietnamese believed that these four had relegated the President to a figurehead role and now wielded the power to control events.

Ten days after the joint communiqué was signed, rumors began to circulate that Nhu's Republican Youth organization was planning a mammoth meeting to demand the withdrawal of some of the concessions made by the government in the June 16 agreement. When these reports became widespread, the Venerable Thich Tinh Khiet wrote a long letter to the President, warning that "if the Republican Youth were to raise its voice to ask for the revision of the joint communiqué, it would be an act of open rebellion against your authority." Expressing the view that so many Vietnamese shared, he urged the President to "resolutely reaffirm your authority as the leader of our nation."

By the first of July, Republican Youth Communiqué No. 3 was in Buddhist hands. To them it sounded as though Nhu had issued a formal declaration of war against their faith, or at least a warn-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing that the President's policy of mediation and conciliation would soon be rejected, and that their religion would be subject to even greater restrictions on the grounds that it was now communist-controlled and therefore an enemy of the state. The communiqué was signed by Nhu as the "Leader of the Movement." Since he was also the "Political Adviser to the Presidency," the implication was clear: either Nhu was not loyal to the President or the government was not sincere in its pledges to the Buddhists.

The Inter-Sect Committee for the Defense of Buddhism immediately filed a formal protest with Vice President Tho. If this communiqué actually reflects the views of the Republican Youth, the Buddhists said, then "this is a movement opposed to the government and going counter to the President of the Republic's successful solution regarding the wishes . . . of the Buddhist majority." Moreover, the document contained "threatening expressions and looks on the Buddhist leaders as rebels and extremists"; thus, the committee charged, it seemed to be preparing public opinion for further repressive government actions.

Communiqué No. 3 is truly a remarkable document. Written in Nhu's articulate, erudite style, and issued on June 25, just when the government and the Buddhists at last seemed to be making some progress in the resolution of their dispute, its central point was that all religions have an obligation to "call upon their faithful to respect and obey the legitimate power." This is a "universal law" based on the separation of clerical and political responsibilities which even the Catholic Church, over the centuries, had learned to accept. The Diem government, according to Nhu,

> has as a historic duty towards the Nation as well as towards the whole world, that of vanquishing on this very land, Communism. It behooves this government to prove that this inhuman giant, having no respect for the human person, for the fatherland, for the family, or faith can be vanquished by a little underdeveloped opponent provided the latter be sustained by an intrepid patriotism.
>
> Buddhism, like all other religions, can deserve the respect of the government and of the people only in the measure it shows itself deeply imbued with the spirit of nationalism and that it adheres to a militant anti-Communism to protect its doctrine and its freedom to propagate its faith. The religious leaders of Vietnam must refuse to solicit or accept any external aid aimed at establishing political sects at the service of an anti-nationalist and so-called neutralist movement which expresses but indifference in the face of the Communist evil.

When President Diem heard of Communiqué No. 3 and real-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ized the damage it had caused, he at once ordered Nhu to issue a clarifying statement. This was done promptly — on the same day the Buddhist protest was received. Called Republican Youth Communiqué No. 4, the new release stated that, although the agreement of June 16 did not present the issues in their true perspective, the government, having signed the document, must respect its terms. "The Republican Youth never intended to oppose such implementation . . . [it] merely promotes vigilance against political speculators and Communists who may abuse the joint communiqué and take it out of the religious context, which is its *only* domain."

V

There was considerable justification for Nhu's fears that the Buddhist problem, whatever its religious beginnings, had now become an organized political movement seeking not so much reform as the overthrow of the Diem regime. He was keenly aware of the coordinated, worldwide communist propaganda campaign designed to inflame and distort the dispute until it became a major weapon in the subversive war against South Viet Nam. He recognized also that the American press was susceptible to this propaganda: it always seemed to give the benefit of the doubt to the Buddhist complaints, while ignoring the government's efforts at conciliation and its difficulties in pursuing these efforts in the midst of a war of survival against the Viet Cong.

Few foreign reporters had any idea of the organization and extent of the international communist propaganda drive that got under way six days after the May 8 Hué incident. During this interval, the Central Committee of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) studied the political factors at its Hanoi headquarters. The communist experts knew they would have trouble establishing their credibility as champions of the cause of religious freedom, since as recently as 1954 more than 600,000 Catholics and 300,000 Buddhists had fled North Viet Nam to escape persecution by Ho Chi Minh's totalitarian regime. However, as propagandists, they also knew that people quickly forget facts and that constant repetition of the "big lie" is a most effective technique.

The Central Committee's statement, issued on May 14, outlined the themes that were to be picked up and played over and over again by communist propaganda outlets in all corners of the globe. They were: (1) The United States was just as much to blame for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Buddhist situation as the Vietnamese government, and both were to be included in all denunciations. The key phrase was to be "the bloody repression of religious freedom in South Vietnam by the U.S.-Diemist fascist authorities." (2) All religious groups within the country and throughout the world should unite in support of the local Buddhist struggle. To underline this central point, a public rally of all religious denominations was organized the next day in Hanoi, and prominent attention was given to communist-controlled representatives from the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao and Catholic faiths. (3) The Diem regime, installed by the U.S. imperialists, prosecutes not only Buddhists but all religions in its efforts to maintain itself in power. (4) The U.S.-Diemists are turning the Vietnamese Catholics against their own people by enlisting them in the war against the Viet Cong. (5) The "Strategic Hamlet Program" is a mechanism of the Diem government designed to deprive the Vietnamese people of all freedom, physical as well as religious.

In addition, the Central Committee included in its important first statement a demand for the immediate release of all persons arrested following the May 8 disorders at Hué, insisting specifically on the release of Bonze Thich Tri Quang. This was followed three days later by a similar demand for Tri Quang's release read over the clandestine "Liberation Broadcasting Station" by Superior Bonze Thich Thien Hao, acting in his dual capacity as Chairman of the Central Committee of the communist-led Vietnamese Buddhist Association and as a member of the NFLSV Central Committee.

Once their basic line was established, the communists moved rapidly to feed it into various international organizations for further dissemination abroad. On May 15, Colonel Ha Van Lau, head of the North Viet Nam Liaison Mission to the International Control Commission, filed a formal protest with the ICC. A similar complaint was wired to Maha Thray Sithu, President of the World Fellowship of Buddhists in Rangoon. The North Vietnamese Peace Committee assembled on May 22 to approve an appeal for help to the World Peace Council then meeting in Vienna. Buddhist leaders in Ceylon petitioned Prime Minister Mrs. Bandaranaike for action to safeguard the rights of Buddhists, and a member of the Ceylonese House of Representatives introduced a motion asking her to raise the issue at the United Nations and to halt all trade with South Viet Nam. The International Association of Democratic Lawyers issued a communiqué from their main of-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fice in Brussels supporting the Buddhist complaints. Mrs. Rameshwari Nehru, Chairman of the communist-organized Indian-Asian-African Solidarity Committee, sent encouragement and sympathy from New Delhi.

In June, having attracted world attention through the main international Buddhist organizations in Burma, Ceylon and Japan, the communist propaganda emphasis shifted to reporting on actions by well-known national leaders and international figures who were sympathetic to their line. Prince Sihanouk blasted the Diem government for its handling of the Buddhist affair and demanded that Washington intervene at once to stop further repressions. President Kennedy, replying in a manner which gave credence to Sihanouk's charges, said that, while he considered this matter an internal affair of the Vietnamese government, the "right of every individual to freely practice his faith is basic to my own philosophy and that of the United States." Encouraged, the Cambodian Prince pressed ahead with his charges by cabling Secretary-General U Thant a demand for UN action. General Giap, the victor of Dien Bien Phu, wrote a letter of protest to the ICC Chairman, Indian Ambassador Goburdhan. Lord Bertrand Russell sent a public statement of moral support to the Chairman of the North Vietnamese Peace Committee. An open letter to President Kennedy, which followed the communist line on the Buddhist question and was signed by Corliss and Helen Lamont, Taylor Adams and some fifty-nine other prominent U.S. personalities, was published as a full-page advertisement in the *New York Times,* the *Washington Post* and other newspapers.

Under the stimulus of this widespread communist propaganda campaign, protest rallies were organized in Kyoto, San Francisco and New Delhi. In Rangoon a crowd burned an effigy of Diem. During June, and particularly after the self-immolation of Thich Quang Duc, similar demonstrations were held in Colombo, Bangkok, Peking, Singapore, Phnom Penh, Calcutta, Hanoi, Djakarta, and even in the little town of Khang Khay, the Pathet Lao headquarters in the center of the remote Plaines Des Jarres.

VI

As the tempo and intensity of these events mounted during July, hopes for a settlement of the dispute, along the lines agreed upon in the communiqué of June 16, sank in an exchange of charges of bad faith. The Buddhists claimed that secret orders were being sent out from the Palace (allegedly by Nhu) in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

structing officials at the provincial level to take certain actions contrary to the intent of the communiqué. The government, aware of the day-to-day activities of the politically trained young bonzes hard at work in Saigon stirring up the people, spreading new accusations, and feeding derogatory information to the U.S. press corps, could not help but feel that its worst suspicions were being confirmed.

In mid-July Diem made another effort toward conciliation. He had Vice President Tho, his senior representative in the negotiations with the Inter-Sect Committee for the Defense of Buddhism, propose the establishment of a joint government-Buddhist commission to investigate all charges of violations of the communiqué. The commission was to have power to make on-the-spot investigations anywhere in the country, with air and ground transportation provided by the government.

This proposal seemed reasonable enough to most observers, but was never accepted by the Buddhists. They asked: "To whom does the joint commission submit its findings?" When they were told that these would go directly to the highest authority in the land, the President of the Republic, they demurred. This would solve nothing. Was not the President himself a Catholic and therefore partial? Was he not surrounded by powerful advisers whose anti-Buddhist position was already well-known? Was not the whole dispute caused by a loss of confidence in the sincerity of the government? Therefore, to what avail would it be to refer the commission's findings to the Palace?

The outcome was a total impasse. The President believed he could not go farther without undermining the government's self-respect and ultimate sovereignty. The U.S. Embassy affirmed that there was nothing which "men of good will on both sides could not solve by consultation and mutual understanding."

During August the Buddhists stepped up their campaign to attract attention and sympathy through voluntary self-cremations. Shifting the scene from Saigon to the countryside, three monks and one nun set themselves afire, on August 4, 13, 15 and 16. The first attracted considerable publicity because of his youth — he was only eighteen when he burned to death in Phan Thiet, a seacoast town east of Saigon. The nun killed herself in the market place of a small village north of Nha Trang, a fishing port about 200 miles northeast of the capital. The other two suicides occurred in Hué, the last one taking place in the courtyard of the Tu Dam pagoda. In addition, a young nun at the Xa Loi pagoda in Saigon made

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

headlines when she attempted to hack off her left hand with a hatchet to indicate her anguish over the treatment being accorded to her religion.

Intelligence reaching the government confirmed rumors that the Buddhist authorities had nearly a hundred volunteers ready to burn themselves to death in defense of the faith. The names of Venerable Khiet himself and Dien Hue, an eighty-year-old nun and mother of Dr. Buu Hoi, South Viet Nam's top nuclear scientist who was then serving as his country's representative at the UN, were reported to be high on the list. Responsible government officials felt they were doing everything within reason to solve the dispute, but each death inflamed the population more. Senior military officers expressed their growing concern over the demoralizing effect the Buddhist issue was having on the will-to-fight of the armed forces. The American Embassy took pains to underline what the Vietnamese officials could read for themselves in the *New York Times* and in American weekly news magazines: the Diem government must solve this problem soon, lest U.S. public opinion turn against it, thus encouraging Congress to discontinue military and economic assistance.

VII

In these circumstances, after three and a half months of fruitless negotiations and with tension mounting all around him, Diem may have felt he was losing control of the situation. Nhu, who had concluded long before that the Buddhist agitation was political rather than religious and that it was directed not at the protection of Buddhist rights but at the overthrow of his brother's government, was pressing hard for a crackdown on Buddhist leaders. The leaders of the Vietnamese army reported that the religious dispute was interfering with the war effort and, if allowed to continue, could cause widespread civil unrest and disturbances which the Viet Cong could exploit. Coincidentally, there was no U.S. Ambassador on the scene. Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., had been recalled and Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, his successor, had not yet arrived.

It is not unlikely that Nhu, persuaded it was time for drastic action, confronted his brother with the dossiers on the Buddhist ringleaders and promised the President that if he were given the necessary authority and means he could within twenty-four hours break the back of the Buddhist political movement. He knew who the leaders were, the evidence was in hand, and he had pinpointed

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

exactly where they could be found and arrested. All he needed was the "go ahead" order. Any further delay or compromise could be disastrous. Moreover, the absence of the American Ambassador provided a good opportunity to settle the matter quickly and to present the new U.S. representative with a *fait accompli*.

Whatever the considerations, the decision to act was taken at a meeting in the Palace late in the evening of August 20. Present were the President, Nhu, and a number of the senior generals, including General Tran Van Don who had recently taken over from the ailing General Le Van Ty as Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese armed forces. Under the authority of Article 44 of the Constitution a state of national emergency was to be declared and martial law invoked at midnight. Apparently it was also agreed that the army was to be responsible for enforcing martial law, instituting a curfew, and preventing disturbances in the Saigon-Cholon area. Within this general framework of military control, Nhu was to direct the operation to round up the Buddhist leaders, using the police and the elite Special Forces troops under Colonel Tung for this purpose. The Xa Loi pagoda, the Buddhists' main headquarters, was to be the primary target of the Special Forces.

By 6:30 a.m. on August 21, when the general public first learned via radio that martial law had been declared, the army had already occupied the key centers of administrative control — the radio station, the telegraph office, the electric power stations, the airport and railway stations — and had established roadblocks on all highway approaches to the city. Press censorship was imposed. Shortly thereafter units of Colonel Tung's forces swept down on the main pagodas. The monks attempted to resist, and the tough Special Forces soldiers, intent on getting this unpleasant assignment over with as soon as possible, were not particularly gentle in their handling of the bonzes. A number were injured, some shots were fired, tear gas was used, but the job was done. The monks were carted off to interrogation centers where the process of weeding out and identifying the leaders was to take place. The pagodas were thoroughly searched and hidden arms or other evidence of communist direction of the Buddhist movement confiscated.

These raids marked a turning point in the relations between the U.S. government and the Diem regime. The State Department minced no words in its formal statement issued in Washington that same day. It "deplored" this unilateral action as a breach of faith — a "direct violation by the Vietnamese government of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

assurances it was pursuing a policy of reconciliation with the Buddhists." The majority of the Vietnamese were shocked. Diem's Foreign Minister, Vu Van Mau, resigned and asked for permission to go to India to become a bonze.

In the course of the raid on the Xa Loi pagoda, two monks managed to clamber over the rear wall and take refuge next door in the office of the U.S. AID Mission. The Vietnamese authorities, believing one to be Thich Tri Quang, requested permission to enter and arrest them, but they were refused on the grounds that the AID headquarters building had been accorded the same degree of diplomatic immunity as the Embassy.

As it turned out, neither of these bonzes was Tri Quang. He had avoided recognition by shaving his eyebrows and mingling inconspicuously with the other yellow-clad monks. According to subsequent reports from Saigon, Tri Quang spent the next eleven days in the crowded interrogation center — the last place the security officers expected him to be. Remaining unidentified, he was released with two companions on September 1. After a brief visit to the Phap Quang pagoda, the three took a taxi to the U.S. Embassy where they requested and were granted political asylum. Tri Quang remained in the Embassy until shortly after the downfall of the Diem government, when he received, in the presence of Ambassador Lodge, assurances of safety from Major General Duong Van Minh and the other key leaders of the new government's Military Revolutionary Council.

His flight to the Embassy had not been a move of desperation or panic, but was part of a carefully thought out plan. The word had been passed to the press in advance and photographers were on hand to record the monk's entrance into the Embassy. Tri Quang subsequently told Embassy officials that his "intention to ask to stay in the U.S. Embassy was something which all Vietnamese Buddhists knew in advance."

By late August events were moving rapidly toward their inevitable conclusion. Not long after the pagoda raids, the U.S. government suspended its vitally important commercial import program to South Viet Nam. Whatever Washington's intentions were, this withdrawal of economic support conveyed to all responsible Vietnamese the message that America had lost faith in President Diem and his government. It was not lost on the generals, who had decided some months earlier that the influence of the Nhus must somehow be broken: they were now sure that Washington, which in the past had stood by the Diem government

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

regardless of its composition or its dynastic trends, wanted a change.

The principal actors continued to play out their parts as though following the script of a Greek tragedy. Diem, despite all his troubles, both current and pending, went ahead in September with the scheduled nationwide election of representatives to Viet Nam's Third National Assembly. Addressing the opening session of this new Assembly on October 7, 1963, he offered his analysis of the Buddhist problem:

> . . . the enemy, having lost the logistic and strategic support of the people in the country-side, is seeking an alternate strategic way out by fermenting, with the complicity of foreign elements, troubles in certain circles who live far from the front and thus are insufficiently aware of the people's heroic struggle.
>
> Under the cover of the struggle for religious or political freedom, the godless, enslaving Communists have been successful to some extent, owing to the demagogic and criminal complicity of a certain number of traitors and foreign adventurers, and also thanks to certain segments of the Western big press which gratuitously gave them a sounding board to poison no small part of the national and international opinion with the help of the so-called Buddhist affair. . . .

Coincidentally, on the same day the UN General Assembly was considering item seventy-seven of its agenda, entitled, "The violation of human rights in South Vietnam." This matter was before the UN as a result of a letter submitted in early September by the Permanent Representatives of sixteen member governments. Before it was formally considered by the General Assembly, however, Diem invited the United Nations to send a mission to see for itself "what the real situation is as regards relations between the Government and the Buddhist community of Vietnam." This invitation was accepted and a fact-finding mission was appointed, consisting of representatives of Afghanistan, Brazil, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Morocco, Ceylon and Nepal. Arriving in Saigon on October 24, the mission conducted its investigations during the tense week prior to the November 1 coup.

The mission's report, released by the United Nations on December 9, was entirely factual, consisting of testimony and documents. While it issued no formal statement of findings, the evidence assembled clearly indicated that the reports of massive persecution of the Buddhist religion were, as Senator Thomas Dodd put it, "at the best, vastly exaggerated; at the worst, a sordid propaganda fraud." Ambassador Fernando Volio Jimenez, one of the members of the mission, stated in a public interview after his return that it

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was his "personal feeling that there was no policy of discrimination, oppression, or persecution against the Buddhists on the basis of religion."

VIII

Between May and November the Buddhists became increasingly suspicious of the motives of the Catholic family surrounding President Diem. These suspicions, reinforced by the maladroit handling of events subsequent to the incident at Hué, created the conditions of political instability that led to the downfall of the Diem regime. The resulting administrative chaos throughout South Viet Nam wiped out the substantial gains made during the preceding years through Diem's long-range, nation-building program and permitted the Viet Cong to regain much of the strength they had lost in the rural areas.

Looking to the future, it would be wise for both American and Vietnamese policymakers to reflect on some observations the ill-fated Ngo Dinh Nhu made to the UN fact-finding mission only a week before he was killed. They underline the dilemma of Buddhism in Viet Nam — a dilemma those of the Buddhist faith undoubtedly will have to face again as they search for the road to true peace.

> In every renaissance there is a return to the beginnings. If Buddhism wishes to return to its beginnings, that can only be the doing of a chosen handful of true holy men whose mission it is to tell us, who are carrying on the war and the struggle for industrialization, that materialism is not everything; of holy men who will remind us laborers in the mire that there is an ideal of spiritual values and contemplation, a force which will break the chain reaction of materialism. This is the religious mission.
>
> But in the historical context of Vietnam, the Buddhist movement has strayed from its path. It has set itself to serve political ends to such a point that it has conceived the ambition of overthrowing the government. . . . Basically Buddhism is in a dilemma in South Vietnam. It cannot remain pure Buddhism if it becomes a political force. . . . Buddhism is not made for that; it is a religion of complete detachment.

Unfortunately, Buddhism has not been able to detach itself from the political turmoil besetting not only the country but the internal organization of the church as well. The Vien Hoa Dao, or Institute for the Propagation of the Buddhist Faith, remains split into two factions: the An Quang group of politically active, generally anti-President Thieu monks, and the Quoc Tu or pro-government bonzes. Efforts to bring these two groups together have been stymied by two basic issues: the degree of Buddhist involvement in politics and the choice of leaders of a reorganized,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unified Vien Hoa Dao. Leaders of the Quoc Tu faction, Thich Tam Chau and Thich Duc Nghiep, and those of the An Quang activist group, Thich Thien Minh and Thich Tri Quang, all advocate church unification, but to date have shown little inclination to compromise their respective positions.

Circumstances have changed but the central dilemma remains. The communists are aware of the split and are actively fishing in the troubled waters of Saigon's Buddhist community. The techniques for any future political mobilization of the followers of Buddha will probably be similar to those so skillfully employed by Tri Quang against Diem.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

U.S. INTERVENTION IN NICARAGUA, 1927-1933: LESSONS FOR TODAY

by John J. Tierney, Jr.

AMERICAN involvement in the Vietnamese war has become the longest, most misunderstood and most frustrating campaign in our nation's history. After more than six years of indecisive conflict the Nixon Administration has begun a cautious but deliberate move toward disengagement. Victory, in the traditional sense, has eluded us. The war has not been won despite the fact that the enemy's homeland is smaller than Connecticut and its population of around seventeen million lives in a pre-industrial setting. It has not been won despite the existence of U.S. nuclear power and the clear naval, air and weapons superiority of American conventional forces. Over 43,000 U.S. battle deaths have been recorded, with several times that figure wounded. On the domestic scene, political-social unrest, economic inflation, revolutionary rhetoric, and acts of violence have been attributed either directly or indirectly to the effects of the Viet Nam experience. Internationally, the nation has suffered a political and propaganda reverse which may take years to overcome. Not one major ally has materially aided the cause; some have even denounced it.

The lessons of the multiple American difficulties in Viet Nam will hopefully not be lost on future policymakers. This is not, however, the first "sublimited" engagement in which the United States has become involved. At least two similar-type wars have been waged in the twentieth century. The first, under Presidents McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt, eventually arrested the Philippine insurrection led by nationalist Emilio Aguinaldo. Of the other, in Nicaragua between 1927 and 1933, practically nothing is now remembered — if any lessons were drawn from it they seem not to have been applied in Viet Nam. Published literature on the Nicaraguan war has been almost exclusively confined to the time-period in which it was fought.[1]

[1]A notable exception is the recent publication by Neill Macaulay, *The Sandino Affair* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1967), which chronicles the military aspects of the campaign. In *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy* (New York: Norton, 1967) Bryce Wood covers the Nicaraguan intervention within the perspective of changing U.S.-Latin American policies. Two State Department viewpoints of the period are contained in Henry L. Stimson's account of his 1927 mission, *American Policy in Nicaragua* (New York: Scribner's, 1927) and U.S. Department of State,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

U.S. INTERVENTION IN NICARAGUA

This article will summarize the main features of the Nicaraguan campaign as it was viewed by the key decision-makers of the time. It is believed that this experience presents to students of U.S. policy a case study similar in several ways to that of Viet Nam.

The Nicaraguan intervention occurred in an era when U.S. global power was only potential; in a zone of relative proximity within which Americans had decades of experience;[2] in a time when the status of the military establishment was negligible; and prior to the advent of modern technology which makes strategic missiles and television sets constant, if indirect, policy factors. It does not compare with Viet Nam in the level and magnitude of the fighting. Neither are the stakes involved comparable. Nicaragua had relatively little bearing on the configuration of the interwar political system. Nevertheless, in character and development it was not unlike Viet Nam in microcosm. Both engagements gave rise to similar policy problems.

U.S. Intervention and Troop Escalation, 1927-1928

For almost two decades prior to 1927 Nicaragua had been governed by Washington "more completely than the American Federal Government rules any state in the Union."[3] From 1912 to 1925 a Legation Guard of U.S. Marines sufficed to remind the country of the overwhelming American dominance. In 1926, however, a civil war broke out which threatened to destroy the political and economic stability the United States had come to rely on. In addition, Mexican intrigues in this conflict were viewed by Washington as a threat to American hegemony.

Relations between the United States and Mexico had already been strained when the Nicaraguan fighting began. Mexico was still influenced by its 1910 nationalist revolution, and during the mid-1920's its government grew more assertive in foreign policy. On several occasions this produced friction with the United States. The anti-clerical provisions of the Mexican constitution aroused a storm of American-Catholic opposition, and there was a widely

The United States and Nicaragua (Washington: GPO, 1932). Other works are Isaac J. Cox, *Nicaragua and the United States* (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1927), and Dana Munro, *The United States and the Caribbean Area* (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1934), the latter an objective review by an ex-State Department official with years of Caribbean experience.

[2]Military interventions in the Caribbean area had been a common feature of U.S. policy since the Spanish-American War. These were frequently followed by complete U.S. takeovers. The Caribbean was, in fact, an "American lake."

[3]Harold N. Denny, *Dollars for Bullets: The Story of American Rule in Nicaragua* (New York: Dial Press, 1929), p. 9.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

held belief that the Mexican government was dominated by some form of "Bolshevism." By 1926, Washington became convinced that Mexico was materially aiding the Nicaraguan rebels. On January 10, 1927, President Coolidge told Congress:

> I have the most conclusive evidence that arms and munitions in large quantities have been, on several occasions since August 1926, shipped to the revolutionists in Nicaragua. . . . The United States cannot fail to view with deep concern any serious threat to stability and constitutional government in Nicaragua tending toward anarchy and jeopardizing American interests, especially if such a state of affairs is contributed to or brought about by outside influence or by a foreign power.[4]

Within two months, therefore, the Coolidge Administration had landed over 2,000 Marines in Nicaragua and was openly selling arms and supplies to the U.S.-backed government army. Although this had effectively checked any potential Mexican intrusion, the civil war continued to drag on.

The President then sent Henry L. Stimson, a prominent Republican, lawyer, and former Secretary of War, to negotiate with rebel leaders for an end to the insurgency. The Stimson mission ended in May 1927 with an American promise to supervise subsequent elections and to organize and train a constabulary capable of maintaining order. Pending the establishment of this constabulary (later renamed the Guardia Nacional), the United States would retain its Marines in Nicaragua.

During the month of May a force of Marines sufficient "to reduce the country to ruins overnight if it so desired"[5] began to arrive. By late June the total reached 3,400. The Marines were placed at strategic points within the country and also began to disarm remaining revolutionary groups unwilling to submit to U.S. or Nicaraguan authority.

Stimson ended his mission on an optimistic note. While reconciled to token resistance by small and scattered bands of irreconcilables, he felt that "there will be no organized resistance to our action"[6] and "there also seems to be less danger of banditry and guerrilla warfare than I at first feared."[7]

Still, he had obligated the armed forces to remain in Nicaragua

[4]*New York Times*, January 11, 1927, p. 1.
[5]Dom Albert Pagano, *Bluejackets* (Boston: Meador Publishing Company, 1932), pp. 136-137.
[6]Stimson to the Secretary of State, May 4, 1927, *U.S. Department of State Records Relating to Internal Affairs in Nicaragua*, National Archives, Washington, Microfilm Reel #32, 817.00/4606-4807.
[7]Stimson to the Secretary of State, May 15, 1927, *Stimson Diary*, Yale University.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as long as necessary[8] to educate the country in political and police functions. The politico-military task was soon to engage the United States in what a Marine Corps historian later termed the "long drawn out and almost futile effort to stamp out banditry and restore order":[9] the campaign against Sandino. This effort was to continue until late 1932.

Augusto C. Sandino, a revolutionary "general" during the civil war, had until then been a comparatively little-known Nicaraguan who had spent at least a portion of his life rallying native workers against U.S.-owned commercial enterprises. After Stimson's truce he rejected the implications of U.S. authority and defiantly retired into the mountains with approximately 200 armed men. His outfit was a "splinter" rebel group. Most of the revolutionaries accepted the truce peacefully, and when their military hero, General José Moncada, became President of Nicaragua in 1928 he worked closely with U.S. authorities to eliminate Sandino.

Since Sandino and his growing body of men refused to disarm peacefully, a Marine Corps ultimatum was issued to them in late June. Sandino rejected the ultimatum and concentrated his forces near the city of Ocotal in northwest Nicaragua. In mid-July hundreds of "Sandinistas" — as they came to be called — stormed Ocotal, then being defended by a unit of about eighty-seven Marines. The battle lasted for almost a day, until the introduction of Marine airpower flushed the Sandinistas from cover and swept them away from the city. As they fled with the planes in pursuit, they were cut down repeatedly with small bombs and machine-gun fire. This was the first known dive-bombing attack ever organized in support of ground troops, and it resulted in at least 300 enemy dead. Marine losses were extremely light — one killed and four wounded — but by the time the planes arrived the men had run short of ammunition and could not have held out much longer. According to one Marine's testimony, "if the planes had not brought immediate assistance, there is no question but the whole band would have been slaughtered."[10]

The Battle of Ocotal, more than any other single event,

[8]At this stage it was unclear how many elections the United States would have to supervise, or how long it would take to organize and train a constabulary capable of maintaining order.

[9]Lt. Col. Clyde H. Metcalf, USMC, "The Marine Corps and the Changing Caribbean Policy," *The Marine Corps Gazette,* November 1937, pp. 30-31.

[10]U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, *Navy Department Appropriations Bill, 1929, Hearings,* before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 70th Congress, 1st Session, 1928. Statement of Major E. H. Brainard, USMC, March 7, 1928, p. 700.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

determined the nature of Sandino's subsequent campaign against U.S. occupation. After that staggering defeat he accepted the folly of meeting his enemy head on and resorted to what is now known as the "classical" guerrilla doctrine of warfare. Although he was intellectually unaware of this doctrine, common sense and the nation's geography dictated such a strategy. Arthur Campbell has defined guerrilla warfare as "that form of warfare adopted by the strategically weaker side to give it the capability of taking the tactical offensive at chosen times and in certain places."[11] Sandino's six-year campaign against the Marines (and later the Guardia Nacional) conforms to this definition. Like guerrilla leaders before and after him, he discovered that his greatest advantage lay in the characteristics of the land. During most of the following years, Sandino would confine his warfare to the northern sections of the country, conveniently located next to the Honduran border. These parts of Nicaragua

> furnish ideal terrain for guerrilla warfare. Vast in extent, they consist of almost unbroken chains of mountains, whose rugged peaks afford ideal lookouts and whose densely forested slopes and secluded valleys furnish numerous hiding places secure from observation and attack from airplanes and inaccessible to all but the most lightly equipped of ground troops.[12]

The Battle of Ocotal also marked the emergence of Sandino as an international figure. Reports of the extensive loss of Nicaraguan lives, reaching both the U.S. and the Latin American press, accelerated in the United States the "anti-imperialist" movement against further interventions and in Latin America turned Sandino into a new hero who was openly defying the "Colossus of the North." Sandinista propaganda, thus introduced as a result of Ocotal, would soon mushroom to worldwide proportions and would provide a continuing irritant to American policy.

For the remainder of 1927 Sandino contented himself with sporadic raids on neighboring towns and ranches and occasional attacks on Marine columns. He was in the process of organizing "the population of the northern part of western Nicaragua into a complex system of intelligence and supply. . . ."[13] His frequent use of Honduras as a border sanctuary further complicated U.S. policy. "It will be very difficult," Chargé Munro wrote, "to im-

[11]Arthur Campbell, *Guerrillas* (New York: John Day, 1962), p. 3.
[12]Major Julian C. Smith, *A Review of the Organization and Operations of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua* (n.p., 1937), p. 23.
[13]*Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy,* FY 1928 (Washington: GPO, 1928), p. 65.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prove conditions in Nueva Segovia so long as these bandits are permitted to cross the frontier at will and subsequently take refuge in Honduranean territory. . . ."[14]

As conditions in northern Nicaragua grew "from banditry into a state of insurrection,"[15] the United States began to take the Sandino movement more seriously. In December a column of Marines sent after Sandino was ambushed by about 450 insurgents. Superior firepower finally drove the guerrillas off but when the mauled column reached headquarters in early January it was badly disorganized.

The situation was by then deteriorating rapidly. Chargé Munro concluded that "it was utterly impossible with the forces now available to control the whole area of Nueva Segovia,"[16] while Admiral David F. Sellers, Commander of the Special Service Squadron, noted the "fact that the bandits are apparently better organized and equipped than the Brigade Commander had reason to believe."[17]

The month of January 1928 witnessed the first in a series of Marine escalations that proceeded unabated until November, when over 5,000 U.S. troops were in occupation of Nicaragua. In launching what he termed "a vigorous offensive against Sandino,"[18] Admiral Sellers penned a letter to the rebel leader, declaring that "it is . . . superfluous for me to point out that the energetic and intensive campaign that our forces are shortly to inaugurate can have but one final result."[19] Like past efforts to obtain Sandino's surrender, this too failed. The rebel leader's reply stated his own demands that "the only way to put an end to this struggle is the immediate withdrawal of the invading forces from our territory . . . [and] supervising the coming elections by representatives of Latin America instead of by American Marines."[20] The Sandinistas would continue to make these their fundamental, unalterable demands for the remaining years of the struggle.

[14]The Chargé in Nicaragua (Munro) to the Secretary of State, December 19, 1927, *Department of State Records, op. cit.*, Microfilm Reel #37, 817.00/5207-5355.

[15]*New York Times,* October 22, 1927, p. 3.

[16]The Chargé in Nicaragua (Munro) to the Secretary of State, December 30, 1927, *Department of State Records, op. cit.*, Microfilm Reel #37.

[17]Commander, Special Service Squadron (Sellers), to the Chief of Naval Operations, January 3, 1928, *The Papers of Admiral David F. Sellers,* Library of Congress.

[18]*Ibid.*, February 3, 1929.

[19]Letter, Sellers to Sandino, in *ibid.*

[20]Letter, Sandino to Sellers, in *ibid.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

By early 1928 the Marine Field Command had no illusions about the nature of the Nicaraguan campaign. General Logan Feland, Marine Brigade Commander, now admitted that the destruction of Sandino would probably be "a matter of months or even years";[21] Admiral Sellers concluded that the restoration of order "will be a slow process."[22]

Nevertheless, the efforts of the enlarged Marine force were successful in carrying the offensive against Sandino and thereby at least containing him during 1928. But even though Sandino was forced away from the more accessible areas of the country, Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg continued to express concern over what he referred to as the "lack of any indication of a definite conclusion of the operations. . . ."[23] In his Spring Review, General Feland replied that "there has been a marked expansion of the territory operated over, and held, by this Brigade. . . . For the past five months, the outlaws have been kept on the move and our small patrols have been punishing them whenever found. . . ."[24] The elimination of Sandino's threat, he continued, "eventually would be obtained by 4,000 Marines in this country, though the end would be hastened by, let us say, a force of from 10,000 to 12,000 which would be required to control simultaneously all parts of the entire area of Nicaragua. . . ."[25]

By midsummer it was apparent that the Guardia Nacional was years away from becoming an effective constabulary. The bulk of combat operations so far had been conducted by Marines. Therefore, wrote Feland,

> a considerable force of Marines will be required in Nicaragua for approximately ten years . . . [since] the Guardia Nacional will continue for at least a decade as an uncontrolled but dependent offspring of any Naval Force which may remain in Nicaragua. . . .[26]

Reactions to the Nicaraguan Campaign

Political repercussions in the United States, however, were militating against further retention of American troops in

[21]Commanding General, Second Brigade (Feland) to the Major General Commandant, February 28, 1928, *Department of State Records, op. cit.*, Microfilm Reel #38, 817.00/5356-5499.

[22]Commander, Special Service Squadron (Sellers) to the Chief of Naval Operations, February 27, 1928, *ibid.*, Microfilm Reel #39, 817.00/5500-5616.

[23]The Secretary of State to the Chief of the American Electoral Mission in Nicaragua (General McCoy, USA), March 3, 1928, *ibid.*, Microfilm Reel #38.

[24]Commanding General, Second Brigade (Feland) to the Major General Commandant, June 1, 1928, *ibid.*, Microfilm Reel #40, 817.00/5617-5840.

[25]*Ibid.*

[26]*Ibid.*, August 21, 1928, Microfilm Reel #42, 817.00/5991-6159.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nicaragua. From the beginning a large segment of Congressional and public opinion had protested the Nicaraguan intervention. In Congress the attack was led by Senator William E. Borah (R-Idaho), powerful chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. He would remain the most articulate and responsible Congressional critic of the Administration's policy. During the first intimations of American involvement, at the end of 1926, he proclaimed that "the truth is, effort is being made to get this country into a shameless, cowardly little war with Mexico."[27] Other Congressional leaders — from both parties — quickly joined Borah in what soon developed into a Congressional division over the Nicaraguan issue. The escalation of Marine strength in the campaign against Sandino only intensified this division. Senator Wheeler (D-Mont.), for example, wondered why, if the Marines were engaged against "bandits,"[28] they could not be put to better use in Chicago.[29] Senator Dill (D-Wash.) labeled the campaign "one of the blackest and foulest crimes that has been committed against men."[30] Numerous resolutions for withdrawal were offered in Congress, and in the 1928 elections Nicaragua became a dominant foreign policy issue.

The antipathy toward U.S. Nicaraguan policies on the part of the press, liberal and academic groups, and the public in general, was even less restrained than the Congressional reaction. A rash of literature from a variety of "anti-imperialist" sources soon emerged, ranging from intelligent criticism of policy to wildly exaggerated stories of Marine atrocities and Wall Street intrigues. Of the "anti-Nicaraguan" conferences held, the *Nation* sponsored one in 1928 and issued invitations to such contemporary notables as Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt and William Allen White, among others. The *Washington News* and other Scripps-Howard papers summarized the mood of much of the country by asking: "What is all this fighting about? Why are these young men in Marine uniforms being killed?"[31]

The frustration of the military when fighting under such circumstances is severe. In the Nicaraguan case the feeling, as summarized by Major Harold H. Utley, USMC, was that a negative public reaction is "taken indeed as an indication of strong support

[27]*New York Times*, December 25, 1926, p. 2.
[28]Official U.S. policy always referred to the Sandinistas as "bandits," thereby denying them political credibility.
[29]*New York Times*, January 18, 1928, p. 3.
[30]U.S. Congress, Senate, 70th Congress, 1st Session, January 20, 1928, *Congressional Record*, Vol. 69, Part 2, p. 1785.
[31]Quoted in "Nicaragua's Bloody Peace," *Literary Digest*, January 14, 1928, p. 8.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for the forces arrayed against us, and thus serves to intensify and prolong the opposition we must overcome."[32] Nevertheless, Assistant Secretary of State Francis White was to write in 1929 that "the sentiment in this country and especially in Congress is very strong against keeping the Marines there indefinitely . . . we can not indefinitely maintain a large force of Marines in Nicaragua."[33]

In Central and South America the public reaction was even more hostile and the Nicaraguan campaign became the focal point in a growing demand for nonintervention. Practically without exception, Latin American journalists and publicists harshly denounced "Yankee imperialism." At the sixth Pan-American Conference in 1928, Argentina, El Salvador and Mexico narrowly missed securing passage of a resolution condemning *all* forms of intervention. Thus, the Nicaraguan campaign and the Latin reaction to it highlighted in 1928 the sentiment which during the 1930's would produce precisely such a resolution.

In Latin America Sandino was almost invariably pictured as a nationalist-patriot defying American omnipotence. Overnight, his name became the rallying cry against U.S. "imperialism." The following editorial view from *La Nacion* (Buenos Aires) is typical of thousands: "Sandino represents the popular sentiments in Nicaragua . . . [he] is not a bandit but one of the many revolutionists found in the history of Latin America."[34]

The Sandinista movement exploited to the fullest the international sympathy given its cause. Propaganda agents distributed literature throughout the hemisphere, and many of the leading Latin American newspapers regularly printed Sandino statements emphasizing Hispano-Americanism and anti-imperialism – and frequently exaggerating the success of his military operations. His propaganda arm was widespread. In Guatemala a "Cigarrillo Sandino" was manufactured. "Nectar Sandino" was a liquor sold in El Salvador. Demonstrations, lectures and appeals for support were common throughout Central America and Mexico. There was a "Sandino Division" in the Soviet-advised Nanking Army during the 1927 Chinese Civil War. Sandino sent a representative to the Second World Congress of Anti-Imperialists held at Frankfurt, Germany in 1929. The "All American Anti-

[32]Major Harold H. Utley, USMC, "An Introduction to the Tactics and Techniques of Small Wars," *The Marine Corps Gazette,* May 1931, p. 51.

[33]The Assistant Secretary of State (White) to the Minister in Nicaragua (Hanna), July 29, 1929, *The Papers of Francis White,* National Archives, Washington.

[34]Quoted in The Ambassador in Argentina (Bliss) to the Secretary of State, January 13, 1928, *Stimson Papers, op. cit.,* File Box #492.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Imperialist League" in the United States circulated "Sandino" stamps until they were suppressed by the Postmaster General. Subscription drives for funds to be sent to Sandino were made throughout the United States.

The Communist International originally backed his cause, and editorials in journals such as *The Daily Worker* solicited support for him. But Sandino was never a party member and the communists eventually became convinced that he was merely a nationalist-opportunist. He was then labeled a "traitor to the cause."[35]

The propaganda effects of Sandino's movement were a constant source of embarrassment to U.S. policy. Assistant Secretary White, for example, wrote that : "He is . . . a figure of great international importance, especially in Latin America, and the inability of the Marines to get him so far has increased his international nuisance value and is causing us considerable annoyance in many ways."[36]

U.S. Troop De-escalation and Withdrawal, 1929-1933

When the 1928 Nicaraguan elections proved to be peaceful and orderly, American authorities were no longer in a mood to continue the occupation indefinitely. "I fervently hope," remarked White, "that we will have no more elections in Latin America to supervise."[37] Washington, however, was reluctant to withdraw all U.S. troops immediately. For one thing, Sandino's inability to interrupt the elections had produced an optimistic estimate of the chances of eliminating him. It will not be long now, General Feland was reporting, "until we can say that they [the guerrillas] are cleaned up."[38] More generally, U.S. officials were fearful of the consequences of an immediate withdrawal. Within the State Department, White noted that "a withdrawal which might be interpreted as weakness could very well lead to a very disagreeable situation. . . ."[39] This combination of optimism and pessimism retained a sizeable Marine force in Nicaragua — three years later only sober pessimism prevailed, leading to complete evacuation by January 1933.

[35]*New York Times*, May 30, 1930, p. 6.
[36]The Assistant Secretary of State (White) to the Minister in Honduras (Summerlin), July 11, 1928, *White Papers, op. cit.*
[37]The Assistant Secretary of State (White) to the Chief of the American Electoral Mission in Nicaragua (McCoy), November 16, 1928, *ibid.*
[38]Commanding General, Second Brigade (Feland) to Commander, Special Service Squadron (Sellers), December 16, 1928, *Sellers Papers, op. cit.*
[39]The Assistant Secretary of State (White) to the Secretary of State, October 5, 1928, *White Papers, op. cit.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

By the beginning of 1929 American policymakers had reappraised the U.S. role in Nicaragua and decided on a gradual phase-out of Marines, concurrent with a "Nicaraguanization" of the war against Sandino. In a letter to President Moncada of Nicaragua, Admiral Sellers made it clear that this policy was

> based upon the assumption that the Nicaraguan Government fully appreciates the fact that the United States forces can not be counted on to maintain order in Nicaragua for an indefinite time, that the obligation to maintain order in the future rests squarely upon the Nicaraguan Government, and that the Nicaraguan Government will take prompt steps to strengthen and build up the Guardia Nacional in order that the Marines may be relieved of this duty at the earliest practicable date.[40]

During the spring and summer of 1929 over 2,000 Marines were withdrawn from Nicaragua, and by early 1930 only about 1,200 remained in the country. This action was partly prompted by a lull in guerrilla activity. During most of 1929 Sandino was in Mexico soliciting support for his movement. In his absence his followers remained relatively tranquil, a fact which prompted Brigade Commander Williams (Feland had since been relieved) to comment that "this country has never been in such a peaceful state."[41]

Meanwhile, U.S. relations with Mexico had markedly improved, largely due to the insightful diplomacy of U.S. Ambassador Dwight Morrow (appointed in 1927). The Coolidge Administration's apprehension of "Mexican intrigues" in Nicaragua, which produced the Marine intervention, passed almost as quickly as it arose. Whether Mexico had serious intentions of removing U.S. supervision from Nicaragua can be debated.[42] At any rate, by 1930 the United States and Mexico were on cordial terms. Sandino's reception inside Mexico was officially cool. He returned to Nicaragua empty-handed.

During the first months of 1930, however, guerrilla activity sharply increased. Sandinistas began again to raid the northern area and on several occasions successfully ambushed combined

[40]In Commander, Special Service Squadron (Sellers) to the Chief of Naval Operations, January 10, 1929, *Sellers Papers, op. cit.*

[41]Commanding General, Second Brigade (Williams) to the Chargé in Nicaragua (Hanna), May 10, 1929, *Department of State Records, op. cit.*, Microfilm Reel #49, 817.00/6299-6511.

[42]Most historians do not believe so. Thomas A. Bailey, for example, writes that "The Coolidge Administration may, indeed, have had convincing evidence of a real threat to canal control from foreign influence, but if so, it took neither the opposition party nor the country at large into its confidence." ("Interest in Nicaraguan Canal, 1903-1931," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, February 1936, p. 15.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Marine-Guardia patrols. Despite these signals of a possible return to full-scale insurgency, U.S. authorities continued reducing the Marines. Brigade Commander Williams was now writing pessimistically that to continue the occupation "would require many times the total available force of Marines and Guardia, and in addition, would produce no definite military results."[43]

The American Minister to Nicaragua, Matthew Hanna, then devised a new approach to the problem, which probably represents one of the earliest attempts at "civic action" as a counterinsurgency tactic. In his letter to Washington, he noted that

> We may not see how the bandits can continue their depredations indefinitely in the face of such persecution as McDougal [the Guardia Commander] is giving them but the fact remains that they do. . . .
>
> The seriousness of the bandit problem viewed from every angle is so grave that I have given the subject much thought and believe that I have hit upon a plan which gives promise of success if it should be carried out. . . .
>
> The fundamental idea is to occupy the bandit territory, retain it and restore civil order therein.
>
> . . . To do this communications must be opened, i.e., roads must be built, and appropriate shelter must be afforded for the troops as they go forward. This is essential.[44]

While this approach was being pondered the conflict dragged on. Sandino was now back leading his men, and the Guardia, which had taken over much of the responsibility in operations against him, was faring little better than the Marines had before it. By late 1930 Hanna was reporting that "the disorder in Nicaragua is more wide-spread and threatening than it has been at any time during my residence here."[45]

Then on December 31 eight Marines were ambushed and killed near Achupa. Their massacre shattered American officials as nothing had since the Battle of Ocotal in 1927. It was also the first heavy U.S. loss in nearly two years. Once again, protest and criticism sprang from Congress and the press. This incident, Minister Hanna correctly stated, "has served to bring the matter out in even bolder relief."[46]

In February 1931 a high-level meeting in Washington finally established that "the time is rapidly approaching when the

[43]In The Second Secretary in Nicaragua (Beaulac) to the Secretary of State, April 9, 1930, *Department of State Records, op. cit.*, File Box #5528.
[44]The Minister in Nicaragua (Hanna) to the Secretary of State, October 2, 1930, *ibid.*, File Box #5529.
[45]*Ibid.*, November 25, 1930.
[46]*Ibid.*, January 7, 1931.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Marines must be taken out of Nicaragua . . . the very latest time must be after the elections of 1932."[47]

During the remaining months of U.S. occupation the Sandinistas grew even bolder. The Guardia was unable to contain the new offensives. By 1932 Sandino's area of operations included all the provinces of the country except the lake district near Managua, the capital. Nevertheless, Washington stiffly adhered to its withdrawal policy. Secretary of State Henry Stimson — completely reversing his 1927 policy as a personal diplomat — privately wrote: "The more I think of it the more sure I am that I am right in regard to keeping the Marines from the center of Nicaragua."[48] In doing so, however, he somewhat bitterly complained that "the Marines haven't done their job . . . when one contrasts them with the way in which the Army handled similar problems in the Philippines, it simply hasn't been a good job well done."[49]

Stimson also had global problems in mind in withdrawing U.S. troops. By 1932, he felt embarrassed in his resistance to Japanese incursions in Manchuria because of the continued presence of Marines in Nicaragua. When asked if he would ever land forces in Central America again, he responded:

> Not on your life . . . it would undo all the labor of three years, and it would put me in absolute wrong in China, where Japan has done all of this monstrous work under the guise of protecting her nationals with a landing force.[50]

Washington's revised estimate of Sandino was another factor in the policy reversal. Sandino had professed all along that the only rationale for his rebellion was the presence of American forces. By the late stages of the campaign, U.S. diplomats were beginning to accept this explanation. Chargé Willard Beaulac wrote White that guerrilla disorders could well be "incidental to and derived from American assistance. In this connection it remains true that the avowed objective of Sandino . . . is to eject the American forces from Nicaragua."[51] Hanna later admitted that

> the possibility of conciliating Sandino will be greater if no Marines remain in Nicaragua and that even if conciliation proved to be impossible, a united Nicaragua, having deprived Sandino of his principal excuse for belligerency, that is, the presence of American Marines on foreign soil,

[47]"Statement of Policy in Nicaragua," February 5, 1931, *ibid.*
[48]*Stimson Diary, op. cit.*, April 20, 1931.
[49]*Ibid.*, April 16, 1931.
[50]*Ibid.*, March 7, 1932.
[51]The Chargé in Nicaragua (Beaulac) to the Assistant Secretary of State (White), December 31, 1930, *White Papers, op. cit.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

might be in a better position to eliminate banditry than the present Government assisted by the Marines.[52]

White himself noted that "the whole pose of Sandino . . . is that he is fighting Americans," thus a withdrawal would leave the guerrillas with "very little of a talking point left."[53]

By late 1932 State Department discouragement was so intense that White felt it "preferable to run the risk of revolutionary disturbances now and let the strong man emerge without further waste of time."[54] Hanna believed "that a disastrous turn of events after the withdrawal of the Marines is probable. . . ."[55] The military had an equally pessimistic view of the Guardia: "it is not believed that the newly appointed native officers have had either sufficient time or experience to sufficiently conduct or maintain their organization after the guiding hand of the Marine Corps has been withdrawn."[56]

Yet the U.S. military hierarchy, especially the Navy Department, was reluctant to withdraw. There was a general feeling that the Marines had not been given sufficient time or support to wage this relatively new-style warfare properly. Admiral Pratt, Chief of Naval Operations, expressed concern about "the good name of the Navy and Marine Corps, which would be getting out with the stigma of having failed in its job and withdrawing in the face of reverses."[57] General Fuller, Commandant of the Marine Corps, had once stated that

> his acquiescence in the proposal to withdraw immediately was based on the failure of the Nicaraguan Government to give adequate financial support to the Guardia. He [Fuller] would welcome the opportunity to settle the situation with a sufficient force of Marines.[58]

The last Marine departed on January 3, 1933. One month later Sandino terminated his struggle and retired to a semi-agricultural life in Nicaragua. This, of course, belied the American notion that

[52]The Minister in Nicaragua (Hanna) to the Secretary of State, November 4, 1932, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1932,* Vol. V (Washington: GPO, 1943), p. 878.

[53]The Assistant Secretary of State (White) to the Minister in Nicaragua (Hanna), March 19, 1931, *White Papers, op. cit.*

[54]The Assistant Secretary of State (White) to Hans Sitarz, Manager of the National Bank of Nicaragua, June 3, 1932, *ibid.*

[55]The Minister in Nicaragua (Hanna) to the Assistant Secretary of State (White), September 9, 1932, *ibid.*

[56]Second Brigade B — 3 File, *Intelligence Report*, December 1932, United States Marine Corps, Historical Records and Research Section, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland, *Records of Marine Corps Units in Nicaragua, 1927-1933.*

[57]Memorandum of a State Department Conference, April 18, 1931, *Department of State Records, op. cit.*, File Box #5530.

[58]*Ibid.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he was a traditional Central American "bandit" with little or no political objectives. A year later his murder was ordered by Anastasio Somoza; the latter then used the U.S.-created Guardia Nacional as the vehicle for his twenty-year dictatorship over Nicaraguan life and politics.

Conclusions

At the beginning of this article an analogy was suggested between the Nicaraguan and Vietnamese campaigns, despite their obvious differences in scale, objectives and impact. Regarding the tactics of Sandino and today's Viet Cong there are also contrasts to bear in mind. First, Sandino was an unsophisticated and inexperienced guerrilla. He had neither an elaborate doctrine nor the years of experience the Viet Cong have been able to draw upon. Second, at no point in the campaign did he have the North Vietnamese capability of switching from irregular to regular, divisional forces. Third, although he received independent, spontaneous support from external sources he was unsuccessful in soliciting aid from an outside power.

Within the means at his disposal, however, Sandino waged a classic guerrilla struggle. In principle, his tactics differed little from those espoused by latter-day communist theoreticians. The manner in which he rallied countrymen to his cause, for example, could be applied to the efforts of the Viet Cong or any other contemporary insurgent group. A Marine communiqué of 1930 summarized the success of his methods:

> The natives throughout the country-side — through fear, often times blood relationship to bandits, resentment at presence of U.S. forces, and in some cases an ignorant sympathy for the perverted propaganda of the bandit leaders—seldom give timely information on bandits and their movements, but on the other hand, aid and assist and forewarn bandit groups of movements of Marine and Guardia patrols.[59]

In most respects, Sandino's campaign was representative of what now is termed a "war of national liberation."

The problems posed to U.S. decision-makers in Viet Nam and Nicaragua are strikingly similar. The policy syndrome is almost identical: the illusion that the U.S. role would be advisory and temporary; the "Americanization" of the war effort during which the local army was downplayed and in many cases criticized; and a U.S. de-escalation simultaneous with a revival of the local army's role. Both campaigns were conducted in a climate of hostile

[60]Northern Area B — 2 Report, February 28, 1930, *ibid.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

domestic and international opinion. While the degree of opposition at the time of Nicaragua never reached contemporary proportions, in both cases the themes were the same. Charges of U.S. "atrocities,"[60] American "imperialism," waging war against the "legitimate desires of the people," and waging an "unconstitutional" war were as common then as they are today.

Both wars were fought in small, backward areas where the terrain defied traditional military strategies. Both the Viet Cong and the Sandinistas were able to utilize "sanctuaries" in neighboring countries to the maximum. In both cases the presence of American forces frequently stimulated the nationalistic appeals of the enemy and allowed him to enlist a sizeable portion of the countryside to his cause — besides which Sandino was no less hesitant than the Viet Cong to employ a variety of measures, including systematic terror, to rally support for the rebel effort.

Viet Nam and Nicaragua, then, are representative samples of U.S. policy against a "war of national liberation." In both cases we fought as top-heavy favorites but emerged without attaining real victory. The evidence from these two campaigns suggests a few general conclusions.

First, the American public entertains an innate sympathy for the international "underdog." Whether this comes from the nature and characteristics of American liberalism, the lack of a sustained period of colonial administration, the general features of the American "character," or something entirely different, is uncertain. At any rate, it seems extremely hazardous for any U.S. administration to undertake warfare against groups representing small, less-developed areas. Public acceptance of such a campaign will be far more difficult to obtain than in the case of war against traditional powers. Second, the American public seems not to tolerate protracted wars without clear indications that victory is feasible. Unless these indications are manifested relatively early, pessimism will set in and open the way for a chorus of protest. Third, the impact of public opinion can be decisive in foreign policy pursuits of this, or perhaps any, type. This was certainly so with respect to Nicaragua and, although it is empirically unverifiable as yet, no one would deny its bearing on the contemporary Viet Nam de-escalation.

[60]Although it occurred far less frequently in Nicaragua than in Viet Nam, innocent civilians were sometimes killed during the campaign. This was, however, a by-product of the war, never an endorsed or deliberate national policy as some of the political opposition implied. U.S. officials made exhaustive efforts to prevent unnecessary casualties.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For the rest, judging from these two cases, U.S. involvement in "national liberation wars" is accompanied by an inherent propaganda disadvantage. If the adversary has access to propaganda outlets there seems to be little the intervening power can do to counteract his endeavors to enlist sympathy and support except to win the war quickly and decisively. Failing this, the intervention must be terminated. Yet disengagement from wars of this nature is, by necessity, a gradual and deliberative process. An involvement grown as deep as those in Nicaragua and Viet Nam cannot be erased overnight. U.S. policymakers, in the future, will have some bitter lessons to ponder before undertaking new interventions abroad.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reviews

The Ingredients of Chinese Foreign Policy*

by Hammond Rolph

Students of international politics have long been intrigued by the linkage between ideology and statecraft in the foreign relations of communist states. While usually conceding the influence of basic philosophies and ultimate objectives on short-run policy decisions, they have frequently noted divergences between vision and action, between the Marxist-Leninist canon on the one hand and national interests and observed international behavior on the other. Studies of this relationship have been particularly relevant in comparing what Benjamin Schwartz has called the aspirational and operational aspects of Chinese foreign policy, because China, to a much greater extent than the Soviet Union, has *professed* to maintaining a posture of militant revolutionary ideological purity in the conduct of its foreign relations.

In *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy,* Professor Peter Van Ness has produced a study designed to clarify whether or not the Chinese practice the "genuine proletarian internationalism" (as defined by them, not by the outside world) they ceaselessly tell us is the basis of their foreign policy. While no definite answers are possible, he succeeds in throwing considerable light on the whole murky area of revolutionary ideology and state interests. This is a valuable study for the specialist, and the author's well-conceived use of some of the empirical research methods of modern social science will not deter the truly interested general reader. As the subtitle, *Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation,* suggests, the work concerns itself with China's policies toward countries of the Third World. Although Peking's relations with developed states can be revealing on the issue of ideology vs. state interests, China's revolutionary rhetoric is addressed to the developing countries, and it is in relations with them that Mao's publicly announced hypotheses can best be tested.

The book is organized in three parts. There is a useful initial exposition of the Maoist canons of revolution and the manner in which Peking's world view is influenced by the theory and practice of the Chinese revolution. The heart of the study is a discussion of revolution in practice; Van Ness focuses on the year 1965, which restricts possibilities for a broader overview, but this helps to keep the data manageable. In the final section, the author studies the effects of the tumultuous Great

**Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation.* By Peter Van Ness. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970. 266 pp. $6.50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Proletarian Cultural Revolution on Chinese foreign policy and draws some tentative conclusions on his general theme.

There is also an extensive bibliographical note, in which primary and secondary sources are described and commented upon. Both Chinese-language documents and English translations of Chinese periodicals have been used, while a wide range of newspapers and periodicals from around the world has provided data on China's relations with other countries. In the secondary category, the sources are representative of the best available scholarship and research.

The Van Ness analysis is rigorous. He clearly defines the relationship of the three operational levels of Chinese foreign policy—official, semi-official "people's diplomacy" with foreign individuals and groups, and communist party relations—and in his study of revolution in practice he carefully differentiates Chinese endorsement of revolution, relations with revolutionary movements, and selection of targets for revolution. There is an admirable avoidance of discussion of Chinese foreign relations *in vacuo;* actual conditions within developing countries and their official attitudes toward Peking are an integral element in the study.

Quantitative and other empirical data illustrate and substantiate the discussion of revolution in practice. There are helpful tabular data on Chinese endorsement of revolutionary armed struggle in the developing world and China's relations with Asian, African and Latin American revolutionary organizations. The former indicate Mao's personal blessing and lesser categories of endorsement; the latter, whether the organization had a permanent mission in China, sent a delegation to visit China, or was only reported on in the Chinese press. In tables noting possible factors in Peking's selection of eighteen targets for revolution among the developing countries, the author uses a simple scale to gauge the official friendliness or hostility of these states toward Peking in 1965—existence or absence of diplomatic relations, votes in the UN on the China representation question, existence of a defense treaty with the West, and level of trade with Communist China. These same factors are then applied to four other states where armed revolutionary struggles were underway in 1965 but which were not officially targeted by Peking for revolution.

These data tend to buttress his two theses: that Peking's decision to support revolutionary movements in other countries is primarily influenced by the policy pursued by the foreign government toward the People's Republic of China rather than by Maoist ideology (p. 169); and that the consistency and intensity of such support varies according to geographical proximity, degree of American involvement and prospects for success (p. 181). Yet he is careful to avoid argument over the tiresome question of "communism" vs. "Chineseness" in Peking's foreign policy, pointing out that the complex blend of the two elements renders such a dichotomy artificial (pp. 196-197).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nevertheless, certain questions are brought to mind by an interpretation that acknowledges ideological impulse but emphasizes state interests. How do the two interact, and where do they conflict? While we can grant that the foremost concern of Chinese foreign policy has been the preservation and security of the state and the enhancement of its power and prestige, the ideological influences on these objectives might well be substantial. Van Ness implies that because the United States is locked into a commitment to defend the entire Free World against communism, a victory by a communist-led revolutionary movement in any country would be considered a major strategic defeat for the United States and a victory for the Chinese. But by the same token, it can be argued that Mao's deliberate choice of the United States as the "No. 1 enemy" a quarter of a century ago and his resounding commitment to a universal struggle against imperialism and neoimperialism influence Peking's perceptions of the consequences of defeat of a "national liberation" movement. Requirements for preservation and security of the state can be heavily influenced by ideological considerations. Can we doubt that China interprets official "friendliness" and "hostility" to a considerable degree by ideological tests? This factor may be of minor consequence in relations with France but it is assuredly important in the case of Burma or Malaysia.

Although he admits that the evidence since the Cultural Revolution appears contrary, Van Ness argues that Mao's policy basically resembles Stalin's in subordinating revolutionary orthodoxy to state interests. To an extent this may be true; the revolution's "home base" must be protected. But there is a significant difference. Stalin's posture was undoubtedly influenced by his own paranoiac outlook, while Mao's "pragmatism" more likely flows from China's inability to organize movements and influence events abroad to the desired extent. The Maoist leaders know full well that their revolutionary model cannot be recreated everywhere. They may have to adjust to deviations, but they do not do so willingly, as they have made tacitly evident in commentaries on the present Vietnamese communist "liberation war" and overtly clear in their break with the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and their fatuous attempt to export the Cultural Revolution to the Communist Party of Burma. Thus, to what degree is Peking's "realistic" foreign policy deliberate? May not much of it be an accommodation to situations over which China has no control?

Commenting that neither the class character of foreign societies nor the nature of the organizations leading revolution abroad is a basic factor in formulating Chinese policy toward other countries, the author states that the primary concern, at least prior to the Cultural Revolution, was a "desire to win adherents to the Chinese program for radical change in the international system." (p. 189.) Again, perhaps true, but if so, the signifi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cance lies in the fact that China concedes that a true revolutionary situation, in Marxist terms, may not exist, and further, that China does not have the capability, either ideologically or physically, to change the international system herself.

Some possible domestic sources of conflict between ideology and national interest in foreign policy are cogently discussed in the chapter on the Cultural Revolution. Van Ness feels that foreign policy during that upheaval was little more than a reflection of the internal struggle in the Chinese leadership, and was therefore an aberration. What is difficult to come to grips with is an identification of the domestic wellsprings of foreign policy, particularly in a closed society where the sources of information are guarded with holy zeal. The data on Chinese relations with foreign governments and revolutionary movements are relatively open; facts on decision-making in Peking are usually not. What do the extraordinary revelations accompanying the Cultural Revolution's power struggle really tell us about the relative influence of Mao, Chou En-lai and Liu Shao-chi on foreign policy? To what extent do they expose genuine differences as opposed to cynical blame-shifting by the winners? Where, when and in what measure do domestic political and economic considerations impinge on Peking's foreign policy choices? Answers to these questions would be largely guesswork.

The Van Ness study modestly refrains from attempting firm conclusions, although it adduces evidence that Mao has remained the principal influence on Chinese foreign policy since 1949. We may accept this, but one wonders why, if Mao's focus of attention on domestic affairs during the Cultural Revolution was responsible for an evident decline in activity regarding Viet Nam, China dramatically escalated the level of official hostility toward Thailand, made an enemy of Burma, and stirred up serious trouble in Hong Kong. As the author suggests, some of this may have been part of an effort to legitimate Maoism and its revolutionary model at home. But placing the blame on Red Guard seizure of the Foreign Ministry or on overzealous Chinese communist representatives abroad gives us only partial satisfaction.

It seems too facile to conclude that even in the case of Burma the thrust of Chinese policy remains the same (p. 245). Peking has in effect declared war on Ne Win (while refraining from initiating formal diplomatic rupture), and it seems impossible to explain this deterioration of a formerly model relationship of peaceful coexistence as a normal Chinese reaction to states committing unfriendly acts. If Peking could overlook Indonesia's persecution of its large Chinese minority a dozen years ago, why can it not swallow a relatively minor effort by Rangoon to control the excesses of Maoist propaganda among its small Chinese population? One suspects that there is always a strong temptation to use the revolutionary war tool in the nearby rimland areas of Southeast Asia, where Chinese power and in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fluence can be most effectively wielded in pursuit of Peking's desire to create a system of essentially subservient states.

One missing element in this otherwise valuable study is consideration of the possible effects of Chinese nuclear weapons acquisition on the guerrilla mentality that has dominated both foreign policy and relations with revolutionary movements. While this aspect is necessarily speculative, it may be a crucial factor in China's future orientation. Whereas nuclear weapons might constitute an umbrella under which Peking would more vigorously promote "people's war," they could also lead to some deemphasis of revolutionary struggle and a greater reliance on traditional methods of power politics.

Whatever the mix of ingredients in Chinese foreign policy, we must admit that a determination to effect a complete change in the international system—if that is Peking's purpose—is a revolutionary objective, even if carried out by more or less traditional instrumentalities. In modern Europe some notably nationalistic regimes attempted with remarkable revolutionary fervor to overturn the existing international order. One major difference here is that China's capacity does not match her ambitions; another is her largely self-imposed isolation from the mainstream of international life. Removal of these impediments, which indeed now seems to be underway, would be one of the major developments affecting international politics in the remainder of this century.

Weapons and Security*

by Harland B. Moulton

In his book, *Arms Beyond Doubt: The Tyranny of Weapons Technology,* Dr. Ralph Lapp tells us that man's heart and his mind are in his weapons, and "society's greatest pooling of brainpower, its most extravagant concert in research, and its largest mobilization of industry have been dedicated to making new weapons of war." (p. 3.) For decades our society has meekly acquiesced in technological determinism, Lapp says, permitting Congress to appropriate funds for promising new weapons systems virtually without challenge. Jousting energetically and often trenchantly with that nebulous phenomenon the "military-industrial complex," or the "weapons culture," he contends that the United States has exceeded the bounds of prudence in questing for security and needs urgently to undertake a searching examination of its national security requirements in light of prepossessing technologies.

Lapp's book, partly anecdotal, is a readable, jargon-free primer on modern defense technology, aimed primarily at the attentive layman. Anyone curious about the evolution of the anti-ballistic missile to its present Safeguard configuration, or the technology of the MIRV (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle), which the United States is presently deploying on land- and sea-based missiles, will

**Arms Beyond Doubt: The Tyranny of Weapons Technology.* By Ralph E. Lapp. New York: Cowles Publishing Company, 1970. 210 pp. $5.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

find an adequate description here. Lapp also has much to say about the relationship of scientists and scientific organizations to the government in planning for national security, the implications of continued dependence on defense funds for free and independent scientific inquiry at our major educational institutions, the care and feeding of the vast complex of defense contractors, and the costs of major weapons systems spawned by American technology since the end of the war. Society, he notes pessimistically, appears totally unable to control the pace of rampant technology. He concludes: "The control of dictatorial weapons technology has become the nation's most urgent problem." (p. 191.)

In a somewhat abridged account of the 1969 Congressional ABM debate, Lapp, using missile performance data made public by the Pentagon, refutes Secretary Laird's contention that the pace of Soviet deployment of the large and increasingly accurate SS-9 missiles signifies a first-strike intention. He applauds a letter Senator Fulbright sent to Secretary Laird in August 1969 and contends (pp. 82-85) that no component (Minuteman) of a three-component force (bombers, Polaris and Minuteman) is ever vulnerable in a meaningful deterrent sense unless an enemy is capable of attacking all three components simultaneously and destroying all but a small fraction of the total force. Laird agrees that the Soviets presently lack such a capability, and it is a moot question whether they will ever attain first-strike confidence in their future weapons systems.

According to Lapp, the 1969 ABM debates demonstrated that when the responsible House and Senate armed services and appropriations committees fail to hold adequate hearings on issues as important as proposed ABM and MIRV deployment, a body as prestigious as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee can successfully challenge traditional authority and nearly achieve victory, as it did on the ABM issue (pp. 88, 115). A chapter of history seems to be closing on the era when defense budgets were submitted by the Executive branch to a pliant Congress and approved without detailed scrutiny of military, financial, technical and political merits.

Lapp chides Congress for having shown scant disposition to staff its key defense program committees with scientists and national security analysts having military-strategic backgrounds of demonstrated competence. In fact, he suggests that under existing chairmanships, the House and Senate armed services and appropriations committees appear historically to have deliberately eschewed adequate committee staffing as a means of avoiding responsibility for detailed and critical review of defense submissions. He maintains (p. 127 ff) that an additional motive for not wanting to staff these committees with competent and inquiring personnel is that an accounting might have to be made of the elaborate defense complexes erected in the states of committee chairmen, which stand as tributes

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to their power. In his judgment the present situation is unlikely to change unless there is public pressure for further strengthening of the staffing system, an evolution toward a healthy two-party system in the South, or an elevation of domestic priorities to the point where they erode the postwar primacy of defense budgets.

This reviewer disagrees with the rationale given by Lapp (p. 108) for focusing public debate in 1969 almost exclusively on the ABM issue. Lapp contends that the ABM debate effectively educated the American public on the issue of escalating the arms race, and that the introduction of the even more complex MIRV issue would probably have weakened the case against ABM with the public and Congress. He seems to overlook, however, that a number of nongovernmental defense analysts were quite aware that MIRV was farther advanced in the test program than ABM, and felt it might have a much greater effect on stimulating the arms race, thus posing a more serious obstacle to the success of the SALT talks. As it turned out, the MIRV question was introduced late in the ABM debates and tended to get lost in the noise.

Had the critics of ABM in 1969 stressed the relationship of ABM and MIRV rather than considering them separately, it is possible that a compromise could have been forced on the Administration affecting the timing of deployment plans for both systems, particularly in view of the SALT. The effect of not raising the MIRV issue was to enable deployment of multiple warheads on Minuteman III and Poseidon missiles to proceed, on grounds that it was simply a prudent reaction to the growing Soviet threat. Whether the MIRV issue will be resolved by agreement in Vienna remains unclear; seemingly it would be in the U.S. interest if this could be done, since in the long range it is the Soviets, with their large MIRV'd SS-9's, who stand to gain an important offensive advantage.

In retrospect one might ask whether liberal defense intellectuals engaged in the national debate on the ABM were so thoroughly committed to dealing the Pentagon its first Congressional defeat on a proposed major weapons system that sheer emotional commitment and a keen sense of victory temporarily blinded them from tackling the ABM and MIRV simultaneously. In the absence of progress on SALT and in the face of continued Soviet deployment of SS-9's and SS-11's, a stronger case could be made for *limited* deployment of ABM, since it would not significantly stimulate an arms race or generate fears of first strike as deployment of MIRV will most certainly do. Objectively, MIRV, not ABM, should have been the focus of the dialogue in 1969.

In an earlier book (1968) Lapp imaginatively characterized the phenomenon of technological determinism in America as "the weapons culture." Although believing that a weapons culture had fastened itself on the American body politic and threatened fundamental democratic values, he

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seemed to reject for the most part the idea of a well-organized, collusive and insidious military-industrial complex. In his latest treatise he presses the charge that a dangerous military-industrial complex does indeed exist.

Following World War II the United States, according to many observers, consistently overestimated and overreacted to Soviet intentions and capabilities. In addition, as the Cold War intensified, it progressively expanded its role as global peacekeeper. These two factors alone could explain the growth and proliferation of vast regional armaments complexes in this country, which only recently appear to have found themselves overextended. Conditioned as a nation by years of continuous crisis, by a Congress and Executive generally disposed to program and fund military forces against a "greater - than - expected" Soviet threat, by the absence of serious domestic challenges to military priorities, and by the lack of an early and effective academic challenge to prevailing assumptions about Soviet foreign policy objectives and military capabilities, the United States, not too surprisingly, has experienced the evolution of its defense industry into a Gargantua, heavily dependent for its health on continued government military spending. Generally accepted high estimates of the Soviet strategic nuclear threat encouraged the defense industry to proliferate plant and personnel in order to maximize qualitative weapons excellence and insure a redundant production base capable of responding to any imaginable threat to our security.

It seems highly unlikely that a convincing case will ever be made against America's defense industry as a highly coordinated complex dedicated to obtaining uninterrupted funds for research and weapons procurement. Without doubt the industry's heavy dependence on military research and procurement funds, and Pentagon dependence on the industry for scientific, engineering and strategic support, inevitably leads to special relationships which are often parochial and fail to take into account the full range of national priorities. Few would deny, however, that competition among key defense industries has been intense—even allowing for understandings within the industry that losers on major bids for new weapons systems will receive generous subcontracts. Basically the record indicates many gyrations in the fortunes of major aerospace industries, with little indication that those which profited generously in one era will necessarily do so in the next.

Instead of continuing to berate America's defense industry as an organized conspiracy zealous of fastening a permanent "weapons culture" on this nation—and to keep "the bright flame of criticism" from being extinguished by the snuffer of secrecy—what would appear useful are uniform rules for reporting information about defense industry practices to Congress and the public. Lapp's prescription is that the Executive branch ought to submit a five-year programmatic budget to Congress, similar to that regularly submitted by the Atomic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Energy Commission, in order to establish clearer trends and guidelines for research and development and weapons deployment funding. The purpose would not be to hold the Pentagon rigidly to long-range estimates later found wanting, but such a system would help to improve overall defense management and engender more cogent justifications for departures from current programs. Another overdue reform would require the standardization of accounting practices by industry and government. Standardized accounting would be expensive initially and could not in all likelihood be accomplished quickly, but it appears to offer the only real hope of anticipating and controlling cost overruns before they reach scandalous proportions.

Finally, there is no substitute for enterprising and impartial news media, augmented by the growing ranks of scholars skilled in issues of national security, which investigate and report on the activities of all agencies responsible for protecting our national security. Since it seems certain that the percentage of the national budget allocated to defense purposes will remain large for the indefinite future, it is essential that the American public be fully exposed to the relationship of defense industry to the federal government, the relative value of priorities competing for limited funds, and the performance records of those industries supplying major defense hardware and advice.

Lapp's conclusion that the nation is in the grip of a dictatorial weapons technology is difficult to refute. MIRV, ABM and even more exotic weaponry still in the R&D incubator would seem to support this hypothesis. Yet there is room for cautious optimism. The arms races and weapons proliferation spawned by the Cold War may slowly give way to multilateral arms control agreements, higher priority domestic needs, and a U.S. decision that a nuclear strategy based solely on the requirements of deterrence will adequately protect the national interest.

The Arms Race and Defense Spending*

by Benson D. Adams

The third round of SALT ended in Helsinki with no written agreement but with some progress noted in negotiations between the Soviet and American delegations. A fourth round ended in May at Vienna. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird has indicated that if no agreement is achieved within the next twelve months and the Soviet strategic buildup continues, the United States will be required to make some critical decisions regarding the development and deployment of new multibillion-dollar strategic weapons systems. Recently it was revealed that the Soviets have begun construction of some kind of new ICBM silo for an SS-9 size

**Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race.* By Herbert York. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970. 256 pp. $6.95.

What Price Vigilance? The Burdens of National Defense. By Bruce M. Russett. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970. 261 pp. $2.45, paper.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

missile. This could be a signal to encourage continued bargaining at SALT, or it could be the beginning of a new ICBM deployment program. Its meaning is not clear, as the missile designed for the silo has not been seen, but it could be for MIRV's. Meanwhile the USSR's building program for ballistic missile firing submarines continues unabated, as does the dramatic modernization and re-equipment of its ground, air and sea forces. In late May the President announced that the United States and the USSR agreed to agree on some limited form of arms control formula by year's end.

The U.S. defense budget for fiscal year 1972 is slated to be about a billion dollars higher than the FY 1971 budget, primarily due to inflationary costs and related pay hikes. Only some of the amount will go toward increased weapons R&D. Civilian and military manpower is being cut back; weapons procurement is being slowed or canceled; ships, aircraft and equipment are being mothballed or laid up. The expected Vietnamese "peace dividend" of reduced expenses has not materialized, as a result of inflation and the depressed state of the economy. It is within this complex, and at times contradictory, political and economic mosaic that two recent books treating of our defense effort must be considered.

Dr. Herbert York's *Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race* is a highly simplified, personal critique of the weapons development process in the United States by a conscience-stricken weapons scientist looking back on it. York protests and criticizes a policy whose implementation was possible because of weapons (from the A- and H-bomb to the vehicles that deliver them) he had a great deal of responsibility for developing. How it is that his political, moral and social insight came to him after he left the government as a top official in the Defense Department under Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy and as an adviser to President Johnson, is not explained. Today he is Chairman of the Federation of American Scientists and acting Chancellor and Dean of the University of California at San Diego. His book is typical of the outcropping of anti-military, anti-science and anti-technology literature that has appeared in recent years.

In contrast to the participant's view, Dr. Bruce Russett's *What Price Vigilance? The Burdens of National Defense* is a study using modern social science methods to evaluate the effect of continued high levels of military spending on American society. Russett asks why current expenditures for national defense are so high and what some of the consequences are for American politics, the economy and the society. York, on the other hand, drawing on the famous Eisenhower Farewell Address, tries *post facto* from his personal recollections and experience to confirm the validity of Eisenhower's statement that "in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the cap-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tive of a scientific-technological elite." Underlying York's work is his belief that "the power to make life-and-death decisions is passing from the hands of statesmen and politicians to lower level officers and ultimately to computing machines and the technicians who program them." (pp. 13-14.)

Both of these books are narrow in their view: York's because of its pejorative cast, Russett's because his methodological "rigor" does not allow for the unmeasurable kinds of data cited by York as a reason for the high costs of defense spending. Neither takes into account the myriad political and economic considerations (some of which were indicated above) that shape the nature and affect the direction of any nation's defense policy and consequently its spending. There is no doubt that York's judgment is sincere, and he may in large measure be right as to how funds are spent and decisions made.

York deplores the wastage in the defense program caused by personal and professional ambitions, the greed of the politicians, scientists and institutions involved, the competition between and within the services for roles, missions and budgets, and the interplay of politics among the services and civilians in the government. But is this politicking any different from what goes on in the business community, academia, other departments of government, the legislature, the church, the Soviet military industrial complex? As one reads York's accounts of nuclear weapons and overkill, bomber bonanzas, the elusive nuclear airplane, the shock of Sputnik, missile gap-mania, the McNamara era, MIRV, the defense delusion and the ABM debate, one gains the impression that nowhere but in the United States are weapons such a preoccupation and such a bone of contention. Yet several articles and documents have appeared in recent years citing debates in the Soviet Union on weapons procurement, doctrine and strategy. Two studies from the Joint Economic Committee have dealt with the problem of the Soviet economy trying to sustain a military effort of the size required by the Kremlin. *Fortune* in August 1969 ran an article by Richard Armstrong entitled "Military - Industrial Complex—Russian Style." Russett has a chapter in his book on "The Costs of Defense in Other Countries." The politics of the defense bureaucracy cannot be unique to America.

However, the untold waste in expenditures for systems that never materialized cannot and should not be ignored. We must face the reality of the cost overruns on major U.S. weapons systems, the mismanagement in the C-5A and TFX (F-111) programs, the loss caused by delays and cancellations (almost $20 billion since 1945 on missile programs alone). To be sure, similar excesses occur in the nonmilitary sector—Medicare, for example, or the cost overruns on the Rayburn Building. Defense extravagances do not come about solely because of people whose aim is to advance their careers or wealth by building more and better weapons. In large measure they

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are the result of Congress never questioning the rationale for Defense Department expenditures; of the ability of the bureaucracy to cover and hide its mistakes, to suppress data and not to admit its errors of commission and omission. But most important, the fault lies with those of us who failed to demand strong political leadership and accountability on the part of our representatives, and who made no effort to see that our resources were used not only on defense but also to alleviate the monumental social, educational, medical and economic problems confronting the nation. As we now endeavor to cope with these problems, it is apparent at what terrible sacrifice our defense posture was bought.

One should not ignore the conclusions of York's book, but one must understand his predisposition. While he thinks the Soviet penchant for secrecy, the closed nature of Soviet society, and for a time Stalin's paranoia, had a part in accelerating the arms race, he admits to emphasizing American actions and programs since he was in part responsible for them, knew their details, and hence understood them far better than Soviet operations (p. 230). As a participant, he believes the initiative for the arms race has been largely determined by unilateral actions of the United States.

Revisionism has entered the field of weapons development and deployment, too. York asks: "What underlies these overreactions and technological excesses?" (p. 234.) For one thing, our defense effort must be posited on a "worst case analysis, a method of analysis that makes it utterly impossible for both superpowers simultaneously to recognize any given strategic situation as being safe for each of them." This basic insecurity leads each side to fear a surprise attack from the other. York blames the arms race on U.S overreaction to Soviet developments and to "patriotic zeal, exaggerated prudence, and a sort of religious faith in technology." The guilty ones are found at all levels of government and in all segments of society. "These human failings are exaggerated by a widely held myth: that technical experts—generals, scientists, strategic analysts—have some special knowledge making it possible for them, and only them, to arrive at sound political judgments about the arms race." How does political judgment become divested from technical advice? Who would he suggest to make the judgments and decisions and provide the advice, the "out" scientists and experts at MIT or the University of California at San Diego? What kind of advice and judgment was Dr. York proffering when he opposed the ABM—technical facts or political judgment and opinions?

In answering the question why he thinks the United States has been responsible for the majority of the actions that have set the rate and scale of the arms race, he offers the following: "The reason is not that our leaders have been less sensitive to the dangers of the arms race, it is not that our leaders are less wise, it is not that we are more aggressive or less concerned

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

about the dangers to the rest of mankind. Rather, the reasons are that we are richer and more powerful, that our science and technology are more dynamic, that we generate more ideas of all kinds." (pp. 238-239.)

York feels that the United States must undertake unilateral initiatives (with the expectation that the Soviets would match our actions) to reverse the course of the arms race and move in the direction of arms control and eventually disarmament. He suggests a number of measures: abandon silo-based ICBM's; reduce the Polaris/Poseidon force to about thirty boats; reduce the number of bombers; abandon ABM; maintain present levels of air defense; stop all nuclear tests and reduce strategic weapons R&D by a third. York makes no mention of the risks involved. He believes the U.S. deterrent would not be impaired by such a program. His reliance on good faith implies a willingness to accept the risks because of the end result.

Russett's analysis of defense spending employs the "most modern social science techniques." He uses voting and economic data to which he applies a number of traditional statistical procedures mostly dealing with correlation. Nowhere are the methodologies or techniques explained. In two chapters, he and his assistants tabulated voting behavior data from the Senate, looking for "Guttman scales" or alignments. The manner in which the data were chosen explains a great deal about the limitations of the conclusions reached. The Senate data were chosen "rather than the House partly for convenience" and because DOD and NASA expenditures are more readily available by State rather than Congressional district. (p. 30.) In addition, voting records are publicly available, whereas the bargaining that goes on in committee and that may determine the meaning of a vote, is not. The Senate roll-call votes on defense issues were drawn from the 87th (1961-1962) and 90th (1967-1968) Congresses—the Kennedy-Johnson years. Russett suggests that by choosing these years we avoid "complications in the analysis that would be introduced by choosing years when different parties organized the legislature or when there were partisan changes at the White House." (p. 30.)

Despite these methodological constraints and the limitations of the behavioral approach, Russett nevertheless arrives at some interesting observations and conclusions which are probably correct for the data used and the period under consideration.

He has found that in the past two decades U.S. military expenditures have been greater than at any time in American history except for periods of total war. The increased spending has been in part forced on the United States by the demands of international conflict and leadership, an apparent (his word) communist threat to U.S. security, and the arms race. The latter, he implies, is distinct from the communist threat. Washington's failure to use its system of military alliances to reduce its defense burdens has helped to main-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tain this high level of defense spending. Most U.S. allies spend much smaller proportions of their resources on defense and look to the United States as their "protector." We have had to take on increased commitments without a corresponding increase in allied military strength. In the absence of grave threat the smaller state, if it is not coerced by the United States or offered special incentives, will view the U.S. military protectorate as a substitute for its own military force. Unless the United States radically reduces its forces below a safe level the smaller ally is unlikely to increase its military effort.

Domestic and political pressures also influence the defense budget and have helped to inflate it beyond necessary levels. How much impact domestic influences have, relative to international pressures or the enemy threat, is not explained. The military has developed mutually rewarding relationships with industry and Congress. While the large defense contractors, through their lobbying and advertising, campaign for new weapons, Russett observes that the industrial component is less conservative than has generally been believed. (York sees the defense contractors in a less objective way.)

Continuing, Russett has found that Congressional attitudes on arms issues seem unrelated to contract awards (p. 180). For the Congressman the political impact of DOD contract expenditures is less severe than is the impact of DOD direct employment (p. 187); those with the largest share of DOD employment in their states are the most "conservative" members of Congress. The large defense establishment helps to maintain in American politics hawkish and uncompromisingly anti - communist men who emphasize U.S. military preparedness, but voting on "DOD appropriations is very similar to that of voting on a wide variety of issues related more generally to defense, arms control, and East-West relations." (p. 179.)

The high level of military spending, which is profitable as far as industry, Congress and the military are concerned, is costly to the taxpayer, the economy and society. Military expansion has limited investment, on which future production depends, thus impairing the economy's long-term growth. At the same time, funds are not available for needed programs in health, education and welfare. By increasing military expenditures, the nation is mortgaging its future. Here York and Russett share a common concern.

From these findings Russett comes to a number of interesting conclusions, less absolute and in some cases differing substantially from York's. He suggests that the control of military spending is a real and present problem for American politics because we cannot afford to waste resources and because excessive arms expenditures distort our political and social life. Yet, as he points out, the United States must provide a spectrum of weapons and forces to meet a variety of conventional and nuclear threats: "...we must not forget that a failure of deterrence can also come from a neglect of our

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

weapons, both current and projected. Until there is an essential change in the international system, a failure to buy a needed new weapon could have effects just as calamitous as a runaway arms race." (p. 183.) Unlike York, Russett believes that the arms race has not been run too rapidly, although there is the ever-present danger that both we and the Soviets will do whatever is technologically feasible without properly considering strategic and political implications. He concludes by arguing that if we are to control military spending it is essential to understand the causes and the consequences of this spending; that it does not derive solely from the external threat and the international conflict environment.

The need, as Russett sees it, is for a countervailing power to challenge and question the rationale for the levels of defense spending known in the past; our lack of strong central political institutions makes it hard to restrain the military and its civilian allies. Does the strong central political institution of the CPSU make it any easier to restrain the "metal eaters" in the Soviet Union? Congress, Russett believes, cannot fill the countervailing role because it shares power with the Executive and it is divided ideologically, regionally and by party politics. Going beyond the findings of his data, he makes a value judgment, citing the 1969 ABM debate as an example of Congress' inability to curb military spending.

But Congress is no longer a passive organization unquestioningly approving Executive Branch expenditures. It can, and during that debate it did, ask pointed questions on rationale, costs and technical developments. It put the Executive and the military on notice that it would no longer be uncritical of authorization and appropriations for more expensive systems when domestic needs also demand resources and attention. In 1970 Congress, on the recommendation of the Senate Armed Services Committee, deleted the area defense component of the Safeguard ABM system which had been requested by the Administration, thus confining the present program to a defense of Minuteman ICBM's. Russett laments the fact that the Senate did not defeat the Safeguard system in August 1969. The vote was 50-51.[1] The fact that Safeguard was not defeated was due to Senate rules and a one-vote majority, not to Congress' inability to marshall a coalition in challenge to the Executive. In the end, Russett offers no prescription on how to weaken the power of constituent pro-military interests, only arguing that it must be done.

There is an interesting point of disagreement to be noted in these two books. Russett contends that the technology of the last decade has been kind to us and to the Soviets since it has allowed both sides to build secure second-strike

[1]By Senate rules an amendment is defeated by a tie vote. In 1969, the vote on the amendment to halt Safeguard deployment was tied until Vice President Agnew cast his vote as President of the Senate against halting deployment.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

deterrents, although he points out that invulnerability of the deterrents is not likely to be permanent. York sees the ever-expanding military power of the United States and the USSR in the last twenty-five years as having led to less and less security for both sides. Both authors agree that the new weapons—MIRV, ABM, FOBS—are capable of eroding either side's invulnerability. Russett argues that this could result in destroying the contemporary balance that preserves the respective second-strike capabilities, whereas York thinks that with MIRV the erosion of invulnerability of land-based forces has already started.

The vulnerability-invulnerability disagreement goes a long way to illustrate this reviewer's contention that the complexity of national security policy issues cannot be viewed in narrow focus. Past actions cannot be attributed to a single cause, but neither can data analysis alone provide an explanation for how national security policy is formulated.

Canadian Crisis Diplomacy*

by Edward P. Moxon-Browne

Canadian foreign policy is a notoriously neglected subject, and books that treat it rarely venture beyond narrative into the realms of analysis. This is largely due to its unassertive nature. It was once easy to dismiss Canada's role as being nothing more than to reconcile loyalties to the United States and the United Kingdom, which themselves enjoyed a "special relationship." Ignorance about Canadian foreign policy has not been confined to observers outside Canada. This is a large country and after a century of confederation it is still concerned about its unity. Interest in foreign affairs has rested in a small elite. In the United States, by contrast, foreign policy issues have always aroused passions—even if these have sometimes been the negative passions of isolationism.

Robert Reford's *Canada and Three Crises* goes a long way toward dispelling some of the popular myths concerning Canadian actions on the world scene. His approach is unique in that he studies Canadian policy through three crisis situations: the Chinese offshore islands crisis, the Suez crisis of 1956, and the Cuban crisis of 1962. Although Canada acted differently in each, the author feels that her reaction in each case was based on purely Canadian considerations. The offshore islands provided an issue on which she openly disagreed with the United States; in the Suez crisis she displayed skillful diplomatic initiative in reconciling her two closest allies; in the Cuban missile crisis she reluctantly and belatedly concurred with the military preparations of her major ally.

As a background to the disagreement over the offshore islands, Reford traces the development of divergent U.S.-Canadian outlooks dating back to World War II. A greater emotional involvement in Chinese affairs, he believes,

**Canada and Three Crises.* By Robert W. Reford. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968. 246 pp. $5.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

explains why the Americans always reacted quite differently from the Canadians to events in China. The treaty signed with Chiang committed the United States to intervene if Formosa or the Pescadores were attacked: in American eyes this was an international issue on which they had a right to voice an opinion. Peking, however, regarding the matter of the islands as the last unresolved issue of the Chinese civil war, perceived the American presence as an unwarranted intrusion. The communist regime was not prepared to make pledges to a foreign government about what was felt to be an internal issue; to do so would have been a derogation of sovereignty.

Canada took a middle line between Peking and Washington. While she agreed with Peking that Formosa did not constitute the sole legitimate government of China, she also agreed with Washington that the Chinese problem was one of international concern, albeit in her view its best solution lay in an international conference.

At all events, Canada had no wish to become involved in the remnants of the Chinese civil war. In 1950, when the United States imposed a trade embargo on mainland China, Canada did not follow the American example. Reford admits that the reasons were partly selfish since Canada needed a market for her surplus wheat; but there was also a feeling (unchanged ten years later in policy toward Cuba) that trade embargoes are usually self-defeating. "Far from leaving a nation starving on the vine, it tends to force it into the arms of other suppliers often less desirable." (p. 33.) At the height of the crisis, in spring 1955, disagreement between Canada and the United States was publicly expressed. When Dulles asked for a clarification of the Canadian position, Lester Pearson commented in the House of Commons on March 24, 1955: "We could not stand aloof from a major war which threatened the very existence of the United States. I do not consider a conflict over the possession of these Chinese coastal islands, Quemoy or the Matsus to be such a situation or one requiring any Canadian intervention in support of the Chinese Nationalist regime." (p. 49.)

Viewed from today's perspective, it is astounding how outspoken Canadian criticisms were of American policy in Asia. Officials in Ottawa said it would be "unutterable folly" to let a global war develop out of the offshore islands. Washington was informed that it could not count on Canada's support if American forces became involved. There was also public regret in Ottawa at Eisenhower's decision to "unleash" Chiang Kai-shek.

But of the infinitely more serious conflagration in Viet Nam, Canadian criticism has been muted. One need not search far for the reasons. First, Canada now has a hand in the situation as a member of the International Commission for Indochina, a duty which arose from the 1954 Geneva agreements. Second, Canadian criticism at the time of the offshore islands crisis was primarily aimed at preventing the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States from being dragged into a larger conflict. Viet Nam is a matter of extricating the United States from a war which began several years ago; criticism from the sidelines is not very constructive here. Third, since some Commonwealth countries actively support American policy in Viet Nam, criticism from Canada would not serve to further Commonwealth solidarity—a factor of prime importance in Canadian foreign policy.

The author turns next to the Suez crisis of 1956. This has already been the subject of several monographs, and Reford's account must, therefore, seem rather condensed. Clearly, he has read all the principal works such as Eden's memoirs, and the treatments by Thomas, Nutting and Robertson, but for a fuller exposition of Canada's cardinal role at Suez, the reader is well advised to refer to Terence Robertson's *Crisis.*[1] Reford affirms what now appears to have been the complicity of France and Britain at the famous Sèvres meeting, held four days before Israel launched her attack on Egypt. The wording of the ultimatum which would be presented to both sides was decided before the attack, but no hint of this was passed either to the United States or to the Commonwealth. He justifiably condemns this as "a mockery of the principle of consultation so important during times of crisis." (p. 98.)

Drawing extensively from *Hansard,* the author re-enacts some of the bitter parliamentary debates that Canada's Suez role aroused. If her traditional task was the reconciliation of her two closest allies, never had this task been so difficult to perform. Such a precarious balancing act could not be repeated, and it was the need to break away from these traditional, yet increasingly incompatible, loyalties that prompted Pearson to enunciate new guidelines for Canadian foreign policy the following year: "Our foreign policy must be Canadian, based on Canadian considerations, Canadian values and Canadian interests." Suez had brought Canada into the limelight of world diplomacy and, perhaps inevitably, there was continued pressure for similar *coups de gloire* in the years that followed. But the case of Suez was unique. As the author says, this was a "one night stand, an exceptional turn staged amid circumstances unlikely to occur again." (p. 137.) Henceforth, quiet diplomacy might seem rather dull, but it was preferable. To be "night-watchman" of the Atlantic Community was not a glamorous or even an easy role to play, but in the long run it would pay better dividends than any hasty or ill-considered excursions on the world scene.

On Suez Canada had exercised a considerable amount of freedom because of the disagreement between her allies. In the Cuban missile affair, on the other hand, she was made painfully aware of the extent to which her options could be restricted by the proximity of her superpower neighbor. The

[1] *Crisis: The Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy* (New York: Atheneum, 1965).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

missile crisis also marked the climax of different policies toward Cuba pursued by the United States and Canada. In October 1960, Reford recalls, Washington had imposed a trade embargo on Cuba. Ottawa had not followed suit on the grounds that Cuba would find less desirable suppliers elsewhere. The Canadian view was soon borne out by events. Castro made a special point of treating Canadian interests with much more circumspection than those of the United States. If the purpose of this discrimination was to drive some sort of wedge between the Canadians and the Americans, it was largely successful. Although other U.S. allies continued to trade with Cuba, Canada bore the brunt of American criticism. This was due, the author suggests, to the belief that Cuba was primarily a hemispheric problem. Canada again showed lack of sympathy for sentiment in the hemisphere when she failed to follow the United States, and several Latin American countries, in breaking off diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Contributing also to the alienation was the growing personal estrangement between Diefenbaker and Kennedy. The author mentions two incidents, in particular, that exacerbated relations between the two leaders. One was an allegedly disparaging phrase used by Kennedy about Diefenbaker which eventually reached Diefenbaker's ears. The other, more serious in Diefenbaker's view, was the case of the "working-paper" that mysteriously disappeared from the State Department in Washington and found its way to Ottawa. On it were several items that Kennedy was required to "push for" while on a visit to Canada. Reford concludes that "the personal strain between them was such that when the missile crisis developed, the two men were no longer able to communicate easily with each other." (p. 165.)

The most critical issue provoked by the missile crisis was the viability of the NORAD agreement between Canada and the United States. Under this agreement the Bomarc missiles situated in northern Canada, like the CF-104 Starfighters in Europe, were dependent on nuclear elements controlled by the United States under the two-key system. It was, in fact, through NORAD channels that first rumors of an impending crisis reached Ottawa in late October 1962. As soon as Kennedy had spoken on television on October 22 the American components in NORAD were put on "Def Con 3" alert (on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 is all-out nuclear war). But Diefenbaker, despite the advice of his cabinet, forbade the Canadian elements to be equally alerted until forty-two hours later, and even then waited until the following day before saying publicly that Canada was standing beside her ally. The whole *raison d'être* of NORAD had thus been undermined. As Reford says of the Pentagon: ". . . to them NORAD must have seemed a foolproof method of ensuring Canadian co-operation in times of crisis, but it had not proved to be so. The Bomarcs were part of a continental system and Canada's fail-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ure to arm them left a gap open. Could this be allowed to happen again in the case of an ABM system for example? In the Pentagon, the Cuba crisis may well have been interpreted as a sign that the United States would be wiser to rely in future entirely on its own resources and to plan its air defence on a national rather than a continental basis." (p. 215.)

The author suggests four possible reasons for Diefenbaker's delay in openly showing solidarity with the United States until the peak of the crisis had passed: (1) He may sincerely have wished not to aggravate the crisis or provoke feelings of panic in Canada. (2) His customary difficulty in reaching decisions may have been accentuated in this instance because he was the leader of a minority government, he was reluctant to hand over control of events to the military whom he distrusted, and he may well have preferred not to be party to raising the specter of nuclear weapons.

More likely, however, are the third and fourth reasons. (3) Diefenbaker was extremely sensitive about any situation in which Canada might appear to be the satellite of the United States, and may have felt that this was a case in point—although many Canadians must have wished that he had chosen a less critical occasion on which to demonstrate Canada's independence. (4) The traditional Canadian desire for independence in foreign policy was here reinforced by Diefenbaker's personal animosity for Kennedy. Although Diefenbaker received as much information as Macmillan, de Gaulle and Adenauer prior to the Kennedy speech, and although part of the speech had been altered at Canada's request, there was still a distinct feeling in Ottawa that Canada had been treated shabbily. In the Canadian Parliament, when the inevitable question was asked about prior consultation, the abrupt reply was simply: "The Canadian Government was informed."

Yet, despite Canada's reluctance, there were ways in which concurrence was shown. On October 23, for example, a long-standing prohibition on Soviet airliners using Canadian airspace was suddenly enforced. On the same day ships of the Royal Canadian Navy moved southward in the North Atlantic to patrol those areas vacated by American ships which had taken up positions in the blockade on Cuba.

Reford concludes his book with a discussion of Canada as a "middle power." He interprets this term in the older Churchillian sense as meaning "linchpin" of the Atlantic Alliance, but he also sees Canada as a "mediator" in disputes where the superpowers are either compromised or directly involved. From his study of these three crises he judges that the middle power can best play a mediatory role when it is concerned by but not directly involved in the crisis. His main argument is that while Canada reacted differently in each of the crises because the circumstances differed, the premises on which the government acted were always the same, as were the ultimate aims.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books Received

NOTE—By special arrangement with the Foreign Policy Association, readers of ORBIS may obtain from the FPA's Book Center any books listed below published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Post free for domestic orders only. Send orders with check or money order to Desk O, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017. (This arrangement also applies to books reviewed in ORBIS.)

I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

Building Cooperative Movements in Developing Countries: The Sociological and Psychological Aspects. By Konrad Engelmann. New York: Praeger, 1968. 238 pp. $15.00. Engelmann, former head of the Association of German Agricultural Cooperatives, discusses the motivations and goals of the cooperatives movements in developing countries; the obstacles they face; the arguments for and against cooperative production; problems of credit and savings; and the record of cooperative aid to developing countries.

Confrontation and Intervention in the Modern World. By Urs Schwarz. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1970. 218 pp. n.p. A former Foreign Editor of the *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* and *The Swiss Review of World Affairs* examines intervention and confrontation as doctrine and as practice, in historical perspective but with a contemporary focus. Treating confrontation as an exercise of mutual deterrence, he identifies 23 instances of its use, commencing with the Berlin blockade of 1948-1949 and extending to the border incidents between Communist China and the Soviet Union in 1969. Intervention, defined as an act by a powerful state in relation to one much weaker in order to support a rule or principle or pattern of politics, is discussed with reference to its usage by the Soviet Union and the United States in the postwar era.

From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950. By Herbert Feis. New York: W. W. Norton, 1970. 428 pp. $10.00. An objective appraisal of the critical immediate postwar years and the statesmen and events that dominated the opening of the era of global tension. Feis chronicles the search for a peace settlement after World War II, the dissension-ridden meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the quarrels over a German peace treaty, the origins and impact of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, the Czechoslovak and Berlin crises, the growing shadow of the atomic bomb, and the rise of opposing Soviet and U.S. alliance systems.

The League of Nations and the Great Powers. By James Barros. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. 143 pp. $6.50. Basing his analysis on materials previously inaccessible in the archives of the participants as well as on League of Nations sources, the author concludes that the Greek attack and invasion of Bulgaria in 1925 proved a notable exception to the charge of its critics that the League was unable to cope with dangerous international situations. He believes this success sheds light on the possibilities and limitations in the use of coercion to accomplish peaceful settlement under the aegis of international organization.

A Modern Introduction to International Law. By Michael Akehurst. New York: Atherton, 1970. 367 pp. $9.50. Intended for undergraduates, this textbook treats the topics normally covered in a course on international law, but with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

particular attention to the relationship between international law and international politics. Included are discussions of the legal aspects of contemporary problems, e.g., Viet Nam, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the Commonwealth Immigrants Acts, as well as of such controversial topics as expropriation of foreign-owned property, fishery limits and colonialism. The author also discusses legal rules pertaining to space and the ocean floor.

Reluctant Door: The Right of Access to the United Nations. By Lief Kr. Tobiassen. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1969. 413 pp. $8.50. An authoritative account of instances in which the United States has prevented access to the United Nations on the part of individuals considered objectionable to American authorities, even though under the terms of a 1947 treaty the United States recognized the right of unhindered access to UN meetings and conferences in New York. Dr. Tobiassen, presently connected with the Folkeuniversitetet in Trondheim, Norway, examines a number of espionage and sabotage cases involving UN delegates and personnel and traces disputes between the United States and the UN that have involved international law and administration, American constitutional law, sensitive diplomatic relations, and U.S. immigration and internal security statutes.

Revolution. By Peter Calvert. New York: Praeger, 1970. 174 pp. $5.00. In this study of the origins and development of revolution as a concept, the author examines revolution in the ancient world; the ideas of Plato, Aristotle and the Romans; the virtual disappearance of the political concept during the Dark Ages; the contributions of Aquinas and Machiavelli; the secularization of the concept, and the justifications for revolutions in Holland, England, America and France. The second half of the book is devoted to the swiftly evolving concepts of revolution in the 19th and 20th centuries: the idea of social revolution, Marx and Engels, anarchism, Lenin's theories and role, Mussolini and myth, self-determination, guerrilla warfare, Mao's theories and role, and internal war. Calvert, Lecturer in Politics at the University of Southampton, concludes with an essay on revolution in the future.

The Theory of International Relations: Selected Texts from Gentili to Treitschke. Introduced and edited by M. G. Forsyth, H. M. A. Keens-Soper and P. Savigear. New York: Atherton, 1970. 353 pp. $8.95. Selections from nine writers ranging from Grotius, Rousseau, Kant, Gentili and Gentz to Treitschke, whose works the editors feel should be studied by contemporary students of international relations. Topics covered include the causes of war, the balance of power, and the relationship between international relations and the political theory of the state.

UN Protection of Civil and Political Rights. By John Carey. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1970. 205 pp. $7.50. This study of the implementation of human rights points up the fact that most of the progress has been in the direction of clarifying or codifying the substantive law norms governing human rights while little progress has been achieved in creating machinery to protect these rights. Concentrating on the practical aspects of existing and proposed implementation machinery—reporting, fact-finding, sanctioning—the author reviews each technique historically as well as in the light of UN practice and makes suggestions for more imaginative or more prudent courses for the future. Carey, a partner in the firm of Coudert Brothers and adjunct assistant professor at New York University, served on the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1968.

The Year Book of World Affairs 1970. Published under the auspices of the London Institute of World Affairs. New York: Praeger, 1970. 345 pp. $15.00. In Volume 24 of this annual series, research articles treat a wide variety of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

topics including "Conflict in Northern Ireland," by H. Shearman; "Race and Colour in International Relations," by A. R. Preiswerk; "China in Africa," by G. T. Yu; "Aid to India," by P. P. Streeten; "The United Nations Development Programme," by G. Brennan; and "Student Revolt in East and West," by T. Szamuely. In the final section, a series of reports reviews the economic, institutional, legal, sociological and strategic issues in world affairs.

II. United States

The American Spirit. By Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard. New York: Collier Books, 1971. 608 pp. $3.95 (paper). Originally published in 1942, this classic work "represents an effort to grasp, through an examination of the written and spoken word, the intellectual and moral qualities that Americans deemed necessary to civilization in the United States."

The Consent of the Governed. (Third edition.) By John C. Livingston and Robert C. Thompson. New York: Macmillan, 1971. 562 pp. $8.95. Although the authors of this revised text deal with many of the subjects traditionally treated in the study of American government, they do so by means of a critique of the pluralist conception of American politics. By examining what they view as manifestations of a fundamental political crisis in the United States—such as civil disorders and confrontation politics—they explore how these phenomena may reflect challenges to the pluralist system of interest group accommodation. In this analysis they take advantage of anti-pluralist writings that have appeared since their last edition was written in 1963.

The Peace Corps. By Robert G. Carey. New York: Praeger, 1970. 274 pp. $8.95. The author, Assistant Professor of English at Montgomery County Junior College in Maryland and a former consultant to the Peace Corps, reviews the records of both the volunteers and the Corps as a government agency, explains how volunteers are recruited and trained, describes the many programs and activities of Corps members, candidly discusses the Corps' many problems and shortcomings, and relates many anecdotes and experiences of volunteers in the field.

Puerto Rico: A Profile. By Kal Wagenheim. New York: Praeger, 1970. 286 pp. $8.50 ($2.95, paper). A comprehensive study of the people, geography, history, economy, government, society, education and culture of Puerto Rico. Wagenheim, a former *New York Times* correspondent in Puerto Rico, treats at some length of Spanish and American domination, movements for self-government and independence, the search for national and cultural identity, and the migration of hundreds of thousands of Puerto Ricans to North America.

Recognition of Russia: An American Foreign Policy Dilemma. By Edward M. Bennett. Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell Publishing Company, 1970. 232 pp. $2.95 (paper). Professor Bennett examines the origins of the American nonrecognition policy; its record, especially toward the Soviet Union, from 1920 to 1933; the reasons why American interests and security dictated a reconsideration of the deeply rooted nonrecognition doctrine and the eventual recognition of the USSR in 1933; and the outlook of the Soviet and other governments on this issue in U.S. foreign policy.

III. Western Europe

The Economy of Sweden: A Study of the Modern Welfare State. By Martin Schnitzer. New York: Praeger, 1970. 252 pp. $12.50. In this study of the banking, public finance, stabilization policies, social welfare legislation, labor-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

management and government-business relations of Sweden, the author describes how this "showcase" country has achieved its high standard of living, eradicated poverty, maintained a high level of employment in the postwar era, and combined many of the institutions of capitalism and socialism into a well-developed economic and political system.

The European Challenge. By Louis Armand and Michel Drancourt. New York: Atheneum, 1970. 256 pp. $5.95. Arguing that worldwide innovations in technology are necessitating fundamental transformations in the way human society must be organized, the authors provide a detailed blueprint on how Europe can federate and use the tools of the new technology to keep pace with the 1970's, especially with the Soviets and Americans, and solve many of the problems raised in J.-J. Servan-Schreiber's *The American Challenge.* Armand is a member of the French Academy and Secretary-General of the International Union of Railways; Drancourt is Editor-in-Chief of *Enterprise* and head of the economics and political science division of *Realités.*

The German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure, and Effects of National Socialism. By Karl Dietrich Bracher. New York: Praeger, 1970. 553 pp. $13.95. In this book, widely acclaimed in its 1969 German-language edition, Dr. Bracher, Professor of Political Science and Contemporary History at the University of Bonn, analyzes every aspect of Nazism: the philosophical, historical and political background, the German state tradition, the weaknesses of the Weimar Republic, the rise of the NSDAP, the personality of Hitler, the Nazi seizure of power, the structure of the SS state, the roles of the bureaucracy, army, business and the church, the domestic resistance and acquiescence, the murder of Jews, the appeasement by the West, the war, the collapse of the regime, and the remnants of National Socialism today.

Italy Chooses Europe. By F. Roy Willis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. 373 pp. $8.50. A thoughtful, informative account of Italy's role in and attitudes toward European integration, which has been largely ignored by American writers. Profiting from the use of Italian sources, the author describes first the various decisions by which Italian leaders defined Italy's role in Europe. He then assesses the internal factors that determined the form of those decisions and the effects the decisions had in helping to solve political and economic problems by placing them in a broader international context.

The Rebirth of Europe: A History of the Years Since the Fall of Hitler. By Walter Laqueur. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970. 434 pp. $8.95. This survey of European political, cultural, economic and social developments since 1945 is divided into four parts: Cold War politics from 1945 to Stalin's death, the main economic and social trends of the 25-year period, cultural developments since the mid-1950's, and politics and international affairs since 1955.

Spain: The Glory and Tragedy. By Robert G. Colodny. New York: Humanities Press, 1970. 96 pp. $5.00. A short, passionate account of the Spanish Civil War and its international ramifications by a Professor of History at the University of Pittsburgh who is a veteran of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade that fought on the side of the Republic.

The World of the French Revolution. By R. R. Palmer. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. 282 pp. $8.50. By studying the European world before 1789, the history of the French Revolution in France itself, and the impact of the French upheaval on the rest of Europe, the author attempts to explain why events in the year 1789, marking the transition between the Old Order and the New, took the form of revolution.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS RECEIVED

IV. Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Poland. By Václav L. Benes and Norman J. G. Pounds. New York: Praeger, 1970. 416 pp. $10.00. In this volume in the Nations of the Modern World series, the authors briefly trace the history of the Polish state from the start of the eleventh century down to World War I; describe Poland's present territorial basis, economy and resources; and examine in detail the political system and international position of the interwar Polish Republic and the postwar "People's Republic." Dr. Benes is Professor of Political Science and Dr. Pounds is Professor of Geography and History, both at Indiana University.

Romania: A Profile. By Ian M. Matley. New York: Praeger, 1970. 292 pp. $8.50. An introduction to the people, geography, history, government, economy, education and culture of Romania by a Professor of Geography at Michigan State University.

The Soviet Union. By Elisabeth Koutaissoff. New York: Praeger, 1971. 288 pp. $8.50. This volume in the Nations of the Modern World series presents a broad, informative account of the Soviet Union, treating, in particular, those factors that have played an important role in inhibiting economic advancement in a centrally planned economy. The author also deals with government efforts to solve agricultural problems. In her conclusion she states that despite significant advances in the Soviet economy and educational system, political liberalization remains fragile, subject to continual dangers from internal and external forces.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: A Handbook. Edited by George Schöpflin. New York: Praeger, 1970. 614 pp. $25.00. In this valuable handbook, nearly 50 experts examine the history, political and economic systems, social structure and cultural life of the USSR and the East European countries.

Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1969. Edited by Richard F. Staar. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1970. 1170 pp. $19.95. The major portion of this valuable annual guide to communist affairs consists of "profiles" of communist parties in some 95 countries, providing data on party leadership and organizational structure, views on domestic and foreign policy questions, relations with other communist parties, and current publications. Similar profiles of international communist front organizations, reports on important international conferences involving communist participation, and a selection of 19 important documents round out the text.

V. Middle East and Africa

Cromer in Egypt. By John Marlowe. New York: Praeger, 1970. 332 pp. $10.00. Evelyn Baring, first Earl of Cromer, was technically British Agent and Consul General in Egypt. Despite the modest title, he exercised an intensely personal and extremely powerful rule in Egypt from 1883 to 1907. This thoroughly documented work appraises Cromer's role in his pursuit of British diplomacy in a land which, while a dominion of the Ottoman Empire and occupied by Britain, was coveted by other European powers.

Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World: The Cairo Conference of 1921. By Aaron S. Klieman. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. 322 pp. $10.00. Convened on the initiative of Winston Churchill, then Colonial Secretary, the Cairo Conference of 1921 served to delineate British interests in the Middle East. After providing the suitable background, the author studies the conference proceedings and assesses the impact of the decisions taken as they have borne on several politically sensitive issues which even today have not been resolved.

Government and Power in West Africa. By Robert S. Jordan. New York:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Africana Publishing Corporation, 1970. 335 pp. $6.95 ($2.95, paper). An account of the evolution of the political systems of former British West African territories.

Islam: A Way of Life. By Philip K. Hitti. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970. 198 pp. $6.50. Based on a series of lectures, this survey of Islam provides the reader with insight into the all-encompassing nature of the force which has shaped the lives of its adherents and those who deal with them. The Muslim tradition is considered as a religion, a state and a culture. Throughout the work, the external factors that have influenced the development of Islam are highlighted.

Libyan Independence and the United Nations. By Adrian Pelt. New Haven: Yale University Press, for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1970. 1016 pp. $35.00. A study describing the peaceful transformation of Libya, under United Nations auspices, from an Italian colony to an independent state. The author, who served as the UN Commissioner in Libya during the period, not only reviews the 1950-1951 transitional time in detail but supplies background information and evaluates contending plans for Libyan development.

The Maghreb in the Modern World. By Samir Amin. Translated by Michael Perl. Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1970. 256 pp. $2.25 (paper). A survey of French colonization as it has affected Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia and the principal changes accompanying the independence of these states. Although social and political factors are examined, the primary emphasis is on economic facets. The first part of the book deals with the period from the beginning of French rule until the mid-1950's. The second portion analyzes more recent trends in the independent Maghreb.

The Middle East in Revolution. By Humphrey Trevelyan. Boston: Gambit Incorporated, 1970. 275 pp. $5.95. Memoirs of a distinguished British diplomat who, as British Ambassador in Cairo (1955-1956), in Baghdad (1958-1961) and as the last High Commissioner in Aden, witnessed three crises that have influenced the contemporary Middle East. His personal account provides a perspective which is unavailable elsewhere.

VI. East Asia and the Pacific

A Concise Economic History of Modern China. By Frank H. H. King. New York: Praeger, 1970. 243 pp. $7.50. In this introduction to modern China's economic history, Dr. King, Director of the Center of Asian Studies at the University of Hong Kong, examines the problem of development under the Manchu dynasty, the Republic in time of war and civil strife, the communist regime, and the Nationalist government on Taiwan.

Himalayan Frontiers. By Dorothy Woodman. New York: Praeger, 1969. 423 pp. $12.50. Drawing upon geographical and historical data, the author explains the influence of the Himalayas on the Indian subcontinent and the British, Chinese, Indian and Russian rivalries of the past and present, and on contemporary power struggles in Asia generally. She discusses the national interests of China, India and Pakistan and shows how they may cause further discord, especially in relation to the small border states.

The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya. By Wilfred Blythe. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. 566 pp. $15.50. In this authoritative, full-scale account of the history, organization, rituals, operations and impact of Chinese secret societies in Malaya, the author brings out the essential conflict between a Western liberal conception of law, judicial procedure and social order and the peculiar social and political characteristics of these secret societies.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mao Papers: Anthology and Bibliography. Edited by Jerome Ch'en. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. 221 pp. $10.00. This volume contains a number of unpublished or little known commemorative writings, letters, talks and conversations, written statements and instructions of Mao Tse-tung, including many issued before and during the Cultural Revolution. Dr. Ch'en, senior lecturer in Asian history at the University of Leeds, has also supplied a bibliography, in English and Chinese, of Mao's writings and prefaces the book with an essay on Mao's literary style.

The Road from War: Vietnam 1965-1970. By Robert Shaplen. New York: Harper & Row, 1970. 368 pp. $7.95. A collection of 22 of the author's articles written from Saigon and Paris between 1965 and 1970 for *The New Yorker,* presented here in slightly shorter versions but otherwise unedited. The various subjects discussed include the nature of the military conflict; the political chaos in Saigon; and the Paris peace talks.

Southeast Asia Tomorrow: Problems and Prospects for U.S. Policy. By Melvin Gurtov. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. 114 pp. $1.95 (paper). Gurtov, a member of the Social Sciences Department of The RAND Corporation, suggests that the vital U.S. interests in Asia are the defense of Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Taiwan and the easing of tensions with Communist China. Nonvital interests are Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Burma, Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia. He proposes certain changes in American perceptions of Southeast Asia and in policies to deal with instability there; takes issue with the notion that the outcome in Viet Nam will critically affect regional security and the future of "wars of national liberation"; and explores such issues as China's foreign policy and nuclear capability, Soviet interests in the region, Japan's expanding role, and the prospects for regional cooperation.

South Vietnam: A Political History 1954-1970. By Keesing's Research Reports. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970. 168 pp. $5.95 ($2.95, paper). Part of a new series of publications on major topics of international significance, which draws on the extensive Keesing's facilities, this report, organized chronologically, presents vital information concerning the main issues and events in Viet Nam between 1954 and 1970.

Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45. By Barbara W. Tuchman. New York: Macmillan, 1970. 621 pp. $10.00. The theme of this book is the relation of America to China and in a larger sense to Asia; the vehicle of the theme is the career of General "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell. "[H]is connection with China spanned the period that shaped the present from the dramatic opening moment of 1911, year of the Revolution, to 1944, decisive year in the decline of the Nationalist Government. . . . in knowledge of the language and country, friendship for the people, belief and persistence in his task, combined with official position and power, he personified the strongest endeavor and, as it was to prove, the tragic limits, of his country's experience in Asia."

The United States and China: The Next Decade. Edited by A. Doak Barnett and Edwin O. Reischauer. New York: Praeger, 1970. 250 pp. $7.50 ($2.95, paper). The views of 34 China specialists, American political leaders and economists, as presented in March 1969 at the First National Convocation of the National Committee on United States-China Relations. Topics covered include the political trends in China; China's development, trade, and the world economy; U.S. China policy; and U.S.-Chinese relations as viewed from other countries.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States Policy toward Vietnam, 1940-1945. By Edward R. Drachman. Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1970. 186 pp. $10.00. An intriguing, well-documented account of the initial period of American diplomatic involvement in the events and problems of Southeast Asia. It is the author's view that U.S. policy regarding the postwar status of Viet Nam was determined more by developments in Europe than by consideration of the situation in Viet Nam itself. Since Indochina ranked low on the list of policy concerns in 1945, he assesses the extent to which U.S. officials on the scene might have been able to prevent reassertion of French control over North Viet Nam. The volume fills in a neglected chapter in the story of U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia.

The Vietnam War and International Law. Edited by Richard A. Falk. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. 1270 pp. $25.00 ($7.50, paper). A collection of articles, court decisions, addresses and documents on the legal aspects of the Viet Nam war. This volume is the result of a continuing effort to analyze the relevance of international law to contemporary civil warfare, made possible by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation to the American Society of International Law.

War, Peace, and the Viet Cong. By Douglas Pike. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969. 186 pp. $2.95 (paper). This book is not primarily a recapitulation of recent events in Viet Nam, but a study of the objectives and nature of contending forces; the social and political milieu in which the conflict is being waged; the alternative directions events may take; the major strategic options open to all parties; and the short-term and long-term prospects for peace and stability in Viet Nam.

While China Faced West: American Reformers in Nationalist China, 1928-1937. By James C. Thomson, Jr. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969. 310 pp. $7.95. Dr. Thomson, Assistant Professor of History at Harvard University, explores the ways in which American missionaries and foundation representatives tried to help the Chinese government and reformers transform rural society during the "Nanking decade."

VII. Latin America

Communist China and Latin America, 1959-1967. By Cecil Johnson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970. 319 pp. $9.95. An account of the effort by the Chinese communists during the years 1959-1967 to become a major force on the Latin American political scene. Dr. Johnson, Chairman of the Department of Political Science at Southern Methodist University, analyzes and compares Mao's strategy of "people's war" with the strategies articulated by Regis Debray, Che Guevara and Fidel Castro; examines China's drive to establish pro-Chinese parties and movements and to extend its influence through the exchange of persons, trade, radio broadcasts, and books and journals; and probes the impact of the Sino-Cuban and Sino-Soviet ideological and political controversies and Sino-American hostility on Peking's relations with Latin America.

The Development of the Colombian Labor Movement. By Miguel Urrutia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969. 297 pp. $10.00. This study of the growth of organized labor in Colombia provides considerable insight into economic, political and social change in Colombia since 1850 and, conversely, examines the impact of organized labor on the economic and political development of the country. The author is adviser to the Junta Monetaria, Colombia's monetary authority.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

An Inter-American Peace Force within the Framework of the Organization of American States: Advantages, Impediments, Implications. By James R. Jose. Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, 1970. 334 pp. $7.50. In assessing the feasibility of an OAS multilateral military force organized on a permanent basis, this study concentrates on the political and legal factors operative in the inter-American system and the relevant factors in the international system which could promote or inhibit the establishment of such a force. Dr. Jose, Dean of the College and Professor of Political Science at Lycoming College, also considers the events leading to the creation by the OAS of the *ad hoc* Inter-American Peace Force employed in the 1965 Dominican crisis.

The Quest for Change in Latin America: Sources for a Twentieth Century Analysis. Edited by W. Raymond Duncan and James Nelson Goodsell. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. 562 pp. $12.50 ($4.95, paper). This volume provides major sources for an analysis of reform policies, both violent and peaceful, in twentieth-century Latin America. The editors include selections from Latin Americans of various political persuasions in order to present diverse perspectives from which the political, economic and social systems of the region may be studied.

The Soviet Union and Latin America. Edited by J. Gregory Oswald and Anthony J. Strover. New York: Praeger, 1970. 190 pp. $7.50. The papers in this volume were prepared for a 1968 symposium sponsored by the Institute for the Study of the USSR. Topics treated include cultural relations between the USSR and Latin America, Soviet strategy toward the area, the role of Cuba in Soviet policies, the strategy of Castroism, Brazilian relations with Eastern Europe, the Castroist challenge to communism, and Regis Debray as the prophet of Castro communism.

United States Policy toward Latin America: A Study in Domestic and International Politics. By R. Harrison Wagner. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970. 246 pp. $7.95. After examining the various goals, conflicts and strategies in inter-American economic relations prior to the initiation of the Alliance for Progress, the author analyzes the impact of domestic factors in the United States on U.S. economic policies toward Latin America, attempting to discover how military security, economic or ideological interests influenced them. In conclusion, he evaluates the various criticisms made of these economic policies.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG.
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Monographs and Reports Received

Bases of Conflict in Rural Java. By Margo L. Lyon. Berkeley: University of California, Center for South and Southeast Asia Studies, Research Monograph No. 3, December 1970. 83 pp. n.p.

The Brezhnev Doctrine. By Boris Meissner. Kansas City, Missouri: Park College, Government Research Bureau, East European Monographs No. 2, December 1970. 79 pp. $2.00.

The Chinese Communist War Tactics and Peace Strategy. By Li Cheng-chung. Taipei: World Anti-Communist League, China Chapter, Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, November 1970. 103 pp. $1.10.

Communist Eastern Europe: Analytical Survey of Literature. Prepared by the Army Library, The Adjutant General's Office, U.S. Army. Washington: GPO, DA Pam 550-8, January 1971. 241 pp., maps. n.p.

The Control of Chemical and Biological Weapons. By Archibald S. Alexander, R. R. Baxter, Stewart Blumenfeld, David Brown, Thomas Buergenthal and Matthew Meselson. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 1971. 130 pp. $1.00.

Cyprus, 1946-68. Edited by Hal Kosut. New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1970. 192 pp. $2.95.

A Design for International Relations Research: Scope, Theory, Methods, and Relevance. Edited by Norman D. Palmer. Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, Monograph No. 10, October 1970. 307 pp. $2.00.

Disarmament & Nuclear Tests, 1964-69. Edited by Vojtech Mastny. New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1970. 254 pp. $2.95.

Dominican Crisis, 1965. Edited by Richard W. Mansbach. New York: Facts on File, Inc., February 1971. 133 pp. $2.45.

Europe and Technology: A Political View. By René Foch. Paris: The Atlantic Institute, The Atlantic Papers No. 2, October 1970. 55 pp. $1.40.

France under De Gaulle. Edited by Robert A. Diamond. New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1970. 319 pp. $3.95.

A Future for European Agriculture. By a panel of experts. Paris: The Atlantic Institute, The Atlantic Papers No. 4, 1970. 75 pp. $1.40.

The German Democratic Republic from the Sixties to the Seventies: A Socio-Political Analysis. By Peter Christian Ludz. Cambridge: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, Occasional Papers in International Affairs No. 26, November 1970. 97 pp. $3.00.

Great Britain & the Common Market, 1957-1969. Edited by William J. Swift. New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1970. 430 pp. $4.45.

The Great Power Triangle: Washington-Moscow-Peking. By Michel Tatu. Paris: The Atlantic Institute, The Atlantic Papers No. 3, 1970. 27 pp. $1.40.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MONOGRAPHS AND REPORTS RECEIVED

Greece under the Junta. Edited by Peter Schwab and George D. Frangos. New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1970. 147 pp. $2.95.

NATO as a Diplomatic Instrument. By Peter V. Lyon. Toronto: The Atlantic Council of Canada, 1970. 38 pp. $1.00.

People's War: The Art of Combining Partisan-Military, Psycho-Social, and Political Conquest Techniques. By Stefan T. Possony. Taipei: World Anti-Communist League, China Chapter, Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, October 1970. 92 pp. $1.00.

A Perspective Review of the Maoist Regime's Rearmament and War Preparations. By Chao Chia. Taipei: World Anti-Communist League, China Chapter, Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, September 1970. 82 pp. 90 cents.

Police and the Modernization Process: Thailand. By Albert C. Weed, II. Princeton: Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson Association Monograph Series in Public Affairs No. 3, 1970. 51 pp. n.p.

Student Revolutionaries of the Sixties. By Karel van Wolferen. 's-Gravenhage, Netherlands: Oost-West Institut, No. 12, December 1970. 54 pp. f4.50.

The U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. By Natan Lerner. Leyden, Netherlands: A. W. Sijthoff, published for The Institute of Jewish Affairs, London, 1970. 132 pp. n.p.

ISI THE INTERCOLLEGIATE REVIEW

Contributors to recent issues:

Raymond Aron
William C. Bark
General Andre Beaufre
Louis I. Bredvold
Yale Brozen
Lev E. Dobriansky
M. Stanton Evans
Lawrence Henry Gipson
Ernest van den Haag
Will Herberg
William R. Kintner
Russell Kirk
Wm. Oliver Martin
Ludwig von Mises
Gerhart Niemeyer
Stefan T. Possony
Leo Strauss
Robert Strausz-Hupe
Frank N. Trager
Eric Voegelin
Simon N. Whitney
Francis G. Wilson

A journal of scholarship and opinion publishing articles in the fields of philosophy, political science, economics, literature and social criticism. THE INTERCOLLEGIATE REVIEW is made available free of charge to faculty and students *four times during the academic year by the Intercollegiate Studies Institute. Subscriptions are invited from those outside the academic community: one year, five dollars; two years, eight dollars; three years, eleven dollars. Subscriptions and inquiries should be addressed to: ISI, 14 South Bryn Mawr Avenue, Bryn Mawr, Pa. 19010.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Contributors to this Issue

Charles Wolf, Jr., Head of the Economics Department, The RAND Corporation; specialist on systems analysis, economic development and limited war problems.

Sherman E. Katz practices law in the Washington Office of Coudert Brothers; author of "The Application of Science and Technology to Development," *International Organization,* Winter 1968.

Reuben S. Nathan, Colonel, USAR (Ret.), specialist in psychological and unconventional warfare since World War II; served as Psychological Operations Officer during the Cuban Missile Crisis and in Viet Nam.

Kenneth J. Twitchett, Senior Lecturer in Government and International Affairs at the United Kingdom National Police College, Basingstoke; formerly, lecturer in International Relations, University of Aberdeen. Co-author of *The New International Actors: the UN and the EEC,* and editor of *International Security: Reflections on Survival and Stability.*

J. H. Huizinga, writer on international affairs, contributor to British, American and Continental journals.

Francis X. Kane, Colonel, USAF (Ret.); formerly, Director of Advanced Planning, Space Systems Division, USAF; contributor to *Fortune, Air University Review, Missiles and Rockets, Air Force and Space Digest* and other periodicals.

John W. Sloan, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Purdue University; appointed Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Houston, beginning fall 1971; currently preparing a book on the Latin American Free Trade Association.

Bobbie B. Smetherman, Instructor in Political Science, Fresno State College; co-author of several articles on Latin American economic development and related subjects.

Robert M. Smetherman, Associate Professor of History, Fresno State College; co-author of several articles on Latin American economic development and related subjects.

George P. Jan, Professor of Political Science, The University of Toledo; editor of and contributor to *Government of Communist China* (1966) and *International Politics of Asia* (1969).

Edwin F. Black, Brigadier General, U.S. Army (Ret.); presently associated with the LTV Aerospace Corporation, Bangkok Field Office. Formerly, Senior MACV Representative with the Joint General Staff (Vietnamese) Headquarters, Saigon, and Commanding General, U.S. Army Support, Thailand.

John J. Tierney, Jr., Assistant Professor, Department of Politics, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

Hammond Rolph, Research Associate, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Southern California; Consulting Editor, *Studies in Comparative Communism;* co-author of *Communism in Vietnam: A Documentary Study.*

Harland B. Moulton, national security and arms control analyst; presently director of individual research at the National War College.

Benson D. Adams, Staff Associate, Office of International Security Policy and Planning, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State; visiting lecturer, Department of Political Science, George Washington University; author of *Ballistic Missile Defense* (American Elsevier, forthcoming). Former Research Associate, Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Edward P. Moxon-Browne, Ph.D. candidate in International Relations, University of Pennsylvania; formerly, Research Fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF THE USSR

An International Research and Study Center, Founded in 1950, with Headquarters in Munich, Germany

In addition to books and monographs, the Institute regularly publishes the following periodicals devoted to all aspects of Soviet domestic and foreign policy:

BULLETIN ..... $12.00 per year
(in English, 12 issues per year)

STUDIES ON THE SOVIET UNION ..... $12.00 per year
(in English, 4 issues per year)

ESTUDIOS SOBRE LA UNIÓN SOVIÉTICA $ 1.00 per year
(in Spanish, 4 issues per year)

MAJALLAH ..... $ 1.00 per year
(in Arabic, 4 issues per year)

REVIEW OF SOVIET MEDICAL SCIENCES $ 4.00 per year
(in English, 2 issues per year)

DERGI ..... $ 1.00 per year
(in Turkish, 4 issues per year)

PROBLÈMES SOVIÉTIQUES ..... $ 2.00 per year
(in French, 2 issues per year)

SOWJETSTUDIEN ..... $ 2.00 per year
(in German, 2 issues per year)

ANALYSIS OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION
(in English, 52 issues per year) ..... $10.00 per year
(in Russian, 52 issues per year) ..... $10.00 per year
(in Spanish, 26 issues per year) ..... $ 5.00 per year

For information, subscriptions, samples:

Munich Office • Mannhardtstrasse 6 • 8 Munich 22, Germany

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Australian Journal of Politics and History

Volume XVI December 1970 Number 3

Henry S. Albinski	PROBLEMS IN AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY JANUARY-JUNE, 1970
Hans Mol	RELIGION AND POLITICAL ALLEGIANCE
D. M. Ray	CHINA'S NEW PATTERNS OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION
Vijay Sen Budraj	THE EVOLUTION OF RUSSIA'S PAKISTAN POLICY
J. A. A. Stockwin	A COMPARISON OF POLITICAL FACTIONALISM IN JAPAN AND INDIA
Edwin Dowdy	ASPECTS OF TOKUGAWA BUREAUCRACY AND MODERNIZATION

AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND HISTORY is published three times yearly, in April, August and December. Individual copies: $2.00. Subscription rates payable in advance: Australia $5.25 a year; United Kingdom £2.10.0 stg. (including postage); U.S.A. $6.00 (including postage); Canada $6.00 (including postage).

Address orders to:

The Manager,
University of Queensland Press,
ST. LUCIA, Queensland, 4067, Australia

THE CHINA QUARTERLY

An international journal for the study of China

JANUARY-MARCH 1971 **ISSUE NO. 45**

Leninism and Maoism: Some Populist Perspectives on Marxism-Leninism in China	Maurice Meisner
The Ninth Central Committee	Donald W. Klein, Lois B. Hager
Railway Development and Economic Growth in Manchuria	Shun-hsin Chou
China's Nulcear-Missile Programme: Regional or Intercontinental?	Alice Langley Hsieh
Documents on the Comintern and the Chinese Revolution	Introduction by Harold R. Isaacs
Why Communist China Imports Wheat	Feng-hwa Mah
Recent Leadership and Political Trends in Taiwan	J. Bruce Jacobs

COMMENT BOOK REVIEWS QUARTERLY CHRONICLE AND DOCUMENTATION

Editorial Office: 24 Fitzroy Square, London W. 1
Subscription Agents: Research Publications Ltd., 11 Nelson Road, London S.E.10

Subscription rates: £3 or U.S. $7.50 a year
For full-time students: £2 or U.S. $5.00
Individual copies: 75 new pence or U.S. $2.00

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE WORLD TODAY

The monthly journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs provides the general reader with up-to-date and authoritative information on current world problems.

Recent numbers include articles on:

SALT, THE *OSTPOLITIK*, AND THE POST-COLD WAR CONTEXT — *by François Duchêne*

AFTER DE GAULLE: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY — *by Wolf Mendl*

POLARIZATION IN RHODESIA: STATE, CHURCH, AND PEOPLES — *by Jack Halpern*

INDONESIA'S FUTURE ROLE — *by Michael Leifer*

SUBVERSION IN CYPRUS — *by Nancy Crawshaw*

Annual Subscription: £3.25 post free (U.S.A. and Canada $10)
28 NP per copy

Orders may be sent to booksellers and newsagents, or to the Oxford University Press, Press Road, Neasden, London N.W.10.

THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
CHATHAM HOUSE, 10 ST. JAMES'S SQUARE, LONDON S.W.1

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

the quarterly journal of the World Peace Foundation providing a lively forum for scholarship on international organizations and for analysis of current literature and research methods in the field

WINTER 1971 VOLUME 25, NUMBER 1

ARTICLES

National Attributes Associated with Dimensions of Support for the United Nations ..... John F. Clark, Michael K. O'Leary, and Eugene R. Wittkopf

UNRWA, the Palestine Refugees, and World Politics: 1949-1969 ..... David P. Forsythe

American Ambassador to the League—1933: A Proposal Postponed .... Gary B. Ostrower

The United States, the United Nations, and the Cold War ..... Edward T. Rowe

REVIEW ESSAYS
by Joan M. Nelson and Robert E. Asher

NOTES ON THEORY AND METHOD
by James Caporaso and Barry B. Hughes

$ 3.25 per copy
$10.00 for one year
$18.00 for two years
$25.00 for three years

WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION

40 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02108

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Politique Etrangère

la grande revue des questions internationales

SOMMAIRE

No. 6—1970

Jacques VERNANT	Le général de Gaulle et la politique extérieure
Jean CHAUVEL	Le 25ème anniversaire de la fondation de l'ONU
Osvaldo SUNKEL	Intégration capitaliste transnationale et désintégration nationale en Amérique latine

---

Prix de l'abonnement:

France ..... 48 F

Etranger ..... 64 F

Le numéro: 9 F

Publiée tous les deux mois

Adresser les abonnements au **Centre d'études de Politique étrangère,** 54, rue de Varenne—Paris 7ème—C.C.P. 1865-41 Paris

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ÖSTERREICHISCHE

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR

AUSSENPOLITIK

keeps you informed on Austrian foreign policy and international relations. Recent issues contain articles by:

Alois Riklin, Modell einer schweizerischen Aussenpolitik

Gerd Kaminiski, "Luftpiraterie"

Arne Haselbach, Ein Überblick über die Vorarbeiten für die Zweite Entwicklungsdekade der Vereinten Nationen

Hanspeter Neubold, Moderne Methoden in der Wissenchaft der internationalen Beziehungen

Document: Statement by Foreign Minister Dr. Rudolf Kirchschläger at the United Nations, 30. September 1970

Chronicle of Austrian foreign policy

Reviews

Annual Subscription $8.50—six copies a year.

Published by:

ÖSTERREICHISCHE GESELLSCHAFT FÜR AUSSENPOLITIK UND INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN

1010 VIENNA, JOSEFSPLATZ 6, AUSTRIA

PACIFIC COMMUNITY

An International Journal of Asian and Pacific Affairs

A NEW QUARTERLY PUBLISHED IN AUSTRALIA COVERING THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, RELIGIOUS, ETHNIC AND MILITARY PROBLEMS OF ASIA

Articles published in recent issues include:

Agriculture in Asia	*Colin Clark*
Soviet-Indonesian Relations and the PKI	*J. M. van der Kroef*
Conditions of Peace in South East Asia	*Ton That Thien*
South-East Asia	*George G. Thomson*
The U.S., Asia and Australia	*Morton H. Halperin*
Australia's Strategic Situation	*B. A. Santamaria*
Aspects of Revolutionary Warfare	*Geoffrey Fairbairn*
Communist Military Strategy and Doctrine in S.E. Asia	*F. P. Serong*

Annual subscription: Australia: **$A4.00**

Overseas: **$US5.50** (surface) **$US13.00** (air mail)

THE PACIFIC INSTITUTE, P.O. Box 2043-S, Melbourne, Australia, 3001.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

William R. Kintner, Director

Research Monograph Series:

No. 3. *Nationalism in the Atlantic Community.* By Hans Kohn. $1.25. January 1965.

No. 4. *Soviet Politics Since the Fall of Khrushchev.* By Sidney I. Ploss. $1.25. January 1965.

No. 5. *Measuring International Alignments.* By Henry Teune and Sig Synnestvedt. $1.00. April 1965.

No. 6. *Aggression and Self-Defense: The Legality of U.S. Action in South Vietnam.* By Stefan T. Possony. $2.50. September 1966.

No. 7. *The British Common Market Decision and Beyond.* By Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. $1.50. March 1966.

No. 8. *To the Twenty-third Congress of the Soviet Communist Party.* By Sidney I. Ploss. $2.00. October 1965.

No. 9. *New Trends in Soviet Policy and the 23rd Party Congress.* By Sidney I. Ploss. $1.25. August 1966.

No. 10. *A Scale of Events Along the Conflict-Cooperation Continuum.* By Alvin Richman. $1.75. March 1967.

No. 11. *The Political Dimensions of Foreign Aid.* By Karl von Vorys. $2.00. August 1967.

Recent Books in the Institute Series:

Peace and the Strategy Conflict. By William R. Kintner. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. 264 pp. $6.95.

Constituency Labour Parties in Great Britain. By Edward G. Janosik. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. 222 pp. $6.50.

The Treaty Trap. By Laurence W. Beilenson. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1969. 344 pp. $7.00.

The Atlantic Community: A Complex Imbalance. By Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969. 216 pp. $2.45 (paper).

Britain Faces Europe, 1957-1967. By Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969. 228 pp. $6.00.

Copies of Institute monographs may be obtained from The Foreign Policy Research Institute, 3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. Institute books may be obtained from the publisher or from your local bookstore.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Index to Volume XIV

Adams, Benson D., The Arms Race and Defense Spending, 1037-1044

Aden, *see* Smolansky, Sullivan

African Modernization and International Institutions, by Kenneth J. Twitchett, 868-890

Albrecht-Carrié, René, For an End to the Hundred Years War, 627-641

Alliance for Progress, *see* Sloan

Amalrik, Andrei, *Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?* Reviewed by Kurt L. London, 221-224

American Foreign Service Association, Committee on Career Principles, *Toward a Modern Diplomacy. A Report to the American Foreign Service Association.* Reviewed by Willard Barber, 229-234

The Anatomy of a Riot: Panama 1964, by Eugene H. Methvin, 463-489

Andrews, William G., The Fall of De Gaulle, 642-656

The Angolan Revolution, Vol. 1: The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950-1962), by John Marcum. Reviewed by Michael A. Samuels, 510-514

Arab world, *see* Cottrell, Marr, Mitchell, Rose, Smolansky, Sullivan, Zoppo, Reflections 10-15, 552-556

The Architecture of Western Security in the Persian Gulf, by Robert R. Sullivan, 71-91

Arms Beyond Doubt: The Tyranny of Weapons Technology, by Ralph E. Lapp. Reviewed by Harland B. Moulton, 1033-1037

arms control, *see* Lambeth

Arms for the Third World: Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy, by Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gibert. Reviewed by John H. Hoagland, 500-505

The Arms Trade in International Relations, by Lewis A. Frank. Reviewed by John H. Hoagland, 500-505

Australia, *see* Simon, van der Kroef

Balabkins, Nicholas, The Course of West German-Israeli Relations, 776-780

Barber, Willard, Professional Views of the Foreign Service, 229-234

Basiuk, Victor, The Impact of Technology in the Next Decades, 17-42

Berlin, *see* Reflections 261-264

Black, Edwin F., The Role of Buddhism in the Overthrow of Diem, 992-1011

Blancké, W. Wendell, *The Foreign Service of the United States.* Reviewed by Willard Barber, 229-234

Bonn and Jerusalem: The Strange Coalition, by Inge Deutschkron. Reviewed by Nicholas Balabkins, 776-780

Breslauer, George W., and Alexander Dallin, *Political Terror in Communist Systems.* Reviewed by Lothar Metzl, 769-773

Brezhnev Doctrine, *see* Reisky de Dubnic

British foreign policy, *see* Albrecht-Carrié, Smolansky, Sullivan

Buddhism, *see* Black

Cambodia, *see* Girling, Reflections 257-260, 815-818

Canada and Three Crises, by Robert W. Reford. Reviewed by Edward P. Moxon-Browne, 1044-1048

Caribbean, *see* Reflections 264-265

The CEP Claims, U.S. Tuna Fishing and Inter-American Relations, by Bobbie B. Smetherman and Robert M. Smetherman, 951-972

Challenges to the Environment: Some International Implications, by Livingston Hartley, 490-499

Chile, *see* Fitzgibbon, Reflections 543-548

China, Communist, *see* Damien, Gelber, Jan, Moxon-Browne, Rolph, Simon, Tretiak

China, Nationalist, *see* Gelber, Jan

communism, international, *see* Methvin, Rolph, Tretiak

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Constan, Nicholas D., Jr., *Caveat Actor:* Petroleum and the Inflammable Middle East, 514-518
Cottrell, Alvin J., The Soviet Union in the Middle East, 588-598
counterforce, *see* May
counterinsurgency, *see* Nathan
Crisis and Conflict in Cambodia, by J. L. S. Girling, 349-365
Critical Choices for the UN System: The Second Development Decade, by Leon Gordenker and Harold Karan Jacobson, 43-57
Cuba, *see* Methvin, Moxon-Browne, Tretiak, Reflections 264-265
Cuba and the Communist System: The Politics of a Communist Independent, 1967-1969, by Daniel Tretiak, 740-764
The Czechoslovak Communist Party: The Limits of Reform, by Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic, 180-191
Czechoslovakia, *see* Korbel, Reisky de Dubnic, Wolfe

Dallin, Alexander, and George W. Breslauer, *Political Terror in Communist Systems.* Reviewed by Lothar Metzl, 769-773
Damien, George D., The Dialectical Structure of the Chinese Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 192-217
Davidson, Basil, *The Liberation of Guiné.* Reviewed by Michael A. Samuels, 510-514
Davies, James C., Individuals, Classes, Institutions and Revolutions, 218-221
de Gaulle, *see* Albrecht-Carrié, Andrews, Micaud
Deutschkron, Inge, *Bonn and Jerusalem: The Strange Coalition.* Reviewed by Nicholas Balabkins, 776-780
The Dialectical Structure of the Chinese Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, by George D. Damien, 192-217
diplomacy, U.S., *see* Plischke, Rosenau

Eastern Europe, *see* Karber, Korbel Reisky de Dubnic, Wolfe
economic assistance, *see* Gordenker, Sloan, Twitchett
Egypt, *see* Cottrell, Marr, Moxon-Browne, Zoppo, Reflections 10-15, 266-270, 552-556
environment, human, *see* Hartley
Europe: An Emergent Nation?, by Carl J. Friedrich. Reviewed by Diane K. Pfaltzgraff, 765-769
European integration, *see* Pfaltzgraff

Falk, Richard A., *The Status of Law in International Society.* Reviewed by Stuart S. Malawer, 224-229
The Fall of DeGaulle, by William G. Andrews, 642-656
fishing, high seas, *see* Smetherman
Fitzgibbon, Russell H., Seven Dilemmas of Latin America's National Revolutionary Parties, 443-462
flexible response, *see* Karber
For an End to the Hundred Years War, by René Albrecht-Carrié, 627-641
The Foreign Service of the United States, by W. Wendell Blancké. Reviewed by Willard Barber, 229-234
France, *see* Albrecht-Carrié, Andrews, Huizinga, Micaud
Frank, Lewis A., *The Arms Trade in International Relations.* Reviewed by John H. Hoagland, 500-505
Friedrich, Carl J., *Europe: An Emergent Nation?* Reviewed by Diane K. Pfaltzgraff, 765-769

Gaullism After De Gaulle, by Charles A Micaud, 657-672
Gelber, Harry G., Limiting Factors in a Reconsideration of U.S. China Policies, 599-626
Gibert, Stephen P., and Wynfred Joshua, *Arms for the Third World: Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy.* Reviewed by John H. Hoagland, 500-505
Girling, J. L. S., Crisis and Conflict in Cambodia, 349-365
Gordenker, Leon, and Harold Karan Jacobson, Critical Choices for the UN System: The Second Development Decade, 43-57
Gurr, Ted Robert, *Why Men Rebel.* Reviewed by James C. Davies, 218-221

Harr, John Ensor, *The Professional Diplomat.* Reviewed by Willard Barber, 229-234

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hartley, Livingston, Challenges to the Environment: Some International Implications, 490-499
Hoagland, John H., Arms in the Third World, 500-505
Huizinga, J. H., The *Trahison des Adultes,* 891-910

The Impact of Technology in the Next Decades, by Victor Basiuk, 17-42
India, *see* Simon, Reflections 811-815
Indian Ocean, *see* Mitchell, Simon, Smolansky, Sullivan
Indonesia, *see* Simon, van der Kroef
Indonesia and West New Guinea: The New Dimensions of Conflict, by Justus M. van der Kroef, 366-400
International Conferencing and the Summit: Macro-Analysis of Presidential Participation, by Elmer Plischke, 673-713
Iran, *see* Cottrell, Smolansky, Sullivan
Iraq, *see* Marr, Smolansky, Sullivan
The Iraqi Revolution: A Case Study of Army Rule, by Phebe Ann Marr, 714-739
Israel, *see* Cottrell, Rose, Zoppo, Reflections 10-15, 266-270
Is United States Foreign Policy Being Militarized?, by Charles Wolf, Jr., 819-828

Jacobson, Harold Karan, and Leon Gordenker, Critical Choices for the UN System: The Second Development Decade, 43-57
Jan, George P., Party Politics and Japan's Policy toward Communist China, 973-991
Japan, *see* Gelber, Jan, Simon
Jerusalem, Key to Peace, by Evan M. Wilson. Reviewed by Linda Rose, 773-776
Joshua, Wynfred, and Stephen P. Gibert, *Arms for the Third World: Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy.* Reviewed by John H. Hoagland, 500-505

Kane, Francis X., Space Age Geopolitics, 911-933
Kaplan, Morton A., Robert Strausz-Hupé: Scholar, Gentleman, Man of Letters, 58-70
Karber, Phillip A., Nuclear Weapons and "Flexible Response," 284-297
Katz, Sherman E., The Tariff Preference: A Reconsideration, 829-849
Korbel, Josef, West Germany's Ostpolitik: II, A Policy Toward the Soviet Allies, 326-348
Kurds, *see* Marr
Kuwait, *see* Smolansky, Sullivan

Lambeth, Benjamin S., Nuclear Proliferation and Soviet Arms Control Policy, 298-325
Laos, *see* Reflections 815-818
Lapp, Ralph E., *Arms Beyond Doubt: The Tyranny of Weapons Technology.* Reviewed by Harland B. Moulton, 1033-1037
Latin America, *see* Fitzgibbon, Sloan, Smetherman, Reflections 543-548
The Liberation of Guiné, by Basil Davidson. Reviewed by Michael A. Samuels, 510-514
Limiting Factors in a Reconsideration of U.S. China Policies, by Harry G. Gelber, 599-626
London, Kurt L., Amalrik's Complaint, 221-224

Malawer, Stuart S., International Law Studies and Foreign Policy, 224-229
Mansbach, Richard W., In Search of a Role: Yugoslavia and Nonalignment, 505-510
Mao, *see* Damien, Gelber, Rolph
Marcum, John, *The Angolan Revolution, Vol. 1: The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950-1962).* Reviewed by Michael A. Samuels, 510-514
Marr, Phebe Ann, The Iraqi Revolution: A Case Study of Army Rule, 714-739
May, Michael M., Some Advantages of a Counterforce Deterrence, 271-283
Mediterranean, *see* Mitchell, Zoppo
Methvin, Eugene H., The Anatomy of a Riot: Panama 1964, 463-489
Metzl, Lothar, Communist Political Terror: A Behaviorist Interpretation, 769-773
Micaud, Charles A., Gaullism After De Gaulle, 657-672
Middle East, *see* Constan, Cottrell,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hoagland, Rose, Smolansky, Sullivan, Zoppo, Reflections 10-15, 552-556
Middle East Oil: A Study in Political and Economic Controversy, by George W. Stocking. Reviewed by Nicholas D. Constan, Jr., 514-518
military affairs, *see* Adams, Kane, Karber, Lambeth, May, Mitchell, Moulton, Nathan, Wolf, Zoppo, Reflections 805-807
military assistance, *see* Hoagland
Mitchell, Donald W., The Soviet Naval Challenge, 129-153
Mondlane, Eduardo, *The Struggle for Mozambique.* Reviewed by Michael A. Samuels, 510-514
Moscow and the Persian Gulf: An Analysis of Soviet Ambitions and Potential, by O. M. Smolansky, 92-108
Moulton, Harland B., Weapons and Security, 1033-1037
Moxon-Browne, Edward P., Canadian Crisis Diplomacy, 1044-1048
Muscat and Oman, *see* Smolansky, Sullivan

Nasser, Gamal Abdel, *see* Cottrell, Marr, Zoppo, Reflections 266-270
Nathan, Reuben S., Planning for Likely Wars, 850-867
NATO, *see* Hartley, Karber, Korbel, Reflections 261-264
naval strategy, *see* Mitchell, Zoppo, Reflections 264-265
Nicaragua, *see* Tierney
nonproliferation, *see* Lambeth
Nuclear Proliferation and Soviet Arms Control Policy, by Benjamin S. Lambeth, 298-325
nuclear strategy, *see* Adams, Kane, Karber, Lambeth, May, Moulton, Reflections 805-807
Nuclear Weapons and "Flexible Response," by Phillip A. Karber, 284-297

oceanography, *see* Mitchell
Ostpolitik, see Korbel, Reflections 261-264

Pakistan, *see* Reflections 811-815
Panama, *see* Methvin
Papua, *see* van der Kroef
Party Politics and Japan's Policy toward Communist China, by George P. Jan, 973-991
"People's War": Vision vs. Reality, by Hammond Rolph, 572-587
Persian Gulf, *see* Smolansky, Sullivan
petroleum, *see* Constan, Smolansky, Sullivan
Pfaltzgraff, Diane K., The Prospects for European Integration, 765-769
Planning for Likely Wars, by Reuben S. Nathan, 850-867
Plischke, Elmer, International Conferencing and the Summit: Macro-Analysis of Presidential Participation, 673-713
Poland, *see* Reflections 548-552
Political Terror in Communist Systems, by Alexander Dallin and George W. Breslauer, Reviewed by Lothar Metzl, 769-773
Portuguese Africa, *see* Samuels
The Professional Diplomat, by John Ensor Harr. Reviewed by Willard Barber, 229-234
Public Protest, Political Leadership and Diplomatic Strategy, by James N. Rosenau, 557-571

Ra'anan, Uri, *The USSR Arms the Third World: Case Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy.* Reviewed by John H. Hoagland, 500-505
Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race, by Herbert York. Reviewed by Benson D. Adams, 1037-1044
Reford, Robert W., *Canada and Three Crises.* Reviewed by Edward P. Moxon-Browne, 1044-1048
Reisky de Dubnic, Vladimir, The Czechoslovak Communist Party: The Limits of Reform, 180-191
revolution, *see* Davies, Huizinga, Samuels
Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation, by Peter Van Ness. Reviewed by Hammond Rolph, 1029-1033
revolutionary warfare, *see* Nathan, Rolph, Tierney
Robert Strausz-Hupé: Scholar, Gentleman, Man of Letters, by Morton A. Kaplan, 58-70

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Role of Buddhism in the Overthrow of Diem, by Edwin F. Black, 992-1011
Rolph, Hammond, The Ingredients of Chinese Foreign Policy, 1029-1033
Rolph, Hammond, "People's War": Vision vs. Reality, 572-587
Rose, Linda, Jerusalem and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 773-776
Rosenau, James N., Public Protest, Political Leadership and Diplomatic Strategy, 557-571
Rubinstein, Alvin Z., *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World.* Reviewed by Richard W. Mansbach, 505-510
Russet, Bruce M., *What Price Vigilance? The Burdens of National Defence.* Reviewed by Benson D. Adams, 1037-1044

Samuels, Michael A., Nationalism and Conflict in Portuguese Africa, 510-514
Saudi Arabia, *see* Smolansky, Sullivan
Seven Dilemmas of Latin America's National Revolutionary Parties, by Russell H. Fitzgibbon, 443-462
Simon, Sheldon W., A Systems Approach to Security in the Indian Ocean Arc, 401-442
Sino-Soviet relations, *see* Gelber
Sloan, John W., Three Views of Latin America: President Nixon, Governor Rockefeller, and the Latin American Consensus of Vina Del Mar, 934-950
Smetherman, Bobbie B. and Robert M. Smetherman, The CEP Claims, U.S. Tuna Fishing and Inter-American Relations, 951-972
Smetherman, Robert M. and Bobbie B. Smetherman, The CEP Claims, U.S. Tuna Fishing and Inter-American Relations, 951-972
Smolansky, O. M., Moscow and the Persian Gulf: An Analysis of Soviet Ambitions and Potential, 92-108
Some Advantages of a Counterforce Deterrence, by Michael M. May, 271-283
Southeast Asia, *see* Rolph, Simon
Soviet internal affairs, *see* London, Metzl, Reflections 807-811
The Soviet Naval Challenge, by Donald W. Mitchell, 129-153
Soviet Party Congress, Twenty-fourth, *see* Reflections 807-811
Soviet Ships in the Mediterranean and the U.S.-Soviet Confrontation in the Middle East, by Ciro Zoppo, 109-128
The Soviet Union in the Middle East, by Alvin J. Cottrell, 588-598
Space Age Geopolitics, by Francis X. Kane, 911-933
The Status of Law in International Society, by Richard A. Falk. Reviewed by Stuart S. Malawer, 224-229
Stocking, George W., *Middle East Oil: A Study in Political and Economic Controversy.* Reviewed by Nicholas D. Constan, Jr., 514-518
Strausz-Hupé, *see* Kaplan
The Struggle for Mozambique, by Eduardo Mondlane. Reviewed by Michael A. Samuels, 510-514
Sullivan, Robert R., The Architecture of Western Security in the Persian Gulf, 71-91
A Systems Approach to Security in the Indian Ocean Arc, by Sheldon W. Simon, 401-442

The Tariff Preference: A Reconsideration, by Sherman E. Katz, 829-849
technology, *see* Adams, Basiuk, Kane, Moulton
Third World, *see* Gordenker, Hoagland, Katz, Mansbach, Rolph, Sloan, Twitchett
Three Views of Latin America: President Nixon, Governor Rockefeller, and the Latin American Consensus of Vina Del Mar, by John W. Sloan, 934-950
Tierney, John J., Jr., U.S. Intervention in Nicaragua, 1927-1933: Lessons for Today, 1012-1028
Toward a Modern Diplomacy. A Report to the American Foreign Service Association, by the Association's Committee on Career Principles. Reviewed by Willard Barber, 229-234
trade policy, U.S., *see* Katz, Sloan
The *Trahison des Adultes,* by J. H. Huizinga, 891-910
Tretiak, Daniel, Cuba and the Communist System: The Politics of a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Communist Independent, 1967-1969, 740-764
Turkey, *see* Cottrell, Zoppo
Twitchett, Kenneth J., African Modernization and International Institutions, 868-890

UNCTAD, *see* Gordenker, Katz, Sloan, Twitchett
United Nations, *see* Gordenker, Twitchett
U.S. Intervention in Nicaragua, 1927-1933: Lessons for Today, by John J. Tierney, Jr., 1012-1028
The USSR Arms the Third World: Case Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy, by Uri Ra'anan. Reviewed by John H. Hoagland, 550-505

van der Kroef, Justus M., Indonesia and West New Guinea: The New Dimensions of Conflict, 366-400
Van Ness, Peter, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation.* Reviewed by Hammond Rolph, 1029-1033
Viet Nam, *see* Black, Girling, Nathan, Rolph, Rosenau, Tierney, Reflections 257-260, 815-818

Warsaw Pact, *see* Karber, Korbel
West Germany, *see* Karber, Korbel, Wolfe, Reflections 261-264
West Germany and Czechoslovakia: The Struggle for Reconciliation, by James H. Wolfe, 154-179
West Germany's Ostpolitik: II, A Policy Toward the Soviet Allies, by Josef Korbel, 326-348
West New Guinea, *see* van der Kroef
What Price Vigilance? The Burdens of National Defense, by Bruce M. Russett. Reviewed by Benson D. Adams, 1037-1044
Why Men Rebel, by Ted Robert Gurr. Reviewed by James C. Davies, 218-221
Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?, by Andrei Amalrik. Reviewed by Kurt L. London, 221-224
Wilson, Evan M., *Jerusalem, Key to Peace.* Reviewed by Linda Rose, 773-776
Wolf, Charles, Jr., Is United States Foreign Policy Being Militarized?, 819-828
Wolfe, James H., West Germany and Czechoslovakia: The Struggle for Reconciliation, 154-179

Yemen, *see* Smolansky, Sullivan
York, Herbert, *Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race.* Reviewed by Benson D. Adams, 1037-1044
Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World, by Alvin Z. Rubinstein. Reviewed by Richard W. Mansbach, 505-510

Zoppo, Ciro, Soviet Ships in the Mediterranean and the U.S.-Soviet Confrontation in the Middle East, 109-128

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION (Act of October 23, 1962; Section 4369, Title 39, United States Code)

1. DATE OF FILING: October 9, 1970.

2. TITLE OF PUBLICATION: ORBIS.

3. FREQUENCY: Quarterly.

4. LOCATION OF KNOWN OFFICE OF PUBLICATION: Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, 3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104.

5. LOCATION OF THE HEADQUARTERS OR GENERAL BUSINESS OFFICES OF THE PUBLISHER: Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, 3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104.

6. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF PUBLISHER, EDITOR AND MANAGING EDITOR:
PUBLISHER: Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, 3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pa. 19104.
EDITOR: William R. Kintner, 3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104.
MANAGING EDITOR: Robert C. Herber, 3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104.

7. OWNER: (If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, the names and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, its name and address, as well as that of each individual, must be given.): The Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104.

8. KNOWN BONDHOLDERS, MORTGAGEES, AND OTHER SECURITY HOLDERS OWNING OR HOLDING 1 PERCENT OR MORE OF TOTAL AMOUNT OF BONDS, MORTGAGES OR OTHER SECURITIES: None.

9. FOR COMPLETION BY NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AUTHORIZED TO MAIL AT SPECIAL RATES (Section 132.122, Postal Manual): The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for Federal income tax purposes have not changed during preceding 12 months.

10. EXTENT AND NATURE OF CIRCULATION:

	Average No. Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months	Actual No. Copies of Single Issue Published Nearest to Filing Date
A. Total No. Copies Printed (Net Press Run)	3950	3800
B. Paid Circulation		
1. Sales through Dealers and Carriers, Street Vendors and Counter Sales	308	184
2. Mail Subscriptions	3054	2640
C. Total Paid Circulation	3362	2824
D. Free Distribution (including samples) by Mail, Carrier or Other Means	261	247
E. Total Distribution	3623	3071
F. Office Use, Left-over, Unaccounted, Spoiled after Printing	327	729
G. Total (Sum of E & F—should equal net press run shown in A)	3950	3800

I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete.

ROBERT C. HERBER

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED